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Abstract 
 
POROUS EMPIRE: FOREIGN VISITORS AND THE POST-STALIN SOVIET STATE 
 
Alexander Hazanov 
Benjamin Nathans 
“Porous Empire” is a study of the relationship between Soviet institutions, Soviet society 
and the millions of foreigners who visited the USSR between the mid-1950s and the mid-
1980s. “Porous Empire” traces how Soviet economic, propaganda, and state security 
institutions, all shaped during the isolationist Stalin period, struggled to accommodate their 
practices to millions of visitors with material expectations and assumed legal rights radically 
unlike those of Soviet citizens. While much recent Soviet historiography focuses on the ways 
in which the post-Stalin opening to the outside world led to the erosion of official Soviet 
ideology, I argue that ideological attitudes inherited from the Stalin era structured 
institutional responses to a growing foreign presence in Soviet life. Therefore, while Soviet 
institutions had to accommodate their economic practices to the growing numbers of tourists 
and other visitors inside the Soviet borders and were forced to concede the existence of 
contact zones between foreigners and Soviet citizens that loosened some of the absolute 
sovereignty claims of the Soviet party-statem, they remained loyal to visions of Soviet 
economic independence, committed to fighting the cultural Cold War, and profoundly 
suspicious of the outside world.  
The gap between Soviet concessions to the era of international mobility  and Soviet 
attitudes to the outside world shaped the peculiar nature of globalization in its Soviet context: 
even as the Soviet opening up to the world promoted Westernization and undermined 
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some of the ideological foundations of Soviet power, it also generated, within the bowels 
of Soviet institutions, a profound and honestly-held commitment to authoritarianism and 
social discipline as an instrument of geopolitical resistance, a mental attitude that still 
shapes Russian official approaches to the outside world 25 years after the fall of the 
USSR. 
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Introduction  
 
In the late 1960s, the travel writers Delia and Ferdinand Kuhn joined the hallowed 
tradition of Western travelers going to Muscovy/Russia/Soviet Union in order to decipher 
the mysteries of the “Rude and Barbarous Kingdom.”1 In what was no doubt a major 
coup by their literary agent, in the run-up to the publication of their travelogue, the Kuhns 
were able to publish a summary of their findings on the pages of the New York Times 
travel section.2    
The Kuhns’ Times account of their travels begins with the following caveat: 
“When the tourist enters the Soviet Union, the test tube of Communism, he is an alien 
body not germane to the experiment.”  From this perspective, the Kuhns explain the 
alienating effects of travelling in the alternate universe that was the Soviet Union: the 
“giant squid” of the Soviet state that engulfs the traveler, the myriad ways in which the 
famed Soviet tourist monopoly, Intourist, both hinders the foreigner and shields him or 
her from the vagaries of Soviet material life, and above all, the psychological costs of 
“routine surveillance.” And yet, the Kuhns argue, as long as one follows Soviet law, has 
the gumption to stand up to Intourist, and possesses curiosity and an open mind (and no 
doubt, a copy of their travelogue),  one could overcome the barriers the Soviets erected 
between foreigners and unvarnished (and uncomfortable) truths about the Soviet Union.  
                                                          
1 Marshall Poe, Rude and Barbarous Kingdom: Russia in the Accounts of Sixteenth Century English 
Voyagers (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012).  
2 Delia and Ferdinand Kuhn, “Foreign Bodies in the Communist Test Tube,” New York Times, 4/10/1970. 
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 This perspective on the incommensurability of foreign bodies and the Soviet 
system was shared by many Soviet officials - albeit from a radically different angle. A 
1963 report on the misbehavior of one such foreign body, the American sociologist Lewis 
Feuer, by the head of the Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy F.V. 
Konstantinov, can serve as a useful case in point. During his four-month stay in the 
Soviet Union, Feuer, Konstantinov complained, neglected his research topic, the 
“theoretical foundations of historical materialism.”  Instead, he spent his time “talking to 
Soviet people on the street, in markets, in synagogues, in open meetings in educational 
institutions”- all the while refusing the services of an officially assigned translator. Feuer 
even enrolled his daughter in a Soviet school with the express purpose (according to 
Konstantinov), of “spying on [vyvedat’] the moods of Soviet children and their parents’ 
opinions.” Even worse, Feuer not only shared his decidedly non-historical-materialist 
perspective on Soviet society with many Soviet colleagues, but also caused a public scene 
by declaring that Soviet Marxism was “at a crossroads,” that antisemitism was rife there, 
and that the younger generation of Soviet people displayed a “powerful drift away from 
Marxism” in a public address at the Institute. 3 
  Based on Feuer’s behavior, Konstantinov concluded that he and other American 
exchange participants were not scientists at all, but simply “functionaries of the State 
Department.” Therefore, he recommended, the Soviet Union should discontinue its 
                                                          
3 “F.V Konstantinov to TsK KPSS, 10/6/1965,” Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv noveishei istorii 
[RGANI], f. 5, op. 55, d. 3, ll. 215-216. 
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exchange agreements with the Americans. These, he argues, served no useful purpose but 
to provide a channel “for the infiltration of ideological spies, of blatant anticommunists 
into our country.”4 This cri de coeur received a cold and laconic reply from the Central 
Committee: Soviet officials in charge of the exchange program were well aware of 
Feuer’s anti-Soviet proclivities, but could not reject his candidacy according to the terms 
of the Soviet-American scientific-cultural exchange agreements.5 
 While their ideological predilections could not be further apart, Konstantinov, the 
anonymous Central Committee official who rejected his request, and the Kuhns all 
agreed on two crucial points. First, foreigners were indeed “alien bodies” quite unlike 
anyone else in bloodstream of Soviet society. Second, the mighty immune system of the 
Soviet state found itself rather ill-adapted to deal with the threats they posed. Seen from 
the perspective of Soviet authorities, the Kuhns’ experimental metaphor was extremely 
apt if, but not at all in the way the Kuhns envisioned it.Foreign visitors to the post-Stalin 
Soviet Union were indeed participants in an experiment, but not quite the one the Kuhns 
were thinking about: rather, the experiment involved the introduction of large numbers of 
foreigners into a society organized along largely autarchic lines between the 1920s and 
the 1950s, thus forcing its institutions to face a new social force they were not designed 
to accommodate. Porous Empire traces the unfolding of this experiment from the initial 
Soviet opening up to the world in the mid-1950s to the demise of the Soviet system in 
                                                          
4 Ibid, 217. 
5 “Spravka na no. 20791, 7/25/1965,” RGANI, f. op. 55, d. 3, l. 218. 
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1991, exploring how Soviet institutions sought to benefit from, accommodate to, and 
limit the socio-cultural consequences of the ever-growing presence of “alien bodies” on 
Soviet soil. 
  The decisions that led to the partial Soviet opening up to the world were anything 
but a careful experimental process. Like so much else during the Khrushchev period, the 
opening up of Soviet borders to foreign traffic was the product of a series of ad hoc 
decisions that together amounted to a profound historical shift. In the late Stalin era, the 
number of foreigners visiting the Soviet Union dropped to nearly zero.6 In 1956, the 
country received 56,000 tourists and numerous other visitors.7 By 1963, the yearly 
number of tourists amounted to 168,000 people, and other forms of travel (everything 
from exchanges like Feuer’s to transit passengers going from Europe to the Far East and 
vice versa) amounted to over one million.8  By the early 1970s, the Soviet Union was 
receiving 4 million travelers yearly, 9 and the foreign presence on Soviet soil became 
dense enough to provide a market for both phone directories aimed at resident foreigners 
                                                          
6 For example, according to a 1948 report by Intourist, foreign tourism in the Soviet Union was 
“nonexistent” [ne imeet mesta] “Otchet inostrannogo otdela VAO Inturist za 1 kvartal 1948 g.,” 
Gosudaretvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii [GARF], f. 9612, op.2, d. 142, l. 18.  In the same year, 
VOKS, the body in charge of hosting writers, artists and intellectuals, received only 89 guests. “Spravka o 
kolichestve innostrannykh delegatsii i otdelnykh deiatelei innostrannoii kul'tury priniatykh VOKSom v 
1949 godu po sravneniiu s 1948 godom,” GARF, f. 5283, op. 8, d. 332, l. 2. 
7 “Ob itogakh raboty Inturista v 1956 godu i zadachakh kollektiva na 1957 god,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 2. d. 
237, l. 65. 
8 “Otchet ob ekskursionnom obsluzhivannie inostrannykh turistov v SSSR v 1963 godu,” GARF, f. 9612, 
op. 1, d. 557, l. 2. 
9 “Bulleten turisticheskoi informatsii, nomer 1, 1977,” GARF f. 9612, op. 3, d.1119, 1. 3. 
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and instruction manuals on the Moscow night scene aimed at “active bachelors.”10 Given 
the global explosion of cross-border traffic in the postwar decades11 or even the numbers 
of foreigners received by small East European socialist countries (Hungary, for instance, 
received near 10 million tourists yearly in the 1970s),12 these were not especially 
impressive figures. However, in the context of Soviet history, these numbers represented 
a profound transformation, making foreigners, for the first time since the imperial period, 
part of the tapestry of social life in major Soviet cities.  
 Despite this rapid and drastic transformation, there is no evidence that the 
problem of foreigners on Soviet soil was ever discussed systematically by Soviet 
authorities. The archival trails of the decisions to close the Soviet Union to foreign traffic 
in the late 1940s and reopen it in the mid-1950s are both rather scant. In the immediate 
postwar years, when discussing the fact that foreign tourism, the raison d’etre of their 
organization, was non-existent, Intourist officials usually said little more than that they 
were “not ready” to open up their system for tourists.13 According to the Soviet Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs’ replies to postwar Western inquiries, foreigners could apply for 
tourist visas to the Soviet Union without any difficulty. However, given that such visas 
were provided only after one purchased an Intourist package, packages that were not on 
                                                          
10 On the phone directory, produced by Soviet journalist (and probable KGB agent) Viktor Louis, see Kevin 
Kruse, Russia and the Russians: Inside the Closed Society (New York: Norton, 1984), 274-276.  For the 
night life manual, see Jeffrey Bocca, The Moscow Scene (New York: Stain and Day, 1974). 
11 Between 1950 and 1970, global tourist flows grew tenfold, from 25 million to near quarter billion. 
Elizabeth Becker, Overbooked: the Exploding Business of Travel and Tourism (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2013), 17. 
12 József Böröcz, Leisure Migration: a Sociological Study of Tourism (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1996), 73. 
13 Quoted in Salmon, “Land of Future,” 139.  
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sale, this was a rather weak rejoinder.14 In 1947, control over other avenues of entry to 
the Soviet Union, private (i.e. family) visits and delegation travel, were transferred to, 
respectively, a newly established Committee on Entrances and Departures of the Council 
of Ministers and the Foreign Ministry, undoubtedly part of Stalin’s effort to tamp down 
on the last shreds of wartime tolerance for contacts with the outside world.15 Another key 
decision from the same year banned marriages between Soviet citizens and foreigners.16 
In the atmosphere of hysteria against foreign subversion and campaigns against 
“kowtowing to the West” and “cosmopolitanism,” these resolutions not only sharply 
curtailed travel to the Soviet Union but also helped to create a zone of exclusion around 
the few foreigners (mostly diplomats and journalists) inside Soviet borders, a zone that 
few Soviet people dared enter.17 
In a similar manner, while historians are confident that the reopening of the Soviet 
Union to foreign traffic fit Khrushchev’s overall strategy of peaceful coexistence, 
spreading the Soviet gospel to the Third World, and modernization by means of 
                                                          
14 Harry Schwartz, “Soviet Aide Says Soviet Visas are Easy to Get,” New York Times, 8/8/1951. 
15 Polozhenie o Biuro o po v’ezdam v SSSR i vyezdam za granitsu pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR,” RGASPI, 
f. 17, op. 3, d. 1065, ll. 77-78. (Accessed online via: http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-
doc/69337, on 3/3/2015). 
16 “Ukaz Prezidiuma VS SSSR ot 15 fevralia 1947 goda ‘O vospreschenii brakov mezhdu grazhdanam 
SSSR i inostrantsami.’” Accessed online, at: 
http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=ESU;n=20128, on 4/1/2015. For a first person 
account of the impact of this decision on foreign-Soviet couples, see Eddy Gilmore, Me and My Russian 
Wife (London: Foulsham, 1952). 
17 For an account of life as diplomat in late Stalinist Moscow, see Richard Hilton, Military Attache in 
Moscow (London: Hollis and Carter, 1949). Also see Whitman Bassow, The Moscow Correspondents: 
Covering the Soviet Union from Revolution to Glasnost (New York: Morrow and Company, 1988), 119-
148. 
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knowledge transfers from the West,18 the exact bureaucratic process by which Soviet 
borders were opened to foreign travel is difficult to reconstruct. In general, the Soviet 
opening seems to have consisted of two distinct phases: a gradual repeal of Stalin-era 
restrictions by his erstwhile underlings and the bureaucracies they led, part of their 
general policy to disarm the tense atmosphere of the dictator’s final years,19 followed by 
a series of iconic events and high-level interventions that established foreign presence as 
a fact of life in the late socialist USSR. 
 The reversal of Stalin’s policies regarding foreigners began nearly immediately 
after his death. As early as June 1953, Soviet authorities allowed foreign diplomats to 
travel outside Moscow, subject to prior coordination and apart from specifically 
designated zones – a principle that would define Soviet regulation of foreign travel for all 
categories of foreigners until 1991 (and, to a much more limited extent, even today).20 In 
October of the same year, the decree banning marriages between foreigners and Soviet 
citizens was abolished.21 In March 1954, the Foreign Ministry drafted a resolution calling 
                                                          
18 See, for example, Pia Koivunen, "The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival: Propagating a New, Peaceful Image 
of the Soviet Union" in Melanie B. Ilic and Jeremy Smith (ed.) Soviet State and Society under Nikita 
Khrushchev (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 46-65.  Rosa Magnusdottir, “Mission Impossible? 
Selling the Soviet Socialism to Americans, 1955-1968,” in Jessica Glenow Hecht and Mark C. Donfield 
(ed.) Searching for Cultural Diplomacy (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 51-72. On Khrushchev’s 
overall strategy, see Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to 
Gorbachev (Raleigh, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 94-192. 
19 Sheilla Fitzpatrick, On Stalin’s Team: The Years of Living Dangerously in Soviet Politics (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2015), 224-254. 
20 “Dudorov to TsK KPSS, 1/5/1959,” GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 506, ll. 16-17. This letter refers to a Sovmin 
Resolution from 1953 (“Postanovlenie Sovmin SSSSR, n. 1560/617SS, 20/6/1953”). This resolution has 
not yet been declassified.  
21 “Ukaz ot 26 Noiabria 1953 goda ob otmene ukaza Prezidiuma VS SSSR ot 15 fevralia 1947 goda “O 
vospreschenii brakov mezhdu grazhdanam SSSSR i inostrantsami.” Accessed online,  at: 
http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=ESU;n=16717, on 4/1/2015 
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for the resumption of foreign tourism, and by early 1955, Intourist was already selling 
tour packages to Western tourists.22 In the same year, Soviet authorities drastically 
loosened control over inter-socialist borders and allowed visa-free travel to residents of 
Czechoslovak, Polish and Hungarian regions bordering on the Soviet Union.23  
 Under Khrushchev, the Soviet opening up to the world quickly evolved beyond 
such mundane bureaucratic measures. The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival and the 1959 
American Sokolniki exhibit were iconic moments in this regard, and still, as we shall see 
below, form the focal point of the historiography of the Soviet opening up to the world. 
Tourism and other forms of exchange with Eastern Europe were substantially expanded.24 
Following Khrushchev’s whirlwind tours of Asia and his infatuation with the prospects of 
the Soviet Union serving as the trailblazer for the developing world, Soviet universities 
started receiving students from the Third World in the late 1950s, a process that 
culminated in the establishment of the Patrice Lumumba Friendship of the Peoples 
University in 1960.25  
 When it came to accepting “capitalist” foreigners, the picture was more 
complicated. While Khrushchev was often enthusiastic about receiving Western visitors 
                                                          
22  “Gromyko to Molotov, 15/3/1954.” GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 449, ll. 3-9. 
23  “Spravka k voprosu ob izmenenii porganichnogo rezhima na granitse so stranami narodnoi demokratii, 
14/9//1955,”GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 466, ll. 86-89. 
24 Rachel Appelbaum, “Friendship of the Peoples: Soviet-Czechoslovak Cultural and Social Contacts from 
the Battle for Prague to the Prague Spring, 1945-1969,” PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2012, 
144-190. 
25 For bureaucratic details of the establishment of Soviet education for Third World Students, see this 
excellent document collection: T. Iu Krasovitskaia et al (ed.), Vozvratit domoi druziami SSSR: obuchenie 
inostrantsev v Sovetskom Soiuze 1956-1965 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond Demokratiia, 2013). 
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and engaging in rhetorical swordplay with Western journalists, his attitude to the problem 
of “capitalists” on Soviet soil was ambiguous. The honeymoon of the Moscow Youth 
Festival, for instance, was quickly supplanted by the hysteria triggered by the Doctor 
Zhivago affair – and with good reason, as far as Soviet authorities were concerned, as not 
only was the novel’s manuscript smuggled abroad by departing journalists, but printed 
copies of the volume were smuggled into the Soviet Union by a host of foreigners who 
received them from CIA-connected publishers.26 Perhaps for this and similar reasons, 
Khrushchev was distinctly unenthusiastic about American plans to, as he put it in his 
memoirs, “make us open our borders, to increase the flow of people back and forth” 
during negotiations of the 1958 Soviet-American exchange agreement.27 As I will 
demonstrate, by the early 1960s, these concerns led to a full-fledged campaign warning 
of the dangers of foreign espionage and subversion. 
  Yet even on this issue, the overall thrust of Khrushchev’s policy was towards 
rapid expansion of Western travel to the Soviet Union, with an eye to the both the 
economic and propaganda benefits it could bring. Thus, impressed by tales of the 
Brussels 1958 World Exhibit and the masses of tourists it brought, he arranged for 
Moscow to apply to host the 1967 iteration of the same event. Moscow’s bid won the 
day, but was withdrawn when Khrushchev learned of the costs associated with the 
                                                          
26 Peter Finn and Petra Couvée, The Zhivago Affair: The CIA, the Kremlin and the Battle over a Forbidden 
Book (New York: Prometheus, 2014). 
27 Cited in Yale Richmond, Soviet-American Cultural Exchanges: Who Wins? (Boulder, CO and London: 
Westview Press, 1968, 8. 
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exhibit.28 Furthermore, according to his son Sergei, during his 1963 vacation in 
Yugoslavia, Khrushchev became so impressed with the open Yugoslav borders and the 
prosperous tourism industry they fostered that he came back to Moscow resolved to both 
expand Soviet travel abroad and compete with the Yugoslavs for European tourists by 
rapidly building up the Soviet hospitality industry and drastically loosening Soviet border 
restrictions – plans that were allegedly foiled only by his ouster.29  
 Khrushchevs’ inconsistency on the desirability of a “capitalist” presence in 
Soviet life highlights an important reality. According to all available archival evidence, it 
seems the Soviet Union opened itself to the outside world, if not quite in a feat of 
absentmindedness, then without any sustained discussion of the implications of this 
dramatic shift. None of the major sources available for the study of decision-making in 
the Khrushchev period, the protocols of the TsK presidium, the files of the Central 
Committee apparat, and the contents of Nikita Khrushchev’s special file [osobaia 
papka], contain evidence that the “foreign question” was ever discussed in a coherent 
manner, or even conceived as such.30 The Central Committee never possessed a 
department in charge of coordinating the activities of institutions handling foreigners 
inside the Soviet Union. The only governmental body that could have served this 
function, the State Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, 
                                                          
28 Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev: Reformator (Moscow: Vremia, 2010), 598-599. 
29 Ibid, 997-998.  
30 A.A Fursenko (ed.) Prezidium TsK KPSS, 1954-1964, (Moscow: Rosspen, 2004); V.A Kozlov and S.V 
Mironenko, Osobaia papka Nikity Khrushcheva (Moscow: Blagovest, 1995). 
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established in 1958, seems to have been still-born and was folded into the Foreign 
Ministry Cultural Affairs Department in 1967.31 
 What this omission meant was that, like so many other Khrushchevian reforms, 
the opening-up of Soviet borders to mass foreign travel was not conceived by Soviet 
policy-makers as a systemic transformation, but as a series of tactical moves meant to 
improve both the hard currency balance and international standing of the first socialist 
state. However, for institutions charged with handling, propagandizing and surveilling 
foreigners, growing numbers of foreigners did indeed represent a systematic 
transformation. In relatively short order, and without much guidance and coordination 
from above, a plethora of organizations that were used to working with a relative handful 
of ideologically sympathetic foreigners were thrown into the deep end of the pool, forced 
to accommodate themselves to a new reality under which nearly anyone who wanted to 
go to the U.S.S.R (and could afford an Intourist package) could do so. Porous Empire is 
therefore an inquiry about institutional adaptation, enquiring how institutions crafted 
during what Stephen Kotkin famously terms “the interwar conjuncture,” a global shift to 
isolationism in the 1920s and 30s, functioned in the conditions of a new era defined by 
ever-increasing flows of people across Soviet borders.32 
 Put otherwise, this dissertation is not a history of foreign travel to the late 
Soviet Union, but rather a study of the interaction between Soviet institutions and 
                                                          
31 Richmond, Exchanges, 9-10. 
32 Stephen Kotkin, “Modern Times: The Soviet Union and the Interwar Conjuncture,” Kritika 2, no. 1 
(2001), 111-164. 
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foreigners. This institutional focus forced me into some difficult narrative and analytic 
choices. First and most obviously, Porous Empire is focused much more on the reaction 
of the Soviet bureaucracy to foreigners than to the foreign experience of the socialist life. 
My focus on the challenges of foreign travel as seen through the eyes of Soviet 
bureaucrats inevitably led me to prioritize some groups of foreigners and give short shrift 
to others. Trouble-makers, chronic complainers, anti-Soviet activists and black 
marketeers, sources of so many head-aches for Soviet authorities, are much more central 
to the stories told here than the no doubt more numerous tourists who dutifully followed 
Intourist itineraries and the lead of their guides. Eastern European visitors, who 
constituted the majority of foreigners in the USSR, enter my narrative to extent they 
deviated from the rituals of international socialist friendship that their presence within 
Soviet borders was supposed to celebrate, by behaving in a manner Soviet officials 
usually associated with “capitalist” travelers, such as expressing material or political 
complaints or participating in illicit activities.33 It is my hope that whatever this approach 
sacrifices in human interest it gains by highlighting the clash between the institutional 
design of the Soviet state and realities of a “postwar conjuncture” in which mobility 
became a defining feature of the international world order. 
  
 
                                                          
33 On “friendship” as instrument of Soviet statecraft, see Rachel Appelbaum, “Friendship of the Peoples.” 
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 Historiography 
Until very recently, accounts of post-Stalin travel in the Soviet Union were outnumbered 
by studies of the interwar period, in which the Soviet Union attracted prominent 
intellectuals in search of utopia and workers and engineers in search of employment. 
During the Cold War era, accounts of the “intellectual pilgrimage” of Western fellow 
travelers to Stalin’s Soviet Union were often written in an accusatory key, demonstrating 
the gullibility of leftist intellectuals and their susceptibility to Soviet propaganda.34 More 
recently, Ludmila Stern, on the basis of archival materials unavailable to the previous 
generation of scholars, demonstrated how the Soviet authorities used flattery and material 
incentives to influence Western visitors.35  
However, the vast majority of post-Cold War literature on interwar travel takes a 
much more ambiguous and empathetic attitude to the problem. Kate Baldwin, for 
example, sympathetically elaborates the dilemmas of African-American intellectuals who 
were attracted to the Soviet Union due to its uncompromising denunciation of racism, 
while also demonstrating the continuing attractions of Soviet anti-racism for radical 
African-Americans well into the 1960s.36 Sergei Zhuravlev reconstructs the life histories 
of foreign (mostly German) workers in Moscow’s Elektrozavod conglomerate, their 
                                                          
34 See, for example, Sylvia Margulies, The Pilgrimage to Russia: The Soviet Union and the Treatment of 
Foreigners, 1917–1937 (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968); Paul Hollander, Political  
Pilgrims: American Intellectuals in Search of  the Good Society, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1998). 
35 Ludmila Stern, Western Intellectuals and the Soviet Union, 1920-1940: From the Red Square to the Left 
Bank (London, Routledge, 2006).   
36 Kate A. Baldwin, Beyond the Color Line and the Iron Curtain: Reading Encounters between Red and 
Black, 1922-1963, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002). 
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contribution to Soviet industrialization, and the clash between their ideals and Soviet 
reality.37 Tim Tzoualiadis describes the tragedy of American workers and engineers who 
had taken Soviet citizenship and were imprisoned or killed in the purges of the 1930s.38 
While works, in the “fellow travelers” paradigm take the totalitarian nature of the 
Soviet system for granted, using duped foreign travelers to cast it in sharp relief and more 
recent literature focuses heavily on foreign experience within the totalitarian system,  
Michael David-Fox’s Showcasing the Great Experiment rewrites the history of 
encounters between the Soviet Union and the “intellectual pilgrims” not as a story of 
Soviet perfidy and leftist gullibility but as a complex interchange, predicated on the 
Soviet tendency towards self-measurement by Western yardsticks. Even as Stalin’s 
USSR limited entry to small numbers of carefully managed travelers, and allowed only 
small cohorts of “Stalinist Westernizers” access to foreigners, David-Fox argues that the 
Soviet leadership’s conviction that arriving at socialism meant leaping over the most 
advanced capitalist countries required obsessive comparison, and at least limited 
engagement, with Western ideas, institutions, and technological achievements. In this 
telling, the total isolation of the last Stalin years was a relative aberration, an amalgam of 
a “Stalinist superiority complex” that led Soviet ideologues to imagine that they had 
                                                          
37  Sergei Zhuravelv, Malenkie liud’ i ‘bol’shaia istoriia’: inostrantsy Moskovskogo Elektrozavoda v 
Sovetskom obshchestve 1920-kh-1930-kh godov (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000). 
38 Tim Tzouliadis, The Forsaken: An American Tragedy in Stalin's Russia (New York: Penguin, 2008). 
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already learned all they needed from the West, and a xenophobic reaction to wartime 
encounters with the West and its material superiority.39 
Compared to this richness of perspectives and interpretations and despite its 
incomparably greater scale, foreign travel to the post-Stalin Soviet Union has received 
relatively little scholarly attention. Somewhat paradoxically, before the collapse of the 
USSR, this omission had much to do with the relative opening up of Soviet borders: 
travel was no longer limited to a select few and became a commonplace activity for both 
scholars of the Soviet Union and the general public, thus losing much of its ideological 
significance and hint of scandal. Subsequently, work on contemporary foreign travel to 
the Soviet Union focused on policy-related issues: the dangers of Soviet outreach to 
Third World students and intellectuals and the virtues and flaws of the cultural exchanges 
between East and West.40 A rare volume from this era that treats the topic as history is 
Whitman Bassow’s The Moscow Correspondents. Written in the perestroika era, it 
focused not on policy implications but on the experiences of foreign journalists in the 
Soviet Union as a mirror to the advance and retreat of reform across Soviet history.41   
While in the immediate post-Cold War era, historians’ attention was focused on 
the Stalin period, in recent years, as first “the Thaw” and then the long 1970s became the 
                                                          
39 Michael David-Fox, Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to 
Soviet Russia, 1921-1941 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
40 See, for example, Herbert Kupferberg. The Raised Curtain: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task 
Force on Soviet-American Scholarly and Cultural Exchanges (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1977), 
Frederick C. Barghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Offensive (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), and 
Richmond, Exchanges. 
41 Whitman Bassow, The Moscow Correspondents: Reporting on Russia from the Revolution to Glasnost 
(New York: William Morris and Company, 1988). 
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focal point of recent Soviet historiography, literature on Western travel to the post-Stalin 
Union proliferated. Crucial events in the history of travel to the Soviet Union, first and 
foremost the 1957 Moscow Youth Festival, then the 1959 Sokolniki Exhibition, and 
much later and to a much more limited extent, the 1980 Moscow Olympics, all found 
multiple chroniclers.42 The chiefs of both American and Soviet cultural exchange projects 
composed histories of cultural and academic exchanges between the Cold War foes.43 
Intourist and its Komsomol counterpart Sputnik both found their institutional historians.44  
Other scholars focused on specific groups, for instance, British prison reformers, Greek 
leftist intellectuals, or East Europeans working on the BAM railroad.45 The experience of 
                                                          
42 For the Festival, see: Koivunen, “Propagataing a Peaceful image”; Margaret Peakock, “The Perils of 
Building Cold War Consensus at the 1957 Moscow World Festival of Youth and Students" Cold War 
History 12, no. 3(2012), 515-535; Kristin Roth-Ey, “Loose Girls on the Loose? Sex, Propaganda and the 
1957 Moscow Youth Festival,” In Melanie Ilic, ed. Women in the Khrushchev Era (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004); Vladislav Zubok, Zhivago’s Children: the Last Russian Intelligentsia (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press, 2009), 100-111. On Sokolniki, Walter Hixson, Parting the Iron Curtain: Culture, 
Propaganda and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1997), 151-214; Susan E. Reid, “Who 
will Beat Whom? Soviet Popular Reception of the American Cultural Exhibit in Moscow, 1959,” Kritika 9, 
no. 4 (2008); Tomas Toivasas, “Cold War Bridge Building: US Exchange Exhibits and their Reception in 
the Soviet Union, 1959-1967,” Journal of Cold War Studies 12, no. 4 (2010), 3-31. On the Olympics, 
Aleksei Popov, “Marafon gostepriimstva: Olimpiada 1980 i popytka modernizatsii Sovetksogo servisa,” 
Cahiers du Monde Russia 54, no. 1/2(2014), 256-293 and Jennifer Parks, “Red Sport, Red Tape: The 
Olympic Games, the Soviet Sports Bureacracy and the Cold War, 1952-1980,” PhD Dissertation, 
University of North Carolina, 2009, ch. 5, 6. 
43 Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain, (University Park, PA: 
The Pennsylvania State University Press), 2003 and E.A Ivanian, Kogda govoria︡ t muzy: istoriia rossiisko-
amerikanskikh kulʹturnykh svi︠ azei, (Moscow: Mezhdunarondnye otnosheniia, 2007). 
44 Salmon, “Land of Future,” V.E Bagdasarian, A.A Fedulin et alia, Sovetskoe zazerkal'e: innostrannyi 
turizm v SSSR v 1930-e-1980e gody (Moscow: Forum, 2007), Andrei Kozovoi, “The Way to the Man’s 
Heart: How the Soviet Travel Agency Sputnik Struggled to Feed Western Tourists,” Journal of Tourism 
History, 6, no. 1 (2014), 57-73. 
45 Alexandra Ionnaidou, “Travel Writing: Greek Intellectuals in the Soviet Union,” in: Jolanta Sujecka (ed.) 
Semantyka Rosji na Bałkanach (Warsaw: Wydawadnictwo zbiorow, 2011), 129-148, Jeff Hardy, “Gulag 
Tourism: Khrushchev’s Show Prison in the Cold War Context,” Russian Review 70, no. 1 (2011), 49-78, 
Chris Ward, Brezhnev’s Folly: The Building of BAM and Late Soviet Socialism (Pittsburhg: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2009), 126-151. 
  
   
 
  17 
 
 
 
African students received much scholarly attention, focusing on questions of race and 
Soviet perceptions of backwardness and progress.46 
Despite the impressive scope and variety of these works, they form but a subset of 
the wider literature on Soviet engagement with the outside world after Stalin. The earliest 
key work in this corpus is Robert English’s Russia and the Idea of the West, a history of 
the formation of Gorbachev’s cohort of Westernizing reformers under the influence of 
international engagement.47 The Russian-French historian Larissa Zakharova showed 
how various forms of engagement with the West, from black market jeans purchases to 
international technology transfers, irrevocably altered both the shape of Soviet material 
culture.48  
In a similar vein, Vladislav Zubok shows how Khrushchev’s opening to the 
outside world helped spark the surge of optimism and internationalism that produced “the 
last Russian intelligentsia.”49 Sergei Zhuk, in his Rock and Roll in the Rocket City, shows 
how even in cities closed to foreigners, the post-Stalin surge of Western culture and 
consumer goods eroded fealty to official ideology and Soviet identity.50 Finally, Aleksei 
Yurchak’s Everything was Forever,  probably the most influential work on late Soviet 
culture published to date, shows how unbridled enthusiasm for cultural materials 
                                                          
46 See among many others, Julie Hessler, “Death of an African Student in Moscow: Race, Politics, and the 
Cold War,” Cahiers du monde Russe, 47, no. 1/2(2006). 33-63. 
47 Robert English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End of the Cold War, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). 
48 Larisa Zakharova,  S'Habiller à La Soviétique: La Mode et le Dégel En URSS (Paris: CNRS, 2011). 
49 Vladislav Zubok, Zhivago’s Children, 88-120. 
50 Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity and Ideology in Soviet Dniepropetrovsk 
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Institute Press, 2012).  
  
   
 
  18 
 
 
 
imported from the “True West” became central to the identities of educated Soviet 
urbanites in the 1970s and 1980s.51 
  As varied and illuminating as they are, the works cited above share two common 
features. First, with the exception of institutional histories, all accounts of Soviet-Western 
intercourse are written from the perspective of either foreigners or, more often, the 
educated Soviet urbanites who partook in cross-border exchanges and Westernized 
cultural consumption, while Soviet officials charged with managing these exchanges are 
reduced to not much more than stumbling blocks against the surge of Westernization of 
late Soviet society. 
More importantly, whether because they seek to explain the sources of the Soviet 
collapse or because so many historians of the late Soviet period are products of 
Westernized late Soviet milieus, nearly all accounts of Soviet engagement with the 
outside world take Westernization and the hollowing-out of official ideology and, 
gradually, Soviet identity as a central organizing principle. Shawn Salmon, in her 
excellent unpublished dissertation on the history of Intourist, narrates a story of 
transformation from an ideological organization to “one of many players in the rapidly 
expanding network of international tourism agencies.”52 Along with many of his subjects, 
Zubok views the Thaw-era opening to the West in general, and the Moscow Festival in 
particular, as a crucial turning point which produced “the first cracks” in the Soviet 
                                                          
51 Aleksei Yurchak, Everything was forever, until it was no More: The Story of the Last Soviet Generation 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
52 Salmon, “Land of Future,” 290. 
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edifice, and thus set the course for subsequent dissolution of Soviet power.53 English 
takes a similar line, showing how foreign travel, readings of Western literature, and 
engagement with transnational networks eroded Soviet intellectuals’ fealty to Marxism- 
Leninism. Taking a different tack, Zhuk argues that cultural consumption made 
Ukrainian urbanites view New York, London, and Paris rather than Moscow as their 
cultural capitols- thus shaking loose their Soviet cultural identity in a way that fostered 
their embrace of European-oriented Ukrainian nationalism in the 1980s.54 Even Yurchak, 
who is more skeptical of linear explanations of the Soviet collapse than most scholars, 
grounds his analysis in the absolute disconnect between official ideology and social life 
under late socialism. 
 Another strain in the literature takes a more critical view of such quick dismissals 
of official ideologies and Soviet identities. Susan E. Reid, for example, famously 
demonstrates that many Soviet attendees at the Sokolniki Exhibit genuinely rejected 
much of what was on display as crass, impractical materialism.55 Rachel Applebaum 
shows that, after 1953, Soviet propagandists were genuinely interested in forging a 
transnational socialist culture all across Eastern Europe - “an Empire of friendship.”56 
Kristin Roth-Ey similarly argues that Soviet media officials were committed to a vision 
of high culture for the masses, which they viewed as superior to American promotion of 
                                                          
53 Zubok, Failed Empire, 163-191. 
54 Zhuk, Rocket City, 303-318. 
55 Reid, “Who will Beat whom.”  
56 Applebaum, “Friendship of the Peoples.” 
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mass consumerism.57 Anne Gorsuch, in her study of domestic and outgoing tourism, 
describes how Soviet domestic tourism officials creatively applied official slogans like 
patriotism, friendship of the peoples, and cultured consumption, to forge a distinctly 
Soviet practice of tourism-as-enlightenment.58 While much of this work is focused on the 
1950s and 1960s, Natalya Chernyshova shows that even under Brezhnev, many Soviet 
officials were genuinely committed to the idea of cultured consumption as the highest 
expression of socialist culture.59 
 Porous Empire builds on these insights regarding the vitality of official 
institutions and seeks to apply them to the problem of foreign travel to the Soviet Union, 
but does so in a darker and more pessimistic key than these relatively sunny accounts. 
The perspective with which I approach the topic draws from a larger debate in the 
theoretical and historical literature about the socio-political import of travel and 
international exchanges. In these fields, one school of thought, popularized by New York 
Times journalist Thomas Friedman’s paeans to globalization, argues that international 
exchange is the handmaiden of liberalization and erosion of authoritarian regimes. Two 
key historiographic works in that regard are Christopher Endy’s study of tourism as a key 
component in the making of a stable, liberal, trans-Atlantic Cold War alliance between 
the United States and France, and Sasha D. Pack’s masterful demonstration of how 
                                                          
57 Kristin Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire that Lost the Cold 
War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011). 
58 Anne Gorsuch, All this is Your World: Soviet Tourism at Home and Abroad after Stalin (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
59 Natalya Chrenyshova, Soviet Consumer Culture in the Brezhnev Era (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
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tourism officials formed a pro-European, liberalizing lobby in Franco’s Spain, and thus 
helped ease the path to Spain’s post-Francoist, democratic path.60   
Another strain of thought in travel studies takes a rather darker perspective. For 
instance, the political scientist Walid Hazboon, building on the work of geographer 
Gearoid O'Tuathail,61 describes how, in the authoritarian Arab states he studied,  “the 
processes of globalization unevenly generate deterritorialization and reterritorialization... 
resulting in the heightened importance of territory, location and boundaries.”62 Put 
simply,  Hazboon argues that the introduction of mass travel into hitherto closed, 
authoritarian societies creates new social dynamics and shakes up state control over its 
citizenry. And yet, this process does not necessarily lead to the dissolution of 
authoritarianism, as successful authoritarian states are quite adept at reorganizing their 
institutions to meet this challenge – often using resources generated by successfully 
integrating themselves into global networks of exchange. 
Porous Empire applies these insights to the work of Soviet institutions that sought 
to maximize benefits and minimize risks of mass travel. More specifically, it is a study of 
how various Soviet institutions attempted to adapt autarchic, authoritarian and 
                                                          
60 Christopher Endy, Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France (Chapel Hill: University of 
Colorado Press, 2004). Sasha D. Pack, Tourism and Dictatorship:  Europe’s Peaceful Invasion of Spain 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
61  Gearoid O'Tuathail Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996). 
62 Walid Hazboon, Ruins, Beaches and Resorts: the Politics of Tourism in the Arab World (Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), xxv. The terms deterritorialization and reterritorialization to 
describe the dialectical process by interaction between global trends and local institutions were coined by 
French theorists Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (New 
York: Viking, 1977).  
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xenophobic ideological attitudes inherited from the Stalin period to a world in which 
millions of foreigners demanded Western levels of service, claimed the right to express 
their opinions freely, brought pernicious “bourgeois culture” to Soviet soil, and forged 
sundry transnational networks with ideologically suspect Soviet citizens. In short, in the 
same way David-Fox found profound commitment to internationalism underneath the 
isolationist façade of Stalin’s time, I argue for the existence of a deep autarchic-
xenophobic institutional substratum that structured Soviet official responses to the global 
age.  
 
Sources 
  
As is the case with all contemporary histories, a major challenge of writing this 
dissertation was managing the enormous mass of materials pertaining to foreign travel to 
the USSR.  In line with my goal to write the history not of foreign travel to the Soviet 
Union but of institutional responses to it, Soviet sources, archival and published, form the 
lion’s share of the evidentiary base of this dissertation. Since, as noted above, there was 
no single coordinating body charged with formulating policy towards foreigners in the 
Soviet Union, the vast majority of the archival documents used here was produced by the 
two institutions most intimately involved with visiting foreigners: Intourist and the KGB. 
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Like all Soviet institutions, Intourist was exceptionally adept at producing copious 
paperwork. However, both its peculiar organizational structure and subsequent decisions 
by archivists circumscribe the kind of narratives historians can reconstruct from its 
records. At the heart of the Intourist collection at the State Archives of the Russian 
Federation are protocols of the monthly meetings of Intourist's board of directors and the 
orders and instructions issued by its central management to its local offices, hotels, and 
other facilities. Until 1980, these stenograms were usually accompanied by supporting 
documentation and the texts of presentations to the board; from 1980 onward, such 
documents disappear from the record and by the perestroika years, the archival trail 
becomes vanishingly small.  Additionally, the files of Intourist’s First Department, 
handling relations with the KGB and other high level institutions, are still partially 
classified up to 1965, and totally absent from the archive after that year. The files of the 
Moscow and Leningrad Intourist local offices, its most important sub-units, were not 
preserved. The archival holdings of the Russian republican branch of Intourist, formed in 
1964, are spotty, but add important perspective on the organizational rivalries that, as I 
demonstrate, helped bring Intourist to an ignominious end. Supplementing these materials 
are files from the party organization of the Leningrad branch of Intourist that allow us a 
glimpse of the everyday life of an Intourist office.  
The source problems presented by the KGB are, of course, much more 
complicated. The former KGB archives archives are currently and for the foreseeable 
future closed to researchers. Other sources of information, say, memoirs by veterans or 
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defectors, tend to be opaque and self-serving and focus more on foreign intelligence than 
the less prestigious domestic work of the KGB. Furthermore, as historian Julie Fedor 
shows, these memoirs often veer into wild conspiracy theorizing about Western plots that 
brought down the Soviet Union.63  
However, sufficient materials exist for taking a stab at the problem of deciphering 
KGB approaches to the dangers of foreign travel. KGB archives from Lithuania and 
materials from Ukraine that became available in the wake of the Maidan revolution 
contain many materials on day-to-day KGB operations in these border republics, 
frequented by “regular” foreigners as well as large numbers of “ethnic” visitors.64 Some 
published collections of KGB documents shed useful light on the problem, as does an 
internal history of the KGB used as a textbook in its Higher School.65 Memoir literature, 
with all its distortions, provides useful hints as to the nature of the KGB’s epistemic 
community, as do official Soviet publications on the pernicious activities of foreigners on 
Soviet soil - often composed by KGB officers working under thin journalistic cover.   
Beyond the institutional views of the KGB and Intourist, I tapped a host of other 
printed, visual, and non-Soviet archival materials. Many published Soviet materials, 
                                                          
63 Julie Fedor, “Chekists Look Back on the Cold War: The Polemical Literature,” Intelligence and National 
Security 26, no.6 (2011), 842-863. 
64 On security anxieties related to these republics, see Amir Weiner, “Déjà vu All Over Again: Prague 
Spring, Romanian Summer and Soviet Autumn on the Soviet Frontier,” Contemporary European History 
15, no. 2 (2006), 159-194. Archival materials from Ukraine’s KGB Archives, available for researchers in 
theory but now undergoing processing before they become the foundation of the Ukrainian Insitute of 
National Memory, were provided to some Western researchers in digital form immediately after the 
Maidan Revolution. I am deeply grateful to Orysia Kulick and Beth Kerley for sharing them with me. 
65  Istoriia Sovetskikh organov gosudarstennoi bezopasnosti (Moscow: Vyshaia shkola KGB, 1977).   
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especially films, often subverted the official line on foreigners and Soviet people who 
interacted with them, in ways that highlighted the difficulties Soviet institutions faced in 
controlling the “foreign problem.” Memoir literature, some of it published in the 
burgeoning on-line world of Runet, provides an important window onto the impact of 
foreigners on Soviet life. Soviet travelogue literature is immense, and I used it to 
highlight both Soviet methods of control and their impact on foreigners’ experiences of 
the Soviet Union.66 Western periodicals provided a running commentary on the problems 
faced by Westerners who interacted with Soviet institutions. Finally, the New York-based 
Soviet Jewry Movement Archives provide a rare opportunity to analyze an organized 
effort to exploit the weaknesses in the Soviet firmament created by foreign travel. As we 
shall see in Chapter Five, these documents nicely complement Soviet sources by 
speaking to issues on which official archives are silent.  
 
Structure and Argument 
 
This dissertation consists of five thematic chapters. The first four offer case studies of 
how Soviet institutions vowed wich particular set of challenges wrought by mass foreign 
                                                          
66 The most prominent Cold War era accounts of Soviet life were composed by journalists posted in 
Moscow:  Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: New York Times Books, 1976); Robert G. Kaiser,   
Russia: The People and the Power (New York: Atheneum, 1976); David Shipler, Russia: Broken Idols, 
Solemn Dreams (New York: New York Times Books, 1983); Kevin Klose, Russia and the Russians: Inside 
the Closed Society (New York: Norton, 1984).  See Dina Fainberg, “Notes from the Rotten West, Reports 
from the Backward East: Soviet and American Foreign Correspondents in the Cold War,” PhD 
Dissertation, Rutgers University, 2012, for an excellent analysis of this literature. 
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travel. The fifth chapter offers a shift in perspective, showing how foreign travel could be 
used by both foreigners and dissenting Soviet citizens to challenge Soviet institutions. 
 My first chapter is a business history of Intourist along two major axes. First, I 
examine how Intourist functioned simultaneously as an institutional player in the 
industrial, producer-oriented Soviet economy and as a competitor in the global market for 
tourism services, one of the key sectors of the global transformation to “post-Fordist,” 
service-oriented economic order.67 Second, I argue that the tension between Intourist’s 
goal of competing in a global market on the one hand, and Soviet resource and 
organizational constraints on the other, forced it into a new relationship with the global 
economy. Charged with obtaining hard currency to be used for imports of machinery that 
would help make the Soviet Union independent of global markets, Intourist found that the 
Soviet planned economy could not provide it with the resources it required to fulfill its 
mission statement. Therefore, it became increasingly dependent on Western imports, 
knowledge, information technology, and credits. Paradoxically, therefore, it was the 
profoundly non-capitalist nature of the Soviet economy that drove Intourist towards a 
growing dependence on the very same capitalist networks it was charged with aiding the 
Soviet state to escape. 
 In the following chapter, I reconstruct the struggles of Soviet propagandists to 
disseminate “the truth about the Soviet Union” to a skeptical foreign audience. These 
                                                          
67 On post-Fordist transformation see Charles Maier, “The World Economy and the Cold War in the Middle 
of the Twentieth Century,” in  Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (ed.) The Cambridge History of the 
Cold War. Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 44-66. 
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efforts were responses to the urgent requirements of the cultural Cold War. The great 
advantage of “imperialist” propaganda was the way in which it could employ superior 
material cutlure to stimulate the senses at a distance. One could watch Hollywood films, 
listen to jazz and rock and roll, and taste bubble gum without ever stepping on American 
shores. Soviet achievements (with the important exception of the space race) were of a                
more abstract nature. Universal literacy, the advancement of formerly “backward” 
nationalities, free education, housing, healthcare, and the other hallmarks of socialist 
modernity could not be communicated at a distance in such experiential ways. To truly 
experience Soviet socialism one had to observe it at close quarters.  
 The problem that Soviet propagandists faced as they struggled to craft narratives 
about the superiority of the Soviet way of life was that their Western, and to a surprising 
extent, their “socialist” visitors as well,68 often arrived with their own, rather skeptical 
views regarding the “truth about the Soviet Union.” Because Soviet propagandists 
realized that in order to perceive “the truth” about Soviet claims for the superiority of 
Soviet life, foreigners’ sensitivities and materialist proclivities had to be respected, they 
increasingly came to observe Soviet reality through the eyes of “imagined tourists.” Yet, 
                                                          
68 Seee for example, a report by a Czechoslovak visitor on his 1955 visit to Hotel Metropol. “O poriadkakh 
v gostinitse Metropol, [n/d, 1955], Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Moskvy. Tsentr khraneniia 
dokumentov posle 1917 goda [TsKhD posle 1917.], f. 4961, op.1, d. 183, ll. 15-18.  Similar feelings were 
voiced even by tourist from less materially prosperous socialist countries, like Romania. “Protokol 
soveshchania nachalnikov upravlenii po inostrannomu turizmu pri Sovetakh Ministrakh soiuznykh 
Respublik, upravlaiushchikh otdeleniami i zaveduiushchikh agentsvami VAO Intourist, 19-21/3/1968,” 
GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 255, ll. 198-200. 
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since they remained loyal servitors of the Soviet state, this realization did not stop Soviet 
propagandists from engaging in Cold War battles. Rather, arguments between foreigners 
and Soviet tour guides ceased to be attempts at persuasion and became ritual 
reenactments of “the unity of party and people” – reminders that the Soviet Union still 
claimed absolute authority to define what truth meant within its borders. 
 My third chapter deals with Soviet official responses to what I term the 
demimonde: a complex ecology of unsanctioned networks and interactions woven around 
foreigners by black marketeers, sex workers, informal artists and other socially marginal 
actors. After sketching out the contours of the demimonde, I demonstrate how policy 
towards its denizens reflected the rise and fall and rise again of official efforts at 
rejuvination of the Soviet project, and the intrinsic links between these reformatory urges 
and coercive practices. Thus, I show that the Khrushchev years saw not only the opening 
of Soviet borders, but also a sustained drive to use social mobilization to isolate and 
repress Soviet citizens who engaged in unsanctioned exchanges with foreigners, as well 
as a bonafide security panic that revived Stalin-era suspicions regarding the links between 
cosmopolitanism and espionage. In the Brezhnev era, this assault ebbed, and the 
demimonde became a de-facto recognized part of Soviet urban life. Yet, the language of 
vigilance and excision directed at it by Soviet authorities survived and was reoriented 
towards “renegades and dissidents.” Most strikingly, the early 1980s, a period I term “the 
Andropov interlude,” witnessed a renewed campaign against the demimonde, again 
attempting to cleanse the Soviet body politic of harmful elements clinging to foreigners. 
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However, in an era in which every Soviet urbanite was somehow engaged with Western 
cultural consumption, this attempt to name and shame black marketeers and hard 
currency prostitutes as a path towards moral regeneration backfired spectacularly, as 
more and more Soviet citizens found the values of the demimonde more appealing than 
official morality.   
The fourth and fifth chapters of this dissertation deal with a far smaller, but even 
more politically charged ecology woven around foreigners: the world of Soviet non-
conformists, dissidents, and nationalist activists, and the foreigners who crossed Soviet 
borders in order to give them aid and succor. In Chapter Four, I reconstruct the ways in 
which the KGB “read” this problem through the prism of what sociologist Andreas 
Graeber termed state paranoia - the deep and abiding conviction that all unsanctioned 
contacts between Soviet people and foreigners were by definition suspect.  I also sketch 
out the vast machinery of surveillance the KGB erected to keep tabs on these contacts. As 
I demonstrate, however, the KGB failed to either fully operationalize its paranoia or 
convince other Soviet institutions to take its lead and seriously restrain cross-border 
flows.   
In Chapter Five, I go beyond the Soviet archives in an attempt to provide an 
explanation for this systematic failure. Using American and Israeli aid to Soviet Jewish 
nationalist and religious activists as a case study, I show how Soviet freedom of action 
was constrained by the demands of the era of mass cross-border exchanges. By nestling 
themselves into the channels of exchange that increasingly linked the Soviet Union to the 
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outside world, activists of the international Soviet Jewry movement could provide Soviet 
Zionist activists with vast amounts of material and spiritual aid. Furthermore, the Soviet 
Jewry movement could credibly threaten harm to the international channels of exchange 
in case Soviet authorities moved to seriously restrict the activities of Zionist travelers or 
attempted to dismantle Zionist networks on Soviet soil. Thus, they forced the Soviet 
authorities to tolerate that which it could not destroy, demonstrating how mass foreign 
travel allowed the existence of late Soviet lifeworlds not only outside (vnye) the bounds 
of official Soviet norms,69 but in active opposition to Soviet power. 
 Overall, I argue, the Soviet adaptation to the ever growing flow of foreigners 
across Soviet borders highlights both the extent of the challenges the post-Stalin opening 
to the outside world created for Soviet institutions, and the robustness of Soviet 
institutional attitudes inherited from the Stalin era. On the one hand, stunted as it was by 
the structures of the planned economy and restrictions on Soviet travel abroad, the 
growing Soviet integration into a global regime based on mobility of people, information, 
and capital undermined the autarchic structures of the Soviet state and forced Soviet 
institutions into a series of compromises that loosened some of the absolute sovereignty 
claims of the Soviet Union over its citizenry.  On the other hand, Soviet exposure to the 
effects of international exchanges was severely limited by organizational and ideological 
structures inherent to Soviet-style socialism. Stalin-era stereotypes about the irreducible 
hostility of foreigners, well-based fears about the Cold War agendas of foreign visitors, 
                                                          
69 Yurchak, Everything was forever, 126-157. 
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and the practicalities of the Soviet planned economy blunted the economic possibilities 
that mass tourism offered, created an adversarial relationship between hosts and guests, 
and spurred a massive surveillance effort that limited unsanctioned contacts with 
foreigners to marginal elements. Above all, these mental and institutional structures 
maintained, among both Soviet elites and the wider Soviet population, a strong 
distinction between “us” and “them,” East and West that remained intact even as the 
Soviet Union grew ever-more connected into global networks dominated by “them.” I 
conclude with the observation that as scholars and policy-makers ponder the combination 
of cultural and economic Westernization and resurgent xenophobic and anti-Western 
attitudes that defines Russian contemporary political culture, they would do well to 
ponder how these phenomena may be traced back to practices and habits of thought 
rooted deep in the Soviet practice of power. 
 
 
 
.
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Chapter 1: Serving Mister Twister, or the Political Economy of 
Intourist 
 
 
The eponymous protagonist of Samuil Marshak's classic Stalin-era fairytale Mister 
Twister is an American billionaire on a pleasure tour of the USSR. Overcoming his initial 
reluctance to visit a socialist land, Twister and his family board a prestigious, racially 
segregated, ocean liner. When they disembark in Leningrad, the American party arrives 
at the hotel Angleterre, a grand hotel from the tsarist period that now belongs to Intourist, 
the already famous Soviet foreign tourism monopoly. There, he is shocked to discover 
that colored guests are welcome in the hotel. Unable to sustain the blow to his racial 
pride, Twister flees, only to learn that all his money cannot provide accommodation for 
the night: Leningrad's hotels are all at full capacity due to a coming international 
congress. Despondent, he is reduced to spending the night on a chair provided by a kindly 
hotel concierge.70 
 Marshak's story is, of course, a grossly inaccurate representation of Intourist's 
practices. From its earliest days, Intourist was a market operation, and earning hard 
currency, not making ideological points, was its primary objective.71  However, Mister 
Twister sheds light on two incongruities that would haunt Intourist down to the final days 
of the Soviet state. First, it was both a commercial enterprise that operated in the context 
                                                          
70 Samuil Marshak, Mister Tvister (Moscow: Detgiz, 1959). 
71 For overviews of Intourist's early years, see Salmon, “To the Land of the Future,” 1-124; Bagdasarian, 
Fedulin, Sovetskoe zazerkal’e, 11-87; David Fox, Showcasing the Great Experiment, 175-206. 
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of a global market for luxury products, and a Soviet organization set in a socioeconomic 
order where money was often not the decisive factor in economic transactions. Second, 
the hard currency Intourist earned was but a means for a greater goal: the purchase of 
machinery and other capital goods that would allow the Soviet Union to construct 
socialism and achieve economic independence.72 Intourist, in short, was to exist within 
global markets, but not be of them.  
This chapter is a business history of Intourist in the postwar era, focusing on the 
challenges Intourist faced as it attempted to live out this double existence. First, I will 
show how Intourist, a bit player in the Soviet institutional latticework, navigated the 
labyrinths of the Soviet administrative-command economy. Then, I shall address the 
ways in which in which the peculiarities of the Soviet socio-economic order shaped the 
managerial practices of Intourist.  Finally, I will closely examine two case studies – 
Intourist’s hotel construction program and its effort to integrate computer technology into 
its business, demonstrating how the failures of the party-state to mobilize resources 
sufficient to fulfill Intourist ambitions pushed it inexorably away from the transactional 
model of trade with the West that was its raison d'etre, to ever-deepening integration 
with and dependence on, global financial and technological networks.  
 
                                                          
72 On the interaction between the chase for foreign currency and ideology in Intourist's market operations, 
see Shawn Salmon, “Marketing Socialism: Intourist in the Late 1950s and Early 1960s,” in Anne Gorsuch 
and Dianne Koenker (ed.) Turizm: the Russian and East European Tourist under Socialism and Capitalism 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006), 186-202. 
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Figure 1.1: Mister Twister 
Source: Samuil Marskhak, Mister Tvister  
Before proceeding deeper into the weeds, we must tackle a fundamental, but 
surprisingly difficult question: was Intourist a succesful business or a failing one? On 
some measures, Intourist may indeed be seen as a success story. As Twister makes clear, 
in its early days, Intourist was a boutique enterprise. In its best prewar year, it served 
slightly more than 13,000 extremely well-heeled tourists.73 In the postwar years, 
however, it grew into a genuine corporate behemoth: by the mid-1980s, it was receiving 
more than 2.5 million foreign tourists (and large numbers of other categories of guests) in 
its facilities per annum. To accommodate this mass clientele, it employed over 50,000 
people, owned 107 hotels and 102 restaurants, a plethora of office buildings, foreign 
                                                          
73 Michael David Fox, Showcasing the Great Experiment, 178. 
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offices and other real estate, and a large fleeet of cars and buses.74 According to the 
authoritative Financial Times, towards the end of the Soviet era, Intourist was the world's 
largest tourist corporation.75 
 The transformation of Intourist from a boutique service into to a corporate giant 
was also visible in its facilities and services. By the 1908s, Intourist's flagships were no 
longer imperial heirlooms like the Angleterre, but capacious modernist hotels in Moscow, 
Leningrad, Tallinn and the “Red Riviera” on the Black Sea shores. While some of the old 
luxuries sold to Twister  were still on offer, Intourist now focused on the provision of 
mass-market niceties like air conditioned rooms, comfortable buses, high quality 
souvenirs, tennis courts, saunas, well-stocked bars, ethnic restaurants, and even American 
style video-games terminals and bowling alleys.76 If, as sociologist Louis Turner argues, 
the second half of 20th century was the era of the “pleasure economy,” of “golden hordes” 
of mass-market, pleasure-seeking travelers aiming to reproduce Western notions of 
comfort and service wherever they went, Intourist retooled itself to accommodate their 
needs.77 
 Still, for better or worse, the Soviet Union was not easily reduced to the kind of 
homogenized, depoliticized and americanized space described by Turner. Even if tourists 
                                                          
74 “Informatsiia o razvitii turizma v SSSR v 1985-1986 godakh i perspektivakh ego razvitiia v 1987 godu,” 
GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 1888, ll. 1. 8. 
75 “Tourism to the Soviet Union Grows, with Intourist being the Largest Travel Organization in the World,” 
Financial Times, 8/20/1982. 
76 “Informatsiia o khode peregovorov s inostrannymi firmami po stroitelstvu gostinists Glavinturista,” 
GARF f. 9612, op. 3. d. 1005, l. 68. 
77 Louis Turner, The Golden Hordes: International Tourism and the Pleasure Periphery (New York: St. 
Martin Press, 1976). 
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were repeatedly forewarned to lower their expectations (Fodor's Soviet Union, for 
instance, delicately reminded its readers that one went to the Soviet Union to expand 
one's mind, not to pleasure one's senses), the encounter between Soviet hosts and foreign 
guests often ended as sadly as did Twister's tale.  In the real-world Soviet Union, just as 
in its fictional counterpart (albeit for very different reasons), money could not always buy 
pleasure.  As we shall see in Chapter Two, Intourist’s flaws - its uncomfortable hotels, 
bad food, rude staff, and deficient restrooms - provided fodder for generations of 
complaining tourists. These complaints were succinctly summarized by the editors of 
Science magazine, who published a letter from a scientist returning from a conference in 
the Soviet Union under the succinct headline “Curse of Russia is Intourist.”78   
 One would be well justified to consider such drastic statements as exaggerated 
expressions of Cold War hostility or playing out of stereotypes about Russian 
backwardness going back to the pre-Soviet period and still extant today,79 if not for a 
curious fact: in their internal debates, Intourist’s leading cadres were, by and large, in full 
agreement with the harshest critiques made by their foreign guests.  Internal inspections, 
for example, revealed that even in prestigious and newly built hotels, rooms were often 
dirty, restrooms clogged, construction flaws visible everywhere, expensive imported 
equipment and furniture in dire conditions, elevators more often than not broken down, 
                                                          
78  Alfred S. Romer, “Curse of Russia is Intourist,” Science, 4/23/1971, 326. 
79 See, for instance, the near universal glee with which Western media and social networks received news 
and images of construction difficulties during the Sochi Olympics. For a typical example, see Max Seddon, 
“Photographic Proof that Sochi is a Godforsaken Hellscape Right Now,” Buzzfeed 2/6/2014 (accessed 
online at:  http://www.buzzfeed.com/bennyjohnson/proof-that-sochi-is-a-godforsaken-hellscape-right-
now#.yrYOn3Ejr, 4/1/2016). 
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hot water and heating not guaranteed.80 The Soviet tourism industry, fretted one official 
in 1960, was unable provide service on the level of even such relatively backward 
fraternal countries as Bulgaria.81   More than two decades later, another official voiced 
essentially the same complaint. Intourist staff, he declaimed, “poisons the tourists' lives 
[otravliaet zhizn'] with their rudeness, lack of professionalism [neakuratnost'], surliness, 
tardiness and so forth.”82  
 Even more concerning from the point of view of Intourist’s management was the 
fact that, despite heavy capital investments, it could never fulfill its promise of becoming 
a major source of badly needed foreign currency. Exact figures for Intourist's earnings are 
difficult to come by: reports filed to the Ministry of Finance and other state and Party 
bodies about the organization’s hard-currency earnings are available in the holdings of 
the secret First Department of Intourist, but only until 1965.83  Still, available numbers 
paint a problematic picture. In 1964, Intourist earned about 7.9 million foreign exchange 
rubles (rubles pegged to the dollar at a rate set by the Soviet state – equivalent to about 7 
                                                          
80 Among literally hundreds of examples, see: “Protokol no. 5 pravleniia VAO Inturist, 12/4/1954,” GARF, 
f. 9612, op. 1, d. 340, ll 24-25. “Prikaz po pravleniiu Vsesoiuzogo aktsionernogo oshchestva po 
inostrannomu turizmu “Inturist', N. 57-B, 4/9/1965,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 6, ll. 135-136. “O prebyvanii 
v SSSR delegatsii ETLI turistkoi organizatsii Itaianskikh trudiashchikhsia, 29/12/1967,” GARF, f. 9520, 
op. 1, d. 1244, ll. 13-15, “Protokol Soveshchaniia nachalnikov upravlenii po inostrannomu turizmu pri 
Sovetakh Ministrakh Soiuznykh respublik, upravlaiushchikh otdeleniami i zaveduiushchikh agentsvami 
VAO Intourist, 19-21/3/1968,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 255, ll. 172-177. “Spravka o sostoianii materialnoi 
bazy i obsluzhivaniia inostrannykh turistov v gorodakh Nobosibirsk, Bratsk, Khabarovsk, 27/9/1974,” 
GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d.  832, l. 191, “S.S Nikitin, Doklad na zasedanii Soveta pri Glavnom Upravlenii po 
inostrannomu turizmu, 26.5.1976,” GARF. op. 3, d. 1014, ll. 50-51. 
81 “Stenogramma vsesoiuznogo soveschaniia rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov VAO Inturista, 17/1/1961”, 
GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, d. 286, l. 96. 
82 “Stenogramma zasedaniia komissii po inostrannym delam Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, 2/2/1985,” 
GARF, A-385, op. 13, d. 61116, l. 25. 
83 Salomon, “Marketing Socialism,” 198n.  
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million dollars in contemporary and 16 million in 2015 dollars, according to official 
Soviet conversion rates). However, in the same year, it suffered a total operational loss in 
rubles of 1.8 million.84 These figures underlay an important dynamic. The Soviet state 
subsidized Intourist's daily domestic ruble-denominated operations it could freely issue, 
so that it could earn hard currency it could not. Given the fact that Soviet exchange rates 
did not reflect the purchasing power of the ruble, the economic benefit of its operations is 
impossible to compute.85  
Scattered figures showing up in the Intourist archives after 1965 tell a similarly 
murky story. In 1989, its foreign currency proceeds grew by a factor of nearly 30, to 200 
million foreign exchange rubles.  In the same year, however, imports of equipment, 
computers, payments to foreign firms for new construction and other hard currency 
expenses stood at over 120 million. These figures, moreover, did not include the 46 
million foreign exchange rubles assigned for ongoing construction projects in the Twelfth 
Five-Year Plan (1986), extensive purchases of imported goods for resale to foreign 
tourists, and the hundreds of millions the Soviet government paid foreign firms for hotel 
construction and imports of furniture, equipment and technology for Intourist facilities 
since the late 1960s - operations often not included on Intourist’s balance sheets.86   
In short, given the state of our sources, it is quite impossible to ascertain how 
                                                          
84 “Balans dokhodov i raskhodov VAO Inturist za 1964 god,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, d. 313, ll. 2-3. 
85 I thank Jacob Feygin for helping me make sense of Intourist balance statements. 
86 For income see, “Ob usovershenstvovanii upravleniia i dalneishem razvitie inostrannogo turizma v 
RSFSR, 3/12/1990,” GARF, f. A-10004, op. 1, d. 806, l. 2. For expenditures, “Postanovlenie kollegiii 
Gosudarstennogo komiteta SSSR po inostrannomu turizmu, n. 31/7, 1989, “GARF, f. 9612, op.3, d. 2108, 
ll. 8-14.  For construction costs: “B.N Temnikov [Chair, Main Administration of Foreign Tourism, RSFSR] 
to N.I Maslennikov [Chair, Gosplan RSFSR], 8/1/1986,” GARF, f. A-10004, op.1, d. 735, l. 20.” 
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much foreign currency Intourist contributed to Soviet state coffers. We can however 
conclude that based by the words and deeds of its principals, it fell far short of the 
expectations they set for themselves. As Intourist officials freely conceded in internal 
discussions from the early 1970s, their institution was chronically ailing:  hard currency 
proceeds were growing not because of improving efficiency of Intourist operations, but 
due to the 'natural' year over year growth in foreign tourism (the income Intourist derived 
per tourist remained constant or deteriorated, even as tourist flows to the Soviet Union 
grew steadily).87 As a result, as the Central Committee official M.A Anisimov put it in 
remarks laying bare the Soviet state’s vision of Intourist’s role in the political economy of 
socialism, Intourist was failing in its one and only task: obtaining foreign currency that 
could be exchanged for new factories, a condition he and the Central Committee he 
represented found “shameful.”88 
 Despite Anisimov’s insistence on economic rationality, the language of shame 
and anxiety invoked by him indicates that more was at stake than just foreign currency 
proceeds.  After all, throughout our period, Intourist generally met the targets set by 
central planners, and whenever it fell short, it could always receive subsidies from the 
state- conditions that would have left most Soviet enterprise managers overjoyed. Their 
emotive response to Intourist’s failures evokes therefore a series of important questions. 
                                                          
87 “S.S Nikitin to Aleksei Kosygin, 16/11/1972,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 611, ll. 37-38; “Stenogramma 
zasedaniia Soveta pri Glavnomu Upravleniiu po inostrannomu turizmu pri SM SSSR po voprosu o 
podbore, podgotovke, povyshenii kvalifikatsii kadrov, zanimaiushchikhsia obsluzhivaniem inostrannykh i 
sovetskikh turistov, 27/1/1974,” GARF, f. 9612, op.3 d. 837, l. 70. 
88  “Stenogramma,” GARF f. 9612, op.3 d. 931, l. 53. 
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Why did Intourist officials endorse so uncritically the complaints of their guests? Why 
weren’t they happy with using state subsidies to pad their balance sheets, as so many 
Soviet officials did?  If, as it might be argued, the story of Intourist can be told in an 
optmistic key, depicting the abandonment of Stalinist autarchy in favor of global 
interaction,89 why were Intourist officials so harsh on themselves? Should historians 
follow their lead, or describe how, despite systemic constraints, Intourist grew into a 
corporate giant and a global brand to boot? 
 Furthermore, the story depicted in Intourist’s archives captures its story as 
perceived  from the center. From this point of view, the history of Intourist consisted in 
carefully navigating between the Scylla of the Soviet state and the Charybdis of 
Intourist’s foreign clientele. This story is, of course, not the only one could tell. If, for 
example, much of Intourist's history, as told by the documents left by its central 
management, depicts it as an impoverished body struggling for its place in the sun, other 
stories could be told depicting Intourist as a machine hoovering desperately needed 
foreign proceeds from the republics to the center,90 or as a centralist bully ignoring the 
needs of cities other than Moscow and Leningrad.91 
                                                          
89 Salomon, “Land of Future,” p. 291. Radchenko, Inturist v Ukraine, and Aleksei Popov, “Marafon 
gostepriimstva” take a rather more skeptical view of Intourist's performance, a point of view I share. 
90 One Estonian researcher argues that Intourist siphoned hundreds of millions of hard currency rubles from 
the Republic to the Center, (Reiner Jaakson, “Tourism in Transition in Post-Soviet Estonia,” Annals of 
Tourism Research 43, no.3 (1996), 620-621. 
91  “M.A  Ponomarev and T. S Sushkov, [Vladimir Oblispolkom]  to K.T Mazurov, [First Deputy Chairman 
Sovmin SSSR], n/d, 1976,” GARF, f. 9612, op.3, d. 1004, l. 69. 
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 However, a business history of Intourist from the perspective of its management 
has much to offers to scholars of the late Soviet period. Such a history offers a view of 
the economic development of late socialism from the point of view of one, not 
particularly important, actor, in the exceptionally complex institutional network that 
constituted the Soviet party-state.92 At the same time, it was one of the few Soviet bodies 
for which engagement with the outside world was not an onerous duty, but a core 
activity.93 As such, the difficulties Intourist management encountered in providing the 
level of service it wished to offer its guests, failures that often look like pages from a dark 
comedy in both the archival record and in the pages of this dissertation, underscore a 
serious reality: the perils the Soviet economy and way of life faced when they opened up 
to the outside world and started to measure themselves by the Western yardstick. The 
tales of woe covered in this chapter, in other words, are reflections not so much of 
objective failures as of the ways the dreams of Intourist officials clashed with the realities 
of the socialist system. Given the crucial importance of the imaginations and perceptions 
of socialist elites to the ultimate unraveling of the socialist system,94the subjective, 
discursive nature of the seemingly dry and business-like pages of Intourist's records 
                                                          
92 Valerie Bune, Subversive Institutions: the Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
93 On export aversion in socialist systems, see, János Kornai, The Socialist System: the Political Economy 
of Communism (Princeton: NJ, 1992), 345-351 and Per Högselius, Red Gas: Russia and the Origins of 
European Energy Dependence (London: Palgrave McMillan, 2012), 37-38. For empirical evidence from 
the Soviet case, see Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, “Red Globalization: the Political Economy of Soviet Economic 
Relations in the 1950s and 1960s,” PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2009, ch. 4.  
94 See Stephen Kotkin, Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment (New 
York: Modern Library, 2009). 
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makes them that much more important for understanding the encounter between the 
Soviet Union and the West.  
 Another, less discursive reason to study the business history of Intourist relates to 
what it can teach us about the nature of the modernization of the Soviet Union's famously 
deficient service sector. Recent works by Dianne Koenker on Soviet domestic tourism 
and Natalya Chernyshova on Soviet consumerism in the long 1970s point out that 
towards the end of the Brezhnev period the Soviet services sector was rapidly 
modernizing and producing what was at least a reasonable facsimile of the Western 
consumer experience.95 By examining the history of a Soviet organization committed to 
reproducing the experience of capitalist consumption in a socialist country as the only 
way to fulfill its overall production goals, we can evaluate the possibilities, dangers, and 
limitations of the nascent Soviet post-industrial transformation. 
 Still more important, Intourist, as noted above, was a highly peculiar institution. 
On the one hand, it was clearly recognizable to a Western observer as a vertically 
integrated corporation, working in a changing, logistically and technologically complex 
market. As provider of goods and services, it was a commercial enterprise competing a 
global capitalist market intensely focused on serving the needs of consumers. On the 
other hand, to obtain the goods it marketed to its clients, it acted as a consumer in a 
wholly different institutional context, in which consumers were, all too often, an 
afterthought.   A business history of Intourist is therefore an opportunity to explore from 
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the ground up the economic transformations that growing Soviet exposure to global 
markets created, as well as the strict limits imposed on such transformation by the 
political economy of state socialism.  
  
  Intourist and the Soviet Economy 
 
The most basic fact about any economic order, writes János Kornai in his seminal study 
of state socialism, is that “whenever a relation subsists between two or more persons or 
organizations, their activity requires coordination of some sort.”96 While, as generations 
of observers and scholars agreed, the planned Soviet economy was largely a myth, 
bureaucratic coordination mechanisms (administrative price setting, production quotas, 
central distribution of resources and labor and, when all else failed, extra-economic 
coercion) played a much larger role in the Soviet economy than they did in market-
oriented economies.97  This correlation of political and economic power led, among other 
things, to the creation of economic conglomerates monopolizing entire economic fields, 
with Intourist assuming that role for the international tourist industry. However, even the 
most powerful Soviet trust or branch ministry faced a struggle for power and resources 
between itself and its economic peers and between its central managers and their local 
agents. Paraphrasing Marx, one might say that the history of the Soviet economy is the 
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history of such struggles. This holds especially true for Intourist, a body that on the one 
hand relied on widespread cooperation from other bodies in order to house, feed, 
transport and entertain its guests, and on the other hand, possessed little political power 
and had therefore to negotiate its way on largely hostile terrain.   
 The most salient fact for the institutional history of Intourist is that, for much of 
its existence, this universally recognized brand name was somewhat of a misnomer. From 
its foundation in 1929 to the 1960s, Intourist was officially known as the All-Union Joint 
Stock Company Intourist [vsesoiuznoe aktsionernoe obshchestvo, (VAO) Inturist] a 
peculiar legal form that allowed it to deal with foreign partners on a commercial basis.98 
However, in 1964, Intourist was subsumed into a new body, the State Foreign Tourism 
Administration [Upravlenie po inostrannomu turizmu pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR].  This 
body was initially composed of the logistical and administrative apparat of the old 
Intourist, the joint stock company itself, and newly-formed republican Foreign Tourism 
Administrations.99 In 1969, the joint stock company ceased separate existence, and was 
merged into the Administration, which was renamed into the Main Foreign Tourism 
Administration [Glavnoe upravlenie po inostrannomu turizmu pri Komitete Ministrov 
SSSR]. In 1983, the Main Administration was re-organized into the State Committee for 
Foreign Tourism [Gosudarstvennyi Komitet po inostrannomu turizmu], and thus for the 
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first time became a ministerial-level institution.100 Finally, between 1988 and 1990, the 
State Committee was abolished, and the Joint Stock Company Intourist reappeared- only 
to be subsumed in a devastating privatization struggle.101 
 These bureaucratic transformations are seemingly negligible enough so that 
clients, contemporary observers, historians, and indeed this author all use Intourist as a 
useful shorthand for the varieties of organizational forms the Soviet foreign tourism 
monopoly took. However, these name changes are directly related to the most precious of 
currencies in the Soviet economic realm: institutional affiliations and the power inherent 
in them.  
  From its formation to 1965, Intourist was not an independent institution, but an 
appenage of other institutions, including, briefly, the NKVD. From 1939 until 1964, 
Intourist settled in as a division of the Foreign Trade Ministry. Given the Ministry's 
mandate to earn foreign currency for the Soviet state, this seemed like a natural 
arrangement. However, perhaps because between 1945 and 1955 Intourist did nothing 
particularly meaningful, it had a difficult relationship with the Ministry, with Intourist 
officials bitterly complaining about ministerial neglect.102 The pay scale was far below 
those of other divisions in the Ministry, as did their prestige levels. For example, when an 
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Intourist employee was moved to a position in the Protocol Department of the Ministry, 
he was warned to “unlearn the ugly habits you picked up at Intourist.”103 
 Due to its marginal status, Intourist struggled with its role as coordinating 
mechanism for the flow of foreign traffic when tourism in the Soviet Union picked up in 
the late 1950s. In a memorandum he penned for Khrushchev, Vladimir Ankudinov, 
Intourist’s chief, drew up a long list of institutions with which Intourist had to cooperate. 
The Ministries of Civilian Fleet, Civil Aviation, and Railroads were in charge of 
transporting tourists.  The Ministry of Trade supplied Intourist facilities with food and 
other consumer goods and the Ministry of Culture was in charge of providing them with 
entertainment. The KGB and MVD policed tourist traffic, and republican organizations 
and ministries, local Soviets and party organizations had to attend to their care in their 
areas of jurisdiction.104  None of these organizations, Ankudinov implied, viewed tourism 
as a pressing concern, and a mere division of the Foreign Trade Ministry did not have 
enough bureaucratic heft to force them to do so. Therefore, he concluded, a Foreign 
Tourism Administration with the right to impose its will on other state institutions in its 
field of competence was required.105 This memorandum was initially rejected by the state 
authorities in a way that demonstrated Intourist’s marginal status: Anastas Mikoyan, then 
the First Deputy Chair of the Soviet of Ministers, responded to a previous appeal on the 
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topic with a terse and vaguely threatening note: “so, you want a committee?!” (chto, 
komitet zakhoteli?).106 
   Despite this snub from above, Ankudnov's plan was realized in 1964. 
Unfortunately, I was not able to find documents shedding light on the lobbying that led to 
this policy reversal. But he reasons for Intourist’s sudden ascent are easy enough to 
guess. The early 1960s saw a sharp upswing in Soviet imports of Western technology that 
had to be paid for in hard currency. Especially before oil and gas became major Soviet 
exports, tourism was one of the most appealing options for improving the Soviet balance 
of payments. We’ve already seen that Khrushchev toyed with the idea of making the 
Soviet Union into a tourist Mecca. Even before his Yugoslav trip described in the 
Introduction, he personally initiated the construction of a hotel for wealthy foreigners not 
far from his favorite vacation haunt in the Crimea.107 Even after his ouster, his more 
sober successors viewed tourism development as a priority item, and accordingly 
approved a massive expansion plan for Intourist.108  
 And yet, as both Intourist clients and managers knew, neither money nor 
institutional independence was a panacea for Intourist’s ailments. Here again, 
institutional arrangements were key. According to the charter of the new Administration, 
it bore total responsibility for the planning, development, financing, marketing, and 
administration of foreign tourism. The charter also established two other bodies: a 
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Council for Foreign Tourism [Sovet po turizmu], a coordinating body that brought 
together Intourist and the other all-Union institutions involved in foreign tourism, and 
republican-level Foreign Tourism Administrations, tasked with conveying Intourist’s 
wishes to republican and local institutions.109   
 However, this institutional design was not enough to overcome Intourist's 
significant weaknesses as a player on the Soviet institutional field, weaknesses that were 
furthermore exacerbated by flaws in its new institutional scheme. Most fundamentally, in 
an economy in which producers had significant advantages over consumers, Intourist was 
at a significant disadvantage as a consumer that produced no tangible material goods and 
could not sell or barter its goods to other Soviet organizations.110 To overcome this 
handicap, it needed administrative power – which it sorely lacked.   Perhaps because the 
the political nature of Intourist’s work with foreigners, was the politically-oriented 
Foreign Cadres Department, 111 and not one of the powerful departments that oversaw 
various sectors of the Soviet economy that served as Intourist’s curator at the Central 
Department.112 Neither of Intourist’s chiefs between the 1950s and the 1980s, Ankudinov 
and his 1968 replacement, Sergei Nikitin, was a member of the Central Committee or any 
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other important party-state institution.113 The Foreign Tourism Council was more or less 
politely ignored by Intourist’s partners, rarely met, and did not improve inter-institutional 
coordination to any significant extent.114 
Coordination within Intourist also far from given. While republican tourism 
administrations coordinated relationships between Intourist departments and republican 
institutions, the center maintained managerial and financial authority over all Intourist 
facilities.115 This arrangement meant that, by and large, Intourist facilities were outside 
the logistical chains and networks of exchange that defined economic life in their 
localities. 
 In short, whatever particular form it took, Intourist’s existence was defined by a 
struggle to impose its will on partners which had little desire to work with it. This 
struggle extended to nearly all interactions Intourist had with Soviet institutions, from its 
failure to obtain reliable train and airline schedules from the relevant organizations, 
through the defeats it faced as it fought for office space,116 and up to the herculean efforts 
it had to exert in order to obtain branded briefcases for its guides.117 Nowhere was this 
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reality more pronounced than in the great difficulties Intourist faced when feeding and 
housing its clientele. 
 
 
  Intourist and the Deficit Economy 
 
In the postwar period, Twister’s homelesness episode could easily be read by a 
despairing Intourist official as an ascerbic comment about the fundamental clash between 
the capitalist offerings Intourist sold, and the socialist institutional arrangements it had to 
navigate in order to provide its clientele the services they purchased. Already by the early 
1960s, tourism to the Soviet Union far surpassed its prewar level. Intourist's hotel base, 
however, remained more or less constant until 1965. As a result, over 85% of the hotel 
space used by Intourist belonged to other organizations, most often city soviets. In 
Moscow in 1962 for example, Intourist required 6,400 rooms in hotels owned by the city 
to accommodate its needs.118 This number of rooms reserved for Intourist was determined 
administratively, with a set quota of rooms assigned to Intourist at the beginning of each 
tourist season, and adjusted on the basis of both foreign and domestic demand (in theory) 
and inter-institutional haggling (in practice) throughout the year.  
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 For two major reasons, this situation created a variety of conflicts between 
Intourist and its hosts. First, hotel room deficits were a significant problem in all Soviet 
cities.119  This situation was even worse in Moscow, by far the most prominent tourist 
center of the Soviet Union, where Intourist clients had to compete for hotel rooms with 
out-of-town Soviet officials and foreigners visiting the Soviet Union on official business, 
putting both Intourist and city officials in difficult situations.120 Second, in the 1960s, all 
foreign currency proceeds from foreign tourism were collected by Intourist and 
transferred to the central state budget, meaning that local authorities had little or no 
incentive in hosting foreigners. That situation was ameliorated somewhat after 1969, 
when the Soviet government allowed Intourist to forward up to 10% of its proceeds to 
republican administrations to be spent purchasing imported equipment for hotels owned 
by local soviets. However, this incentive was insufficient to fundamentally transform 
relations between local soviets and Intourist.  In 1986, for instance, the RSFSR received 
10 million foreign exchange rubles, a sum not nearly sufficient for its needs in equipment 
and construction funds.121 Given this lack of financial inducements, as far as local Soviets 
were concerned, their administrative needs far outweighed Intourist’s commercial 
considerations. 
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 As a result of these realities, relations between Intourist and local soviets were 
extremely acrimonious. Fights broke out over the ownership of major hotels, including 
Leningrad’s reknowned tsarist-era Evropeiskaia and Astoriia.122  Local authorities made 
concerted efforts to boot foreign tourists from their hotels during major events.123 The 
most determined fights took place over Intourist room quotas. Arguing that the needs of 
Soviet economic, administrative and scientific bodies (the main client base of Soviet 
hotels) should not be outweighed by the demands of foreign tourism, local authorities 
furiously tried to reduce Intourist’s quotas. Since relations between the local soviets and 
Intourist were not based on legal contracts, but on administrative decisions, the only 
recourse the latter had was to appeal to Party and state authorities.  However, even when 
Intourist managed to obtain positive administrative outcomes, success in obtaining 
needed hotel space was far from guaranteed. 
 For example, in Leningrad in 1958, the Leningrad local soviet (Lenispolkom) 
waged a valiant delaying battle against Intourist. After an initial quota of 700 rooms was 
assigned to Intourist, with the personal involvement of Frol Kozlov, the Vice Chairman 
of the all-Union Council of Ministers, the Lenispolkom refused to execute the decision. 
After further negotiations involving senior party officials, the Leningraders relented, and 
promised to supply the rooms. However, when the local Intourist department tried to 
make orders [zaiavki] for the rooms it was promised, it was refused. In a meeting 
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between Ankudinov and the chairman of the Administrative Department of Lenispolkom, 
the latter promised yet again to provide 700 rooms. However, in a subsequent meeting of 
the Leningrad party committee, the Leningrad official again reneged on his promise and 
even “indicated that in the future Intourist will receive no rooms at all.”124 
 While this was an extreme case, the basic contours of the room deficit problem 
remained constant until the end of the Soviet era. In 1976, as détente brought more and 
more foreigners to Soviet soil, the Moscow soviet unilaterally reduced Intourist's quota in 
its hotels from 5,800 to 4,000, announcing the cuts in March, after Intourist had already 
signed most of its contracts with its Western partners. Unable to come to an agreement, 
as both sides had fewer rooms in their possession than their minimal plans for the year 
required, they had no choice but to appeal to the Soviet government to mediate.125 A few 
years earlier in Kyiv, Intourist was joined in the battle for hotel rooms by the republican 
KGB, which argued that the local Soviet was sabotaging surveillance efforts by 
confiscating hotel rooms from Intourist.126 In the absence of material incentives, only 
“administrative resources” could help Intourist get its way. 
As was the case so often in the Soviet Union, food supplies were another serious 
flashpoint. Here Intourist faced problems of both production and institutional 
coordination. Complaints about deficits of meat, milk products, vegetables, and 
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especially delicatessen were a staple of Intourist correspondence. Strikingly, the situation 
in this regard was becoming worse, not better as the decades went by: by the early 1980s, 
Finnish tourists were complaining about shortages of the most basic of Soviet staples, 
potatoes.127 
  While these deficits surely had something to do with the chronic problems Soviet 
agriculture faced, this was surely not the entire story: after all, production difficulties did 
not impact the operations of the famous “closed” food shops catering to Soviet elites. The 
problem was again with relatively low priority other institutions assigned to production 
for Intourist, which required items of a quality few Soviet consumers could dream of. For 
instance, breakfast items favored by foreign tourists, for instance small packages of jam 
and butter, were not manufactured by Soviet industry, to Intourist’s great shagrin.128 Even 
when Soviet industry produced desireable items, Intourist often remained outside the 
supply chains that connected them to the markets. Soviet industry produced ample 
amounts of delicatessen items (caviar, sturgeon, and so forth) for export. Intourist 
restaurants, by contrast, suffered endemic shortages of such products. The reason for this 
situation was simple: the Ministries of Trade and Foreign Trade refused to categorize 
Intourist restaurants as export-oriented institutions, even though they catered to 
foreigners and earned hard currency, as sending produce to Intourist would have reduced 
their own foreign currency earnings, since Intourist paid other Soviet organizations in 
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domestic rubles.129 On the local level, the fact that Intourist facilities were outside 
republican chains of supply meant that trade organizations kept them at very low priority, 
a condition that led to serious disruptions even in such high priority locations as Sochi.130 
 Supplying tourists with souvenirs and high-end products was another problem 
Intourist lacked the resources and administrative heft to resolve.131 A series of 
investigations conducted into lagging sales of such items in the mid-1960s found that 
production lines were obsolete, knowledge of market conditions was missing, and 
manufacturers showed little interest in working for the tourist market, since such work 
required a high level of investment, with hard currency returns going to Intourist, not to 
the manufacturers. Furthermore, since mass-produced souvenirs were considered luxury, 
and therefore low priority products [produkty ne pervoi nadobnosti], the Ministry of 
Trade set their prices at levels above what tourists were willing to pay.132And even when 
prices were right, Soviet souvenirs failed to sell, because manufacturers lacked the 
capacity to package them in anything but simple cardboard.133 
  Yet again, the problem was rooted in incentives: as long as Intourist made 
foreign-currency demoninated profits and paid manufacturers in domestic rubles, the 
latter had no particular desire to work for the demanding foreign market. The Soviet 
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government, concerned with the lost opportunities to earn hard currency that these 
conditions created, recognized this reality, and decreed in 1964 that up to 50% of all 
proceeds from hard currency sales of souvenirs were to be reinvested in imports of, 
among other items, machinery for souvenir producing factories.134 Yet, even this 
measure, which after all diverted desperately needed hard currency towards the 
production of low priority items, was not enough to overcome the problem. In 1968, the 
Russian Foreign Tourism Administration complained, the Soviet Union could provide 
less than half of tourist demand for furs, gold, amber, and other luxury items - as the 
Ministry of Trade refused to classify deliveries to Intourist hotels and their Berezka stores 
as counting towards’ manufacturers export quotas.135 Four years later, Nikitin complained 
to the Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin, things had not improved at all - and the Soviet 
Union was losing as much as 25 million foreign currency rubles per annum in funds that 
foreigners reconverted from rubles to their currencies, after they failed to spend them on 
Soviet products- more than twice the sum the Soviet Union made from souvenir sales.136 
 Even more strikingly, even when the bureacratic mechanisms of the Soviet state 
assigned top priority for production for foreigners, their mode of operations could prove 
to be counter-productive. Amber was, according to Krupin’s 1968 estimates, the top 
deficit item in Berezka stores, with as much of 90% of demand for it going unmet.137 
According to an investigation into the matter by the State Control Committee, these 
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deficits were rooted in the vast performance gap between the Soviet Union’s two amber 
processing facilities: Kar'er in Kaliningrad, and Daile in Klaipėda (Lithuania).138  The 
former was a massive enterprise, operating under the auspices Rosiuvelirtorg, the 
institution that, among other things, ran the Berezkas. As such, it was the sole supplier of 
Intourist's clientele, and a major beneficiary of the 1964 decisions on the development of 
the souvenir industry, receiving large amounts of West Germant machinery in the 
preceding 3 years. The latter belonged to the Lithuanian Union of Artists, sold nothing to 
foreigners and owned no imported machinery. Despite these advantages, State Control 
found that Kar’er produced low-quality and unfashionable product, and took years to put 
to its designs to market. Meanwhile, Daile produced fashionable products, with its 
product cycle taking months, not years.  
 This curious condition, State Control inspectors discovered, came exactly because 
of the priority status Kar’er enjoyed. In order to launch a new product line, it had to 
receive approval from Rosiuvelirtorg. Rosiuvelirtorg, in turn, required the State Planning 
Committee to set production quotas and hard currency prices for each new product line- a 
process that could require up to two years, meaning that Kar’er product was out of 
fashion by the time it hit stores. At the same time, Daile, due to its marginal institutional 
affiliation, could set its own prices and immediately market its products through local 
Lithuanian stores. Thus, the products that were sold in Intourist hotels and Berezkas were 
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below global standards, while Daile's superior product reached almost no foreign 
customers. While no Intourist official would ever put it this way, no less than Twister, the 
story of Daile and Kar’er served to illustrate the radical disjuncture between Soviet 
institutional arrangements, and the rules of the global market in which Intourist operated. 
 
  Managing Intourist   
 
So far, this chapter has focused on the ways in which Intourist navigated the complex and 
often dysfunctional Soviet economic coordination mechanisms. However, like any large 
organization, it was not a unitary body acting as a transmission belt to the wishes of its 
principals, but a complex bureaucracy in which a variety of agents acted to promote their 
interests which sometimes did and sometimes did not coincide with the interests of the 
organization itself (as defined by its principals.) These organizational dynamics, 
moreover, played out in a large, diffuse organization that was shaped both by the unique 
institutional context of the Soviet system and the emerging global context of a service 
economy anchored by ever increasing information flows. In the following pages, I will 
examine at some length two institutional dynamics to which these realities gave rise: 
tensions between Intourist's principals and their agents, and the informal practices that the 
latter turned to in order to both accomplish their tasks and promote their material 
interests.  
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From 1964, when Intourist underwent its first major postwar reorganization, to the 
perestroika years, when it underwent first an attempt at commercial reform and then a 
rapid implosion, Intourist took many institutional forms, but its basic organizational 
principles remained the same.139 It was divided into a central, Moscow-based and 
functionally organized apparat, and geographically organized sub-units. At the top of its 
pyramid stood its First Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and its board (kollegiia), consisting 
of the heads of various central departments and divisions.  
 Given the rapidly evolving size and complexity of Intourist's operations, its 
structure was in constant flux, and accounting for its many permutations is both 
impractical and unnecessary. Crudely speaking, however, one could functionally divide it 
into three component parts: propagandistic, economic and logistical. Intourist's 
propaganda work lies outside the scope of this chapter. Economic sub-units included the 
Commercial Division, the body that designed and marketed tour packages, the Financial 
[valiutnoe-finansovoe] Division in charge of formulating plans and price policies, and 
smaller sub-units charged with accounting and oversight.  Finally, Intourist's logistical 
section included a variety of bodies in charge of overseeing the organization’s sprawling 
possessions, managing logistics and supplies, and ensuring the smooth flow of 
information. 
                                                          
139 For a sketch of Intourist's institutional structure in 1964, see: “Struktura VAO Inturist na 1/1/1964 god,” 
GARF, g. 9612, op. 4, d. 3, ll. 3-5. For the same in 1987, at the end of Intourist's evolution and shortly 
before the beginning of its devolution, see “Prikaz 2- DSP, 21/01/87,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 1941, ll. 8-
9. 
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 Outside the central apparat, Intourist’s organizational structure was defined by 
institutional duality. As mentioned above, Intourist facilities were subject to an awkward 
system of dual subordination. Financially and organizationally, its facilities were under 
the direct control of the central apparat. At the same time, the republican Administrations 
were in charge of both overseeing their daily activities and facilitating their relationships 
with republican organizations, without which the work of local managers became 
difficult, if not impossible.  
 The expansive mechanism described above functioned in a similar manner to that 
of all other Soviet economic institutions. Intourist's main plan indicators, namely the 
desired number of tourists per year, profit goals, and hard currency objectives, were set 
by the State Planning Committee, but could be negotiated down or ratcheted up in a 
dynamic manner.140 Intourist profits were returned to central and republican authorities. 
Where necessary, the state provided Intourist with subsidies. Within the organization, the 
central apparat set plans and allocated resources for localities – but these were also 
subject to negotiation. Such negotiations were, however, only one aspect of a series of 
endemic conflicts that pitted republican administrations against the center, peripheral 
organizations against the central apparat, and, indeed, different central apparat divisions 
against each other.   
                                                          
140 Such alterations occurred, for example, after major international shocks, for instance of the 1973 
October War and the ensuing oil boycott. See, for example, “O merakh po obespecheniiu vypolneniia 
valiutnogo plana 1974 g. kommercheskim upravleniem, 15/1/1974,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 830, ll. 8-10. 
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 Quite understandably, the awkward conditions of the republican Administration 
were cause for sharp arguments between them and the central apparat. This was 
especially the case for the Russian Foreign Tourism Administration, which forcefully 
argued that given the fact that the vast majority of tourist traffic in the Soviet Union was 
in Russian cities, it should have a much stronger voice in Intourist's affairs.141 Shawn 
Salmon argues that such arguments were part of a process in which Intourist was 
gradually shaking off its pan-Soviet identity and focusing its business on selling Russia to 
the world.142 However, the underlying theme of the debate between Russian and all-
Union Intourist officials was administrative. The Russian Administration (as well as 
many other republican Administrations) was interested in asserting more control over 
Intourist facilities for two reasons.  First, as described above, in the absence of any assets 
with which to manage and barter, republican Administrations had little standing vis-à-vis 
both the center and other republican bodies and thus could not fulfill their role as 
advocates for the development of foreign tourism in their republics. The second cause of 
conflict was money. The Administrations were republican institutions, and as such, they 
chafed under the rules of a system that pumped back 90% or more of the proceeds of 
what should have been their domains into the all-Union budget. Instead, they argued, the 
lion's share of Intourist's proceeds should be the property of the republican 
Administrations, so that the republican authorities could directly benefit from an industry 
                                                          
141 “Krupin to Nikitin, 28/6/1967,” GARF, f. 9612, op.  3, d. 41, ll. 161-164. “Krupin to to A.M Shkolnikov 
[Vice-Chairman, RSFSR Council of Ministers], n/d, April 1969,” GARF f. A-10004, op. 1, d. 85,l1. 97-
101. 
142 “Land of Future,” 268. 
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that after all “sold” their histories and cultures. While this issue did play a crucial role in 
Intourist’s eventual breakup along republican lines, it was rooted less in nationalist 
aspirations than in a very Soviet struggle over administrative resources.143 
 Similar tensions characterized inter-departmental relations inside the central 
apparat. Here, problems revolved less around policy-related issues than the politics of 
plan fulfillment. The plans for Intourist's commercial division, for example, set maximum 
numbers of tourists it could commit to receiving – numbers that took account of 
Intourist’s chronic resource shortages, but not the foreign currency goals set by the state.  
As exceeding plans was deemed less damaging than failing to hit planned targets, the 
sub-units of the division tended to sign contracts to receive more tourists than the quotas 
they were allotted.144 Since hotel rooms, restaurant spots, airline quotas and other 
resources were also rationed and, as we have seen, mobilizing outside resources was an 
often impossible task, this practice helped to stretch Intourist's already more than limited 
resources beyond the breaking point. 
 In an even more glaring example, competition between the Soviet Tourism 
Division, charged with sending Soviet tourists abroad, and the People's Democracies 
Department of the Commercial Division, in charge of receiving East European tourists, 
directly undermined Intourist's financial goals. Tourism to Eastern Europe was handled 
on the basis of a barter-based system of clearing agreements that presumed roughly 
                                                          
143  See the conclusion to this dissertation. 
144 “Stenogramma zasedaniia... 27/1/1974,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 837, l. 70. 
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equivalent incoming and outgoing bilateral tourist flows. In other words, if the number 
of, say, Soviet tourists in Poland exceeded the number of Polish tourists in the Soviet 
Union, Intourist had to compensate its Polish counterparty. In negotiating with the Polish 
side, however, the two Intourist sub units failed to coordinate their activities, the former 
pushing to maximize the number of tourists it wished to send abroad, and the other 
minimizing the number of tourists it was willing to receive, thus both causing economic 
damages and endangering relations with Intourist's Polish partners.145 
 While conflicts at the center could and did affect Intourist's bottom line, much of 
its everyday existence was defined by friction between its central apparat and agents on 
the periphery. On some level, such tensions were an inevitable result of the gap between 
Moscow, Leningrad and the rest of the Soviet Union.  For instance, when a Council of 
Ministers official referred to the non-Moscow facilities of Intourist’s network as the 
'provinces' in a 1960 meeting of Intourist’s cadres from the localities, his words caused a 
wave of indignation in the crowd.146 
 Such psychological factors however were not the main driver of the problematic 
relationships between center and periphery. Rather, they were the result of the profound 
tension between the centralized nature of Intourist, the far-flung nature of its network, 
                                                          
145  “Protokol n. 12 zasedaniia kollegii Glavnogo Upravlenia po inostrannomu turizmu pri SM SSSR, 
17/6/1977,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 1106, 120-123. 
146  “Protokol vsesoiuznogo soveshchaniia rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov VAO Inturista, 17/1/1961,” 
GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, d. 286, l. 144 
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and the constraints that technology and the incentive structure of the Soviet system put on 
the center's ability to both control and provide aid and resources for the periphery.  
 The conflicts and complaints this reality created were myriad. Hotel managers in 
Moscow, one witty Intourist official complained, practiced spikhotekhnika  (the art and 
science of shoving problems on someone else), directing tourists to address the central 
apparat with their problems and difficulties.147 The Commercial Division, the periphery 
complained, did not have proper information about conditions on the ground, and sold 
tourists promises the local departments could not fulfill.148 The Commercial Department 
complained that hotel managers preferred to host tourists sponsored by other 
organizations (for example, businessmen working with industrial ministries) at the 
expense of tourist groups sent by the Commercial Division, as the former paid higher 
prices for rooms.  Hotel managers complained that they had few incentives to sell theater 
tickets and guided tours for hard currency, as such income was assigned to the 
Commercial Department’s hard currency quota.149 The central apparat berated localities 
for distorting their reports, hiding damning facts, and failing to provide the center with 
accurate information about tourist movements, while the localities retorted that they were 
swamped with paperwork and complex instructions (a point that Intourist management 
                                                          
147   “Protokol no. 10 Pravlenia VAO Inturist, 21/5/1965,” GARF, f. 9612, op.3, d. 49, l. 148. 
148   “Protokol Soveshchania... 19-21/3/1968,” GARF, f. 9612, op.3, d. 255, l. 189 
149  “Spravka ob ispolzovanii nomernogo fonda gostinits inturista v gorode Moskve, n/d, 1978,” GARF f. 
9612, op. 3, d. 1211, l. 11-12, “Protokol soveshchania... 19-21/3/1968,” GARF, f. 9612, op.3, d. 255, l. 33. 
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not only conceded, but often bemoaned).150 According to the localities, food, equipment 
and machinery shortages in Intourist facilities were due to faulty work of the central 
logistical departments.151 According to central logistical departments, they were the result 
of the localities' proclivity to hoarding, incompetence, and collusion with local authorities 
to make Intourist, not the latter, bear the brunt of supplying local facilities with deficit 
items.152 
  Intourist's leadership was anything but oblivious to the frictions described above. 
The policy response it devised to the problems that plagued its bureaucratic mechanisms 
reflected the tension between the centralization embedded in Intourist’s structure and the 
center's lack of sufficient administrative capacity to control its far-flung network. 
Intourist, for example, was an enthusiastic participant in the Kosygin reforms (1965-
1969), which thought to delegate some decision-making authority to individual 
enterprises (in this case, hotels), and introduce “material incentives” (i.e profits) as a 
measure of managerial success.153 This reform, however, failed to impact Intourist 
operations, due to resistance from both localities and the central apparat. Hotel managers 
were concerned that the news system would make it harder for them to obtain resources 
                                                          
150 For several examples among many, see, “Prikaz po Pravleniu VAO Inturist, N. 65-B, 18/10/1965”, 
“Otchet o sostoianii i merakh po dalneishemu sovershestvovaniu bukgalterskogo ucheta, otchetnosti, i 
kontrolno-revizionnoi raboty v sisteme glavinturista,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 1007, ll. 134-143. 
151  “Spravka o khode vypolnenia utverzhdennym prikazom ot 30 maia 1971 g. n. 116 meropriatiem po 
obespecheniiu zamechanii i predlozhenii, vyskazannykh na vsesoiuznom soveshchanii rukovoditelei 
otdelenii, agenstv I predpriatii Inturista,” GARF f. 9612, op. 3, d. 513, ll. 157-164. 
152 See, for example,  “Prikaz nachalnika Upravleniia po inostrannomu turizmu pri SM RSFSR n. 17, 
17/4/1970,” GARF, f. A-10004, op. 1, d. 110, ll. 42-44,  “Otchet o komandirovke na predpriaiia 
Gokominturista SSSR raspolozhennye v Uzbekskoi SSSR, n/d, 1985,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 1754, ll. 
175-189. 
153 Salmon, “Land of Future,” 212-217. 
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from Intourist’s logistical departments,154 while the central apparat was concerned, as we 
had seen, that “material incentives” would lead hotel managers to prioritize obtaining 
guests via other organizations over fulfilling the directives of Intourist’s commercial 
departments. 
 After the Kosygin reforms failed to make a mark on Intourist, attempts at reform 
focused on centralization as path to better resource management. In the 1970s, Intourist 
started reorganizing its local departments, which until then exerted little control over 
Intourist hotels and restaurants, into more cohesive bodies, entitled hotel trusts 
[ob'edineniia]. The goal of this reform was twofold. First, the trusts were to take over 
many of the organizational and logistical functions of individual hotel managers, thus, in 
theory at least, obtaining savings by reducing manpower and reducing resource hoarding. 
Second, the trust manager was to become an administrative link between the Central 
apparat and local managers, and thus allow the former to better control the latter.155 
Another attempt at centralizing reform was taken in the early 1980s. During this period 
an experiment that allowed the Ukrainian and Armenian republican Administrations more 
control over Intourist facilities within their borders was rolled back.156 Moreover, the 
central apparat attempted to remake the republican Administrations into subordinate 
institutions, taking them out of the control of republican-level governments. This attack 
                                                          
154 “Spravka o voprosakh perevoda otdelenii i agenstv na khoziaistvennyi raschet, 17/3/1976,” GARF, f. 
9612, op. 3, d. 1005, ll. 231-238. 
155 I.A Riabova, “Sozdanie proizvodsvennykh obedinenii - vazhnoe napravlenie razvitiia khoziastvennogo 
rascheta   sisteme Glavinturista,” Problemy inostrannogo turizma v SSSR, 4 (1983), 71-85. 
156  “Protokol n. 31/83 zasedania komissii po sovershenstvovaniiu stuktury Glavnogo Upravlenia po 
inostrannomu n turizmu pri SM SSSR, 21/4/1983,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 1579, ll. 172-174. 
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was however rapidly rebuffed.157 This defeat as well as the entire pattern of resistance to 
control from above described in this section was a reminder of the extent to which 
realities on the ground gave local actors far more power than the formal structures of 
authority allowed them. Neither centrifugal nor centripetal forces could do much to 
change a status quo with which neither side was particularly satisfied. 
 
A look from Below 
 
So far, we have examined the history of Intourist from the perspectives of its clients and 
top management.  This is a story of deficits of material goods, of institutional power, of 
even basic competence, in which local cadres appear as impediments to better business 
practices at best, and as a gaggle of inept, perhaps malevolent, incompetents at worst. 
Viewed from a local perspective, the story looks markedly different, in a way that 
highlights the extent to which the Soviet Union was indeed the workers’ state - but in a 
very different sense than that which its founders intended. 
 To better understand how the Intourist system operated from the ground up, we 
must start by looking at its linchpins: the managers of Intourist hotels, restaurants and 
local departments. How did the balance sheets of their assets and liabilities look? At first 
                                                          
157  “O preobrazovanii Upravleniia po inostrannomu turizmu pri Sovete Ministrov RSFSR v Goskomitet 
RSFSR po inostrannomu turizmu, 05/07/1983,” GARF, f. A-10004, op. 1, d. 658, ll. 24-29. 
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glance, their position was not particularly envious. Local managers were to supply 
services at a level higher than any other Soviet institution, while locked out of the local 
supply chains and administrative networks. However, they were also in control of what 
was, for most Soviet people, the stuff of which consumer dreams were made: material 
items fit for consumption by foreigners. Armed with these assets, as well as with 
whatever administrative resources they could muster, Intourist's managers engaged in a 
complex system of informal exchanges that aimed to both promote their organizational 
goals, and their personal interests. 
 The most immediate goal of Intourist's local managers was rather straightforward: 
obtaining scarce material resources. One obvious method of doing so involved informal 
channels. Like many other economic functionaries, Intourist leaders widely used the 
services of tolkachi, black market and informal barter experts, to obtain food for their 
restaurants and scarce items for their hotels, paying them in both money and material 
objects they received from the state (for example, black caviar and other specialty 
items).158  Others exchanged favors with local institutions, by, for instance, writing off as 
unuseable out-of the-box imported supplies and selling them for symbolic prices to other 
institutions.159 Imported equipment  and high quality foodstuffs was a key to this sort of 
barter trade, and local managers did indeed flood the central logistical apparatus with 
                                                          
158 “Prikaz no. 78-B po pravelniiu  VAO 'Inturist', 5/7/1957.” GARF, f. 9612, op. 1, d. 386, ll.  157-158; 
“Prikaz Nachalnika Glavnogo Upravlenia po inostrannomu turizmu pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, 31, 
12/2/1971,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 514, ll. 67-68. 
159 “Prikaz po Glavnomu Upravleniiu po inostrannomu turizmu pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR n. 184, 
7/7/1972,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 620, l. 3. 
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request for imported materials even when, central officials complained, Soviet materiel 
was available.160 In one such case, the Intourist hotel in Dushanbe requested the center to 
provide it with $200,000 of imported products for its hard currency bar, even though it 
already had half a million dollars' worth of such items on hand. These facts, an auditor 
dryly noted, were especially surprising as the hard currency bar of the Dushanbe Intourist 
hotel was closed for business.161 From the point of view of the center such practices were 
incompetence at best, and corruption at worst. From the point of view of local managers, 
however, they were necessary preconditions for navigating the deficit system - and if they 
provided opportunities to skim off the top, so much the better. 
 Another crucial arena in which Intourist managers had to exercise their creativity 
was in the retention of their labor force. In this respect, Intourist had several serious 
disadvantages. First and foremost, as its cadres department complained repeatedly, the 
wages it could offer were lower than those in equivalent organizations.162 With few 
exceptions, it could also rarely offer its employees housing, childcare, and other welfare 
provisions that many other bigger and more powerful institutions could provide. In these 
circumstances, informal methods came to the fore. One common method to retain 
workers, the vast majority of whom were women straining under “dual burden” of both 
                                                          
160 “Spravka ob ispolzovanii importnogo oborudovaniia i materialov na predpriatiakh Glavinturista i o 
fel'etone v gazete Izvestia, 'Dzhin iz banki,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 10007, ll. 10-13. 
161 “Ekonomicheskii obzor khoziastvenno-finansovoi deiatelnosti predpriatii Glavnogo Upravleniia po 
inostrannomu tuirizmu pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR za 1976 god,” GARF, f. 9612, op.3, d. 1027, ll. 9-10. 
162 See, for example, “Otchet o rabote s kadrami v VAO Inturist za 1963 god,” GARF, f.9612, op.2, d. 315,  
l.4;  “Spravka o sostoianii raboty s kadrami i merakh ee ulucheniia, n/d, 1970,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 
427, l.71. 
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working and caring for their families, was providing them with deficit food items pilfered 
from the warehouses of Intourist restaurants, or using the writing-off method described 
aboveto provide bonuses for employees. Thus during several months in 1983, in Moscow 
alone, nearly one million’s rubles worth of consumer goods, and 20 tons of delicatessen, 
were provided to employees for kopecks on the (dollar equivalent) ruble. During the 
same time period, the Moscow hotel trust paid its employees a sum total of 90,000 rubles 
in illegal bonuses every day.163   
 So far, the practices described here were, even if strictly speaking illegal, aimed at 
promoting Intourist's organizational aims. However, Intourist managers were no angels. 
With paychecks  that, in line with the egalitarian ideology of the Soviet state, were 
sometimes lower than those of waiters who worked in their restaurants, and yet 
controlling extremely valuable resources, Intourist managers were constantly tempted to 
supplement their salaries. Quite often, the illegal practices they engaged in derived from 
the informal practices they employed in Intourist's service. For example, the manager of 
the famous Hotel Intourist in Moscow, desperate to obtain proper uniforms for his staff, 
negotiated directly a deal with a West-German textile firm in violation of Intourist 
protocols that limited such deals to the proper authorities in the central apparat.  Was the 
fact that he also obtained a number of high-quality suits for himself in the deal an act of 
corruption, or a simple bonus for a job well-done?164 In a similar manner, a State Control 
                                                          
163 “Protokol zasedania kollegii Goskomiteta po inostrannomu turizmu, 17/10/1983, “GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, 
d. 1634, ll. 98-90. 
164  “Spravka o faktakh zloupotreblenii v gostinitse Inturist, 08/07/1971” Tsentr khraneniia dokumentov 
posle 1917 goda, [TsKhD posle 1917], f. 734, op. 1, d. 388, ll. 7-8. 
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investigation in the early 1970s found that the manager of an Intourist hotel in Sochi 
hosted hundreds of Soviet citizens on his premises. Many of these guests were Georgian 
black marketeers, who presumably paid for the privilege of ostenstatiously staying in a 
hotel for foreigners.165 However, many others were referred to the hotel either by local 
bodies that held (or could take away) resources that the hotel needed (a woodworking 
factory, the Sochi concrete works, a military recruiting office, a municipal bus park), or 
other organizations that provided deficit items to the hotel (the Russian republican trade 
Rossbakaleia provided the hotel with 1.3 tons of black pepper, for instance). Such 
transactions were, technically speaking, illegal, but nevertheless crucial for managerial 
success in the late Soviet economy.166   Other misdeeds, however, were less ambiguous. 
In Moscow's car park, for example, the wives of senior Intourist officials used luxury 
vehicles for their own purposes while their husbands could purchase barely used vehicles 
at deep discounts.167 
 The work-lives of Intourist employees were also defined by the same interplay 
between low wages and a wide field of opportunities to enhance them by illegal means.  
Intourist's archives groan with tales of the myriad ways in which employees benefitted 
from easy access to its store of material goods. Restaurant workers, for example, diluted 
                                                          
 
165 On the Georgian black markets, and the ways in which Georgians were used by Soviet officialdom as 
scapegoats for the corruption of the late Soviet era, see Erick R. Scott, Familiar Strangers: The Georgian 
Disapora and the Evolution of Soviet Empire (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 155-
194. 
166 “Spravka o ser’eznykh nedostatkakh v provedenii soveshchanii i ispolzovanii svobodnogo nomernogo 
fonda dlia razmeshhcneniia sovetskikh grazhdan v sviazi s fel’etonami v gazetakh Pravda i 
Komsomolskaia Pravda,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 1007, ll. 115-117. 
167 See investigation files at GARF, f. 9527, op. 1, d. 5978. 
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patrons' drinks, replaced expensive drinks with cheaper ones, served portions smaller 
than the norms, or simply took off with stolen deficit food items.168 In Leningrad in the 
early 1960s, one bohemian taxi driver writes in his memoirs, high-class Intourist cars 
were used as private, illegal, taxis so often that the wealthy guests of the Evropeiskaia 
hotel who paid in advance for a chauffeured car had to use his decrepit cab as a 
replacement vehicle.169 Warehouses were a gold mine where plates, cups, silverware, bed 
sheets and many other items were ripe for the taking. Such practices were often covered 
up by accountants and facility managers, who unfailingly covered up for the graft.170 
Whether this widespread phenomenon was the result of collusion, criminal conspiracy, 
attempts to maintain the good name of one's enterprise, or indeed a welfare ethic that 
viewed access to pilfered goods as part of the benefits packages attendant on working in 
Intourist, is impossible to determine. It can be said with near certainty that, like the rest of 
the Soviet economy, work life in Intourist was based on what James Millar terms the 
“little deal”: an implicit arrangement in which workers and the Soviet state traded low 
wages for job security, and graft as a safe proposition to supplement one’s income.171 The 
implications of this arrangement are profound: while the global tourism industry is 
                                                          
168 Examples of such complaint were so common than it is practical to cite here (from about 60 revisions I 
have transcribed in my files, none fails to have at least some variation of these misdeeds in its bill of 
particulars).   
169 “Leonid S'htakelberg, “Pasynki pozdnoi imperii”, Zvezda, 1996(5), 21. 
170 In one revision in a hotel in Baku, for instance, it was discovered that over 1 million rubles worth of 
plates registered as “broken” by the local accountant in a few monts in 1971 alone. “Prikaz Nachalnika 
Glavnogo Upravlenia po inostrannomu turizmu pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, 115, 31/5/1971, GARF, f. 
9612, op. 3, d. 514, ll. 225-227. 
171 James R. Millar, “The Little Deal: Brezhnev’s Contribution to Acquisitive Socialism,” Slavic Review 44, 
no. 4(1985), 694-706. 
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renowned for its exploitative work practices, in Intourist, workers, not management, held 
the upper hand in labor relations - while the balance of payments of the Soviet state, let 
alone the wants and needs of foreign clients, were often an afterthought. 
 Foreigners were nevertheless the linchpin of another systematic perk of working 
for Intourist: hard currency payoffs. Waiters, for example, could get hard currency tips, 
and barmen allowed sex workers and black marketeers entrance to their bars for a hard 
currency feee.172 As we shall see in Chapter Three, such extracurricular activities were 
crucial for the survival of the complex world that “a-social elements” wove around 
foreigners. For our purposes, it suffices to know that according to oral history interviews 
conducted by Crimean historian Alexei Popov, such business opportunities constituted up 
to 70% of the income of an Intourist employee.173   
These operations could, of course, only exist with the connivance on Intourist 
senior cadres. Even before the Andropov-era assault on corruption exposed the 
widespread nature of such schemes, the head of Leningrad's powerful hotel trust, Sergei 
Sorokin, was arrested for extorting over 90,000 rubles from Intourist staff in bribes.174 
Memoir literature suggests that this was probably a vast under-estimation of the fortune 
he amassed.175 This arrest did not deter other culprits- and under Andropov, large 
                                                          
172 “Doklad na zasedanii Soveta po inostrannomu turizmu,” GARF, f.  9612, op. 3, d. 837, l. 91. 
“Stenogramma zasedaniia, 2/12/1985,” GARF, f. A-385, op. 13, d. 6116, l. 57 
173 Popov, “Marafon,” 288-289. 
174 “Protokol no. 1... 27/1/1974,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 837, l. 44. 
175 Leonid S'htakelberg, “Pasynki pozdnoi imperii” Valery Panov and George Pfeiffer, To Dance (London: 
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numbers of Intourist workers and their superiors were arrested, imprisoned, or removed 
for bribery and coverup of foreign currency speculation.176 
 
  
 
Intourist and Global Economic Networks  
 
 Bribery, corruption, theft, graft, barter: albeit usually denominated in rubles, not dollars, 
these activities were the inevitable (and, at times, salutory) effects of the social 
arrangements of the Little Deal and all were rooted in the peculiar rules of the Soviet 
political economy. Yet, another corruption case from the early 1980s was profoundly 
different, in a way that highlights the slow transformation of Intourist’s business practices 
and the states of minds of its senior employees in the twilight of the Soviet era. The case 
involved one E.V. Fillipov, the manager of Intourist-Reisen, Intourist’s wholly owned 
West-Berlin subsidiary. Fillipov concocted a complex scheme in which he obtained a 2.5 
million DM credit line from a West German Soviet-owned bank, which he used to 
purchase consumer goods he smuggled to the GDR, thus obtaining money to pay back 
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the loans he took. In parallel, he founded a West German firm which directly competed 
with Intourist-Reisen. 177 
Fillipov’s innovative shift from Soviet-style graft to Western-style credit 
manipulation reflects an important underlying reality of Intourist’s history in the late 
socialist era. So far in this chapter, the image we drew is that of a relatively static 
institution, struggling in 1985 against the same set of systemic constraints it fought in 
1955. However, Intourist’s everyday operations took place in the context of a global 
economic revolution: the explosion of the international travel and leisure industry, which, 
between 1960 and 1970 alone, grew tenfold (from 25 million international tourists’ trips 
taken in 1960 to 250 million in 1970).178 These incoming hordes of tourists had to be fed, 
housed and moved around, tasks that required significant capital investment and 
technological innovation. In direct competition with competitors at the cutting edge of the 
global travel revolution. More than any Soviet institution besides the defense sector, 
Intourist therefore felt the pressures of competitive modernization. To conclude this 
chapter, I will survey two crucial elements of Intourist’s modernization program: hotel 
construction and information technology development, demonstrating how the stable, yet 
inefficient equilibrium Intourist developed with the rest of the Soviet economy was 
insufficient to mobilize the resources required to keep up with the rest of the world. 
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  As discussed above, the single most pressing issue on the agenda of Intourist 
officials as they strove to build a viable foreign tourism industry was the quantity and 
quality of the hotels they owned. On that front, the conditions they faced when tourism to 
the Soviet Union was renewed in the 1950s were grim. Not only was the number of 
hotels and rooms inadequate for new needs, Intourist inventory bore the scars of war and 
chronic under-investment. As a result of these difficulties, even in the late 1960s, the time 
tourists could spend in Moscow and Leningrad was limited to 3 nights, foreigners were 
sent to sub-par hotels, and, in a twist straight out of the pages of Twister, it was not 
uncommon for guests to sleep in hotel hallways.179 
 Intourist’s 1964/5 reform also included an ambitious construction program aimed 
to adress these difficulties. If in the early 1960s, Intourist possessed around 30 hotels and 
other tourist facilities, the hotel construction program authorized in 1965 called for the 
construction of 59 hotels, 50 motels and 9 camping sites by 1968, bringing  the total size 
of Intourist's network to about 150 facilities and 52,000 rooms.180 Ten years later, 
however, only 34 facilities with 18,000 rooms were completed.181 While in themselves, 
these numbers represented significant improvement, they not only fell short of the 1965 
planned targets, but failed to adress the endemic room shortages which plagued Intourist 
to the end of the Soviet era (in the 1980s, Intourist still limited tourists to 3 day-long stays 
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in Moscow- and housed thousands of them on-board improvised river-boat hotels).182 
Worse stil, while original plans called for hotels to be built by Soviet organizations and 
thus incur all expenses in rubles and profits in foreign currency, starting in the 1970s, 
construction of Intourist hotels was increasingly monopolized by foreign contractors – 
making them far less beneficial to the Soviet balance of payments than originally 
planned. 
 To understand the the gaps between the promises and the realities of the Intourist 
construction program, we must turn, as always, to the coordination mechanisms of the 
Soviet economy.  As always, local authorities had little incentive to part with their assets 
(in this case, real estate) to favor Intourist. Haggling over hotel locations put the 
construction program off track even in the first months after its launch.183 Six year later, 
construction was still meeting serious difficulties as “the choice of locations for hotels is 
not done on a scientific basis and does not take the interests of foreign tourism into 
consideration as a result of... localist tedencies [mestnicheskikh nastroenii].”184 
 A similar problem haunted relations between Intourist and its contractors. The 
crucial fact in this regard was that unlike more powerful Soviet organizations, Intourist 
had no independent construction capacity.185 Instead, construction projects were assigned 
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administratively to a hodge-podge of organizations, usually the construction trusts of 
large cities, and for smaller locations, the construction units of branch ministries. One 
such contractor, for example, was the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, the 
institution in charge of the Soviet nuclear industry.186 These organizations were often 
unwilling or unable to fulfill their assignments. Almost uniformly, they lobbied to reduce 
their construction plans sharply, even after years of construction delays. If plans were not 
reduced, contractors refused to supply the work-force and machinery that Intourist 
construction sites required. Employing such tactics, Intourist contractors fulfilled only 
30-50 percent of their initial plan targets in 1970, a fairly typical year in that regard.187 
 As was the case with its interactions with other institutional partners, Intourist had 
little recourse but to turn to higher authorities.  Here again, the record was mixed. Even 
when Intourist managed to obtain governmental instructions for contractors to focus on 
Intourist projects, the latter could find ways to resist such impositions. In Sochi, for 
example, the local construction agency argued that it could not fulfill its assignments due 
to a deficit of construction machinery.188 Other contractors complained they could not 
make progress as Intourist failed to provide them with the construction materials.189 If all 
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else failed, they could just ignore previous promises at will, knowning Intourist had no 
clout over them.190 
 Other construction problems were the results of planning and architectural 
difficulties. While hotel planning was a topic often discussed by Soviet architects,191 the 
scale of Intourist’s program and their lack of institutional knowledge of global standards 
of hotel construction overwhelmed their efforts. Looking to save costs, many architects 
used hotels for Soviet citizens as their base model. As such hotels were deemed unfit for 
Intourist’s client base, planning had to be redone at higher standards, causing significant 
delays and cost overruns.192  Other architects erred in the opposite direction, designing 
luxurious facilities that had to be readjusted to reduce costs.193 When consruction began, 
it was more often than not delayed by discovering that plans called for materials Soviet 
industry did not produce or that Soviet equipment was unable to work with imported 
materials.194  All this meant that, by the time hotels were launched, they were often 
already outdated and in need of serious restructuring.  By 1975, Intourist estimated, 
financial damages caused by delays of hotel construction stood at 100 million foreign 
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exchange rubles (in 1964, as described above, Intourist’s yearly proceeds were about 8 
million foreign exchange rubles), with more damages accruing into the 1980s.195  
  In an earlier era, this systemic failure might have been construed as a result of 
sabotage, with dire consequences for both Intourist and its contractors. In a more 
civilized age of Soviet power, the policy response was altogether different. While I was 
not able to locate any document testifying to a conscious decision to turn away from the 
Soviet construction industry, foreign contractors became a growing presence on the 
Soviet scene. Between 1969 and 1972, Finnish construction crews working under the 
terms of Russo-Finnish foreign trade clearance agreement constructed Tallinn's Viru 
hotel.196  In the early 1970s, foreign firms were hired to quickly complete construction of 
long delayed facilities. By the mid-1970s, French, Swedish, Yugoslav and Finnish firms 
held 400 million foreign exchange rubles' worth of contracts for the construction of new 
hotels in Moscow, Leningrad, Sochi and Yalta.197  
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Figure 1.2 Hotel Viru, Talinn 
Source: thetallinncollector.com 
 
 While foreign contractors were by no means exempt from the difficulties of 
mobilizing labor, materiel, and inter-institutional cooperation that so plagued Soviet 
contractors,198 by and large, their superior experience and technological skill sufficed to 
create a major jump forward in Soviet hotel inventory.199 However, the prevalence of 
foreign contractors created an ideological conundrum: the growing market in Soviet hotel 
construction created foreign interest in even more involvement in the Soviet hotel 
construction. By the late 1970s, major hotel chains were fielding offers to fund, construct 
and jointly manage Intourist hotels if these could be run under their corporate brands and 
                                                          
198 Florence Pitts, “Hotel Cosmos: How the Biggest Soviet Hotel was Built,” Freedom at Issue, 58 
(1980)18-25. I would like to thank Proffessor James Heinzen for bringing this source to my attention. 
199   See, for example, “O sostoianii bazy priema inostrannykh turistov v Respublike [RSFSR], 1/6/1983,” 
GARF, f. A-10004, op. 1, d. 660, ll. 44-50. 
  
   
 
  82 
 
 
 
joint-Soviet American management. Up until the perestroika years, Intourist forcefully 
rejected such offers, brokering instead deals that limited foreign participation in Intourist 
hotels to the construction phase. Credits were agreed upon “only on conditions extremely 
favorable to us” - making sure that construction was funded by foreign credits, and that 
foreigners neither managed nor owned stakes in Intourist hotels.200  This nod to the 
dreams of economic independence embedded into Intourist's foundation could not 
however elide two crucial facts: Intourist's straddling of the Western service economy 
and the Soviet economic system was an inherently unstable proposition, and continued 
modernization required increasingly leaning on the capitalist world. Nowhere was this 
dilemma felt more acutely than in the unfolding of another major Intourist initiative, its 
entrance into the information age. 
While many many of the difficulties with which Intourist’s management struggled 
were products of the Soviet political economy, they also reflect dilemmas faced by all 
major modern bureaucratic institutions: how could any large organization gather, handle 
and disseminate the massive amounts of information required to fulfill organizational 
tasks and maintain control over the operations of its agents?201 Like all Soviet 
bureaucracies, Intourist was intimately familiar with problems caused by faulty 
accounting practices, abundant paperwork, and the tendency of lower-level bureaucrats to 
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avoid disclosure to their superiors. How did it handle the challenges of the information 
age?  
 While the technological and organizational problems involved in handling the 
myriad pieces of information required to efficiently (and profitably) move travelers 
around the world were shared by all major participants in the emerging mass travel 
industry,202  in Intourist’s case, they were exacerbated by the unique challenges posed by 
its institutional structure. This was especially the case for two of most pressing 
informational challenges Intourist’s logistical experts faced: processing information 
regarding tourist traffic, and managing its hotel room inventory.   
  The basic document that defined the movement of a given tourist (or, more often, 
a tour group) during their Soviet tour was called the notification [izveshchenie]. A 
notification was created when a sub-unit of the Commercial Division received a request 
[zaiavka] from a foreign tour operator and contained all pertinent information about the 
package. The notification was then circulated to various logistical departments that 
handled reservations for room, board and transportation. If the reservation was approved, 
the notification was sent to the localities that were slated to receive a given tour group.  If 
and when itinerary changed, the localities had to inform both the Commercial Division 
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and other localities on the itinerary. For each change, an amended version of the 
notification had to be reissued.203 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Intourist Information Scheme, c.1975.  
Source: GARF, f. 9612 
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 The complex bureaucratic process described above was suited to Intourist’s days 
as a boutique enterprise. By the 1960s, however, the massive increase in tourism to the 
USSR overwhelmed the Intourist’s information processing mechanisms. Some of the 
problems in this regard were organizational. The dispatch group of the Service Division, 
the body in charge of handling the planning and regulation of tourist flaws, was staffed 
by transient labor who struggled with the complexities of their assignments.204 Handling 
the notifications taxed the modest capacities of local Intourist offices, especially since 
they often had to rely on the not-so-reliable Soviet postal servie to conduct their 
business.205 More importantly, Intourist experienced a serious technology lag. Telephones 
and fax machines were sorely lacking, as were copying machines (access to which was 
limited anyway due to security considerations).206  Due to the shortage of typewriters, 
into the 1970s many notifications were still handwritten.207 As a result of these 
conditions, one official estimated that in 1965 about 75% of all notifications arriving to 
and from Moscow, the hub of the Intourist system, arrived with errors and significant 
delays.208 This informational breakdown stranded tourists in airports and hotel lobbies, 
                                                          
204  “Tezisy o merakh ob ulucheniiu obssluzhivaniia inostrannykh turistov v g.Moskve, n/d, 1967,” GARF, 
op. 3, d. 210, l. 226. 
205 “Ob obespechhenii zadanii po priemu turistov v 1976 godu gostinichnoi bazoi I merakh po ee 
ratsionalnomu ispolzovaniiu,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 1005, l. 112; “Spravka o sostoianii,” GARF, f. 
9612, op.3, d. 491, l. 117. 
206  “Doklad o rabote Lenotdelenia VAO Intourist na kollegii Glavnogo Upravleniia po inostrannomu 
Turizmu pri SM SSSR. (n/d, 1970),” GARF, op. 3, d. 1005, l. 139. 
207 “Spravka o sostoianii i merakh po ulucheniu informatsii o dvizhenii turistov i ispolzovanii materialnoi 
bazy,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 427, l. 11-119 
208  “Protokol no. 10, 21/9/1965,” f. 9612, op. 3, d 49, l. 149. 
  
   
 
  86 
 
 
 
befuddled Intourist employees charged with handling arriving and departing tourists, and 
often drove senior Intourist officials to a state of despair.209  
  The structure of Intourist’s hotel inventory further exacarbated its logistical 
problem. As discussed above, a significant share of its hotel quotas were obtained from 
often recalcitrant partners.  The latter assigned Intourist a room quota based on an 
estimate of demand Intourist had to submit 40 days before the start of the calendar month 
in which rooms were required (for instance, orders for September had to be filed on July 
20th). These estimates were based on preliminary orders submitted by Intourist's foreign 
partners, who, being aware of Soviet hotel room shortages, often inflated their demands. 
In these circumstances, avoiding a paradoxical condition in which many of the rooms 
assigned to Intourist stood empty while tourists were turned away due to room deficits, 
was only possible if rooms could rapidly be reassigned to respond to new reservations.210 
However, even if the local city authorities who owned the hotel rooms in question 
cooperated in this task (which they preferred not to, as they could simply commandeer 
vacant rooms for their purposes), the technological capacity necessary for this turnaround 
was simply not available for Intourist’s officials. Large Western corporations used 
business machines for such relatively straightforward information processing tasks for 
decades, and computers were beginning to transform the science of inventory 
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management starting in the late 1950s.211 However, in Moscow in 1967 the Intourist team 
in charge of managing the city’s room quota was still using abacuses as its main 
computational device.212 
 Distressed by this logjam, Intourist's management embarked on a major 
modernization drive. Unlike the hotel construction program, while developing a Soviet 
software was briefly considered,213 Intourist  quickly decided on a foreign solution. In 
1973, it signed an 11 million dollar deal with IBM for a mainframe based reservation-
management system.214 Why this significant foreign currency outlay? First, Intourist 
officials and their academic advisers found that Soviet industry could not compete with 
the superior performance of IBM's products.215 Equally importantly, they reasoned, 
Intourist could enjoy the privileges of backwardness. In a 1972 memorandum describing 
the history of IPARS [International Passenger Airline Reservation System], a proprietary 
reservation management system that IBM developed for American Airlines and was 
refitting for tourism industry uses, one Intourist official noted that the system took 11 
years and vast amounts of money to develop, but was now on sale for a relatively 
manageable sum. By purchasing IPARS as an off-the shelf package, he surmised, 
Intourist could in essence outsource technology development costs, leapfrog from the pen 
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and ink era to the digital age in one fell swoop - and do so on the cheap.216 Finally, 
proponents of the deal argued, since Soviet industry could produce IBM-compatible 
peripheral equipment, hard currency spending on the project would be limited to the 
initial purchase.217 The IBM deal was conceived, in other words, as a one-off transaction, 
not as long term technological relationship. 
 Unfortunately, the Intourist computerization project revealed the perils and 
unforeseen consequences of relying on Western technology. While original plans called 
for finishing the project in 1976, the American government took almost 2 years to decide 
whether to provide IBM with an export license for its equipment and software.  In 
November 1975 the US Department of Commerce denied the export license, on the 
grounds that the hardware sold to Intourist could be repurposed by the Soviets for 
military uses.  After a series of complex negotiations, IBM was finally authorized to sell 
Intourist a less powerful version of its hardware in 1976.218  This delay forced a major 
reworking of the project: the launch of the reservation and inventory management 
modules was delayed until 1979, and the launch of other sub-systems, for example a 
billing system for Intourist's foreign partners, was punted into the mid-1980s.219 
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 Beyond this setback, the computerization project ran into the difficulties inherent 
in the implementation of all large-scale projects in the Soviet Union. Intourist’s newly 
established Main Computational Center [GVTs], was beset by a series of difficulties. The 
Moscow city authorities refused to provide it with a proper facility to house its computer 
room, while Intourist's own cadres department failed to pressure universities to put 
Intourist on the list of enterprises to which computer science graduates were sent for 
mandatory work assignment (raspredelenie).220  Intourist's office buildings proved 
difficult to network, while the long-distance network hardware linking southern resort 
cities to the Intourist’s mainframe required more bandwidth than Soviet 
telecommunications authorities could provide. Even more frustratingly, Soviet industry 
failed to provide enough peripheral equipment, forcing continued imports of IBM 
terminals, printers, storage devices, and communication equipment.221 Furthermore, as 
Intourist's informational needs kept growing while the launch date of the IBM system 
was being pushed back, GVTs was forced to launch a massive program of business 
technology purchases (accounting machines, printers, copying machines, typewriters and 
other similar devices).222 Such purchases and the efforts GVTs took in installing and 
training staff in the new technology could alleviate some of the most pressing problems 
Intourist's back-office employees faced but could not resolve the structural  crisis of 
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Intourist’s informational infrastracture. Such unforeseen expenditures, furthermore, 
further encumbered Intourist’s hard currency balance of payments. 
 Unfortunately, after 1980, Intourist's archival holding are much thinner than for 
the preceding  three decades, and therefore reveal relatively little about the subsequent 
history of the computerization project. A centralized reservation system was indeed 
launched in the early 1980s.  In 1983, however, the system was not yet connected even to 
the Moscow hotel trust, let alone the periphery, and therefore could not be used for real-
time inventory management and control of tourist traffic, the purposes for which it was 
designed.223 Only in 1988 could Intourist finally retire paper-based notifications. Even 
then, the new digital system did not extend to all cities in its network.224 The first 
integrated database of all Intourist hotels, tours, and itineraries was launched, on an 
experimental basis, in 1989,225 at a time when its new list of information technology 
purchases already included personal computers, the device that was rapidly displacing the 
kind of centralized, mainframe-based systems Intourist spent nearly two decades 
developing.226 At that point, however, computer technology was already far from the 
most important item on Intourist’s agenda, as both it and the socialist system that shaped 
its unique political economy, were rapidly dissolving.  
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226  “Postanovlenie kollegiii Gosudarstennogo komiteta SSSR po inostrannomu turizmu, n. 31/7/1989,“ 
GARF, f. 9612, op.3, d. 2108,  l. 9. 
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Conclusion  
 
Like the Soviet system itself, Intourist entered the 1980s in a state of seeming stability 
that obscured serious transformations that were slowly, almost imperceptibly, eroding its 
foundations. Like the rest of the Soviet economy, Intourist was an underperforming 
institution, but not by a degree that indicated that it could not preserve its business model 
for the foreseeable future.  The number of tourists it received grew steadily. More and 
more hotels were constructed every year.  If supplying them with proper services, decent 
hotel rooms, souvenirs, and, indeed, food and drink was a difficult proposition, things 
were probably not much worse than they were in 1955 of 1965 - not a given the growth in 
the numbers of foreigners the Soviet Union received. Intourist’s financial conditions was 
murky, but not murkier than before; on paper at least, it seems to have kept turning a 
profit for the Soviet state.  Bureaucratic reshuffling, modernization efforts, anti-
corruption drives came and went, leaving Intourist and its staff seemingly unchanged, 
year after year, decade after decade.   
 And yet, step by step, almost imperceptibly, a new reality was taking shape 
behind this facade of stability. Built by foreign contractors, stocked with foreign furniture 
and décor, networked by foreign computers, Intourist hotels in the twilight of the Soviet 
era showed the vast limitations of Intourist business model: participation in global 
markets, without fostering dependence on the capitalist system. From Mister Twister’s 
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fantasy of the market yielding to the superior morals of the socialist system, to the 
“money for factories” dreams of party officials, the function of Intourist seemed so 
simple: to sell Soviet-made luxury for hard currency, currency that would  allow the 
Soviet Union to construct an economy unconstrained by dependence on capitalists. 
However, manufacturing mass-market luxury for the “golden hordes” to which Intourist 
catered proved impossible under the constraints of the Soviet economy, with its 
bureaucratic social coordination system, problematic manufacturing base, and lagging 
information technology system. To meet the demands of both foreign tourists and the 
standards its managers set for themselves,  Intourist officials were forced to retreat from a 
purely transactional view of engagement with the outside world, under which even  
Soviet organizations operating in the international trade sector considered the “purpose of 
trade […] to use imports to help meet internal goals...[and] the role of exports merely to 
cover the resulting deficits in the balance of payments,”227 and came to accept growing 
dependence on global chains of finance, supply and technology. The story of Intourist 
under late socialism was therefore a tale of an almost imperceptible Soviet surrender to 
the forces of international capital, or for the poetically inclined, of Mister Twister’s 
revenge.
                                                          
227 Högselius, Red Gas, 37. 
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Chapter 2: Truth? Which Truth? Contesting the Tourist Gaze in the 
Soviet Union 
 
 
In 1960, Eugene Lyons, a former “intellectual pilgrim,” and now a known figure on the 
anti-Communist Right, was invited to provide testimony to the Senate’s Subcommittee on 
Internal Security on a topic near and dear to his heart: the gullibility of American visitors 
to the Soviet Union.228 The report attending his testimony, appropriately entitled 
“Beware! Tourists Reporting from Russia,” concluded that the new cohort of post-Stalin 
travellers were nearly as open to Soviet seductions as their 1930s predecessors.229 This 
new generation of “Columbuses” travelling to the “Soviet Atlantis” he argued, were 
nothing but “innocent transmission belts for Soviet propaganda.”230 
 The reasons for the susceptibility of travelers to Soviet propaganda were twofold. 
First, the visitors’ conceit that they could comprehend a complex social system through a 
short, state- arranged visit was nothing but folly.231 More importantly, naiveté and, often, 
                                                          
228 The Chair of the Judicial Committee, to which the Subcommittee on Security belonged, was 
Mississippi’s James Eastland, one of the Senate’s most rabid anti-Communists and an opponent of the 
Eisenhower administration’s drive to establish cultural exchanges with the USSRR. On Eastland and his 
Committee see Larry Ceplair, Anti-Communism in 20th Century America: a Critical History (Santa Barbara, 
CA: ABC-Clio, 2011), 105-106. 
229 Beware! Tourists Reporting on Russia. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1960). 
230 Ibid, 6. 
231 Ibid, 2-3. Here, Lyons’ argument prefigures Anna Krylova’s seminal article about the tendency of 
Western students of the Soviet system to comprehend the Soviet Union more through the mirror of their 
notion of liberal society and less through empirical observation of Soviet social reality. Anna Krylova, 
“The Tenacious Liberal Subject in Soviet Studies,” Kritika 1, no.1 (2000), 119-146. 
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“soft spots” for the Soviet project made them prone to accepting the lies, omissions, and 
the Potemkin vistas offered to them by the Soviet regime at face value. Given the vast 
literature about the Soviet Union available in the West, seeing the Soviet Union firsthand 
obscured rather than revealed, the true nature of the system, Lyons concluded.  
 Lyons’ fears about Western susceptibility to Soviet Potemkinism were profoundly 
misplaced. Even a cursory examination of their reports from beyond the Iron Curtain 
reveals that even if many of them were friendly to Soviet people, very few, if any, 
mainstream Western travelers in the postwar era returned  overall impressed with Soviet 
system or its achievements. Yet, nagging doubts about the truth of what one could see 
there and the power of Soviet propaganda to warp it were a permanent feature of Cold 
War discourses about travel to the Soviet Union.  In the late 1950s, for instance, a 
somewhat mysterious non-profit operated a tourist information center in New York, 
providing prospective travelers to the Soviet Union with briefings and literature so that 
“they won’t become easy marks for Soviet propaganda.”232 More than 10 years later, the 
New York Times was still offering its readers tips on “getting to know Russia by avoiding 
the guided tour.”233  
Such efforts, many critics of Soviet power believed, were woefully insufficient to 
withstand the allure of Soviet propaganda. The dissident Andrei Sakharov argued that 
                                                          
232 “Tourists Briefed on Soviet Visits,” The New York Times 8/2/1959. The GAI also issued a travel guide 
to the Soviet Union (Dean B. Mahn and Richard H. Marshall, Soviet Russia: A Guidebook for Tourists 
(Washington DC: GAI, 1963). A FOIA request filed to the State Department and the CIA in regards to 
possible government funding of this institution was filed by me in February 2015, and has not yet received 
a response. 
233  The New York Times, 5/21/1972. 
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“foreign tourists who come here will go around the country in comfortable buses, 
prevented by simple measures from making contact with regular Soviet people.”234 While 
giving some credence to Western diplomats and journalists, Sakharov’s fellow dissident 
Solzhenitsyn found that the impressions of short-term visitors were of no significance in 
deciphering the Soviet Union, as “due to the skillful efforts of Intourist” their impressions 
were “altogether superficial.”235 The myth of the Soviet propaganda machine’s successful 
befuddlement of “fellow travelers” even survived the Cold War.  During the Presidential 
campaign of 1992, for example, Bill Clinton’s exchange student trip to the Soviet Union 
in 1970 briefly became a campaign issue, with several Republican Congressmen alluding 
that he might have been recruited as a Soviet agent of influence,236 with similar 
accusations popping during the 2013 New York mayoral election, and the 2016 
presidential race.237 
Such exaggerated views of the allure of the Soviet Union aside, concerns about 
travelers’ access to unvarnished Soviet reality contain a hidden assumption worth 
unpacking. The notion that Russian, and later Soviet authorities, shamelessly manipulated 
travelers’ perceptions of Russian reality was a staple of travel writing on Muscovy/Russia 
                                                          
234 Interview with the Observer Review, 8/6/1975, read into the Congressional Record by Rep. Donald 
Fraser (121 Congressional Record, 22899). 
235 “Misconceptions about Russia are a Threat to America” Foreign Affairs 58, no. (1980), 799. On 
dissidents’ perceptions of Westerners see: Barbara Walker, “Moscow Human Rights Defenders Look West: 
Attitudes toward U.S. Journalists in the 1960s and 1970s,” Kritika 9, no.4 (2008), 905-927. 
236 “Clinton Toured Moscow at War’s Peak,” Washington Times, 10/5/1992, read into Congressional 
Record by Rep. Duncan Hunter (138 Cong. Rec. E 3201.  
237 “Bill DeBlasio visited Communist USSR in College,” New York Post, 11/3/2013, accessed online at:  
http://nypost.com/2013/11/03/de-blasio-visited-communist-ussr-in-college/ on 3/1/2016.  “Bernie Sanders’ 
Soviet Honeymoon,” National Review Online, 6/24/2015, accessed online 3/1/2016. 
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since the early modern period.238 However, the burgeoning literature on travel and tourist 
studies takes as more or less given that all forms of travel, foreign and domestic, are an 
essentially constructed enterprise.  Thus, sociologists John Uhry and Jonas Larsen use the 
French theory-inspired term “tourist gaze” to describe the social interaction of visitors 
and hosts that creates the act of observing foreign locations. The tourist gaze, they write, 
is “constructed in relationship to its opposite, to non-tourist forms of social experience 
and consciousness,” and consists of observing outside reality “through frames and styles, 
circulating images of this and other places,” that condition the tourist to see their 
surroundings as “interesting, good or beautiful.”239  Simply put, tourists observe little that 
is not culturally encoded beforehand as the kind of thing tourists should observe. From 
this perspective, what made /Soviet perspectives unique is not that Russian authorities 
sought to manipulate foreign perceptions and block travellers’ access to unvarnished 
truths about the Soviet Union. Rather, if in Uhry and Rasmussen’s formulation, the 
tourist gaze is an essentially collaborative enterprise, Soviet authorities and their visitors 
were often in disagreement about what was “interesting, good and beautiful” about Soviet 
reality. 
In this chapter, I reconstruct Soviet efforts to win this battle of perceptions, 
construct an image of Soviet reality its propagandists could “sell” to foreign audiences, 
                                                          
238 Marshall Poe, Rude and Barbarous Kingdom: Russia in the Accounts of Sixteenth Century English 
Voyagers (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012). 
239John Urri and Jonas Larsen, The Tourist Gaze 3.0 (London: Sage, 2011), 1.See also the essays gathered 
in David Pircard and Michael A. Di Giovene, Tourism and the Power of Otherness: Seductions of 
Difference (Bristol, Toronto and Buffalo: Channel View Publications, 2014.) 
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and find ways to block counter-narrative imported by foreign travellers to disrupt Soviet 
images. To do so, I explore the world of Soviet “warriors on the ideological front:” 
propagandists, tour guides and other employees of Intourist, Sputnik and other 
organizations charged with propagandizing foreign visitors.240 Building on recent works 
of scholars like Michael David-Fox, Kristine Roth-Ey and Anne Applebaum, I argue that 
Soviet propaganda in the Cold War era was not an ossified relic, but rather an expression 
of deep ideological commitment to a vision of the Soviet Union as viable alternative to 
Western modernity.241 
Before proceeding, we should adress an important objection: despite Lyons’ 
concerns over their persuasive powers, foreigners’ Soviet handlers often appear in 
Western accounts of the late Soviet period either as somewhat ridiculous conveyors of 
Soviet propaganda, authoritarian robots, or voices of the Soviet “person on the street” 
forced to convey lines they don’t believe in.242 Should their voices and narratives be 
taken seriously?  My answer is a resounding yes.  Even if we accept that by the 1970s, 
few if any Soviet ideological workers took the Marxist-Leninist claims they espoused 
literally, there are still reasons to consider carefully the narratives they offered to 
foreigners. First, their foreign encounters were part and parcel of the cultural Cold War, a 
                                                          
240  For uses of this term to describe Intourist guides, see “Stenogramma…” GARF f. 9612, op. 2, d. 286, l. 
192; “Otchet ob ekskursionnom obsluzhivannie inostrannykh turistov v SSSR v 1963 godu “GARF, f. 
9612, op.1, d. 557, l. 87. See also Igor Orlov “Boitsy ideologicheskogo fronta: podgotovka gidov-
perevodchikov v SSSR,” in Irina Glushchenko, Vitalii Kernnyi (ed.), Vremia vpered! Kulturnaaia politika 
v SSSSR (Moscow: VShE, 2013), 81-95.   
241 David-Fox, Showcasing the Great Experiment, Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time, Applebaum, “Empire of 
Friendship.” 
242  For an example see: Colin Thiburon, Among the Russians, (London: Heinemann, 1983), 14-17, 
Polonsky and Taylor, From an Original Idea, esp. ch. 12. 
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context in which Soviet patriotism in the face of ideological aggression was still a 
powerful stimulus. Second, while the narratives offered to foreigners may not have 
seemed particularly convincing, they still conveyed a set of values that exerted power on 
the Soviet imagination: multi-nationalism, war memory and pursuit of peace, universal 
welfare and infatuation with high culture.243   
Finally, on the most basic level, the elaboration of stories fit for foreign 
consumption was an activity to which the Soviet Union devoted significant attention. 
Soviet tour guides, for example, were trained and professionalized to a degree rarely 
achieved by their Western counterparts, where this profession is usually the domain of 
transient labor.244  This implies that the stories they told, the images they conveyed, the 
efforts they made to convince visitors who could be convinced and to silence those who 
could not - that all of this mattered for the conduct of the cultural Cold War and for the 
maintenance of the stability of the Soviet discursive universe. The gap between the 
bumbling and burdensome image of the Soviet official handler in Western accounts and 
the massive Soviet efforts at the construction of a coherent narrative of Soviet modernity 
invites several key questions. What did Soviet authorities try to achieve in constructing 
the images they offered to foreign consumers? What arguments did they offer regarding 
                                                          
243  Aleksei Yurchak Everything was forever. 
244 Orlov, “Boitsy.”  An interesting exception to this trend is Israel and the Palestinian territories, where 
tourism, both domestic and foreign, is a subject of political contention (see, for example, Glenn Bowman, 
“The Politics of Tour Guiding: Israeli and Palestinian Tour Guides in Israel and the Occupied Territories,” 
in: David Harrison (ed.), Tourism and the Less Developed Countries (London: Belhaven Press. 1992), 121-
134. 
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the superiority or at least the sustainability of the Soviet way of life? How did patriotism 
and cynicism interact in the professional identities of Soviet propagandists for foreigners?  
How did they handle challenges to the narratives they offered? In short, what do the 
stories the Soviet Union told about itself tell us about the nature of “real existing 
socialism”? 
 
On the Ideological Front 
 
Aleksei Legasov, a representative of the International Department of the Central 
Committee, was the keynote speaker at a January 1961 meeting of the leading cadres of 
Intourist. The Communist Party, he reminded the audience, viewed the employees of the 
Soviet tourism industry as fighters on a crucial sector of the “ideological front.” Foreign 
tourism was an important “channel of our influence on… international public opinion 
[obshchestvennost’].” The effects of travel to the Soviet Union on visiting foreigners 
could help “refute vicious propaganda unleashed by foreign countries.”  A crucial 
indication of Soviet success in this field was the fact that “the ruling circles of capitalist 
countries including the USA are making efforts to neutralize impressions [created by] 
tourist travel to the Soviet Union. They are brainwashing people [obrabatyvaiut 
liudei]…the State Department is creating work groups on tourism, gives tourists 
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assignments, creates briefing documents [pamiatki] for tourists”- all in order to 
counteract Soviet and promote Western propaganda.245 
 With its combination of optimism and (well-grounded) suspicion, Legasov’s 
address was a fitting expression of the state of mind of Soviet propaganda officials in the 
late 1950s.  As a number of scholars demonstrate, Soviet officials in the late Stalin and 
early Khrushchev eras were painfully aware of the failings of the Soviet foreign 
propaganda apparatus. In the form it took under late Stalinism, Soviet propaganda aimed 
at the West was dry, boring, didactic, and ignorant of postwar conditions in the West.246 
Whereas during the prewar years Soviet propagandists could rely on the impact of the 
Great Depression and the rise of fascism to find friendly audiences, during the postwar 
boom, they could appeal only to the thin sliver of Western public opinion that was 
ideologically sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the old, text-based methods 
of Soviet propaganda proved no match for the appeals of American popular and 
consumer culture, spreading with the help of new communications technology, 
innovative advertisement techniques – and massive state backing.247 In this context, the 
                                                          
245 “Stenogramma vsesoiuznogo soveshchaniia rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov VAO Inturista, 17/1/1961” 
GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, d. 286, l. 192 
246  Kristin Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time, ch. 1; Rosa Magnusdottir, “Mission Impossible: Selling Soviet 
Socialism to Americans, 1955-1968,”  in  Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried (ed.), 
Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy (New York: Bergahn Books, 2010), 51-72; V.O Pechatnov, “Strel’ba 
kholostymi: sovetskaia propaganda na zapad v nachale Kholodnoi Voiny, 1945-1947,” in I.V Gaiduk et al 
(eds.) Stalin i Kholodnaia Voina (Moscow: Insitut vseobshchei istorii RAN, 1998), 114-129. 
247 On the appeals of American culture and Cold war propaganda, among a vast literature, see Hixson, 
Parting the Curtain, Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through 20th Century 
Europe (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2005), Penny M. Von Eshchen, Satchmo Blows up the World : 
Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), Nicholas Cohn, 
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opening of the Soviet borders to mass foreign travel seemed like a golden opportunity to 
show, not tell, the “truth about the Soviet Union” to increasingly skeptical foreigners.  
 The potential of Soviet travel to improve foreign perceptions of Soviet reality 
seemed so powerful to Soviet officials that they (not without reason) both publicly and 
privately charged that Western governments were waging a concerted campaign to 
forestall travel to the USSR. A 1958 Intourist report on conditions in international tourist 
organizations noted with pride that Americans were planning a major push to negate what 
the latter perceived as “the great advances made by the socialist bloc” in advancing 
tourism to the Eastern block.248 In West Germany, Intourist chief Ankudinov angrily 
reported in late 1960, “the press, instructed [po ukazke] of the ruling circles of the FRG, 
conducts a campaign against travel to the Soviet Union,” by terrifying them with 
accounts of KGB surveillance. This campaign he alleged, brought only 14,000 West 
German tourists to the Soviet Union, instead of the 20,000 Intourist planned to receive.249  
Beyond such statements, which more than anything else mirrored Soviet attitudes 
to media management to a different cultural context, Soviet tourism officials had a 
somewhat solid case regarding Western approaches to Eastern Block travel. For instance, 
Soviet media relished reports on State Department refusals to issue foreign passports to 
                                                          
The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 1945-1989 (New York and Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
248  “O razvitii inostrannogo turizma v SSSR (predvaritelnyi otchet za 10 mesiatsov 1958 g.),”GARF F. 
9612, op. 2, d. 247, ll. 83-85. 
249  “Doklad Predsedatelia Pravlenia. VAO Inturist , V.N Ankudinova ‘Ob itogakh turistkogo sezona za 
1960 god’ na soveshchanii VGK SM SSR po kul’turnym sviaziam s zarubezhnymi stranami,” GARF, f. 
9612, op. 2, d. 273, l. 62. In fact, as I show in Chapter 3, the real culprit was a hysterical Soviet campaign 
against espionage, conducted after the U-2 shootdown in summer of 1960. 
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suspected Communist sympathizers, arguing that this refusal showed “who really is 
constructing an Iron Curtain.”250  In West Germany, state employees still had to sign 
affidavits acknowledging travel to “Communist dominated countries” as late as the mid-
1980s.251 In Italy, Soviet officials and their Italian Communist partners complained, 
authorities aimed to sabotage travel to socialist countries by denying Communist-
affiliated tour firms foreign currency quotas and dragging their feet on issuing passports 
for would-be proletarian tourists.252 In dictatorial Latin American countries, returning 
travelers from the Soviet Union could expect harassment, arrests, and torture.253 
And still, flattered as they might have been by alleged attempts to stop travel to 
the Soviet Union, Soviet officials knew Western attempts to use travel for their own 
purposes represented a far greater threat.  Many foreign tourists, Soviet officials fretted, 
were either innocents captured by the coordinated Cold War campaign to darken Soviet 
reality or were “open or hidden enemies of Communism.”254 Foreign governments, media 
tycoons, travel book publishers, and “ideological centers of anti-Soviet propaganda” all 
colluded to turn tourists into willing or unwilling vectors of ideological infection.  Thus, a 
1963 Intourist report complained that “...the American propaganda machinery aims to use 
                                                          
250 A. Vishnevskii, “Gde zhe zheleznyi zanaves?” Pravda 7/12/1956.  
251 I’d like to thank Professor Benjamin Nathans for bringing this fact into my attention. See also, “Reise 
Bindet,” Spiegel 43 (1976), accessed online at: http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-41125167.html on 
8/15/2016. 
252 “Zapis’ besedy nachalnika inostrannogo otdela pravlenia VAO Inturist t. Shibaeva K.I s direktorom 
italianskoi firmy Italturist g-nom Petruchchi, 16/10/1960,” GARF f. 9612, op.1, d. 425, ll. 31-36. 
253 “Zapis besedy nachalnika otdela po turizmu so stranami Ameriki, Angliei i Britanskimi stranami, t. 
Chesnokova G.A s direktorom brazilskoi turfirmy 'Livrarai’Vansovichem A.N, 1/11/1966,” GARF, f. 9612, 
op.3, d. 133, ll. 56-57. 
254 “Stenogramma...” GARF f.9612, op.2, d. 286, ll.20-21. 
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foreign tourism [kanaly inostrannogo turizma] to spread bourgeois ideology and alien 
mores [chuzdykh nam nravov]…to achieve these aims, they recommend that tourists 
create as many contacts as possible with Soviet people, to study their psychology, their 
attitudes towards the foreign and domestic policies of the CPSU.”255 Acting under this 
malign influence, a significant minority of tourists from the West was “gathering 
sensitive information, engaging in currency speculation, distributing anti-Soviet 
literature… and participating in other hostile activities.”256  
Despite the hyperbolic nature of these complaints, they were undoubtebly 
grounded in fact, as we’ve seen above and will still amply demonstrate. Here therefore 
was the cultural Cold War in all its complexity. Soviet officials, skilled in the art of 
organizing tourist groups, foreign and domestic, to see what they wanted them to see,257 
could not but imagine their foes acting in a similar manner, while the latter - motivated 
by a similar mixture of fears and ambitions, obliged – and thus confirmed Soviet fears. 
Thus travel to the Soviet Union became a battleground on which Soviet 
propagandists had to deploy both offensive and defensive strategies. On the one hand, 
Soviet  officials aimed to “propagate truthful information about the life of the Soviet 
people,”258 in order to “penetrate the web of lies and disinformation about the Soviet 
                                                          
255 “Otchet ob ekskursionnom obsluzhivanii... v 1963 godu," GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, d.552, l. 82. 
256 “Prilozhenie k prikazu Pravleniia VAO Inturist no. 5, 20/4/1965,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, d. 299, ll. 37-
38. 
257 Gorsuch, All This is Your World, ch. 4. 
258 “Ob itogakh raboty Inturista v 1956 godu i zadachakh kollektiva na 1957 god,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, d. 
237, l. 68. 
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Union woven by the owners of Big Media [bolshoi pressy]”,259 and thus confirmed at 
least some of Lyons’ fears.  On the other hand, they had to find ways to minimize harm 
caused by visiting “enemies” and their impact on both locals and their less ideologically 
committed travel-mates. While neither side would have thought about this in these terms, 
what was at stake were competing ways to gaze at Soviet reality: will foreign visitors 
perceive the benefits of the Soviet way of life, or will they serve as witnesses, validators, 
and, worst of all, disseminators, of “bourgeois ideology” and its claims of Soviet 
oppression and backwardness? 
 
The Truth about the Soviet Union 
 
In 1960, Intourist released a short pamphlet aiming to provide its guides with an itinerary 
for showcasing “the capital of the world’s first socialist state of the toilers” [stolitsa 
pervogo v mire sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva trudiashchikhsia] to its foreign guests.260 
Starting on Sverdlov Square (today, Theater Square), the city tour looped through 
Moscow’s historic center, then veered off beyond the Garden Ring to showcase new 
construction along Lenin prospect, passed by the architectural marvel of the Moscow 
University skyscraper, and then returned downtown to conclude at Red Square. Along the 
                                                          
259 “Tezisy doklada na mezhvedomstvennom soveshchanii po ulucheniiu koordinatsii raboty v oblasti 
inostrannogo turizma” GARF, f.9612, op.2, d. 286, l. 26. 
260 Opisanie ekskursii po Moskve na temy ‘Moskva- stolitsa SSSR’, ‘Massovoe zhilishchnoe stroitelstvo v 
Moskve’ (Moscow: N/A), 1960. 
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route, guests were to absorb vistas of the past, present, and future of the socialist 
metropolis. 
At the first point of the tour, the Bolshoi Theatre, guides provided detailed 
explanations of the flourishing of theatre culture in the Soviet Union, pointing out 
especially that the Soviet Union was home of the world’s first children’s theatre, still 
unrivalled in any capitalist country. Observing the Palace of Unions, visitors were 
reminded of the love the Soviet people bore for Lenin. Standing on Manezh Square and 
enjoying the view it provided of the Moscow University’s skyscraper, they were told both 
of the great patrimony of imperial-era Russian science it represented, and of the great 
efforts Soviet power took to overcome illiteracy. On Gor’kii Street, they were shown the 
granite facades of new buildings made of materials the Germans had planned to use for a 
monument to their conquest of Moscow, while pointing out how much wider this 
boulevard was compared to its tsarist predecessor. In front of the Moscow Soviet 
building,  guides provided information on housing construction and Moscow’s emerging 
transport, heating, electricity and gas networks.261  
The mingling of past, present, and future did not subside when the tour moved 
away from historical Moscow. On the recently finished the Garden Ring road weaving 
around the historical heart of Moscow, tourists were told about the ongoing construction 
of the Moscow Ring Road, encircling the outlying parts of the town constructed in Soviet 
times (perhaps in an attempt to dispel the impression made by the frequent traffic jams). 
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During the ride down to the Academy of Sciences, visitors were told both about rapid 
scientific progress in the Soviet era and reminded that the road on which they were 
travelling had been used by Polish and French invaders as they beat hasty retreats from 
Moscow. The views of Moscow’s new South-West District visible along the Lenin 
Prospekt provided an opportunity to discuss both the massive scope and the welfarist 
nature of Khrushchev’s housing program: its self-contained mikro-raiony, featuring 
“buildings equipped with stores, cinemas, clubs, restaurants,” parks and green zones, and 
gleaming new kindergartens and experimental boarding schools “for the education of 
children who will live under Communism.”262  
The tour reached its climax at Red Square. There, visitors were told about the 
Square as the launching point of “popular rebellions against the boyars and tsars,” as well 
as about the heroic feats of Russia’s princes, nobles and tsars: Dimitry Donskoi’s victory 
over the Tatars, Minin and Pozharskii’s expulsion of the Poles from Moscow, and 
Kutuzov’s triumph over Napoleon. Following this encomium to tsarist heroes (and subtle 
reminder that the Cold War was not the first clash between Russia/USSR and the West), 
they were treated to a list of revolutionary heroes interred in the Kremlin wall. After a 
brief introduction to the mausoleum, still housing both Stalin and Lenin, guides were to 
recall the famous November 7th 1941 parade that demonstrated Soviet willingness to fight 
to the bitter end, and the Victory Parade of June 24, 1945.  Then, visitors were requested 
to look above, at the building of All-Union Council of Ministers, and to the other side of 
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the Square, where GUM, the USSR’s flagship department store, worked to fulfill 
Muscovites’ consumer needs. Connecting past, present and future, the everyday and the 
heroic, the nationalist and the socialist, tours concluded with a paean to Moscow, a city 
that was “living its ninth century, but is eternally young, growing, developing, renewing 
itself.  Moscow is a city with a glorious past, grandiose present and even more 
magnificent future.”263 
The Moscow city tour, the first socialist society’s love song to itself at a moment 
when its dreams seemed, for some at least, within reach,264 encompassed an important 
transition in the way visions of socialist modernity were transmitted to outsiders.  
Michael David-Fox demonstrates that during the interwar period, sightseeing programs 
for foreigners focused heavily on exceptional objects: ultra-modern factories, model 
farms, schools and social welfare institutions that served as harbingers of the socialist 
future.265 In the immediate postwar years, perhaps due to the general turn of Soviet 
culture to the celebration of the Russian past, programs for the few visitor groups that 
entered the Soviet Union balanced such showcases with a heavy diet of museums and 
classical culture.266 
While the structured, stage-managed programs balancing showcases and classical 
culture never disappeared, and were now the main fair offered to myriad “friendship” 
                                                          
263  Ibid, 52. 
264  On optimism in the Soviet 1960s, see Aleksandr Genis, Petr Vail, 60-e: mir Sovetskogo cheloveka 
(Moscow: Corpus, 2013); Zubok, Zhivago’s Children, ch. 4. 
265 David-Fox, Showcasing, ch. 3. 
266 For examples, see VOKS itineraries for visits of European “progressive” delegations in 1948 (GARF f. 
5283, op. 8, d. 331, ll. 1-20.) 
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delegations from Eastern Europe,267 the sharp post-Stalin increase in the numbers of 
foreigners entering the Soviet Union required a significant change of tactics.  First, given 
the rapid rise in the numbers of visitors the USSR received, the capacities of the 
showcases (ob’ekty pokaza) were exceeded, while the interest of the average visitor in the 
achievements of, say, collective farmers waned (if it had, indeed, ever existed in the first 
place). Second, given that travellers to the Soviet Union from the United States and, to 
lesser extent, Western Europe, tended to be well-educated and often viewed trips there as 
political endeavors, visitors could be quite skeptical of the official Soviet line.268 
Propagandists at the Moscow House of Friendship, for instance, were bombarded with 
questions ranging from social insurance to the finer points of Marxist theory, revealing 
very high level of preparation among their “clients”.269 While this sort of familiarity with 
the Soviet Union was surely an exception rather than general rule, complaints about 
skeptical or even hostile tourists were ubiquitous among Soviet “warriors on the 
ideological front” (see below).  
                                                          
267 Applebaum, “Friendship of the Peoples,” Zbigniew Wojnowski, “An Unlikely Bulwark of Sovietness: 
Cross-Border Travel and Soviet Patriotism in Western Ukraine, 1956–1985,” Nationalities Papers 43, no. 
1(2015), 82-101, are recent examples of work on Soviet uses of foreign travel to facilitate “friendship” with 
Eastern European peoples.  
268 For a profile of American visitors to the USSR, see: Peter Grothe, Attitude Change of American Tourists 
in the Soviet Union (Washington DC: US Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1969), esp. 158-
163. 
269 On the House of Friendship, see Eleonory Gilburd, “The Revival of Soviet Internationalism in the mid-
to-late 1950s,” in idem and Denis Kozlov (ed.) The Thaw: Soviet Society and Culture during the 1950s and 
1960s (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 362-363.  For questions from the 1970/1971 seasons, 
se various documents, GARF, f. 9576, d. 79, ll. 1-12. Well-informed foreign interest in Soviet life, and 
Soviet interest in questions asked by foreigners, lasted all the way into the 1980s. See, for instance 
“Perechen voprosov, postupivshikh v pervom polugodii s.g sotudnikam organov KGB USSR pri chtenii 
letksii o povyshenii politicheskoi bditelnosti sovetskikh liudei.” 30/8/1982), DGA SBU f.16, op. 7, spr. 35, 
ark. 86, f.16, spr. 228-236. 
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 The rhetorical responses Soviet propagandists fashioned in response to these 
challenges were conditioned by the profound ideological transformation that the Soviet 
system underwent in the late 1950s.  On the most basic level, the narrative offered to 
foreign visitors was evidence of a profound temporal shift. Visages of socialism were no 
longer limited to future visions. Rather, socialism was a living, breathing reality. 
Itineraries were now structured not so much to demonstrate abstract Soviet achievements 
or heroic labor but rather social objects of everyday life (kul’turno-bytovye obekty): 
housing projects, schools, clubs, kindergartens, hospitals, and clinics.270 Tour guides were 
instructed to put special emphasis on such objects even when taking tourists on tours of 
factories and collective farms. Welfare, not production, was the new calling card of 
Soviet socialism.  
Recitation of statistics, the Soviet Union’s favorite form of self-measurement, was 
another tactic that brought home socialism’s record of achievement. In what they termed 
the “comparative method” [sravnitelnyi metod] statistical information about the USSR 
was presented not in isolation but in contrast with data on contemporary capitalist powers 
and tsarist Russia. The former comparison was usually presented in terms of welfare: the 
Soviet Union, visitors were told, produced more engineers, doctors, kindergartens, and 
university students than the United States, while providing social benefits (free schooling 
and healthcare, universal employment and retirement benefits) that West Europeans and 
                                                          
270 See, for example, “Otchet ob ekskursionnom obsluzhivannie...” GARF, f. 9612, op.1, d. 552, l. 8; “O 
marshrutakh puteshestviia inostrannykh turistov po SSSR na 1963 god,” ibid, ll. 204-212. 
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Americans could only dream of.271 Comparisons with tsarist Russia were made in terms 
of productivity: the former “backward annex of the global capitalist economy” now shot 
to a position of global leadership in the production of tractors, electricity, machinery, coal 
and steel.272 The superiority of the socialist system, these figures aimed to demonstrate, 
was not a matter of theory or prediction; rather, it was embedded in its capacity to 
combine productivity, fairness and welfare in the here and now. 
  Soviet propagandists took a similar attitude towards discussion of national issues. 
Here again, the past and present, rather than future, were used to defuse questions about 
Soviet colonialism, Russification, suppression of national movements, the “Jewish 
Question” and other thorny problems that might be raised by inquisitive visitors.  For 
instance, when planning itineraries to Uzbekistan, a showcase of the multiethnic nature of 
Soviet modernity,273 modernization and benevolence were the key items on Intourist’s 
agenda. Itineraries emphasized the miraculous development of a backward corner of a 
backward empire into an industrial, cultural, and educational powerhouse. Here again, 
socialism was described not as a future promise, but as concrete reality: one (Slavic) 
Intourist official proposed to use indigenous, female, university-educated Intourist guides 
with “their unveiled beautiful faces… smiling eyes [and] self-confident manner,” as 
                                                          
271 See, for example, “Materialy is opyta infromatsionnoi rabote s inostrannymi turistami, Biuleten 
n.14.1971),” GARF, f. 9612, op.3, d. 520, ll. 73-77.  
272 “Materialy is opyta infromatsionnoi raboty s inostrannymi turistami, biuleten n.17, 1971,” GARF, f. 
9612, op. 3, d. 520, ll. 152-159. 
273 Paul Stronski, Tashkent: Forging a Soviet City, 1930-1966 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2010), ch. 9.  
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living proof of Soviet achievements in modernizing Central Asia and refutation of the 
slanderous notion that the Soviet Union was a colonial power there.274     
 Similar themes on the national question were played out on the politically fraught 
terrain of the Soviet Union’s western borderlands.275 As in the center, statistics and the 
“comparative method” were the main weapon of Soviet propagandists. Tourists visiting 
L’viv,  for example, were fed figures comparing the meagre educational levels, 
urbanization rates, and industrial production indices of the backward, agriculturally 
oriented province of “szlachta-dominated [panskaia]” Poland to the industrial 
development figures of the modern day L’viv oblast’.276 In the Baltic republics, visitors 
were given litanies on the numbers of books, plays, newspapers and periodicals in 
Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian designed to prove that claims of russification were 
nothing but slander. Above all, Soviet propagandists argued, Soviet-style modernization 
and the preservation of national cultures were not antithetical, but served to reinforce 
each other. Thus, Intourist itineraries for Tallinn emphasized that the reconstruction and 
upkeep of the Old City, the main tourist attraction in the republic, was part and parcel of 
the Soviet concern for the preservation of Estonian culture. Veering off from the Old City 
to Mustamäe, Tallinn’s first mass housing district, the same itinerary emphasized that the 
new housing program was motivated by the same ethics of welfare and care that 
                                                          
274 “Iz opyta raboty s turistami iz GDR v g. Tashkente, [n/d, 1969], GARF f. 9612, op. 3, d. 339, l.  131. 
275 On the politics of the Western Borderlands, see Amir Weiner, “De Ja Vu all over again.” 
276 “Biuleten n. 19 v pomoshch  gidu perevodchiku, 1972” GARF, f. 9612, op.3, d. 625, l. 66-71. 
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motivated Soviet preservation efforts in the Old City.277 Over and over again, socialist 
modernity was represented not as a future promise, but as a mature, dividend-bearing 
model of social organization. 
 If socialist modernity was the main ingredient in the self-image Soviet 
propagandists drew for their guests, the peaceful nature of Soviet society was a powerful 
secondary motiff. As Finnish historian Pia Koivunen describes, desire to counter Western 
images of the Soviet Union as a militaristic, aggressive state was a key motivation in the 
Soviet decision to open itself to foreign travel in the 1950s.278 Throughout the post-Stalin 
period, disseminating messages about the “peace-loving foreign policy” of the Soviet 
state and contrasting it with images of Western brutality remained a key goal of Soviet 
itinerary planners. For instance, images of the Vietnam War were so common in Soviet 
propaganda aimed at foreigners that they drew complaints from Intourist’s American 
business partners concerned that they were creating discomfort among their clients.279  
In this context, the Second World War grew ever more prominent in Soviet 
representations to foreign visitors. War memorials, Tombs of the Unknown Soldier and 
narratives about Soviet sacrifice, heroism and commitment to peace became central 
ingredients of visitors’ itineraries. As was the case with propaganda aimed at the Soviet 
public (in which, as Nina Tumarkin demonstrates, the War took an ever more central 
                                                          
277 “Spravka Otdeleniia VAO Inturist o propagande materialov XXXVI s’zda KPSS, 28/04/1982,” ERAF, 
af. 1, av.46, s.309, ll. 14-18.  
278 Koivunen, “Propagating a Peaceful Image.” 
279 “Zapis peregovorov s prezidentom firmy 'Daily Trevel Servis ' G-nom L. Bek, 25/10/1966,” GARF, f. 
9612, op. 3 d. 133, l. 30. 
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position as the promises of the Khrushchev era faded),280 the growing obsession with the 
war served both to express Soviet self-perceptions and explain away Soviet flaws. 
Damages caused by the war were, for example, an easy retort to Western boasts about 
material superiority (and, at times, could serve as rebuke to foreigners complaining about 
trifles like tourist amenities). Even more important, such narratives reminded visitors that 
the Soviet Union was a hero-martyr nation, and this heroic martyrdom served to reiterate 
the extent to which the pursuit of peace was at the very heart of its identity. After all, as 
one training document for guides preparing for the 50th anniversary of the formation of 
the Soviet Union put it, “if we say that the Soviet people carried the entire burden of the 
war on its shoulders,” how could visitors fail to understand that “the Soviet people wants 
peace and is unified behind the Soviet government”?281 
 
Image and Reality  
 
In short, in theory at least, the “interesting, good or beautiful” things Soviet propagandists 
expected their charges to gaze at featured moderate consumerism bound by reasonable 
limits, housing for all, modern cities, emancipated women, friendly faces, and peace-
loving foreign policy: all the benefits of contemporary capitalism, but none of its flaws. 
                                                          
280 Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War 2 in Russia (New 
York Basic Book, 1994).  
281 “Biulleten n. 19,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 625, l. 11a.  
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Like all imagery presented to tourists, the particular vision of reality had essential 
elements of truth (the Soviet leadership did indeed seek to avoid nuclear war at nearly all 
costs, and welfare socialism was indeed at the center of the post-Stalin Soviet social 
contract).282 Yet, bridging the gap between what Soviet propagandists thought foreigners 
should see, and their guests’ actual perceptions of their surroundings (perceptions that 
were moreover mediated by preconceived images of the Soviet Union) required 
herculean labor.  
From the point of view of the constructivist literature on travel, the gap between 
Soviet reality and narratives Soviet propagandists offered to their visitors was in itself 
nothing unusal. And yet, one cannot avoid the conclusion that the Soviet case possesed 
some uniqure features. First, as discussed above, images of the Soviet Union held by 
hosts and visitors were instruments of ideological war, designed to be incommensurate 
with each other.  On the most basic level, whereas in many other cases when foreigners 
visit a poorer location,  exoticism, backwardness, and poverty serve as essential 
components of the “othering” effect of foreign travel offered for tourist consumption,283 
Soviet propagandists aimed to represent the Soviet Union as a society that beat back 
backwardness, and where the most exotic locations were transformed by modernity into 
“normal” spaces. 
                                                          
282 On the centrality of peace to the Soviet leadership, see Zubok, Failed Empire, 192-226. On welfare, 
Mark B. Smith, Property of Communists: The Urban Housing Program from Stalin to Khrushchev (Dekalb, 
IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010). 
283 This argument was made, originally and most famously in Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: 
Penguin, 1995, esp. pp. 166-201. 
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No less importantly, constructivist views of the tourist experience, developed to 
their logical conclusion, imply that there was nothing especially peculiar about Soviet 
practices of ideologically arranged hospitability. Travelers, especially travelers taking 
part in modern, mass, commercialized forms of foreign travel to relatively poor locations, 
never experience foreign life as it is, but rather exist in carefully constructed bubbles of 
privilege that both protect them from most of the material effects of relative (or absolute) 
impoverishment, and produce attractive slices of foreign, exotic life for their enjoyment. 
In the Soviet case, due to a combination of high-flying ideological statements by hosts, 
visitors’ skepticism, and, above all, the Soviet economy’s failure to produce bubbles of 
privilege rising to the level of upper-middle class Western existence (or, sometimes, even 
middle class East European existence) , made generating the totalizing effects of tourism 
an especially hard assignment.  What made the Soviet organization of hospitality unique 
was not that it wrapped foreign visitors in a web of deceit, but that it failed to produce a 
coherent enough image of Soviet reality to support its rhetorical claims. 
 As described in Chapter One, the most fundamental problem Soviet propagandists 
faced when attempting to arrange a satisfying imagery of the Soviet experience was the 
failure of Intourist and attendant industries to provide for a tourist experience meeting the 
standards Soviet authorities set for themselves. And indeed, Intourist archives groan with 
internal complaints about shoddy construction, bad maintenance, insufficient food, faulty 
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bathrooms, and an immeasurable host of other problems of the Soviet hospitality 
industry. 284  
And if these were the opinions of Intourist officials, foreigners often had a field 
day reporting with barely hidden glee the many ways in which they were let down by 
Intourist.  One rather typical description of an Intourist hotel in the Georgian Republic, 
for instance, found it: “a distorted reflection of Intourist description: shabby bathroom, 
broken window, doors that didn’t close, and dirty interior.”285 The comic travel writer 
Irene Campen devoted much of her account of travelling by car throughout the Soviet 
Union (memorably entitled Are You Carrying Gold or Living Relatives?) to sketches of 
various Intourist officials who, trapped in the informational chaos described to Chapter 
One, struggled to comprehend where she came from and where was she going next.286 
Poor Soviet restrooms, and especially the endemic lack of toilet paper therein, served for 
one libertarian writer as a vivid reminder of the evils of price controls.287 Stan Rose, a 
Kansas-City columnist, opened his Memo from Russia in a similar key, remembering 
“stinking public toilets that befoul the air from Moscow to the faraway Pacific.”288 Soviet 
                                                          
284 Besides examples from Intourist archives cited in chapter 1,  see TsMAM, f. 496, op.1, d. 382 (Hotel 
Ukraina in Moscow, 1959); RGASPI, f. 5-M, op. 1, d. 7 (Komsomol tourist camps, 1961), GARF, f. 9520, 
op.1, d. 2176, ll. 13-20, on German tourists in Central Council hotels in the mid-1970s.  
285 Karen Gilden, Camping with Communists: The Adventures of an American Family in Moscow (Sisters, 
OR: Artha Press, 2013), 34.  
286 Irene Kampen, Are You Carrying any Gold or Living Relatives (New York: Doubleday and Company, 
1970).  
287 Edward H. Crane, “Fear and Loathing in the Soviet Union,” in: David Boaz (ed.) Toward Liberty: the 
Idea that is Changing the World: 25 years of Public Policy from the Cato Institute (Washington DC: Cato 
Institute, 2002), 166. 
288 Stan Rose, Memo from Russia (Kansas City, KS: Lowell Press, 1986), 1. For other examples of 
conservative/libertarian Soviet travelogues see Edwar C. Diedrich, “The Rose Colored World of Intourist,” 
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restaurants with their long wait times, kitchens that lacked most items listed on the menu 
and featured haughty staffs, were “designed to teach you that, just because you have the 
greenbacks, it doesn’t mean you call all the shots”  wrote Max Polonsky and Russell 
Taylor, the authors of a satirical travel guide to the Soviet Union.289  And of course, 
Intourist’s flaws were but a metaphor for the faults of the USSR itself. As one British 
reporter put it: “when I started a three-year stint as… Moscow correspondent, I stayed at 
the grim Intourist hotel on Gorky Street. It incorporated the worst aspects of Soviet 
society: incompetence, surveillance, bad standards, incivility and suspicion.”290 
  Soviet officials fully grasped the metonymic link such accounts established 
between the Soviet hospitality industry and the Soviet system. As I.G. Bolshakov, a 
functionary from the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, 
explained to a group of Intourist officials:  “the political effect of tourism depends, above 
all, on material factors… How will the tourist be received? How will he be fed? How will 
he be served [budet obsluzhivatsia]?” Here, he continued, lay Soviet weakness: if a 
“tourist receives a bad room... Has to wait hours for his meal... Has to stand in line to 
receive this or that piece of paper [tu ili inuiu spravku]... He will leave the country in a 
bad mood.” And since such rooms, delays, and lines were indeed what awaited visitors, 
                                                          
National Review, 6/13/1967, P.J O’Rourke, “Ship of Fools,” in idem, Republican Party Reptile: Essays and 
Outrages (New York: Atlantic Monthly, 1987), 43-71. 
289 Polonsky and Taylor, From an Original Idea, 106. 
290 Richard Beeston, “Frightful Food and Bugs in Every Room,” The Times, 11/10/2010. Accessed online 
at: http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/industries/leisure/article2822338.ece on 4/14/2016. For more 
memories of the Intourist on Gorky Street, demolished in 2008 to universal acclaim, see Salmon, “Land of 
Future,” vii. 
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“foreigners say that the Soviet Union supposedly launched Sputnik into space [govoriat 
chto mol zapustil v kosmos sputnik], but they can’t organize good service. Hostile 
foreigners are gloating [zloradstvuiut].”291   
Bolshakov’s channeling of Western tourists’ complaints captures the near 
obsessive zeal with which Soviet officials treated foreigners’ perceptions of the USSR. 
The files of Moscow’s Hotel Administration, a body that played host to the majority of 
visitors to the Soviet capital in the 1950s and 1960s, contains numerous translated 
newspaper clippings of highly uncomplimentary Western travel writing about the Soviet 
Union. 292  The Central Committee’s Propaganda Department commissioned a translation 
of an American sociological study about the impact of travel to the Soviet Union on 
American opinions,293 while Sputnik briefly considered disguising sociology students as 
guides in order to better understand, and influence, how its guest perceived their 
environments.294 Most strikingly perhaps, tourism officials were almost gleeful to recount 
negative comments from foreigners, as these often reinforced their own perceptions of 
organizational weakness. For instance, one trip report cited, with no negative comment, a 
West German tourist complaining that “you don’t know how to squeeze money out of us 
                                                          
291 “Stenogramma…” GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, d. 286, l. 141. 
292 “Spravka o zamechaniakh i predlozheniakh inostrannykh turistov, posetvishikh SSSR v 1959 godu, po 
materialam angliiskoi provintsialnoi i stolichnoi pressyy, a takzhe nekotorykh gazet FRG, Shveitsarii, I 
drugikh stran,” TsKhD Moscow, f. 496, op. 1, ll. 1-6.   
293 A.M. Rumiantsev, "Ob otnoshenii amerikanskikh turistov k SSSR do i posle poezdki v nashu stranu, 
24/9/1968,” RGANI f. 5, op. 60, d. 43, ll. 60-71.  
294 “Postanovka zadach dlia prikladnykh sotsiologicheskikh issledovanii ideologicheskoi raboty Sputnika, 
(N/D, 1969),” RGASPI, f. 5-M, op.2, d. 146, ll. 1-11. 
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[kaki iz nas den’gi vykolachivat],295 and another took to heart a comment from a 
Yugoslav tourist that “you don’t care whether we spend money here or not.”296 
 No doubt, Soviet officials could credit some private complaints to the problematic 
mentality of Western tourists (“these gentlemen,” one incensed official observed “are 
abusing our patience” [zlouboterbliaut polozheniem]),297 while public complaints could 
be seen as attempts at slander. For instance, articles in the Western press doubting the 
capacity of the Soviet tourist industry to accommodate tourist influx were deemed by 
Soviet officialdom to be part of a campaign to sabotage the 1980 Olympics, orchestrated 
by Western “imperialists.”298 And yet, the zeal with which such comments were 
collected, indicates something more fundamental was afoot than cataloguing slander.  
Soviet propagandists knew exactly what foreigners should observe and what they ought 
to ignore as surface phenomena obfuscating deeper truths. However, they also knew that 
for foreigners not trained in in Soviet art of separating the observed aspects of reality 
from its deeper ideological meaning,299 it was immediate sensual perceptions that 
                                                          
295 “Spravka o rabote s gruppoi turistov iz FRG, 10v-295, 10/7/1973.” GARF, f. 9520, op. 1, d. 2008, l. 33. 
296 “Spravka ob otritsatelnykh nastroeniakh nekotorykh sotsialisticheskikh turistov v sviazi s tem chto oni 
iakoby v SSSR obsluzhivaiutsia khuzhe chem turisty iz kapitalisticheskikh stran,  29/10/1975” GARF, f. 
9612, op. 3, d. 922, l. 36. 
297 “Protokol no. 8 soveshchania u predsedatelia pravlenia VAO inturist, 7/6/1956,” GARF. 9612, op. 1, d. 
369, l. 146. 
298 “Informatsionnnaia zapiska APN v TsK KPSS ‘Osnovnye tezisy vrazhdebnoi propagandy v sviazi s 
Olimpiadoi-8- i predlozheniia po kontr-propagande, 13/9/1978’,” cited in Tomilina et al (ed.), Piat Kolets, 
189-191. 
299 On the Soviet mode of foreign travel, see Ann Gorsuch, All this is Your World, ch. 3, 4 and Applebaum, 
“Empire of Friendship,” ch. 5.  
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counted. Therefore, to organize a proper presentation of the truth about the USSR, Soviet 
officials had to learn to perceive the Soviet Union from a foreign perspective. 
 Unfortunately for the efforts of Soviet propagandists, there was no bridging the 
gap between narratives of socialist modernity and sensory perceptions of foreigners. The 
power of Soviet narratives could not, for example, overcome the shock that olfactory 
exposure to Soviet reality could produce. Soviet restrooms were such an endemic and 
embarrassing problem that on the eve of the Moscow Olympics they were personally 
denounced by no lesser authority than than Aleksey Kosygin, the Chairman of the Soviet 
of Ministers.300 In another high-level meeting involving olfactory matters, in 1970, the 
Foreign Relations Committee of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet debated the problem of 
unpleasant smells emanating from dishes in restaurants serving foreign tourists, noting 
that the problem was that foreigners could not tolerate smells Soviet people learned to 
live with.301 Unceasing complaints from Intourist regarding Soviet the terrible quality (or 
absence) of microphones on tourist buses it was provided by Soviet industry meant that 
things were not much better when it got to hearing.302 
                                                          
300 “Stenogramma zasedaniia komissii inosrannykh del Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, 30/5/1980,” GARF, f. 
A-385 [Supreme Soviet RSFSR], op. 13, d. 4925, l. 254. 
301 The problem was caused by the fact that in the absence of dishwashers, dishes were washed by hand at 
temperatures insufficient to dissolve accumulated fats; no solutions were proposed. "Stenogramma 
zasedaniia Komissii po inostrannym delam Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, 29/6/1970,"  
GARF f. A-385, op. 13, d. 2570, ll. 39-40. 
302 See, among many other complaints, “Protokol soveshchaniia zaveduiushchikh otdelenei i agenstv VAO 
Inturist Ukrainy, Moldavii i RSFSR (punktov raspolozhennykh k iugu ot Moskvy) v gorode Kieve, 19-
22/4/1962,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 1, d. 515, l. 167. “Doklad kommercheskogo upravleniia na zasedanii 
kollegii Glavnogo Upravlenia po inostrannomu turizmu pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, 12.12.1971, o khode 
akvizitsii inostrannykh turistov v SSSR na 1971 g.,” GARF, op. 3, d. 512, l. 18. 
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Figure 2.1: Intourist Tour Bus (Scaled Model) 
Source: http://sprzedajemy.pl/ 
 
 Manufacturing appealing visual snapshots of Soviet reality also proved largely 
beyond the grasp of Soviet tourism organizers. At times, they struggled with making 
tourists see Soviet reality in the most literal sense of the word. In 1967, one French group 
complained that winter travel in Intourist's buses was equivalent to a trip to a dark frozen 
cavern. Another group christened such buses “hearses,” as they were cold, dark, and 
allowed one to see little of the outside world through their frozen, besmirched 
windows.303 
 While these were extreme cases, such occurrences represented real and persistent 
problems:  the resource constraints and coordination efforts that so hampered efforts to 
                                                          
303 “Spravka komissii po proverke raboty otdela gidov-perevodchikov sotsialisticheskikh stran, 3/3/1972,” 
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feed and house tourists also hindered the production of visual paraphernalia of the tourist 
trade: albums, postcards, posters, brochures, souvenirs, maps and guidebooks.  Intourist 
official spent decades complaining about deficits of high quality paper necessary to 
produce everything from coffee-table books to humble suitcase labels,304 while staff 
uniforms even in such key locations as the Sheremet’evo and Vnukovo’s airports were 
made of “bad fabric and fraying after less than one year of use” – and therefore gave the 
wrong impression to foreign visitors.305  
As their title implies, showcase objects - factories, top collective farms, and 
increasingly, schools and kindergartens, were key components in the scenery Soviet 
propagandists wished to arrange. However, here too their capacity to organize a coherent 
image was impaired.  The managers of such objects generally disliked this duty. 
Exasperated by demands on his time and resources, one such manager declared that he 
was “sick” of Intourist demands [vy nam nadoeli].306  Security concerns also posed 
difficulties. In 1963, one Komsomol official complained that due to secrecy rules, 
Sputnik could only take visitors to obsolete factories.307 The state of these factories, even 
                                                          
304 On complaints about deficits of albums and reference works, see among many others,: “Otchet ob 
ekskursionnom obsluzhivannii...” GARF f. 9612, op. 1, d. 552. l. 89. “Krupin to Sovmin RSFR, 
25/03/1983,” GARF, f. A-10004, op. 1, d. 657, l. 88. On suitcase labels: “Protokol zasedaniia Pravleniia 
VAO Intourist, 21/2/1957,” GARF f. 9612, op. 2, d. 237, l. 74.  
305 “Spravka o rabote agenstv VAO Inturist v aeroportakh Vnukovo i Sheremetevo v 1963 g.” GARF. f. 
9612, op. 1, d. 597, l. 232. 
306 “Protokol no. 10 soveshchaniia u predsedatelia pravleniia VAO Inturist tov. Ankundinova, 13/9/1956” 
GARF, f. 9612, op. 1, d. 369, l. 52. 
307 “Stenogramma vsesoiuznogo soveshchania seminara predsedatelei biuro molodezhnogo turizma i 
direktorov molodezhnykh lagerei Sputnik, 15/2/1973,” RGASPI, f. 5-M, op.2, delo 63a, l.72. 
  
   
 
  123 
 
 
 
sympathetic visitors could not help but point out, undermined Soviet claims about its 
industrial achievements.308 
Similar problems of priority and coordination plagued attempts to provide visitors 
with showcases in one field where the Soviet Union did excel:  high culture.309 Here, 
Soviet tourism organizers were stumped by two problems. First, the Soviet Ministry of 
Culture often failed to provide them with sufficient quota of tickets to address foreign 
demand, arguing that Soviet citizens deserved a priority over foreigners. In the summer 
months, moreover, the height of the tourist season, the most prestigious troupes and 
performers were often abroad, as the Ministry of Culture preferred foreign tours (for 
which it was paid in foreign money) to local shows (from which Intourist benefitted).310   
  These difficulties were all rooted in one fundamental reality: the institutional 
power of Soviet tourism organizers was nowhere sufficient enough to arrange an 
idealized image of Soviet life for their clients. This conundrum expressed itself most 
powerfully in their inability to control the physical spaces in which foreigners moved.   
Outside the historical hearts of Moscow and Leningrad and other select locations (such as 
the Golden Ring towns of Vladimir and Suzdal’, where major reconstruction was carried 
                                                          
308  “Otchet o prebyvanii v Sovetskom Soiuze delegatsii rabochei molodezhi Danii,” 
 RGASPI, f. 3-M, op. 4, d.8, ll. 135-140. 
309 The classical account of the cultural wars during the Cold War is David Caute, The Dancer Defects 
(New York and London: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
310  For the argument between the Ministry of Culture and Intourist on this issue, see “Stenogramma 
zasedaniia soveta pri Glavnom Upravlenii po inostrannomu turizmu pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR po voprosu 
“O zadachakh po razvitiu materialno-tekhicheskoi bazy inostrannogo turizma v SSSR,” 28/1/1975,”GARF, 
f. 9612, op. 3, d.931, ll. 80-83. 
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out in the 1960s), the aesthetic qualities of Soviet life failed to fit the standards they set 
for foreign consumption.  
 The former problem was, by and large, a product of some of the basic features of 
the Soviet economic model: rapid industrial development that left little room for 
historical preservation. As Shawn Salmon demonstrates, tourism officials, 
preservationists and Russian nationalists successfully lobbied the Soviet government to 
fund Vladimir and Suzdal’s reconstruction in part by arguing that these historical towns 
would draw significant numbers of foreign visitors, who would then spend dollars 
there.311 This was, however, a rare success. Documents from the perestroika era indicate 
that little was done for preservationists and tourist officials thereafter. For instance, 
Intourist, activists and local officials argued that despite its commercial potential, the Old 
City of Novgorod failed to attract foreign tourists, as it was in a state of near ruin due to 
frequent floods of liquid industrial wastes.312  
Similar conditions obtained in other historical sites. For example, on the eve of 
the Moscow Olympics, the State Control Commission found that the Borodino 
battlefield, a possible draw for foreign Tolstoy buffs, 313 was in a state of total disrepair. 
Battlefield museums, chapels and nearby historical monasteries were all in a neglected 
                                                          
311 Salmon,”Land of Future”, 268-276. 
312  See correspondence between Intourist, city authorities, the RSFSR Sovmin, VOOPiK, and local 
activists at GARF, f. A-10004, op. 1, d. 783, ll. 15-40. 
313 During his visit to the USSR at the late 1950s, Senator Richard Russel, Head of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee and an obsessive Tolstoy reader, evaded his Intourist guide in order to visit Borodino 
(Curtis Peebles, Twilight Warriors: Covert Air Operations against the USSR  (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2005), 172. 
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state, and funds for their restoration were scarce. Even worse, neighboring factories and 
collective farms used the battlefield as dumping grounds for their waste and refused to 
take measures necessary to reverse the damage they caused. As result of these findings, 
Borodino was removed from the list of “Olympic” objects.  
While balancing industrial development and historical preservation was hardly a 
uniquely Soviet challenge, Soviet tourism organizers faced another dilemma: the glaring 
contradiction between Soviet claims of alternative modernity and the evidence provided 
by Soviet human and physical landscapes. Intourist officials were, for example, stymied 
by the prevalence of begging: both cripples on cathedral squares and “chewing gum 
knights,” children pleading foreigners for gum and other souvenirs, served as embodied 
counter-arguments for claims about the superiority of the Soviet way of life. 314  
Rural landscapes posed an even harsher challenge to Soviet claims of alternatice 
modernity. All across the Soviet Union, model collective farms located at some distance 
from cities had to be removed from showcase object lists, as “by the time they get to 
these kolkhozy, tourists will see 20 lying in ruins [v razvalinakh].315  An inspection of the 
Moscow-Vladimir-Suzdal highway in 1970, six years after they became a key ingredient 
of tourist itineraries, revealed “old, decrepit, boarded up houses… old barracks…a club 
                                                          
314 On cathedral beggars, see “Organizatsiia i provedenie ekskursii dlia turistov puteshestuiuschikh po 
avtomarshrutam [n/d, 1963],”GARF, f. 9612, op. 1, d. 558, l. 124. On chewing gum knights and other 
problematic social elements that gathered around foreigners, see Chapter Four of this dissertation. 
315  “Protokol no. 15 zasedaniia u predsedatelia Pravleniia VAO Inturisst t. Ankundinova, 23/11/1956,” 
GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, 1, d. 369, l.8.  
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with a broken door, missing windows… decrepit sheds and silos” scattered along the 
tourist route.316  
Even entry points to the Soviet Union could not be reshaped to fit forms Soviet 
tourism organizers considered appropriate. Another pre-Olympic investigation by State 
Control,  this time  of the Soviet-Finnish border town of Vyborg, an important hub on the 
Helsinki-Leningrad tourist route, found that tourist facilities in the town had “dirty walls 
and ceilings, peeling paint on walls and ceilings…water and sewage networks requiring 
urgent repairs.”317 This finding was especially interesting, as tourist organizers were 
complaining about conditions in Vyborg since the late 1960s, focusing on the 
embarrassment caused to the Soviet Union by the condition of its old town.318 Looking at 
Soviet reality from the perspective of imagined Western tourists, Soviet propagandists 
could not but find the views on offer rather disappointing. 
 
 
 
Golden Links of the Chain of Friendship: Soviet Tour Guides 
                                                          
316  “Spravka o sostoianii vnov’ otkryvaemogo avtomarshruta Moskva-Vladimir-Suzdal dlia tranzitnogo 
sledovaniia inostrannykh turistov,” GARF, f. A-10004, op. 1, d. 76, l. 86. 
317 “Spravka o rezul’tatakh proverki organizatsii obsluzhivaniia inostrannykh turistov na predpriatiakh 
obshestvennogo pitania Leningradskoi oblasti, 3/9/1970,” GARF, f.  A-420, op. 5, d. 721, ll. 20-26. 
318 “Krupin and Shibalov [Ispolkom, Leningradskaia oblast’] to Sovmin RSFSR, 17/1/1969,” GARF, f. A-
10004, op. 1, d. 85, ll.  86-89. 
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The reality described above had clear implications: in the Soviet case, seeing did not 
mean believing. Since Soviet propagandists could not surround their charges with 
coherent images of their vision of Soviet modernity, they had to train them in the art of 
Soviet observation. This entailed filtering out the unessential elements of Soviet reality to 
get at its underlying truths, and stopping visitors from innocently (or maliciously) 
mistaking chaffs for wheat. For that reason, as was the case with Soviet travelers both 
home and abroad, tour guides (gidy-perevodchiki) took a key role in elaborating 
ideologically appropriate perceptions.     
Here too, Soviet tourism organizers faced substantial difficulties, succinctly 
captured by French chansonnier Gilbert Bécaud. In his 1960s hit Nathalie, Bécaud 
sketches a fantasy of romance between the first-person narrator and his tour guide, the 
eponymous Nathalie. The first stanza of the song is set on Red Square, where Nathalie 
“spoke in somber phrases//of the October Revolution,” while the narrator daydreams that 
“after Lenin’s tomb, we will go to Café Pushkin //to drink hot chocolate.” After the visit 
to the Mausoleum, Nathalie takes him to a party at a student dorm room. Later they are 
left alone, and “there was no longer any question of somber phrases// or of the October 
Revolution.” At the end of his visit the narrator is left to dream that “one day in Paris// I 
will be her guide.”319 
                                                          
319 I am grateful to Professor Benjamin Nathans for bringing this source to my attention, and helping me to 
vastly to improve my translation. 
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Figure 2.2: Gilbert Becaud and “Nathalie” 
Source: youtube.com 
 The duality of Bécaud’s Nathalie as both symbol of the distance the Cold War 
created between East and West and the means by which it could be overcome, agreed in 
some ways with the vision of Soviet propagandists of the role Intourist guides should 
play. In others, it realized some of their deepest fears. On the one hand, as one official put 
it, citing Kant’s paean to the translator, Intourist guides were “a golden link in the chain 
of friendship:”320 a smiling (and, visitors observed over and over again, physically 
attractive)321 bridge between the Soviet Union and its guests. On the other, the same 
                                                          
320 “Stenogramma…”GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, d. 286, l. 143. This quote was apparently so memorable that is 
was used by another Intourist official 11 years later (“Stenogramma XIII otchetno-vybornoi profsoiuznoi 
konferentsii Glavnogo Upravleniia  po inostrannomu turizmu pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, 17/11/1971,” 
GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 614, l. 8) 
321  See, for instance, John Gunther, Meet Soviet Russia. Book One: Land, People, Sights (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1962), 95. Eric Grant, Peregrinations: A Man’s Journey. A Biography (Lincoln, NE: 
iUniverse, 2003), 117. Richard Timothy Conroy, Our Man in Vienna: a Memoir (New York, Thomas Dunn 
Book, 2000), 93-94. Robert F. Ober, Tchaikovsky 19: A Diplomatic Life Beyond the Iron Curtain (New 
York: Xlibris, 2008), 213.  
 
  
   
 
  129 
 
 
 
official continued, the very qualities that made the guides good ambassadors (youth, 
higher education, gender), also were a glaring weakness: “they must wage an ideological 
struggle in person [odin na odin] with bourgeois ideology… They are [usually] young 
recent graduates… lacking life experience and knowledge of capitalist reality…  They 
require much educational and political work [nuzhdaiutsia bolshoi politiko-vospitatelnoi 
raboty].”322 Here was a double bind: tour guides had to be friendly and open enough to 
serve as efficient propagandists, and yet were expected to maintain enough distance to 
avoid propagandizaton by bearers of “bourgeois ideology.” In a world riven by fierce 
ideological struggle, Soviet tour guides played twin parts: both as subjects charged with 
propagating Soviet self-portraits and as objects over whose minds and bodies both 
ideologies struggled.  
 Who were these “golden links”? With the important exception of guides who 
worked in the Intourist system since before the war,323 in the early years of mass foreign 
travel, they were recent, overwhelmingly female, graduates of pedagogical, literature and 
foreign language faculties. Intourist officials sometimes demanded tour guide classes to 
be included in university language curricula, and the inclusion of Intourist in the list of 
institutions receiving graduate quotas (raspredelenie). In reality, Intourist had to compete 
for graduates with other, often more prestigious, institutions.324 Sputnik, the other major 
                                                          
322 “Stenogramma…17/1/1960.”. GARF, f. 9612, op.2, d. 286, l. 143-144.  
323 Khripun points out that these older employees were more likely to be ideologically orthodox than their 
younger colleagues (“Inostrantsy v Leningrade,” 70-71).  
324  See, for example, “Otchet o rabote s kadrami VAO Inturist za 1962 god,” GARF, f. 9612, op.2, d. 302, 
ll. 9-11. 
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employer of tour guides, employed university students recommended for service by their 
faculties and Communist Youth League cells. Until the 1970s, the seasonal nature of 
foreign tourism necessitated that a significant proportion of Intourist’s guides were 
temporarily hired (and undertrained) students and recent graduates.325 However, 
throughout our period,  Intourist’s management, for reasons having to do with both the 
lackluster professional performance and putative political unreliability of temporary 
cadres, strove to make employment as tour guide into a professional career (for example, 
in Moscow, it provided winter employment by establishing a Translation Bureau which 
marketed its services to other institutions.)326 While statistics are sketchy, the near-
disappearance of complaints about temporary guides indicates that by the mid-1970s, 
Intourist maintained a stable corps of career tour guides. 
 Given the key role of these “warriors on the ideological front” played in the 
cultural Cold War, Soviet tour guides faced an intensive training regimen. Starting in 
1965, this included three months of initial training, followed by a period of supervision, 
and, in theory at least, continuous professional development.327 This ongoing training 
included, among other things, weekly meetings in which tourists’ questions, the 
international situation, difficult encounters with hostile tourists, and ways to “rebufft” 
[davat’ otpor] bourgeois ideology were discussed.  Guides were expected to engage in 
                                                          
325  “Protokol no. 10…13/9/1956,”GARF, f. 9612, op.1, d. 369, ll. 53-54. “Otchet po rabote s kadrami...,” 
GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, d. 315, ll. 2-4. 
326  “Perechen’ meropriatii uluchenia khozraschetnogo biuro perevodchikov, 28/3/1963,” GARF, f. 9612, 
op. 1, d. 552, ll. 153-156. 
327 Orlov, “Boitsy,” 92-93. 
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country studies [stranovedenie], read and discuss foreign language publications, and 
attend political education sessions and lectures by experts and propagandists.  In the off-
season, they were supposed to produce a major essay [referat] either outlining a city tour 
or summarizing information on a topic of pertinence to the “ideological struggle,” and 
before the start of the season, to conduct a supervised model run of their tour.328 
The contents of the guides’ training were an expression of the priority Soviet 
tourism organizers put on ideological warfare. While Intourist training courses devoted 
time to language, presentation skills, history, and culture,329 post-employment training 
was relentlessly focused on political issues. During the training season in 1958, for 
example, guides had to learn about the development of the Soviet chemical industry, 
events in the Middle East, and Soviet-Chinese relations.330  A 1962 list of recommended 
literature for Intourist guides included a plethora of Marxist classics, interpretations of 
the Party platform, works on economics, welfare, foreign affairs and stranovedenie, but 
little on culture, art, or history.331  
To think that all or even most guides talk this ideological training literally would 
strain belief. First, given the ubiquitous breakdowns of the Soviet service industry, much 
of their actual work-time was devoted to various ‘organizational’ issues. The seasonal 
                                                          
328  See, among many examples, “Soobshchenie Pravleniiu VAO Inturist, 2/3/1962,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 1, 
d. 515, ll. 72-75. 
329  Orlov, “Boitsy,” 92. 
330 “Otchet o rabote s kadrami v gostinitse Astoria Lenotdelenia VAO Inturist za 1958 god,” GARF f. 9612, 
op. 2, d. 417, l. 80. 
331V. Sergeev, Metodicheskie rekomendatsii po podboru literatury dlia gidov-perevodchikov VAO Inturist 
(Moscow: VAO Inturist, 1962). 
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nature of the industry (intensive work in the summer, which earned guides extensive time 
off in the winter), meant that guides had little time to hone their ideological skills when 
they needed them most.332 Others had no time for such affairs, as they were doing 
“business” – finding ways to benefit from access to foreigners and their material goods. 
In 1959, one senior guide was caught defrauding Intourist by inflating the number of 
tourists in the groups he led, and pocketing the funds and products meant for feeding the 
phantom tourists.333 
More importantly, tour guides and (sometimes) itinerary planners employed a full 
ranges of techniques that followed the forms, but hollowed out the content, of 
“ideological struggle.” For instance, despite admonitions to focus their efforts on displays 
of the Soviet way of life, many guides instead preferred to showcase churches, palaces 
and other venerable objects [starina].334 Other guides took a “formal” approach to their 
work, reciting dry facts and figures and newspaper extracts instead of integrating new 
materials in their texts, which meant visitors had to listen to the same text over and over 
again in different cities.335 As was usually the case in the Soviet system, middle 
management colluded with subordinates, allowing them to rewrite their referaty instead 
                                                          
332  “Protokol No. 1 zasedaniia Pravleniia VAO Inturist, 10/1/1964,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 1, d. 596, l. 222. 
333 “Spravka po rezultatam proverki knizhek-podtverzhdenii uslug po obsluzhivaniu grupp i spets-poezdov 
s nemetskimi turistami, vypissanykh perevodchikom t. Bulychevym s aprelia po noiabr' 1960 g.” GARF, f. 
9612, op. 1, d. 442, ll. 18-24 
334   “Protokol no. 13 zasedania pravlenia VAO Inturist, 25/10/1960,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 1, d. 442, 1,26. 
“Otchet ob ekskursionnom obsluzhivannii inostrannykh turistov v SSSR v 1962 godu,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 
2, d. 517, l. l. 37. 
335See, for example, “Reshenie Glavnogo Upravleniia po inostrannomu turizmu pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR 
ob informatsionno-propagandistkoi rabote otdela gidov-perevodchikov Anglii i Ameriki sredi inostrannykh 
turistov v 1973 godu,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 727, ll. 184-185. 
  
   
 
  133 
 
 
 
of producing original work, and cared little about the quality of model tours.336  Whether 
these realities represented a subtle rebellion against official phraseology, or an example 
of late Soviet attitudes towards work, the odds are that much of what guides were taught 
during their training was confined to their classrooms. 
Finally, Intourist guides, a young professional group that enjoyed privileged 
access to foreigners, were not exempt from the general trend of Soviet urbanites’ 
fascination with the West. Tour guides, one official complained as early as 1956: “dress 
in foreign styles, wear outwordly [svrekhestestvennye] hairstyles and hang all sorts of 
weird decorations that even savages wouldn’t put on themselves.”337 Despite bans and 
admonitions, guides exchanged addresses and phone numbers with their charges, and 
maintained connections with “their” tourists when they left the country.338As visitors 
noticed with relish,339 and Soviet officials with anger, 340 guides were no less infatuated 
with Western consumer goods that the most enthusiastic black marketeers.  They 
therefore regularly asked for and received gifts: cosmetics, clothing, and other consumer 
                                                          
336  “Operativnyi otchet o rabote marshrutno-metodicheskogo otdela Pravleniia VAO Inturist za 1962 god,” 
GARF, f. 9612, op. 1, d. 517, l. 53. 
337 “Doklad na obshchem sobranii Pravleniia VAO Inturist, 25/10/56,”GARF, f. 9612, op. 1, d. 369, l. 82.  
338 "Prikaz po Pravleniiu VAO Inturist no. 18, 19/12/1961,” GARF f. 9612, op. 2, d. 287, l. 85, “Protokol 
n.9 partiinogo sobranniia Leningradskogo otdeleniia VAO Inturist, 28/7/1971,” TsGAIPD SBP, f. 2064, op. 
2, d. 13, ll. 30-31.  Salmon, “Land of Future,” 206-207.  
339  Idem, “Marketing Socialism,” 186. 
340 See among many others, “Otchet o rabote s kadrami VAO Inturist v 1961 godu,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, 
d. 292, l. 8; “Otchet o rabote s kadrami v Leningradskom otdelenii VAO Inturist v 1971 godu,” GARF, f. 
9612, op. 3, d. 548, ll.  16-18; “Protokol no. 14 partsobraniia Leningradskogo otdela VAO Intourist, 
5/6/1961,” TsGAiPD SPB, f. 2064, op. 2, d. 4, l. 24. 
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goods (and, sometimes, small sums of money) from their charges. 341  In light of these 
predilections, Intourist regulations barred guides and other employees from “starting 
personal correspondence with foreigners, exchanging gifts... Inviting them home, 
fulfilling personal requests... purchasing gifts and other items for them, exchanging 
money… and introducing them to third persons.”342  It seems reasonable to take this 
inventory as a good approximation of actual practices among Intourist guides.343 
Worse still from the point of view of tourism organizers, Becaud’s Nathalie was 
not a pure fantasy.  As one Georgian Intourist official complained, mixing ideological 
fervor with traditional paternalism, some guides were prone to inappropriate behavior 
with their charges, instead of “behaving like a proper Soviet person and a modest, 
virtuous girl.”344 In other words, whether tempted by the material objects foreigners could 
offer, the excitement of a new experience, or a bona fide search for love, guides, charged 
with policing the border between socialism and capitalism, were sometimes seduced by 
the latter, in the most literal sense of the word.   Sometimes, such liaisons led to 
“treason”- marriage and subsequent emigration. While this problem was discussed in 
Intourist circles from the late 1950s on,345 perhaps the most telling episode of this sort 
occurred in the early 1970s, in Leningrad, where three guides who had all recently 
                                                          
341 Elizabeth Warren, Travel Memories (Bloomington, IN: AuthorsHouse, 2013), 45-46.  Mumin Shakurov, 
“S prikhodom Rossii biznesa ne stalo,” Radio Svoboda, 15/4/2015. Accessed online, at: 
http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/26812394.html on 4/4/2016. 
342 “Osnovnye pravila,” GARF, f. 9612, op.3, d. 1212, l. 147. 
343 For an amusing look at the struggle between Intourist, KGB and tour guides over gifts, letters, and 
personal favors involving foreigners, see Shakurov, “S prikhodom Rossii.”  
344 “Stenogramma…” GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, d. 286, l. 99.  
345  Salmon, “Land of Future,” 207-210. 
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married West European tourists were revealed to have made a pact to get hired by 
Intourist for exactly this purpose.346 Such acts revealed a basic contradiction between the 
words guides were delivering and Soviet reality as foreigners perceived it. If Soviet 
modernity was indeed superior to the Western way of life, how could this eagerness to 
leave it behind be explained? If, as a KGB general invited to give a talk to Intourist brass 
about vigilance [bditel’nost’] complained, a 25-year-old Intourist guide married a 57-
year-old obese American,347 how could one explain this but by reference to love of 
money and material things, and how could such materialism be squared with the different 
sort of Marxist-Leninist materialism featuring in the lectures Intourist guides were 
delivering?  
Such questions indicated how thin the line was between the personal and political 
in such close proximity to foreigners. Some ideological problems skirted the line between 
the political and the material: guides who took books from foreigners or borrowed and 
never returned Western reading materials from Intourist reference libraries might have 
been reading them themselves, or unofficially circulating them among friends on on the 
book black market.348 Others expressed personal opinions that were, in the context of 
“ideological struggle,” very political indeed: one male guide, possibly in a better position 
                                                          
346 “Protokol n. 4 otkrytogo partsobraniia partiinoi organizatsii Leningradskogo otdeleniia VAO Inturist, 
18/4/1972,” TsGAIPD, f. 2062, op. 2, d. 14, l. 44-45. 
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to defend his amorous adventures than his female colleagues, boldly argued that no one 
had the right to ban him from loving whomever he wanted.349  
Especially in the Khrushchev era, with its political zig-zaging and growing 
engagement with the West, grumblings of dissent among guides went further than this. In 
one extreme case, Boris Shragin, an art historian moonlighting as tour guide and not 
hiding his unorthodox opinions from foreigners, found the questions about when “had his 
eyes opened” regarding the official party line bizarre, as he never had a shred of faith in 
it.350 Others took more ambiguous positions, but voiced them openly to their superiors. In 
Leningrad, younger guides expressed doubts regarding the usefulness and necessity of the 
“ideological work” they were required to perform.351 At a 1963 conference organized by 
Sputnik, rank and file guides issued a series of challenges to a functionary of the 
Komsomol Central Committee giving a keynote address, asking about contradictory 
Soviet policy regarding Stalin’s memory, the Sino-Soviet split, and other thorny issues. 
One guide went so far as to ask whether, given that Stalin, Mao and Enver Hoxha had all 
been denounced as dictators, foreigners might conclude that there was something about 
socialism that inevitably led to dictatorship.352  
                                                          
349 Cited in Salmon, “Land of Future,” 209. 
350 Recounted in Ben Nathans, “When did Your Eyes Open,” London Review of Books 32, no.9 (2010). 
Accessed online at: https://www.history.upenn.edu/sites/www.history.upenn.edu/files/nathans_when-did-
your-eyes-open.pdf on 1/12/2014.  
351 Cited in Khripun, “Inostrantsy v Leningrade,” 72. 
352 "Stenogramma soveshchaniia direktorov otdelenii I lagerei BMMT Soutnik po voprosma agitatsionnoiu 
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These realities lead to an inevitable question. Were Soviet tour-guides, to cite 
Anna Krylova’s celebrated term, concealed “liberal subjects” forced to play in an ugly 
comedy? Post-Soviet memoirs and interviews indicate that some guides conceived of 
themselves in these terms, at least retrospectively.353 Management complaints about the 
failure of Intourist guides to police their “treasonous” colleagues indicate that their 
commitment to discipline by the kollektiv was lacking.354 Most important, fear and self-
interest helped keep guides on the straight and narrow. On the former side of the ledger 
lay the complicated relationship many guides had with the KGB (see Chapter 4). On the 
latter lay the simple fact that satisfactory performance allowed one access to foreigners, 
their material goods, and above all: the prospect of foreign travel as escorts to Soviet 
tourists going abroad.355 As former Intourist guide Marina Kenderovskaia recalls, when 
she, a recent graduate of a linguistics faculty, was sent to work in Intourist, “all my 
teachers were shaking their heads and telling me how sad it all was, while I was thinking 
that the world was opening up to me... and that extraordinary travels awaited.”356 Such 
opportunities were surely worth the costs of ideological struggle. 
                                                          
353See: Lyudmila Noble, Just Touching the Memory (New York: X-Libris, 2013); Russel L. Volkema, 
Elena Turner, A Russian Intourist Guide Visits the USA (New York: Vintage, 1996); Shakurov, “S 
prikhodom Rossii;” Alfred Borcover, “Inside Intourist: a former Guide’s View of the Stifling bureaucracy,” 
Chicago Tribune 6/21/1987. 
354 “Partsobranie,”TSGAIPD SPB, f. 2062, op.2, d. 14, l. 45. 
355 On the social significance and prestige of foreign travel in the late Soviet period, see Donald J. Raleigh, 
“On the Other Side of the Wall, Things Are Even Better. Travel and the Opening of the Soviet Union: The 
Oral Evidence,” Ab Imperio 4 (2012), 373-399. 
356 Marina Kenderovskaia, “Moia zhizn’ v inturiste,” posted by LiveJournal user bloha_v_svitere , at: 
http://bloha-v-svitere.livejournal.com/451381.html (accessed online, 4/15/2016). 
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Yet, some indications exist that conformism and dual consciousness are not the 
only terms that apply to the experience of Soviet guides. Kenderovskaia’s memoirs 
clearly indicate that she was motivated not only by material factors, but also genuine 
affection for her charges, pride in Russian and Soviet history, and plain old 
professionalism.357Archival evidence points to genuine outrage and shock at any 
expressions of disrespect for the Soviet sacrifice in the War (or failure by German visitors 
to properly reflect on it).358 The behavior of “chewing gum knights” and black marketeers 
who swarmed foreigners evoked shame and frustration for some tour guides.359 In one of 
the few extant contemporary texts by an Intourist guide, a 1969 open letter to 
Literaturnaia Gazeta by Intourist guide Viktoriia Vershkova-Sdobnova, the author 
declared that her life goal was “to meet new people, from all corners of the world… I 
would like them to be inspired [voskhishchalis] by my Motherland, the heroism of our 
people, to believe in our future... [I would like] to show them the best in our lives, in our 
people.”360 The protagonist of Kira Mikhailovskaia’s 1964 novel, The Intourist 
Translator [Perevodchitsa iz Inturista], a young Leningrad guide, expresses strikingly 
similar emotions.361 
                                                          
357 Her memoirs, only recently uploaded online, are gathered at: 
http://kraeved1147.ru/category/%D0%BC%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B2%D0%B0/nasha-rabota/ 
(accessed online, 4/21/2016). 
358 Khripun, “Inostrantsy,” 147. “Otchet o rabote s gruppami 10v-176, 10v-23, iz FRG po marshrutu 
Leningrad –Moskva, 20/3/- 6/4/1974,”GARF, f. 9520, op. 1, d. 2008, ll. 10-11. 
359 “Protokol n.5 zakrytogo partiinogo sobraniia partorganizatsii Lenotdeleniia VAO Inturist, 26/5/1966,” 
TSGAIPD SPB, f. 2064, op. 2, d. 8, l. 16-17. 
360 “Ia rabotaiu gidom,” Literaturania Gazeta, 6/8/1969. 
361  Perevodchitsa iz Inturista (Moscow: Sovetskii pisate), 1964. 
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Finally, it was not impossible, and perhaps even probable, that tour guides could 
combine dislike for official rhetoric with a sense of Soviet patriotism and honest desire to 
defend their country from foreign aspersions.362 For instance, an anonymous poem from 
the 1970s, a supposed March 8 tribute from the men of Intourist to its female guides, 
entitled The Ballad of the Intourist Soldier [Ballada o soldatke iz Inturista], contains the 
following lines:  
The war is over - but you are still in the thick of battle 
For the hearts and minds of mankind 
For future generations 
And the triumph of our ideals. 
 
No guns are pointed at you now 
But still - the enemy is nearby 
And when duty calls you become 
A soldier guarding our Intourist frontiers. 
 
You know all about the Five Year Plan 
And all about that temple too 
You're smart and witty 
But can sock the face that annoys you.363 
   
What was the meaning of these pugnacious couplets? Did they indicate pride in the 
patriotic work Intourist guides conducted, or perhaps corporate pride, or annoyance at 
visitors eager to torment Intourist guides with ideological disputations?  Was it perhaps 
an elaborate late Soviet joke? Some combination of both? Ultimately, the answer is 
unknown and probably unknowable. As Aleksei Yurchak memorably argued, a simple 
                                                          
362 On the contradictory and at times performative nature of Soviet patriotism, see Weiner “De ja Vu,” 
Wojnowski, “Bulwark”, idem, “Staging Patriotism: Popular Reactions to Solidarność in Soviet Ukraine, 
1980-1981,” Slavic Review 71, no.4 (2012), 824-848.  
363 “Ballada o soldatke iz inturista,”posted online by LiveJournal user bloha_v_svitere, on 3/23/2016. 
Accessed online, at http://bloha-v-svitere.livejournal.com/461191.html, on 4/20/2016. I thank Professor 
Kevin Platt for  his help with the translation 
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distinction between truth and lies is insufficient to crack the cultural code of the late 
Soviet period. Rather, Soviet life, and especially the life of Soviet ideological institutions, 
was a series of performative acts, in which the enactment of rituals and speech acts 
established one’s standing as a Soviet citizen, and enabled the pursuit of both public and 
private projects. In this sense, it did not matter whether guides believed in what they said 
or not. Rather, in order to maintain their positions and the benefits, psychic and material, 
they conferred, they had to enact a role - that of a vigilant “warrior on the ideological 
front” manning the increasingly porous borders between the capitalist and socialist 
worlds. And to enact that role in the face of interlocutors who, inhabited the cultural trope 
of truth-tellers behind the Iron Curtain, guides had to perform the scripts written for them 
to the best of their ability. Let us now see how this performance unfolded. 
 
 Demonstrating the Soviet Way of Life 
 
In theory, it was all very simple. Foreign visitors, brought to the Soviet Union by their 
curiosity about the socialist way of life, are organized in a group. These groups are led by 
a guide who, armed with her itinerary, extensive knowledge and ideological vigilance, 
explains the ways in which socialism forms the scenes that unfold around them.  Well-
intentioned questions are given extensive answers, and ill-intentioned ones are resolutely 
challenged. Along the way, tourists meet Soviet people and encounter demonstrations of 
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friendship (if the visitors are socialists) or polite disagreements (if they are capitalists). At 
the end of the visit, socialist guests bring home the spirit of friendship, while capitalist 
visitors, although perhaps not converted to Marxism-Leninism, relinquish the stereotypes 
they held about the Soviet state and society, and accept Soviet civilization as an 
equivalent, if not superior, model to their own. 
 The problem with this story was that very little in it unfolded as planned. A very 
large proportion of Intourist clients came to the Soviet Union individually, and were 
escorted by guides only if they wanted (and were willing to pay for) the services 
provided.364 Even for group tourists, the authority of the collective did not mean what it 
meant in usual Soviet practice.   Not only were hierarchical relations between ideological 
authority and the collective non-existent, but as one visitor recalls: “when a tourist bus 
opened its doors, [tourists] disappeared in all directions and…it was a very unpleasant 
task for the Intourist guide to pull out all the fleas back into the flea box.”365  
In short, nothing but the tour guide’s capacity to impose discipline, and the fear of 
being a stranger in a land where preciously few spoke foreign languages, stopped 
foreigners from either scattering to the winds or challenging the authority of their guides. 
What happened to visitors who left their transient collectives, and the impact their 
adventures had on Soviet society, will be discussed in subsequent chapters.  What follows 
                                                          
364  In 1970, only 46% of Intourist clients from capitalist countries were members of groups –a marked 
improvement over previous years. “Doklad Kommercheskogo upravleniia na zasedanii kollegii Glavnogo 
Upravleniia po inostrannomu turizmu  pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR ‘O khode akvizitsii inostrannykh turistov 
v SSSR na 1971 g’, 12/12/1970,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 512,  l. 3. 
365 Robert Van Voren, On Dissidents and Madness: From the Soviet Union of Leonid Brezhnev to the 
“Soviet Union” of Vladimir Putin (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V), 13. 
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below addresses to a more limited question: how, given the circumstances of their work, 
did Soviet tour guides go about maintaining control and message discipline? How did 
they establish authority when Soviet narratives were delivered to audiences not bound to 
Soviet-style discursive discipline? 
As far as many visitors were concerned, the clash between tourists and guides was 
indeed a power struggle between a totalitarian state, represented by Intourist guides, and 
voices of the free world: themselves. Travelers and journalists gleefully reported on the 
authoritarianism and dishonesty exhibited by Intourist guides.  A journalist from the 
Miami Herald recalled, for instance, that “when we reached Leningrad, we were told that 
there would be no dinner. The Intourist guide, with no apology, remarked, "It will do you 
good.366 Ronald Hidgley, author of the 1977 Russian Mind, found Intourist guides among 
the Soviet Union’s best practitioners of vranyo – the uniquely Russian (according to 
Hingley) practice of telling lies and then becoming convinced by one’s own 
fabrications.367   Similarly, based on his total distrust of anything he was told by his 
Intourist minders, the science fiction writer Robert Heinlein surmised that the Soviets 
were so adept in the art of lying that they were misleading the West to think Moscow had 
5 million people, when its real population was about 700,000.368 Such tales made an 
                                                          
366 “In Russia, Sign Up or Sign Off,”Miami Herald, 7/7/1982. 
367 Ronald Hingley, The Russian Mind (New York: Scribner, 1977), 85-86, 91. 
368 Robert Heinlein, “Inside Intourist,” in idem, Expanded Universe (New York: Ace Books, 1982), 342-
358.   
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obvious implication: if the Soviet Union was could not treat foreigners with dignity, how 
much worse did Soviet people have it? 
Furthermore, unlike Soviet people, foreign “liberal subjects” could challenge 
Soviet power on the public square - and did so with relish. Their most common tool was 
to “disrupt the guide’s work... [by] asking provocative questions, and sometimes giving 
commentaries distorting Soviet reality.”369 Thus, Irving Levine, the author of one of the 
first wide-circulation travel guides to the Soviet Union, found in the course of a trip to 
Zagorsk that many a Western visitor was “more enthusiastic about having bested his 
guide in an ideological argument than about the sights of that old monastery 
settlement.”370  Over twenty years later, a Wall Street Journal reporter gleefully described 
how he forced his Intourist guide to bend himself into a pretzel, trying to answer why the 
Soviet Union did not allow the distribution of Western newspapers.371 Such challenges 
could grow heated indeed:  one erstwhile traveler recalls that when he became enraged 
with the whitewashed version of the history of the swimming pool that had taken the 
place of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior presented by his guide, he “grabbed the 
microphone from her and explained it myself.”372  
 How did Soviet tourist organizers respond to this challenge? In the mid-1950s, 
they couched the problem in crudely Marxist terms, as Soviet officials tried to impute a 
                                                          
369 “Otchet ob ekskursionnom...,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 1, d. 552, ll. 86-88. 
370 Irving R. Levine, Travel Guide to Russia (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 49.  
371 Charles Preston, “My Paper Chase in Moscow,” Wall Street Journal, 8/13/1985. 
372  Arthur Waldron, “Red Scarcity,” New Criterion 32, no.2 (2013), 19. 
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connection between the class backgrounds of foreign visitors and their opinions of the 
Soviet Union.373 However, this analysis was quickly abandoned. Instead, foreign visitors 
were conceptually divided into three groups. First, there was a minority of visitors who 
were “genuinely curious,” knowledgeable about, and perhaps sympathetic towards the 
Soviet system. Open opponents of the Soviet system constituted another group of visitors. 
Finally, the vast majority of visitors were “philistines” [obyvateli,] who, while often 
curious and well-intentioned, were also profoundly ignorant of Soviet reality. Their 
ignorance was exploited by the Western media which, as Soviet officials viewed it, 
pounded into them [vbili v golovy] that the Soviet Union was both a police state and 
“utterly devoid of any comfort.”374  This assumption of ignorance implied an important 
silver lining: darkness, as any Soviet propagandist knew, could always be penetrated by 
light.  Therefore, what Soviet tour guides required was a strategy to isolate and discredit 
hostile visitors so that they could enlighten their ignorant peers. 
  In line with their collectivist conception of foreign travel, Soviet tourism 
organizers saw the key to their problems in the existence of alternative, anti-Soviet 
sources of authority providing “distorted” images of the Soviet Union and strategies to 
distribute them to both hostile and unwitting travelers. As we have seen above, the 
ultimate culprits in this regard, as far as Soviet propagandists were concerned, were 
Western media, governments and “ideological centers” working in unison to slander the 
                                                          
373 See, for example, “Protokol no. 6 zasedaniia Pravleniia VAO Inturist, 2/3/1962,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 1, 
d. 515, ll. 34-36. 
374 “Stenogramma…” GARF, f. 9612, op.2, d. 286, l.258. 
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USSR. Therefore, Soviet officials attempted to identify and neutralize such local agents 
of influence. For instance, all socialist tourist groups and many ‘capitalist’ ones were 
escorted by a representative of the Intourist or Sputnik foreign partner firm that organized 
the group in question. Many of the partner firms from the West, especially firms working 
with various NGOs, were suspected of sending group leaders who worked to subvert the 
authority of the Soviet guides.375 Western embassies were another alternative source of 
authority. They, Soviet officials believed, briefed tourists and delegation members, gave 
them literature to spread among Soviet people and recommended visits to places outside 
tourist itineraries: “pawn shops, beer bars, train stations, saunas.”376  
Finally, in some groups, charismatic or well-educated tourists threatened to seize 
the initiative from their tour guides. In one Italian group in 1963, for example, a Jesuit 
professor of philosophy (Luciano Josephi) who was also an expert on “Marx, Engels… 
harpooning whales and Italian cuisine” and a “brilliant story-teller” became the unofficial 
leader of the group. From the position of authority he gained, he quietly scored points 
against the tour guide (tikhoi sapoi… zabival goly v nashi vorota] by asking 
uncomfortable questions, and pointing out disconcerting sights that tourists had no 
business gazing at (for example, elderly women doing heavy manual labor).377  
                                                          
375  “Protokol no. 6 Zasedaniia Pravlenia VAO Inturist, 29/6/1960,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 1, d. 440, ll. 90-93; 
“Otchet o provedennoi Pravleniem VAO Inturist rabote… 1962,” GARF, f. 9612, op.  1, d. 517, l. 1;   
“Reshenie… ob infromatsionno-propaganistkoi rabote…provedennnoi v1973 godu,”GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, 
d. 727, l. 193. 
376 “Informatsiia Glavinturista o merakh po usileniu propagandy po kanalu inostrannogo i sovetskogo 
turizma materialov i reshenii XXV s’ezda KPSS [n/d, 1976],” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 1014, l. 188. 
377 “Spravka iz opyta bor’by gidov-perevodchiov otdela stran Evropy i vostoka s popytkami ispolzovat 
turizm v Sovetskii Soiuz s tseliami antikommunizma, [N/D 1963],”GARF, f. 9612, op.3 d. 557, ll. 144-145.  
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What could tour guides do in the face of such challenges to their authority? Some, 
seeking to report that their ideological struggle was a success, sought accommodation 
with their charges (or simply quietly ignored their extra-curricular activities). Polish 
tourists, for example, cut informal deals with their tour guides to get some free time in 
exchange for dutifully attending trips to the Mausoleum and the Museum of the 
Revolution.378 In another case, Israeli tourists in Moldova who feigned illness in order to 
avoid planned trips and meet their local relatives instead, brokered a deal with their 
guide, under which the guide agreed to release two tourists from planned excursions 
every day, in exchange for disciplined participation by others.379  
Especially during the ideologically active Khrushchev era, at least some tour 
guides attempted more aggressive action against hostile visitors. Foreigners who took 
pictures of old and decrepit buildings and other unseemly sights that confirmed, to Soviet 
minds, their intent to embarrass their hosts, where shamed by their guides, and sometimes 
faced vigilantism by the Soviet public.380 Problematic tourists could expect to have their 
bags carefully searched when they exited the Soviet Union - searches that sometimes 
yielded lists of provocative questions, proving to Soviet authorities that subversive 
activities by foreign visitors were organized and directed from above.381 In one case, a 
                                                          
378 “Stenogramma…15/2/1972,” RGASPI, f. 5-M, op.1, d. 64a, l.6. 
379 “Iz moego opyta s turistami iz Izrailia (perevodchitsa L. Demartseva), n/d, 1963,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, 
d. 558, l. 170. 
380  “Spravka o rabote Kishinevskogo Otdelenia VAO ‘Inturist’s turistami- emigrantami s byvshei 
Bessarabii,” ibid, l. 155. “Otchet ov ekskursionnom obsluzhivannie inostrannykh turistov v SSSR v 1962 
godu,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 1, d. 517, l. 35. 
381 “Spravka of prebyvanii v SSSR grupp Italianskikh turistov, 21/5/1964,” RGANI, f. 5, op. 55, d. 121, ll. 
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customs officer entered the tour bus of a group of Italian tourists waiting to clear the 
border at Brest, and read to the group unflattering entries about his fellow travelers made 
by one troublemaker who just had his papers impounded as anti-Soviet propaganda.382 
Such divide-and-conquer tactics aimed to isolate and, if possible, humiliate ideologically 
hostile visitors. Tour guides were encouraged to ferret out and utilize political divisions, 
especially in groups from Italy and France, where at least some members or sympathizers 
of local Communist parties could be expected to take the Soviet side in political 
debates.383 West German tourists who “slandered” Soviet reality were pointed out to the 
rest of the group as ingrates who did not appreciate the extent to which the Soviet 
Union’s difficulties were products of the war.384 As indication of the success of such 
strategies, an Intourist document cited the example of a story published in the Daily 
Pennsylvanian by a “University of Philadelphia” student who denounced the behavior of 
members of his group who were expelled from the Soviet Union for throwing literature 
they received from their embassy (the journal Amerika) from the windows of their tour 
bus.385  
When all else failed, Intourist guides were forced to engage in debates in which, it 
was hoped, their erudition and training would win the day. This is how things went in the 
                                                          
382 Ibid, l. 44. As the Intourist guide that reported the incident wrote with some glee “the tourists’ response 
was similar to the silent scene in Gogol’s Revizor.” 
383 “Biulleten, no. 19,” GARF, f. 9612, op.3, d. 625, ll. 56a-67. 
384 Ibid, l. 37. 
385 “Doklad Predsedatelia Pravleniia VAO Inturist , V.N Ankudinova ‘Ob itogakh turistkogo sezona za 
1960 god’ na soveshchanii VGK SM SSR po kulturnym sviaziam s zarubezhnymi stranami,” GARF, f. 
9612, op. 2, d. 273, l. 75-76. 
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case of the aforementioned Jesuit, Josephi. When the latter made the mistake of trying to 
explain that the Bolsheviks rejected the concept of the family by citing Marxist classics, 
his guide seized the initiative, noting that Marx and Engels discussed bourgeois families 
only, and convincingly arguing that the Soviet family was fully intact. When the priest 
cited article 142 of the Soviet Constitution, banning religious instruction of minors, the 
next day the guide, T. F. Maniukova, having consulted experts, retorted that Article 143 
penalized attacks on religious buildings and ceremonies. As a result of such clever 
retorts, claims a report praising Maniukova, the Jesuit’s control over the group was 
broken.386 
Maniukova’s alleged victory over Josephi hints at perhaps the most important 
asset Soviet propagandists possessed as they waged ideological struggle with hostile 
visitors. As long as their charges stayed with their groups, the Soviet side controlled their 
time and itineraries. Intourist guides, as mentioned above, were trained to drown 
opponents with facts and figures, in a way that could generate respectful silence. One 
hostile observer conceded the efficacy of this tactic: “during the bus ride from the airport 
to the hotel where the guide would sum up an enormous amount of facts…whether 
intended or not, this information overload caused the visitors to soon stop listening and to 
accept the greatness of the Soviet system without any discussion.”387 The Soviet side also 
controlled access to people and institutions visitors wanted to meet and examine. For 
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professionals who visited the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s in order to learn about 
Soviet schools, hospitals, and scientific institutions, Intourist’s aid was instrumental,388 
and the members of the Soviet intelligentsia for whom exchanging knowledge with 
foreigners was a boon, must surely have appreciated the opportunity Intourist provided 
and structured their words and behavior appropriately. Soviet officials could also appeal 
to visitors’ egos: one 1961 delegation of Italian artists, ambivalent about the Soviet Union 
due to the campaign against formal art launched by the regime, had its mood lifted when 
cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin suddenly dropped in to visit the delegation.389 
Finally, one must keep in mind that, as long as foreign contact with Soviet people 
was mediated by Soviet institutions, even in this post-Stalinist era, it was a highly 
choreographed affair. As Jeff Hardy demonstrates, in the1950s, foreign visitors to Soviet 
prisons could still be convinced they served as laboratories for the “new man.”390 Muslim 
clerics from Pakistan and Syria were impressed by the respect accorded to Islam in Soviet 
society after a series of trips in the 1950s in which Soviet authorities pulled all the stops 
                                                          
388  “Spravka o poseshcheniem inostrannymi turistami iz kap. stran nauchnykh i meditinskikh uchrezhdenii, 
nauchno-issledovatelnykh institutov i promyshlennykh predpriatii, organizovannykh pomimo VAO Inturist 
v 1959 godu,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 268, ll. 142-157. Such visits did not always live positive 
impression. For instance, the sociologist   Herschel Alt entitled one of the chapters of his book on his visit 
to the Soviet Union (Russia's Children: the First Report on Child Welfare in the Soviet Union (New York: 
Bookman Associates, 1959)) “Our Struggle with Intourist.” In line with the extreme sensitivity of Soviet 
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to make them feel welcome.391 Even, or perhaps especially, debates and round tables 
could easily be stage-managed: a Komsomol document from the early 1960s 
demonstrates the staging instructions of debates between Soviet and Western youth 
groups. Komsomol authorities were charged with selecting Soviet participants, devising 
the list of topics to be discussed, assigning roles to different Soviet participants and 
anticipating possible questions the foreigners might raise.392 In such conditions, the 
Soviets could be sure that a victory, or at least, conditions sufficient to report victory, 
could be achieved in every battle in the war on “bourgeois ideology.”  
 
Conclusion 
 
The patterns of “ideological struggle” described above lasted all the way down to the 
perestroika years.  As Taylor and Polonsky archly observe, disputations between Soviet 
propagandists and Western “Defenders of Freedom” became, by the 1980s, a well -
choreographed ritual that kept both sides satisfied.393 As mentioned above, in the run-up 
                                                          
391 “Informatsia o prebyvanii v SSSR delegatsii musulmanskikh dukhovnykh deiatelei Siriiskogo Raiona 
Ob’edinenenoi Arabskoi Respubliki v iule i avguste 1958 goda,” GARF, f. 6991, op. 4, d. 93, ll. 109-128. 
392 ““Stenogramma soveshchania-seminara po voprosam agitatsionno-propagandisticheskoi raboty s 
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to the Moscow Olympics, Soviet authorities put massive efforts into cleaning up Soviet 
cities, reconstructing churches and monuments, stocking their shops with food, and 
protecting them from the approaches by problematic social elements, efforts that were 
reported in the West as another proof of Soviet duplicity - “Potemkin Olympics,” as the 
New York Times editorial board described it.394 The early 1980s saw Billy Graham’s 
Soviet visit, where the venerable evangelist, formerly a fierce anti-Communist, attested to 
the freedom of religion in the Soviet Union (and, for good measure, the excellent food 
situation there.)395 The American twelve-year-old  Samantha Smith, who wrote a 
personal letter to Yuri Andropov and received a personal invitation to visit the Soviet 
Union and spend some time in the Artek summer camp, became a media sensation on 
both sides of the Cold War divide.396 In the increasingly heated atmosphere of the Second 
Cold War, such peace tourism became a sufficiently common activity among left-wing 
Westerners that the conservative satirist P.J. O’Rourke could publish a travelogue 
                                                          
attrition warfare - and is worn down by an extremely tedious tit-for-tat debate.” From an Original Idea, 
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394  “The Potemkin Olympics,” New York Times, 7/17/1980. See also Kevin Klose, Closed Society, 286-
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396 For accounts of her trip, see Smith’s memorial website: http://www.samanthasmith.info/ (accessed 
online, 4/5/2016). Also see “O Samante, shokoladkakh, bantikakh i bditel’nykh spetssluzhbakh: Samanta 
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skewering participants of a “peace cruise” on the Volga and their fellow-travelling 
naiveté.397 In the meanwhile, Intourist and other tourist organizations kept devoting 
significant resources to propaganda work. In 1983, for instance, over 1,000 propagandists 
provided lectures and roundtable discussions for over 443,000 tourists, in addition to the 
daily labors of Soviet tour guides.398  The latter, in the meanwhile, kept honing their craft: 
As late as 1987, guides were expected to read and digest a highly proffesionalized review 
of recent Western historiography on the October Revolution.399 
 And yet, the tenor of “ideological struggle” shifted, in subtle and important ways. 
As Shawn Salmon points out, antiquities once denounced by zealous planners, now 
became officially enshrined as a key tourist draws.400 Careful reports about the mood, 
ideological divisions, responses and questions asked by individual tour groups compiled 
by Intourist and Sputnik guides in the 1950s and 1960s nearly disappear from Intourist 
and Sputnik archives in the 1970s and 1980s, while  propaganda work took less and less 
space on the agendas of Intourist board meetings. As everywhere else in Soviet life, the 
experimentation and urgency that characterized the 1960s was replaced by routine, sober 
economic considerations, and a whiff of imperial nostalgia. 
Does this shift mean that ideology no longer defined the struggle over the tourist 
gaze in the Soviet Union? Not at all. Information sheets for Soviet tour guides 
                                                          
397 “Ship of Fools.” 
398 “Spravka o merakh po usileniiu lekstionnoi propagandy sredi inostrannykh turistov, poseshchaiushchikh 
SSSR, 5/9/1984,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 1683, ll. 242-246. 
399 Z.I Aksianova, Velikii Oktiabr. Mify i realnost. Metodicheskie razrabotki v pomoshch gidu-
perevodchiku (Novosibirsk: Goskominturist, 1987). 
400 Salmon, “Land of Future,” 267-284. 
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(biulleteni), arguably more important than ever in this era of rote repetition, still brim 
with directions on the proper waging of ideological struggle. Still, instructions from the 
1970s and 1980s were no longer focused on enlightenment, persuasion or even coercion. 
Rather, their aim is to deflect all questions and end all discussions. Thus, when asked 
about human rights violations in the Soviet Union, guides were told to attack American 
atrocities in Vietnam. When English visitors asked about the Soviet constitution of 1977, 
they were rather bizarrely told that “England has no constitution, and that…no one asked 
the English about how their country is governed.”401 When economic questions were 
raised, data on inflation, unemployment and racial tensions in the West were cited, and 
guides “reminded [listeners] that they know better about the material needs of their own 
people than do freshly arrived guests [priezhye gosti].402 Canadians were told their 
country was rapidly becoming an American colony.403 Visitors who raised concerns 
about freedom of travel in the Soviet Union in light of the Helsinki process were told that 
it was the US that was sabotaging the agreement. If discussion in this vein continued, 
guides were told to address the other members of the group and indicate that such 
discussions were themselves proof of American imperialists’ hatred for détente.404 Such 
statements could not, and I would venture to guess, did not, convince anyone to embrace 
Soviet views. Rather, they were an invitation to remain silent, to let the ritual of 
                                                          
401  “Infromatsionnyi biulleten dlia gidov n. 54 [1979,) GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d.1235, l. 5. 
402  Ibid, l. 9. 
403  Ibid, l. 58. 
404 “Informatsionnyi biuleten dlia gidov, n. 59 [1978], GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 1358, l. 78. 
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hospitality take over, to accept the Soviet order of things as long as one was inside Soviet 
borders, and to let guides be guides and guests be guests. 
 On some level, this switch from debate in the 1960s to expectations of silence in 
the 1970s was an element of the general shift of Soviet socio-political life to silent 
conformism during the Brezhnev period. However, I would argue, more was at stake here 
than ideological apathy. The officially sanctioned image of the Soviet Union as a superior 
alternative to capitalist modernity was, for reasons outlined above, unpersuasive to 
foreigners. Manipulating physical surroundings to adjust Soviet realities to fit Western 
demands proved beyond the capacity of Soviet propagandists. Changing Soviet narratives 
to account for this failure was an impossibility as long as official ideology remained 
sacrocant. In these circumstances, the defiance thrown back at skeptical foreigners by 
Soviet tour guides served as evidence of the solidity of this ideology, a reminder that the 
Soviet model of modernity was there to stay, protected not only by guns and tanks and 
nuclear weapons, but also by the willingness of Soviet people to repeat its strictures, no 
matter how hollow they seemed. In this sense, the most important “truth about the Soviet 
Union” was that, as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, the self-images it generated 
were immutable, irrefutable, and not up for discussion. 
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Chapter 3: Speculators, Frivolous Girls and Other A-Social Elements  
 
  
 
On September 15, 1960, several months after the Soviet shoot-down of Gary Powers’ U-
2 spy airplane trigered an international crisis and renewed concerns over imperialist 
agression and espionage,405 the readers of the Komsomolskaia Pravda were treated to an 
article with a familiar headline: “Vigilance is our Weapon.”406  The author, V.A. Liakin, 
a raikom deputy from Leningrad, made a simple point. Given that the old exploiting 
classes had been eliminated in the USSR, imperialist powers could no longer rely on 
class-hostile elements to do their dirty work. Since “natural” opponents of Soviet power 
had ceased to exist, imperialists had to invent them - and did so by cultivating 
“speculators in goods purchased from tourists, frivolous girls [devochki legkogo 
povedeniia] and other parasitic elements among morally unstable Soviet youth. These 
                                                          
405 On the U-2 crisis, see William Taubman, Khrushchev: the Man and his Era (New York, W.W Norton, 
2004), 442-480; Timothy Naftali and Aleksandr Fursenko Khrushchev’s Cold War: the Inside Story of an 
American Adversary (New York: W.W Norton, 2007), 263-291. 
406 “Bditelnost’ nashe oruzhie,” Komsomolskaia Pravda, 9/15/1960. 
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corruptible elements were the only potential source of espionage, subversion or 
opposition to Soviet power.  Westernization was a source of ideological infection, and the 
proper prophylactic, Liakin concluded, was reporting wavering youths to the proper 
authorities before harm came to the Soviet body politic. 
 While this op-ed was a product of an exceptionally heated moment, Liakin’s 
clarion call reflects the basic dilemma Soviet authorities faced in the era of mass travel. 
Shaped by a long-standing culture of suspicion stretching back to the revolutionary era, if 
not indeed to Muscovite times,407 institutions in charge of political hygiene in the Soviet 
Union - party and Komsomol organizations, official media, and coercive agencies - were 
designed to create both mental and physical hindrances to unsupervised contacts between 
Soviet people and foreigners.408 And yet,  after Stalin, they operated in a context in which 
Soviet borders became increasingly porous to ever-increasing numbers of visitors who 
sought to create connections, fleeting or permanent, licit or illicit, with Soviet people, 
who in their turn, proved stubbornly vulnerable to the attractions of foreignness.  These 
connections created a proliferation of contact zones between Soviet people and 
foreigners, “spaces of freedom”409  in which the usual rules of Soviet life seemed 
suspended. And yet, these spaces, which I term the demimonde, were a product of late 
                                                          
407 On the long history of Soviet culture of vigilance, see: Gábor Rittersporn, Anguish, Anger and Folkways 
in Soviet Russia (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014), ch. 1, 2.  Peter Whitewood, The 
Red Army and the Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Soviet Military (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas 
Press), 2015. 
408 Andrea Chandler, Institutions of Isolation: Border Controls in the Soviet Union and the Successor States 
1917-1993 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998). 
409 Joseph C. Troncale, Sergei Kovalsky et al (ed.), The Space of Freedom: Apartment Exhibits in 
Leningrad, 1964-1986 (Richmond, VA: University of Richmond Press, 2006). 
  
   
 
  157 
 
 
 
Soviet society: its deficit-based economy, its combination of public consensus and private 
free-for-alls, its fascination with the West, and above all, its growing capacity for self-
organization outside state control.410 The clash between Soviet institutions and 
demimonde residents provides insight into the ways in which Stalin-era mental and 
institutional attitudes kept shaping the late socialist Soviet policy, as well as the growing 
difficulty the Soviet state faced in realizing its claims of absolute sovereignty over its 
citizens.411 In this chapter, I first sketch out the operations of the demimonde and then 
proceed to show how the Soviet authorities sought to constrain it, by means of both 
coercion and “political public relations”412- the use of the vast Soviet official media 
empire to mark participants in the demimonde as pariahs. 
 
  Portrait of a Demimonde 
 
As the Soviet dissident Andrei Amal’rik writes, for many Soviet people 
Even for ones buying and selling jeans, [meetings with foreigners] were a 
means of escape - a nearly metaphysical exit - from the world in which we 
                                                          
410 On this issue, see: Stephen V. Bittner, “A Negentropic Society? Wartime and Postwar Soviet History,” 
Kritika 14, no. 3(2014), 599-619. 
411 For the Soviet absolutist (if not to say total) view of citizenship and sovereignty, see Yanni Kotsonnis, 
States of Obligation: Taxes and Citizenship and the Early Soviet Republic (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2015), ch. 10. 
412 Anke Fiedler and Michael Meyen, “The Steering of the Press in the Socialist States of 
Eastern Europe: the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as a Case Study,” Cold War History 15, no. 4 
(2015), 449-470. 
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existed; they wanted to convince [us] that the Soviet world is a closed 
sphere…but by making tiny holes in it we could breathe another air.413 
 
Foreigners, in this telling, had a semi-sacral status, as emissaries of a different world, 
reorganizing the space around them so that it became, in an important sense, ex-territorial 
and immune to pressures of Soviet life and its demands for conformity. 
  This sense of breaking barriers, of the ex-territorial nature of encounters between 
Soviets and foreigners, is a common trope in both Soviet and Western memoirs of these 
first encounters. To cite a famous example, accounts of Moscow’s iconic 1957 Youth 
Festival are rife with ecstatic, sometimes sappy, emotional recollections of first 
contacts.414 Art historian Mikhail German responded in a similar fashion when witnessing 
the first Scandinavian ships entering the Leningrad port shortly after Stalin’s death: 
 Quiet, aggressively shy, crowds gathered on the shore, [gazing at ] incredibly 
clean sailors… clean-shaven, like actors in foreign movies, and strangely 
elegant in wonderfully tailored uniforms…What shone was not so much 
their intellect, but their civilized stature [tsivilizovannost]: they all spoke 
German easily…We could touch and feel this “abroad” [zagranitsu]… A 
small crowd formed around each sailor. He was pressured by a silent, 
persistent and obsequious crowd. The Swedes were embarrassed, could not 
understand why they were so exotic [dikovinka] and carefully answered 
ladies’ questions on whether they were married or if they wished to exchange 
addresses. I barely spoke, or to be more accurate, pronounced some foreign 
words, but thoroughly enjoyed myself: “I am speaking to a foreigner.” “Do 
you speak English” [sic] I shyly inquired of one…sailor who sat at the bench 
near the Winter Palace next to me. That was the first time I ever spoke a 
foreign language to a foreigner. 415 
 
                                                          
413 Andrei Amal’rik, Zapiski dissidenta (Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis, 1982), 18-19. 
414 Zubok, Zhivago’s Chidren, 105-120, provides many examples. See also chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
415 Mikhail Geman, Slozhnoe proshedshee/ passé compose (St. Petersburg: Iskusstvo SPB, 234-235. 
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The appeal, whether practical or metaphysical, of encounters with foreigners so aptly 
described by German remained in effect long after the initial excitement of the mid-1950s 
passed. Wherever foreigners appeared in significant numbers, Soviet people 
spontaneously reorganized space around them.  In Moscow, the “pleshka,” the Gor’kii 
street segment between Pushkin Square and Intourist’s Natsional hotel, was a commercial 
hub, where black marketeers bought foreign goods, currency speculators eager to help 
tourists to exchange their currency at comfortable black-market rather than confiscatory 
official ones operated,416 and prostitutes plied their trade, with few interruptions from the 
authorities.417 Along the Nevskii Prospekt in Leningrad, “hundreds of...fartsovshchiki, 
currency speculators, thieves and burglars were circling” foreigners. The nearby 
Gostinnyi Dvor metro station exit became an open market where “items of desire were 
shot… into the closets of Soviet people.”418 In cities lacking such iconic spaces, tourists, 
especially from Eastern Europe, were not above turning hotel squares into improvised 
markets [barakholki].419 Even the Soviet sanctum sanctorum, the Lenin Mausoleum, saw 
                                                          
416 On the economics of exchange markets under socialist economies, see: Jan Vanous, “Private Foreign 
Exchange Markets in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,” unpublished paper accessed online at: 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/private-foreign-exchange-markets-eastern-europe-and-the-ussr-
1980, originally published in 1980. Accessed on 4/10/2016. 
417 Iurii Aizenshpis, Zazhigaiushchii zvezdy: zapiski i sovety pionera shou biznesa (Moscow: Algoritm, 
2005), 96-97. 
418  For quotes see Sheilla Fitzpatrick, A Spy in the Archives: a Memoir of Cold War Russia (London and 
New York: I.B Tauris, 2013), 54; Evgenii Vyshnenkov, “Peterburg na iznanku,” Fontanka.ru, 12/25/2012, 
accessed online at http://www.fontanka.ru/2012/05/25/114/. For a portrait of life on the Nevskii Prospekt, 
see idem, Krysha. Ustnaia istoriia reketa (Moscow: Ast), 2011, 29-35 
419 “Otchet ob oblsuzhivanii inostrannykh turistov v sezone 1963 goda Kishinevskim otdeleniem VAO 
Intourist,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 1, d. 558, ll. 45-47.  
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similar scenes, as teenagers hungry for foreign goods, gum and currency swarmed the 
Mausoleum’s foreign visitors.420 
 
Figure 3.1: Black Marketeers on Nevskii Prospekt, Early 1980s 
Source: online812.ru 
  Hotels hosting foreigners were, of course, spaces prearranged for such encounters. 
The American journalist George Feifer describes how the vast restaurant of Hotel Rossiia 
became a stage of impromptu demonstrations of friendship of the peoples, as visiting 
Americans and provincial officials on komandirovka reassured each other regarding their 
countries’ love of peace and progress.421 Intourist restaurants and other culinary venues 
refined enough to be available to foreigners also inevitably drew members of both formal 
                                                          
420 “Spravka o nekotorykh faktakh skupki inosttannoi valiuty i veshchei sovetskimi grazhdaninami u 
inostrannykh turistov,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, d. 268, ll. 173-175; Yuri Brokhin, Hustling on Gorky Street 
(New York: Dial Press, 1975), 14-15; Brokhin was a participant-observer in the life of the Soviet 
demimonde: in 1983, after his emigration to America, he was murdered by unkown assailants in New York, 
in a mafia-style execution. (Daniel Bursten, “Death of a Hustler,” New York Magazine, 16 (1983), 26-29). 
 
421 George Feifer, Russia Close up (London: Jonathan Cape, 1973), 101-149.  
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and informal Soviet elites. In such locations, foreigners, writers and artists, black market 
speculators and prostitutes, army officers on leave and various officials danced, listened 
to jazz and rowdy Soviet orchestras, and enjoyed the best material comforts the Soviet 
Union could offer.422 In hotel lobbies, commerce flourished as foreigners were besieged 
by black marketeers and “chewing gum knights.”423  
  Similar encounters occurred in less exalted locations. In resorts on the Black Sea 
shores, Soviet women were berated for spending their time chasing foreigners instead of 
following doctor’s orders.424 Foreign sailors’ clubs in Soviet ports (interkluby) 
established by the Soviet authorities to propagandize these working-class visitors, 
inevitably drew the attentions of black market traders and sex workers.425 The Leningrad-
Vyborg highway, on which large numbers of Finnish tourists seeking escape from strict 
Finnish anti-alcholol laws travelled,426 attracted “highway men” [trassoviki], who  
fashioned a series of impromptu rest-stops where tourists exchanged currency, clothes, 
and consumer items for rubles, vodka, and sex.427  
                                                          
422 For snapshots of life inside restaurants catering to foreigners, see: Leonid Shtakelberg, “Pasynki pozdnoi 
imperii,” 35-43; “A Shock for the Aragvi,” The Times, 7/7/1959.  
423 Brokhin, Hustling, 16-17; “Prezrennye rytsari zhvachki,” Komsomolskaia Pravda, 1/1/1959. 
424 “Kak zhe oni ustali?” Komsomoskaia pravda, 18/9/1969.  
425 “Protokol n. 4 zasedaniia Komissii po inostrannym delam Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, 6/7/1981,” 
GARF, f. A-385, op. 13, ll. 7-11. 
426 On the so-called “vodka trail” phenomenon, see Auvo Kostianen: “The Vodka Trail: Finnish Travelers’ 
Motivation to Visit the Former Soviet Union,” in: Janne Ahtola and Timo Toivonen (ed.) Travel Patterns: 
Past and Present (Savonlinna, Finland: University of Joensuu, 1999), 33-48.  
427 Leonid Milosh, “Fartsovshchiki,” Smena 1457 ( February, 1988), accessed online at: http://smena-
online.ru/stories/fartsovshchiki on 4/30/2015; D. Vasiliev, Fartsovshchiki: kak delalis’ sostoianiia (St. 
Petersburg: Vektor; Nevskii prospect, 2007), 170-172; “Stenogrammma zasedaniia Komissii po 
inostrannym delam Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, 23/6/1983,” GARF, f. A-385, op. 13, d. 4931, ll. 24-25.  
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  Others forms of exchange took less commercialized forms.  The kitchens and 
studios of prominent dissidents, underground artists, and academics were places of 
pilgrimage for politically conscious visitors (a point to which we shall return at length in 
Chapter Four). For connoisseurs of more exotic fares, fashionable “salons” promised 
meetings with Soviet “Catholics, fascists, homosexuals, poets, artists, and surrealists.”428 
Prominent residences, like the “mansion” of American reporter Edmund Stevens and his 
Soviet wife Nina or the Peredelkino dacha of journalist, guide book author, and alleged 
KGB agent Viktor Louis were locations where Soviet elites and foreign diplomats, 
journalists, and other dignitaries networked, exchanged gossip and, one presumes, 
cheerfully spied on each other.429 A step below on the social scale, Western and Soviet 
students argued about art and science and literature, exchanged gifts, souvenirs and rock 
records, drank, and formed friendships and romantic relationships.430 Further below, the 
aforementioned Polonsky and Taylor recommended participation in a drunken evening in 
a “disreputable Soviet flat” as key point in familiarizing oneself with Soviet life.431 
                                                          
428 Satter, Age of Delirium, 337. 
429 On the Stevenses, see John McPhee, The Ransom of Russian Art (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
1994), 27-28, Bassow, Correspondents, 318-322. On Louis, see Klose, Closed Society; 272-277. “Viktor 
Louis: Obituary,” The Times, 07/20/1992. In his memoirs, dictated to KGB officer cum biographer V. 
Kevorkov, Louis denies all connections to secret services, rather unconvincingly. (V. Kevorkov, Viktor 
Lui: chelovek s legendoi (Moscow: Sem’ dnei, 2010).  
430 For a touching example of relationships between rebel youth and American exchange students, see 
exchange of letters between Lauren J. Leighton, E.F Slavinsky, the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, 
and the Ameican Immigration and Nationalization Service, National Conference for Soviet Jewry Records, 
The Soviet Jewry Movement Archives [NCSJ-TSJM], Box 12, folder 1. The proclivity of American 
exchange students for sexual and other illicit liaisons with Soviet citizens was cause for some concern for 
American authorities. See David Engerman, Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet 
Experts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 240-245. 
431 Taylor and Polonsky, From an Original Idea, 162-168. 
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  Such transnational interactions produced a subtle shift in Soviet life, creating new 
niches in which the usual rules and hierarchies applied loosely, or were reversed.  In 
Georgia in the late 1950s, for instance, the local KGB complained that one of the most 
marginal of Soviet commuinities, local  Molokan “sectarians,” were rapidly gaining 
social prestige as they were receiving gifts and money from visiting Norht American co-
religionists.432  Closer to the center, contacts with foreign visitors and the circulation of 
texts, information and artifacts that these contacts allowed, were crucial for the 
flourishing of marginal communities, ranging from Leningrad’s rock underground to 
Moscow’s esoteric mystics.433  
  Most famously in this regard, contacts between Soviet underground artists and 
Western afficionados profoundly transformed the Soviet art world by creating a 
commercial space outside the control of official creative unions - the so called dip-art 
scene.434  According to artist and collector Anatolii Brusilovskii, the origins of this form 
of commercial exchange date to the Moscow Youth Festival of 1957 during which 
foreigners for the first time made appearances in the underground studios of non-
                                                          
432 “B. Katsitadze (Georgian KGB) to Central Committee, Georgian Communist Party, 31/8/1959,” 
Sak’art’velos sinagan sak’met’a saministros akk’ivi (II) (Archive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
Georgia: Party Archive), f. 14, op. 34, d. 438, ll. 50-51. 
433 On the contribution of one American “rock girl“  to the Leningrad rock scene, see Dennis Boyannov, 
“Joanna Stingray, a California Girl in the U.S.S.R,” Moscow Times, /14/2016, accessed online at: 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/arts_n_ideas/article/joanna-stingray-a-california-girl-in-the-
ussr/562009.html on 3/20/2016. On esoteric communities, see: A. Rovner, “Gurdzhievskoe dvizhenie v 
Rossii v 1960-kh-1970-kh. Vospominaniia i refleksii uchastnika,” accessed at: 
http://ariom.ru/forum/p357562.html, on  2/28/2015. 
 
434  On the world of dip-art see Valentin Vorob’ev, Levaki (Moscow: NLO, 2012), Anatolii Brusilovskii, 
Studiia (St. Petersburg: Letnii Sad, 2001), John McPhee, The Ransom of Russian Art. 
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conformist artists.435 In the aftermath of the Festival, and the subsequent Khrushchevian 
attack on modernist art, this scene expanded, to include foreigners resident in the Soviet 
Union, Soviet collectors (like the aforemonetioned Stevenses), foreign collectors visiting 
under the guise of tourists and exchange students, and, most importantly (as the term dip-
art indicates), diplomats. The latter not only used their diplomatic immunity and 
connections to resident foreigners and elite Muscovites to scout out and discover new 
artists, but also took advantage of their access to diplomatic pouches to overcome 
draconian Soviet regulations regarding art exports. Thus, the world of dip-art united 
foreigners, Soviet social elites and socially marginal artists, connecting them to a world 
market that appreciated modern art than it did socialist realism. For foreigners, the world 
of dip-art offered the thrill of finding “an avenue into real Soviet life,”436 of aiding 
“dissenting artists,” and, not least, of acquiring original art at very low prices.437 For 
underground artists, contacts with foreigners a possibility of international fame, a 
measure of defense in the face of official assaults, and, of course, unparalleled access to 
foreign currency and Western goods.  
  No less important, however, access to foreigners and the art market they created 
represented reversal of fortunes. For artists living on the margins of Soviet life, 
periodically attacked by the authorities and lacking access to the security, privilege, and 
material perks that official favor and membership in creative unions offered, access to 
                                                          
435. Brusilovski, Levaki, 7-10. On the artistic impact of the Festival and the international contacts it allowed 
for artists, see the memoirs of the jazz musician Aleksei Kozlov. Kozel na sakse (Moscow: Vagrius), ch. 5. 
436 John McPhee, Ransom of Russian Art, 48. 
437 Vorob’ev, Levaki, 37-38. 
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and purchase of their works by foreigners represented an inversion of the regular Soviet 
order of things. As Brusilovskii puts it vis-à-vis the painter Vasilii Stepnikov: “here was a 
provincial [chelovek iz naroda]… unrecognized by anyone, branded as mentally ill… He 
was flattered by people from far away America buying his pictures…What he could not 
receive in the sinking sands [zybkoi triasine] of Soviet life: respect, recognition, social 
life, became a wonderful dream for him.”438 To borrow a Bakhtinian term, the 
demimonde created small corners of topsy-turvy reality, in which these outcasts were on 
top.  
 Sex workers “specializing” in foreigners constituted another community in which 
material privilege was combined with deep marginality.  This form of commerce also 
first became visible in the 1957 Moscow Youth Festival. As Kristen Roth-Ey 
demonstrates, despite the considerable efforts Soviet authorities took to “cleanse” 
Moscow from unwanted social elements, “loose girls on the loose,” Soviet girls who had 
sex with foreigners, sometimes in exchange for gifts or souvenirs, became one of the 
most visible aspects of Festival life.439 A scant few years later, this field became 
“professionalized” enough that the aforementioned journalist George Pfeiffer could 
conduct an interview with a well-educated, English-speaking, full-time, hard-currency 
prostitute, “a tall, blue-eyed blonde [who]…never wears a single crummy Soviet 
stitch.”440   
                                                          
438 Brusilovskii, Studiia, 53-54. 
439 Roth-Ey, “Loose Girls,” 82-86. 
440 Feifer, Russia Close Up, 182. 
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 Like most instances of sex tourism, sex work involving foreigners in the Soviet 
Union involved not only “professionals” like Feifer’s interlocutor, but also various 
relationships rooted in the privileged economic position of foreigners.441 For instance, 
access on the part of students from the developing world to material goods made them 
attractive to many of their Soviet female peers, while, as we had already seen, sex 
between Intourist guides and their charges was a standing concern of Intourist and 
Sputnik officials. 
 Yet, in the cultural imagination of the late Soviet period it was hard currency 
prostitution that represented the most ubiquitous form of sexual encounters between 
Soviets and foreigners. As mentioned above, prostitutes were drawn to all major 
concentrations of foreigners, ranging from and sailors’ clubs to Intourist’s top hotels. The 
bars and restaurants of the latter became the abode of the so-called “Intourist girls,” later 
known as interdevochki, after the eponymous perestroika- era novel and film by Vladimir 
Kunin. By the 1980s, “Intourist girls” were perhaps the most visible symbol of the 
luxurious possibilities contact with foreigners offered. As late Soviet society saw it, with 
either admiration or moral outrage, by dint of their access to foreigners vaulted to the top 
of the Soviet material hiearchy, consuming clothes, cosmetics and foods other Soviet 
                                                          
441 For an overview of the literature on the topic of sex tourism, see Chris Ryan and C. Michael Hall, Sex 
Tourism: Marginal People and Liminality (London: Routledge, 2001). Also see Amalia L. Cabezas, 
Economies of Desire: Sex and Tourism in Cuba and the Dominican Republic (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press), 2009. 
  
   
 
  167 
 
 
 
citizens could only dream of, and earning significant fortunes, 442 which moreover were 
denominated in dollars, not rubles.  
  Yet behind this exotic façade lurked the usual realities of the sex trade, 
overlayed with the peculiar arrangements of the late Soviet period. To operate, “Intourist 
girls” had to pay exorbitant bribes to Intourist staff for access to foreigners,443 provide 
bribes and sexual services for militia officers, and maintain a modus vivendi with the 
KGB (see Chapter Four).444 Furthermore, perestroika-era studies of Soviet sex workers 
show that “Intourist girls” fit the global profile of sex work: they were predominantly 
young migrants from the provinces to Moscow and Leningrad, products of broken homes 
and abusive parents, and suffered extremely high levels of alcoholism, mental illness and 
venereal disease.445 Unsurprisingly, they were also defenseless in the face of violent 
attacks by their clients.446 
 Sex work was but a small element the vast commercial community that sprouted 
around foreigners. As with sex work, the generic term fartsovka, after the irrepressible 
                                                          
442 In 1987, the newspaper Trud reported the arrests of two foreign currency prostitutes involved in 
currency speculation with half million rubles in state bonds. (“Po kakoi tsene liubov?” Trud, 7/31/1987). 
443 According to the Soviet legal scholar V.V Diukov, the nightly payoff prostitutes paid to Intourist staff 
stood at 500 rubles. (“Grimasy rynka svobodnoi liubvi” in in Iu. M. Khochenkov (ed.), Prostitutsiia i 
prestupnost’ (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1991), 155.  Another expert found that between these 
expenses, and the need to invest in clothing, makeup and contraceptives, foreign currency prostiutes were 
often heavily indebted to other black market participants. (A. Ia. Vilks, “Mify I realnost’, ibid, 62.) 
444 See interviews with hard currency prostitutes, Anna Iakovleva, Khroniki pikirueshchego erosa 
(Moscow: Izdatelskie resheniia, 2014), accessed online at: http://www.litmir.info/bd/?b=224281 on 
5/5/2015) and Andrei Karaulov, Vokrug Kremlia-2 (Moscow: Slovo, 1993), 178-183. Besides works cited 
above, fot impressionistic details on the often brutal world of foreign currency prostitution see Mark 
Popovskii, Tretii lishnii: on, ona i sovetskii rezhim (London: Overseas Exchange Publishing, 1985), 305-
344 
445 A.Ia Vilks, “Mify i realnost’,” N.A Averina, “Piatdesiat’ sem’ iunykh ‘ledi’ iz obslugi interservisa.” 
446 Karaulov, Vokrug Kremlia-2 (Moscow: Slovo, 1993), 181-182. 
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black marketeers (fartsovshchiki)447 who badgered generations of foreign visitors to 
exchange clothes and dollars for rubles and Soviet souvenirs, covers a myriad of 
practices.448  The stereotypical fartsovshchik was a young, urban, bohemian, male, and 
motivated by curiosity no less than material concerns – a stereotype largely generated by 
the fartsovshchiki themselves. 449  To cite a typical example, one practicioner, the 
pseudonymous Sergei Panov, proudly began his account of life on the black market with 
the following boast:  
My kommunalka neighbors call me scum (podonok). But if I am scum, I 
am an intellectual scum. I am curious about the history of mankind, from 
the troglodites to group sex. I visit museums and exhibits every day, 
combining aestethics with business. Black business, of course.450 
 
This view of a fartsovshchik as bohemian capitalist living in conflict with Soviet 
philistines obscures the complex nature of black market exchanges involving foreigners. 
Not all participants in the market were either young or motivated by “aesthetic” concerns 
The British travel writer Collin Thubron recalls, for example, seeing elderly women 
                                                          
447 The origins of this term are obscure, deriving from either English (for sale) or Yiddish (forets- an 
Odessa-originated term for wily market operators). 
448 Despite the vast amount of literary and memoiristic literatures on this phenomenon, the English 
language scholarly literature on the fartsovshchiki is surprisingly scant. For Russian language treatments, 
see See P. Romanov, M. Suvorova, “Chistaia fartsa: sotsialnyi opyt vzaimodeistvia sovetskogo gosudarstva 
i spekuliantov,” in I. Olimpieva and O. Pachenko (ed.) Neformalnaia ekonomika v postovetskom 
prostrantsve (St. Petersburg: TSNI, 2003, 148-164.  P. Romanov, E. Iarskaia-Smirnova, “Fartsa: Podpol’e 
Sovetksogo obshchestva potrebleniia.” Neprikosnovennyi zapas 5(2005), 62-68, N. B Lebina, 
Povsednevnost epokhi kosmosa i kukuruzy: destruktsiia bolshogo stilia. Leningrad 1950-e- 1960-e gody 
(St. Petersburg: Pobeda, 2015), 420-430. Also see Larisa Zakharova, S’habiller à la soviétique. La mode et 
le Dégel en URSS (Paris: CNRS editions), 2012), 220-232, Salmon, “Land of Future,” 202-205. Finally, 
Zhuk, Rock and Roll is a brilliant study of the cultural impact of fartsa where it could not physically exist 
the closed city of Dnepropetrovsk. 
449 On social backgrounds of the fartsovshchiki, see Romanov and Suvorova, “Chistaia fartsa.” 
450 Sergei Panov, Fartsovshchiki (Moscow: Flegon Press, 1971), 33.  
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picking through the garbage of an Intourist motel where he was staying, in search of 
foreign items to resell.451 On the other hand, the most prominent black market traders 
cared more for accumulation than adventure.  Thus, unlike his flamboyant colleagues, the 
eponymous protagonist of Maksim Veller’s “The Legend of the Founding Father of 
Fartsovka, Fima Bliaishits,” is a quiet, reticent character who “ate little, almost never 
drank, spoke quietly and politely, and bought himself a used Moskvich for necessary 
transportation.”452  
 More importantly, after the “heroic” period of the late 1950s, when 
fartsovshchiki were usually drawn from the Soviet “golden youth” who alone had the 
courage and language skills to approach foreigners, fartsa became fully integrated into 
late Soviet social networks.453 At the bottom of the pyramid, fartsovshchiki were 
recruited among “chewing gum knights” – who were often “normal” Soviet children who 
partook in the universal craze for Western consumer goods.454 At the top, fartsovka 
increasingly became a component of late Soviet criminal structures. Even though it was a 
victimless crime, its illegal nature brought practicioners into contact with “violent 
entepreneurs,” who by the 1980s were “taxing” fartsovshchiki for access to prime spots –
and thus setting up the foudnations for the vast criminal empires of the late Soviet and 
                                                          
451 Tiburon, Among the Russians, 17. 
452 Maksim Veller, “Legenda o rodonachalnike fartsovki, Fime Bliashitse,” in idem, Legendy (St. 
Petersburg: Parol, 2003), 9-35.  For more on the conflict between tame businessmen and unruly romantics 
among the fartsovshchiki see Sergei Dovlatov, “Krepovye Finnskie noski,” in idem, Chemodan (Tenafly, 
NJ: Ermitazh, 1986). 
453 Bellfrage, A Room in Moscow. 
454 Anya Von Bremzen, Mastering the Art of Soviet Cooking (New York: Crown, 2013), 16. 
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early post-Soviet periods.455  Fartsovka became a hierarchical affair, where street level 
traders (“bombily”)456 were subject to the upper echelon of market participants, the so-
called “merchants” (kuptsy).457  The merchants bankrolled street-level traders, gathered 
their hard currency proceeds and  traded in icons, jewelry, gold, (and, at times, even rare 
industrial materials).458 
 To ply these trades, “merchants” had to forge both domestic and foreign 
connections. For instance, gold and foreign currency speculators were often connected to 
Soviet underground millionaires, who both supplied them with products for sale (say, raw 
gold stolen from state enterprises), and provided a market for the foreign currency and 
other valuables gathered from street operations.459 Others obtained goods for sale by 
launching expeditions to the Soviet countryside to gather ancient icons (which could be 
obtained for a pittance or even received as gifts from naïve and generous villagers). 
                                                          
455 On the violent transformation of fartsovka see Vyshenkov, Krysha, passim and “Chem zhivet ‘reket’”, 
Pravda, 5/3/1989. On violent entepreneurs, see Vadim Volkov,  Violent Entrepreneurs: The use ofin the 
Making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002) 
456 Aleksandr Ukhov, “Bombilla” Lebed’, 03/17/2002, accessed online at 
http://lebed.com/2002/art2865.htm, on 5/1/2015.  
457 For details of the structure of the black market see, Brokhin, Hustling, ch. 1,  Vasil’ev, Kak delalis 
sostoianiia, 127-141, and especially Iurii Aizenshpits, Zazhigaiushchii zvezdy: vospominaniia pionera 
shou-biznesa (Moscow-Algoritm, 2005), esp. 96-117. Aizeshpits, one of the Soviet Union’s first rock 
producers, also doubled as major actor on the foreign currency market- and earned three prison terms for 
his efforts. From the other side of the curtain, see S. Fedoseev, “Koroli i kapusta,” in Vasilii Stavitskii (ed.) 
Lubianka: obesephecenie ekonomicheskoi bezopasnosti gosudarstva (Moscow: Kuchkovo pole, 2004), 
146-157.  The author served as the chief of the KGB department in charge of battling foreign currency 
speculation. 
458 Aizenspis, Zvezdy, 109. According to him, he smuggled abroad cinnabar, a mercury ore used in the 
shipbuilding industry. 
459 Iurii Feofanov, “Firma terpit krakh,” in idem, Firma terpit krakh (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1969), 
140-147. “Dno,” Trud, 1/16/1962. 
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These were then resold to visiting foreigners or diplomats, connecting decrepit churches 
in Siberian kolkhozes to the growing international market in Russian religious art.460 
 Like all forms of informal economic activity in the Soviet Union, the foreign-
oriented black market was deeply dependent on cooperation with members of formal 
institutions. As we’ve seen, the most crucial actors in this regard were Intourist staff who 
sold access to foreigners or directly competed with black marketeers for tourist dolars.461 
In the mid-1950s, employees of commission stores became a major node in illicit trade 
networks, selling gold received from foreigners to Soviet speculators, and helping 
foreigners buy rubles on the black market.462 Later on, smuggling and illicit trade 
networks relied on the aid of Berezka clerks, jewelry and art assessors, and other Soviet 
officials.463 Customs officers were especially open to graft, an issue that caused 
significant heartburn to KGB and MVD officials, given their concerns regarding the 
political and security implication of slackened vigilance at the border (see Chapter 4).464 
Another important contribution was made by various Soviet employers who provided 
                                                          
460 Krizhevskii, “Svet v podvale,” Konstantinov, Bandistkii Peterburg, 298 
461  On the competition between black market traders and hotel staff for the tourist market, see Panov, 
Fartovshchiki, 36-37. 
462 “Dudorov [Minister of Internal Affairs] to TsK KPSS, 3/9/1957,” GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 491, l. 
268.This problem was so acute that the Soviet authorities banned commission stores from receiving items 
from foreigners: “Postanovlenie Soveta Ministrov SSSR ot 7 iulia 1956 goda, n. 83-842S. “O merakh po 
bor’be s spekuliatsyei inostrannymi tovarami v SSSR i sovetskoi valiutoi za granitsei,” GARF, f. 5446, op. 
106, d. 1070, l. 92. 
463 For examples of sweeping cases involving foreigners and Soviet officials, see: V. Titov, “Tarakany,” 
Sovetskaia Kul’tura, 12/14/1977; V.Kassis and L. Kolosov, “Sekret zolotoi shkatulki,” Izvestiia, 4/24/1982;  
V. Konovalov and M. Serdiukov, “Chuzhoi Mirazh,” Komsomolskaia Pravda, 1/11/1982.   
464 V.E Kevorkov, General Boiarov (Moscow: Sovershenno sekretno, 2003). 113, Iu. Andropov, “O rabote 
organov KGB po presecheniiu gosudarstvennykh prestuplenii v pervom polugodii 1980 goda, 02/08/1980,” 
in: A.A Makarov et al (ed.) Vlast’ i dissident: iz dokumentov KGB i TsK KPSS  (Moscow: MKhG,) 2006, 
229-230. 
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black marketeers and prostitutes with fictive employment, thus allowing them to live in 
large cities and protecting them from charges of parasitism – all for a fee. Hard currency 
prostitutes, for instance,  were often registered as working in the service sector, 
“employed” as cleaners, store clerks, hairdressers and so on465- making it difficult to 
employ “the principle of socialist morality: he who does not work shall not eat” or use 
laws against parasitism to deal with the demimonde.466  
 If collaboration from Soviet officials was necessary in order for fartsovka to 
survive, collaborative foreigners were required to make it thrive. Tourists were, of course, 
the most common market for street level deals. Polish tourists were especially prone to 
black market activities, which, by the end of the Soviet period, reached gargantuan 
proportions.467 Western tourists were also tempted by the easy ruble. In 1967, the 
American embassy in Moscow complained that hundreds of American tourists and 
exchange students systematically engaged in smuggling, resale of items purchased in 
Berezka stores and illegal currency operations.468 Five years later, the New York Times 
                                                          
465 Popovskii, Trettii lishnii, 279; Vishnevskii, Krysha,5; “Dama s podachkoi,” Komsomolskaia Pravda, 
10/9/1986. Senior black marketeers had even better arrangements. An investigation of Ian Rokotov, the 
“king” of the Moscow black currency market in the late 1950s (see below) revealed, for instance, that two 
of his associates held positions as engineers in a prestigious construction bureau and as ballerina at the 
Bolshoi (“Demichev to Tsk KPSS,” RGANI, f. 5, op.30, d. 373, l. 34), while Aizeshpis recalls how he 
obtained a position in a research institute, with the understanding he would come to work late and leave 
early in exchange of providing his “collective” with consumer items and other perks ( Zvezdy, 80-85). 
466 “Ustupite shtany.” 
467 In the only statistical estimate of this trade I was able to locate, the yearly turnover of illicit trade by 
Polish tourists was estimated in 500 million rubles.  (“O protivopravnoi deiatelnosti turistov iz PNR, 
11/1/1989.” GARF, f. A-10004, op. 1, d. 802, l. 97.  On Polish involvement in black market activity in the 
USSR, see also Wojnowksi, “Bukwark of Sovietness,” Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City. 
468 “Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the State Department, 1/11/1967,” Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968. Volume XIV: the Soviet Union (Washington DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 2001), 445-447. 
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reported on an American couple who funded their honeymoon trip to the Soviet Union by 
bringing a suitcase of jeans, selling them for rubles at inflated prices, then exchanging  
the rubles for dollars with other tourists at black market rates, and smuggling the 
proceeds through Soviet borders in their underwear.469 
  Frequent border crossers were less famous but more profitable participants in 
transnational black market networks. Members of diasporic communities (most often 
Armenians and East-European Jews) could easily connect to Soviet underground trade 
networks and reap impressive profits.470 In 1958, for example, the head of the Warsaw 
pharmacy trust was apprehended in Odessa with 45,000 rubles, over 500 dollars, and 845 
tsarist era coins. Further investigation showed that he sold 38 gold watches to a local 
black market dealer, who was in turn arrested with a suitcase packed with gold.471 By the 
1970s, the growing integration of socialist and Western economies opened space for 
much more ambitious operations. In a case so brazen that it was used by KGB vice-
Chairman Semen Tsvigun to highlight the dangers of contraband to the Soviet state, two 
diaspora Armenian students brought 35 kilograms of gold for sale on Soviet black 
markets, and smuggled 17 kilograms of platinum abroad over the course of their 
studies.472 
                                                          
469 ‘R.V.D’, “Your Old Jeans can bring $30—and Jail,” New York Times, 5/21/1972  
470 On Armenian contraband networks, see V.M Koldaev, “Istoriia i sovremennye metody bor’by s 
kontrabandoi v SSSR,” Dissertation for Kandidat Nauk Degree, Leningrad State University, 1972, 110-111, 
163-165.  On the “Jewish” aspects of contraband and black market, see below.  
471 “Dudorov to TsK KPSS,” GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 490, l. 161.  Fedoseev, “Koroli i kapusta,” 146-147. 
472 Semen Tsvigun, Tainyi front: o podryvnoi aktivnosti imperializma protiv SSSR i bditelnosti sovetskikh 
liudei (Moscow: Politizdat, 1973, 318- 319. Tsvigun does not provide a date for this affair, but the early 
1970s were a historic peak for gold prices, which reached as high as $2,000 per ounce in 2015 prices. 
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 Such activities were not contained to foreigners with pre-existing Soviet ties. 
Third World students were not only avid importers of consumer items for sale or barter 
on the streets and on campuses, but employed in a variety of trading schemes. Iurii 
Aizenshpis, a pioneer rock producer who also doubled as a prominent currency 
speculator, recalls how he used foreign students as straw buyers at foreign currency 
shops, selling the items they acquired to underground Soviet millionaires.473 Icon traders 
employed the same students as mules to deliver to clients in Western Europe, with the 
proceeds plowed bulk purchases warm winter clothing that was resold in Siberian retail 
black markets.474  
 As connections between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world thickened, 
more and more opportunities for profit opened up for professional border-crossers. In the 
era of détente, American ships brought not only grain, but contraband items stocked by 
sailors seeking to make a quick dollar.475 Making use of this business opportunity 
between 1974 and 1976, a group of black market traders in the Ukrainian port city of 
Izmail bought 8,700 female handkerchiefs valued at over 170,000 rubles from foreign 
                                                          
Taking this as baseline, the gold the two students smuggled into the Soviet Union was worth about 2.5 
million dollars - and probably more as according to Tsvigun, the two smuggled medallions and ancient 
coins and not raw product. (Historical data from: http://www.macrotrends.net/1333/historical-gold-prices-
100-year-chart, accesed on 5/1/2015). 
473 Aizenshpis, Zvezdy, 105-106. 
474  Aleksei Krizhevskii, “Svet v podvale,” Russkaia zhizn’, 8 (2007), accessed online at: 
http://www.intelros.ru/readroom/rulife/170807/1035-aleksejj_krizhevskijj_svet_v_podvale.html, on 
5/1/2015. 
475 David K. Shipler, “Black Sea Port in Soviet [sic] Adapts to U.S Seaman,” New York Times 10/16/1976. 
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sailors.476 “Karl” a West German businessman who often visited the Soviet Union. “Karl” 
provided funding for a group of Soviet art aficionados, who used the funds to buy art 
works from Leningrad residents, which were then smuggled out by tourist bus drivers on 
the Leningrad-Helsinki highway, who hid them in specially equipped chambers in their 
buses.477   In the same vein, one Belgian diplomat formed a business partnership with a 
Soviet illicit icon trader, and was apprehended in August 1982 trying to smuggle a store 
of icons valued at 120,000 rubles out of the USSR478 while numerous African diplomats 
were apprehended smuggling icons, art and jewelry from, and consumer items into, 
Soviet borders.479  Encompassing myriad of operations, from street trade to major import-
export operations, the demimonde helped the “little deal” go global. 
 The social milieus, commercial interactions, and transnational networks that 
constituted the demimonde all had one common feature: they violated either written or 
unwritten Soviet laws, norms, or regulations. The sex-workers, criminals, marginals and 
outcasts who resided in the demimonde not only belied the “truth about the Soviet 
Union” that Soviet authorities labored to construct but also to the norms that defined 
normal existence within the Soviet system. The contradiction between the demimonde 
and Khrushchev’s attempted re-launch of the socialist project on the basis of social 
                                                          
476 “Ukrainian KGB to Central Committee of Ukrainian CP, “Informatsionnoe soobshchenie, 11-
13/1/1985,”[IS] DGA SBU, f. 16, op. 7, spr. 24, ark. 2-3.  
477 M. Iu Miliushkin, “Iz zhizni kontrabandistov,” in K.E Gusev (ed.) Sledstvie prodolzhaetsia. Khroniki 
politicheskikh prestuplenii. Kniga vtoraia (St. Petersburg: Spetsialnaia literature), 293-300. 
478 “IS, 27-29/8/1982,” GDA SBU, f. 16, op. 7, spr. 70, ark. 68.  Konstantinov, Banditsksi Peterburg, 264-
266.  
479 “12 negritiat: [sic] posly Afrikanskikh stran rabotali kur’erami u russkikh kontrabandistov,” Versiia, 
August 2003, accessed online at: http://www.agentura.ru/dossier/russia/people/latysheva/12negrityat/ on 
4/15/2015. “IS, 11-13/1/1985,” GDA SBU, f. 16, op. 10, spr. 9, ark. 27. 
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mobilization was so clear as to be nearly comical.480 The contrast between the 
demimonde and the rest of Soviet society became much more blurry after 1965, but if, as 
Aleksei Yurchak convincingly argues, performance of rituals of belonging was a 
precondition for “normal” existence in late Soviet society, denizens of the demimonde 
still stood out, caring not one wit about these rituals (and not much about normality 
either).481  
 Thus, the demimonde represented a profound challenge to Soviet authorities, a 
challenge that was made even more acute by fears regarding the inherent link between 
social and political deviance articulated by Liakin. One policy response to the problem, 
erecting a massive surveillance system to police interactions between Soviet people and 
foreigners, is the topic of the next chapter. However, I argue, policy-making towards the 
demimonde cannot be reduced to secret policing. Rather, it was a dynamic process that 
reflected the changing face of Soviet society and the rise and fall of official attempts at 
social mobilization. The history of the confrontation between Soviet authorities and the 
demimonde was a mirror for the ebb and flow of official attempts to rejuvenate Soviet 
society – and the obdurate resistance of Soviet society to any such attempts at 
rejuvenation.  
                                                          
480 On social control, mobilization and repression in the Khrushchev era, see Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold 
Summer; Roberty Hornsby, Protest, Reform and Repression in Khrushchev’s Russia (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Brian LaPierre, Hooligans in Khrushchev’s Soviet Union: 
Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance during the Thaw (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 
2014). The argument for the Khrushchev era as an attempt at total social control is made most forcefully by 
Oleg Kharkhordin (The Collective and Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1999, esp. ch. 7).  
481 Yurchak, Everything was forever. 
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. Vigilance is Our Weapon! 1957-1965 
 
 The 1950s, the period in which the demimonde emerged in its late Soviet form, was a 
time of both unprecedented opening up to the world and a series of crises that highlighted 
the dangers global exposure created for the Soviet party state. As a number of scholars 
have demonstrated, despite the liberal myths surrounding the “Thaw,” the late 1950s 
were an age of moral panic about crime, social anomie, dissolute youth, and a rising tide 
of westernization.482 The combination of the political shock of de-Stalinization and the 
echo of the 1956 events in Hungary trigerred anxieties regarding the loyaltties of 
educated youth and denizens of the USSR’s western borderlands.483 Economically, the 
demands of the rush towards Communism under Khrushchev demanded massive 
technology imports, with expected proceeds from foreign tourism on Soviet soil slated, as 
we saw in chapter 1, to help pay for the construction of new factories.484 Finally, despite 
Khrushchev’s drive for “peaceful coexistence,” his era saw some of the tensest 
international crises of the Cold War as well a series of espionage scandals. This 
                                                          
482 Dobson, Cold Summer; Hornby, Protest and Reform; La-Pierre, Hooliganism; Roth-Ey “Loose Girls,” 
Sheilla Fitzpatrick, “Social Parasites: How Tramps, Idle Youth and Busy Entrepreneurs Impeded the Soviet 
March to Communism,” Cahiers du Monde Russe 47, no. 1/2 (2006), 377-408. 
483 Hornby, Protest and Reform, Amir Weiner, “The Empires Pay a Visit: Gulag Returnees, East 
European Rebellions, and Soviet Frontier Politics,” Journal of Modern History 78, no.22 (2006), 333-
376. 
484 Salmon, “Marketing Socialism.” On the international economic context of the Khrushchev years, see 
Sanchez-Sibony, Red Globalization, esp. ch. 3. 
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constellation of crises made the increasing numbers of foreigners in the USSR and the 
social ecology that was rapidly coalescing around them an important challenge for 
Khrushchev’s attempt to revitalize socialism and forge a peaceful coexistence from a 
position of strength with the “imperialists.” The disruption of this ecology thus became 
an essential ingredient of Khrushchev’s drive to eradicate the emerging contradictions of 
rapidly-maturing socialism. 
 On the most basic level, from the point of view of Soviet authorities, the 
demimonde was but one of the unintended consequences of “expanding cultural, 
economic, and other connections with capitalist countries,”  which carried the risk of  
“the spread of bourgeois ideology,” among educated, urban youth most likely to be 
exposed to foreign bacilli.485 In line with the spirit of the time, campaigns against this 
danger involved not Stalin-era purges, but attempts to mobilize the Soviet public against 
the “westernizers” by manipulating populist economic and cultural grievances.486 The 
most visible aspect of this strategy was using the violent enforcement arm of 
Khrushchev’s battle for social discipline - Komsomol patrols (druzhinny) to police areas 
frequented by foreigners and the Soviet “golden youth.” The early fartsovshchiki, likely 
to be university students of somewhat privileged background, thus became a favorite 
                                                          
485 Draft resolution of the Moscow Gorkom “Meropriataiia po usileniu kommunisticheskogo vospitaniia 
trudiashchikhsia Moskvy i borby s burzhuaznym vlianiem, [undated, 1962],” GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, d. 299, 
ll. 97-99. See also “Spravka o prodelannoi rabote po pismu TsK KPSS o povyshenii revoliutsionnoi 
bditelnosti, Moskovskii raion, Leningrad [n/d, 1960],” TsGAIPD f. 24, op. 113, d. 152, ll. 97-98.  
486  For Khrushchev’s campaign against westernization, see Julianne Fuerst, Stalin’s Last Generation: 
Soviet Postwar Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 235-249. 
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target of the druzhinny - usually manned by working class youth who had no love for 
their more privileged peers.487  
  In theory, these guardians of socialist morality were supposed to cooperate 
with Intourist staff in keeping unwanted elements from hotels and restaurants, detain 
black marketeers and loose women, and escort them to militia stations.488  In practice, 
however, they often resorted to street justice: beatings and confiscation of western 
clothing and other items.489 If a black marketeer did arrive to a militia station, he could 
plausibly expect a “comrade trial” resulting in expulsion from the Komsomol and, if he 
was unlucky, exile or imprisonment for “parasitism.”  These “comrade trials” often 
reprised Stalin-era displays.  In one 1963 trial, the “comrades” constituted 1,200 “young 
Muscovites, gathered in the Luzhniki stadium,” who sentenced 3 fartsovshchiki to “exile 
from Moscow and hard physical labor.”490 Even when such trials were less elaborate 
affairs, they received massive media coverage that named names, provided the 
biographies of their subjects, highlighted their privileged backgrounds, disdain for work, 
and subservient attitudes to foreigners.491    
                                                          
487 On the druzhiny see, Lapierre, Hooliganism, 148-157. On their treatment of “westernizers”, see 
Vasil’ev, Sostoianiia, 62-64. 
488 “Ankudinov to senior Intourist Staff, 22/5/1962” GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, d. 299, ll. 56-58.  
489 Tikhonenko, “Tarzan. “ 
490 “Doloi tuneiadtsev iz Moskvy!” Pravda, 5/31/1963. 
491 See, for example, “Sovremennye Mitrofany,” Komsomolskaia Pravda 3/2/1957; “Rytsari zhvachki,” 
Komsomolskaia Pravda, 1/17/1959; “Biznesmeny,” Literaturnaia gazeta, 10/19/1960; “Frenk Soldatkin: 
mestnyi inostranets” Komsomolskaia Pravda, 8/3/1960; Atel’e Mistera Toda,” Vechernyi Leningrad, 
7/3/1962; “Krushenie nigilista,” Komsomosklaia Pravda 6/21/1962.  
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 Educated youths who went beyond simple commercial exchanges with foreigners 
could expect even worse. Between 1957 and 1965, a number of young educated urbanites 
were put on trial for associating with and receiving gifts and information from 
foreigners.492  The most famous of these cases involved the “literary parasite” Joseph 
Brodsky: in both the infamous 1963 Leningradskaia Pravda broadside that launched the 
attack on him and in his trial, meetings with foreigners were mentioned as evidence of his 
alienation from Soviet life.493 In a similar manner, when Sally Belfrage, a “progressive” 
American who for a few months worked as translator in a Moscow publishing house 
composed a memoir of her life among Moscow’s “golden youth” that Soviet authorities 
considered slanderous,494 the wrath of the authorities was turned towards members of her 
circle. Various “friends of Miss Sally” were expelled from the Komsomol and 
universities, suffered imprisonment in psychiatric hospitals and violent media assualts.495 
Two especially unfortunate friends (Rybkin and Repnikov) were put on a publicized trial 
for espionage, with coverage focusing not as much on their alleged blackmail into 
espionage by foreigners who plied them with gifts but on their pampered upbringings (the 
Komsomolskaia Pravda coverage of the trial began with a vignette describing how 
Repnikov threw a shoe at his grandmother for failing to get him breakfast in bed – at 11 
                                                          
492  See, for example, “Postanovlenie po delu Fomicheva K.M, Fomichevoi K.A, Izhboldina V.S, 
17/6/1959,” GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 8482, l. 1-3; “Postanovlenie st. sledovatelia spets. otdela KGB  pri 
SM GSSR [Georgian SSR] kapitana Chitashvili, 23/12/1964,” GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 98411, ll. 1-5. 
493 “Okololiteraturnyi truten’,” Leningradskaia Pravda, 29/11/1963 (Reprinted in Etkind, Protsess, 15-22. 
On his court case, see Dobson, Cold Summer, 231n.  
494 Belfrage, Room in Moscow. 
495 “Postanovleniie po sledstvennomu delu, Barenbaum Iosif Berkovich, 15/10/1959” GARF, f. 8131, 
op.31, d. 87418, ll. 2-6. “U damochki Selli nashelsia drug,” Izvestiia, 12/26/1960. 
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AM).496  Whatever the truth in these accusations,497 rhetorically, they filled a number of 
important functions. First, for the urbanites who associated with foreigners, such exposes 
were a shot across the bow. For the rest of the Soviet public, they conveyed a message 
about citizenship and social hierarchy. If, seemingly, the residents of the demimonde 
enjoyed a privileged existence, this was not cause for envy, as the Soviet state stood 
ready to restore justice swiftly and ruthlessly. By tying their material existence to 
commerce with and handouts from foreigners, residents of the demimonde broke the 
Soviet social compact - just rewards for honest labor - and took themselves outside the 
circle of protection offered by the “all people’s state.”  
 As is often the case, such boundary policing was especially ferocious when it 
involved female bodies.  The late 1950s and early 1960s were, indeed, a period of violent 
assaults, rhetorical and physical, against Soviet women engaged in sexual liasions with 
foreigners. As Roth Ey demonstrates, even during the halcyon days of the Moscow Youth 
Festival rumors that “loose girls” were assaulted by vigilantes, had their hair cut,  and 
were exiled outside Moscow were in wide circulation.  Even in a moment of maximum 
affection for the outside world, elemental discomfort with the idea of Soviet women 
besmirching national honor by cavorting with materially privileged foreigners was 
                                                          
496 Prodavshye dushi,” Komsomolskaia Pravda 8/30-9/1, 1959. 
497 As human rights activist Aleksandr Esenin-Vol’pin, who was associated with Repnikov and Rybkin 
points out, the two “spies” had their charges reduced from espionage to anti-Soviet propaganda in short 
order. (“Pamiatka dlia neozhidaiushchikh doprosa: beseda s Aleksandrom Eseninym Vol’pinym,” 
Neprikosnovennyi zapas, 1(2002), accessed online at: http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2002/21/dopr.html (4/1/ 
2015). 
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exhibited by both authorities and rank-and-file Soviets.498 Subsequent years indeed saw 
action from below aimed to police “transnational” sexual encounters. Soviet girls who 
slept with exchange students could expect violent reactions from their fellow students and 
the general public. 499  Druzhinniki joined in the effort, roughing up women who dated 
Western visitors,500 and in some less reputable Soviet hotels, waging pitched battles 
against tourists who opposed this treatment of their dates.501 
 The fact that Soviet women were seduced by the temptations of foreigners and 
their goods was so detrimental to the self-perception of the Khrushchev era Soviet state, 
that in the mid-1960s, its official media broke the total taboo on the topic of prostitution 
in socialist society.  Here too, names were named. For instance, Svetlana Trofimova, a 
19-year-old who worked the hard currency bar of Hotel Metropol, became the subject of 
an intermittent three-month long attack in Komsomolskaia Pravda, which traced her 
moral dissolution, contempt for her parents and child, and intention to commit treason to 
both her family and her nation by marrying a foreigner. Tellingly, the first article in the 
series was entitled “Offal” [Nechist’] a term that captured well the purity politics that 
were hiding not far below the surface of the campaign against sexual relations with 
foreigners.  
                                                          
498 Roth-Ey,”Loose Girls on the Loose.” 
499 Hessler, “Death of African Student.” 
500 “Student Back from Russia; Reports on Soviet People,” Yale Daily News, 3/2/1966. 
501 “Spravka o rabote narodnoi druzhiny po okhrane obshchestvennogo poriadka v gostinitse Turist za 1959 
god.” TsKhD posle 1917 g., f. 496, op.1, d. 496, l. 5. “Spravka o prieme i obsluzhivanii gostinitsami 
Mosgorispolkoma inostrannykh grazhdan v 1961 godu,” TsKhD posle 1917 g. f. 496, op. 1, d. 441, l. 28. 
  
   
 
  183 
 
 
 
 The undercurrents of purity and taboo that lay just below the surface of official 
discources on the demimonde were understood (and promoted) as such by at least some 
Soviet ideologues. Thus, when Valerii Skurlatov, an early organizer of the Komsomol 
partrols and a member of the incipient “Russian Party” of apparat nationalists, was asked 
by the ideological department of the Moscow Komsomol to prepare a document on 
struggle with bourgeois ideology, one of the ten points of the “Moral Code” [ustav nrava] 
he penned called for “corporal punishments, branding and sterilization of women giving 
themselves over to foreigners.”502 While Skurlatov’s text was quickly suppressed for its 
outlandish content, the shrill tone of the Komsomolskaia Pravda articles about Trofimova 
indicates that his positions had at least some support among other members of the 
nationalist wing of the Komsomol leadership.503 
 If loose girls and rag merchants harmed the reputation of the Soviet state and 
broke the boundaries of proper Soviet citizenship, the currency speculators who besieged 
foreigners materially harmed the Soviet treasury.  Given the failure of the Soviet tourism 
industry to meet policy makers’ expectations discussed in chapter 1, the extraction of 
extra cash by means of confiscatory official exchange rates was a powerful means for the 
Soviet state supplement its foreigh currency holdings.504 However, the gap between these 
                                                          
502 On Skurlatov, see Nikolai Mitrokhin, Russkaia partiia: dvizhenie Russkikh natsionalistov v SSSR, 1953-
1985 (Moscow: NLO, 2003), 288-294. For his text, see:  
http://www.anticompromat.org/skurlatov/ustav.html (acessed 3/20/2015).  For Skurlatov’s post-Soviet 
reflections on his document, see “Dnevnik: perechityvaia ustav nrava), at: 
http://skurlatov.livejournal.com/148680.html  (accessed 3/15/1015). 
503  Mitrokhin, Russkaia partiia, ch. 5.  
504 Salmon, “Marketing Socialism.” For a theoretical view of the problem of informal currency markets in 
state socialist economies, see Jan Vanous, “Private Foreign Currency Markets.” 
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rates and what foreign money could fetch on the Soviet black market created arbitrage 
opportunities for generations of entrepreneurs, who successfully siphoned millions of 
dollars that the Soviet state felt rightfully belonged to it.505 Due to concerns with this 
monetary drain as well as the reputational damages caused by by this activity,506 foreign 
currency speculators became the most prominent targets of the drive against the 
demimonde. 
  Ian Rokotov (1927-1961), also known as Kosoi (cross-eyes), was Moscow’s 
most prominent currency speculator in the late 1950s. Born to an intellectual Jewish 
family, Rokotov, then an MGU student, was imprisoned under article 58-10 (counter-
revolutionary activitiy) in 1945 and rehabilitated in 1954.507  He began foreign currency 
operations in 1957. By 1961, he headed a network of 450 street-level dealers,508 owned a 
significant fortune (including a suitcase laden with gold he kept in storage in various 
Moscow train stations), and was one of Moscow’s top playboys.509  
                                                          
505 After Soviet authorities allowed the dollar to be exchanged at near-realistic rates in the late 1980s, 
proceeds from hotel exchange points grew tenfold. (“’Dereviannye’ rubli tozhe den’gi,” Izvestiia, 
6/8/1991.) 
506 According to Fedoseev, complaints by foreign visitors regarding their harassment on the streets of 
Moscow, and a clash in West Berlin in which Khrushchev was told by a local that Moscow had the world’s 
biggest black market trigerred the clampdown on currency speculators.  Fedoseev, “Koroli i kapusta,” 146, 
153. 
507 I.M Feltshinskii, “Ian Rokotov,” Volia: zhurnal uznikov totalitarnykh system 1(1993), 54-56. 
508  “P. Demichev [Chairman of Moscow Gorkom] to Central Committee, after June 15, 1961,” RGANI, f. 
5 op. 30, d. 373, l. 35. According to Demichev, most foreign participants in this network were “from the 
Arab East countries,” in all likelihood diplomats, military officers and exchange students. I would like to 
extend my gratitude to Samuel Casper for providing me with this file. 
509 While the Rokotov affair received enormous attention in Soviet times and is still well remembered today 
(in 2014, A New York-based film producer established a line of premium jeans under the brand name 
Rokotov&Faibishenko), the affair received scant attention in academic literature. The only comprehensive 
narrative of the affair may be found in G.V Kostyrchenko, Tainaia politika Khrushcheva: vlast’, 
intillegentsia i evreiskii vopros (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2012), 424-433. This account 
borrows heavily from Fedoseev’s “Koroli i kapusta.”   The archival evidence about the affair is scant:  the 
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 Inevitably, Rokotov’s rise contained the seeds of his fall. In 1959/60, 
responsibility for investigating hard currency speculation was transferred from the MVD, 
where Rokotov reputedly had excellent (and well-paid) contacts, to the KGB.510  In 
parallel, the new RSFSR legal code set to go into operation on January 1st, 1961, raised 
penalties for large-scale currency speculation from 3 to 8 years imprisonment.511 In June 
1960, following a massive surveillance operation, Rokotov was arrested while getting his 
suitcase from storage.  Several days later his junior partner Vladislav Faibishenko 
[Fainberg] and other members of their network were apprehended. 
 At this point, the Rokotov affair evolved into a massive show trial. Soviet 
newspapers published numerous exposes exploring Rokotov’s earnings, extensive social 
networks, lifestyle, and criminal connections.512  In March 1961, the Supreme Soviet 
further raised penalties for large-scale currency violations to 15 years.513  In an 
unprecendented step in response to Khrushchev’s rage at the criminal system’s alleged 
leniency, this decree was applied retroactively to Rokotov and Faibishenko. This, 
however, did not satisfy the First Secretary. In a meeting of the Presidium on June 17th, 
                                                          
relevant KGB files are closed to researchers, the files of the Soviet prokuratura hold no trail of the court 
case against Rokotov and Faibishenko, and the files of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, which handled 
the appeals in the case, are also not available. Demichev’s letter cited above is the only archival source I 
was able to locate shedding light on the affair.  See also Blokhin, Hustling on Gorky Street, ch. 1 and 
Konstantin Simis, USSR: The Corrupt Society (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), 199-210.  
510 Fedoseev, “Koroli i kapusta,” 146.  
511 On the evolution of the Soviet laws on currency speculation, see S.K Osipov, “Otvetsvennost’ za 
narushenie valiutnogo zakonodatelstva,” Pravo i ekonomika 5(1999), accessed online via: 
http://www.lawmix.ru/comm/7568/ on 4/2/2015. 
512 See for example, “Sterliatniki,” Komsomolskaia Pravda, 5/19/1961; “Pered otvetom,” Pravda 
07/05/1963; “Firma terpit krakh,” Izvestiia, 5/18/1961; “Rak dushi,” Literaturnaia gazeta, 6/10/1961, 
“Konets chernoi birzhi,” Pravda, 07/15/1961. 
513 Kostyrchenko, Politika, 430. 
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he browbeat Chief Procurator Rudenko for “liberalism,” and demanded the death penalty 
for both men. Tellingly, Khrushchev phrased his demand as a populist appeal, citing a 
working-class friend from the Donbass who allegedly demanded rough justice for the 
“scoundrel” for whom “the grave cries,” thus pitting the Soviet state and Soviet workers 
against corruption and its elite enablers.514 In response to this pressure, on July 1st, the 
Supreme Soviet released another decree, stipulating the death penalty for currency 
speculation. In a violation of legal norms unseen even under Stalin, Rokotov and 
Faibishenko were retried, with their second trial broadcast on Soviet TV,515 condemned 
to death based on retroactive application of the July 1st decree, and executed on July 28th. 
 
Figure 3.2: Ian Rokotov 
Source: aif.ru 
                                                          
514  A.A Fursenko, et  al (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS, 1954-1964. Tom 1: Chernovye protokolnye zapisi 
zasedanii (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003), 525-529. 
515 Charles A. Schwartz, “Economic Crime in the U. S. S. R.: A Comparison of the Khrushchev and 
Brezhnev Eras,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 30, No. 2(1981), 293. 
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 The Rokotov affair was the opening shot in a wave of nearly 1,000 trials of 
currency speculators over the next four years.516  As was the case with Rokotov, these 
trials were widely publicized, with coverage focused on the unearned privileges the 
defendants enjoyed. Given that, like Rokotov and Faibishenko, about 50% of the 
defendants in these trials were Jewish and many others bore Caucasian or Central Asian 
last names,517 the messages that this press coverage conveyed were surely well 
understood by Soviet readers. Thus, it was not hard to read messages about the loose 
Soviet identity  and dubious loyalty of foreign currency speculators encoded in a 1962 
Trud story about one Basia Khaimovna Reznitsky, a Vilnius speculator, her partners 
(Kaminer, Ebenstein, Rabinovich, and  Zismanovich), and their trade partners: foreign 
tourists and Catholic priests connected to North American émigré groups and the 
Vatican.518 By playing on stereotypes about the commercial prowess, parasitic 
tendencies, and possible disloyalty of certain ethnic groups, such stories subtly 
emphasized the double foreignness of contact zones between foreigners and Soviet 
people: they were not only a space where Soviet and foreign met, but also dominated by 
Soviet people who were not quite Soviet people. 
  The link between the economic corruption and dangers to Soviet national security 
implied in these messages was reinforced by an-all-out campaign against espionage 
                                                          
516 Kostyrchenko, Tainaia politika, 433. 
517  Ibid, 434. 
518 “Na dne,” Trud, 1/16/1962. 
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launched by the Soviet authorities in the 1960s.  As we shall demonstrate in Chapter 
Four, Soviet authorities did have ample reasons to suspect that “imperialist” powers were 
using travel to the Soviet Union for their purposes. However, in the late 1950s, probably 
due to Soviet interest in cultivating international connections and dispelling “slander” 
about the Soviet surveillance state, the issue was kept relatively quiet. For instance, 
according to testimony from a CIA case officer, American tourists asked to gather 
intelligence on Soviet industrial installations felt that “as long as they did not openly 
violate regulations, the KGB treated them with benign indifference.”519  
Even when travelers strayed from the bounds of legality and yet remained 
discreet, the Soviet authorities kept things quiet. Thus, while Rybkin and Repnikov’s ties 
to Belfrage and her volume triggered a campaign against their “espionage” activities, a 
number of similar court cases did not evoke much in way of public response, perhaps 
because Soviet authorities were concerned the meagre details of the cases would make 
them seem like Stalinist witch hunts.520  
                                                          
519 Kurtis Peebles, Twilight Warriors: Covert Air Operations against the USSR (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2005), 139. 
520 See, respectively, the prokuratura files of the brothers Izhboldin, who exchanged literature and gifts 
with American tourists they befriended in 1957, who allegedly requested them to contact a “friend” who 
asked them to provide him with secret information (GARF, f.  8131, op. 31, d. 84821) and S.N Grib, who 
established connections and correspondence with Marc Kursal, a Colonel in French military intelligence 
who visited the Soviet Union in 1958. (GARF, f.  8131, op. 31, d. 89526).  Whether these cases constituted 
espionage by any but the very loose standards of the KGB is an open question. In a similar case, the 
Russian-French repatriate Nikita Krivoshein was imprisoned for “revealing state secrets”- discussing 
preparations for the Moscow Youth Festival with a French diplomat (according to the authorities) or, 
(according to Krivoshein), for smuggling out a response  article to the Hungarian Revolution published at 
Le Monde.  For official documents of the trial see GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 97391, 97392; for Krivoshein’s 
version, “Nikita Krivoshein: dvazhdy frantsuz Sovetskogo Soiuza,” Pravmir.ru, 11/12/2014, accessed 
online at: http://www.pravmir.ru/nikita-krivoshein-zaklyuchenie-primirilo-menya-so-stranoy/ on 
(4/5/2016). 
  
   
 
  189 
 
 
 
This period of  discreete silence ended in 1960 when the Powers shootdown both 
highlighted Soviet sensitivity to American espionage efforts and offered an opportunity 
for Soviet authorities to remind people of the dangers of foreign subversion during an era 
of sagging commitment to Cold War battles.521 On June 2, a month after the U-2 incident, 
the Central Committee issued a resolution calling for “heightened revolutionary 
vigilance.”522 In it, it roundly criticized Soviet institutions for endangering state security 
by letting foreigners access their facilities and staff without concern for proper protocol, 
among other breaches of secrecy. 
 This resolution, followed in short order by a frenzy of discussions of secrecy 
and carelessness all across the Soviet Union,523 triggered a noisy national campaign for 
vigilance (of which Liakin’s op-ed was undoubtedly a key component). Readers of the 
Soviet press were treated to innumerable stories describing in great detail the 
machinations of “tourist-spies” and their henchmen.524 KGB officers, eager to rehabilitate 
the name of Soviet security services, fanned out to Soviet institutions, providing briefings 
                                                          
521  On the difficulties Soviet authorities faced when they tried to arouse popular patriotism in the 
Khrushcev era, see: Andrei Kozovoi, “Dissonant Voices: Soviet Youth Mobilization and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis,” Journal of Cold War Studies 16, no.3 (2014), 29-61. 
522 “PostanovlenieTsK KPSS o povyshenii revoliutsonnoi bditelnosti, s vypiskoi iz protokola n. 284 
zasedaniia Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 2/6/1960,” RGANI, f. 3, op. 22, d.103, ll. 79-91. 
523 See, for example, accounts of secrecy meetings from Leningrad at TsGAIPD, f. 24, op. 113, d. 152. The 
far flung effects of this resolution were experienced even where very few foreigners stepped. In1962, a 
Komsomolskaia Pravda journalist found that in the Tadjik border area of Badakhshan, local authorities 
organized a 1,000 strong “young friends of the borderguards’ unit’ [otriad iunnykh druzei pogranichnikov]. 
These “friends”were trained to track “border violators” and exercised with local military and militia units. 
Iaroslav Golovanov, Zametki vashego sovremennika. Tom 1:1953-1970 (Moscow: Dobroe Slovo, 2001), 
157. 
524 In addition to stories referred above, see: Y. Pinchukov, “Bditelnost’,” Znamia 10(1960) N. Mironov, 
“Gosudarstvennaia bezopasnost, delo vsenarodnoe,”127-138, Kommunist 11(1960), 39-48, “Vo imia 
pravdy i spravedlivosti,” Nedelia 9/1/962, “Kogda nad name reiut chuzhie flagi,” Pravda 8/6/1964, and 
many more. 
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on security, vigilance, and ideological struggle for both the intelligentsia and the general 
public525while professional propagandists, armed with an array of pamphlets with titles 
like Vigilance is our Weapon, No Entrance for Spies, and Spies under Guise of Tourists 
and aimed to remind Soviet people that the enemy was near.526 The latter volume, for 
instance, explained to its readers how:  
These types couldn’t care less about science, technology, culture, or the Moscow 
subway. They are mysteriously pulled to the outskirts of Soviet towns to gather 
tendentious information… try very hard to “get lost” near some defense installation 
and, confusing it for some monument, snap a quick photo. These are the types that 
are trying to hand out anti-Soviet literature. A real enemy stands in front of you, but 
try and recognize it! He kindly smiles, cheerfully laughs, pretends to be a decent 
fellow. But his hand is inexorably drawn to the camera button.527 
 
Writers and filmmakers were also recruited to the vigilance campaign. Rapidly 
proliferating spy novels (often co-authored by KGB officers)528 were laden with plots 
involving Western spies disguised as tourists and marginal elements as their 
henchmen.529 The Soviet movie industry was not far behind. For instance, the 1965 film 
                                                          
525 Filip Bobkov, (Moscow: Beteran MP), 1995, 102-105. On KGB efforts to rehabilitate its image, see 
Julie Fedor, Russia and the Cult of State Security: the Chekist Tradition from Lenin to Putin (London: 
Routledge, 2011), 30-117. 
526 B.A Viktorov, Shpiony pod maskoi turistov (Moscow: Voennizdat, 1963); V.V Marukhin, Bditelnost’ 
nashe oruzhie (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1963); E.F Bezrodnyi, Shpionam net dorogi (Kiev: Gospolizdat 
USSR), 1962.  
527 Viktorov, Shpiony pod maskoi, 6. 
528 For instance, one of the co-authors of the most popular Soviet spy thriller of the 1960s, Oshibka 
rezidenta was Oleg Gribanov, the recently removed head of Soviet counter-intellegence, writing under the 
pseudonym Oleg Shmel’ev. O. Shmel’ev and V.Vostoktov, Oshibka rezidenta (Moscow: Molodaia 
gvardiia, 1996). 
529 In Oshibka Rezidenta for instance, the titular resident is a Russian émigré, now an “imperialist” spy, 
employs the services of former Nazi collaborators and black market dealers as agents. For other examples 
of novels employing similar plots see, L. Samoilov, B. Skorbin, Tainstvennyi passazhir (Moscow: 
Voenizdat, 1954); V. Mikhailov, Bumerang ne vozvrashchiaetsia (Moscow: ASPOL, 1998)[orig. 
published, 1958]; Iosif Freilikhman, Shchupal’tsa spruta (Kishinev: Kartia Moldovianske, 1960); O. 
Sidelnikov, Nokaut (Tashkent: Goslit UzSSR, 1960).  
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Dark Business [Chernii Biznes] grafts a spy story onto a ripped-from-headlines plot about 
an underground textile production ring run by Jewish black marketeers, covering the 
adventures of an American femme fatale spy sent (for reasons that are not made totally 
clear) under the guise of tourist to help the culprits smuggle their profits abroad.530 
 Perhaps the clearest juxtaposition of the demimonde, material privilege, 
subversion and espionage was presented in a May1963 feuilleton by Melor Sturua, a top 
international reporter for Izvestiia.531 The protagonist “Oleg Penkovskii“ (not to be 
confused, Sturua adds, with Pen’kovskii, “the notorious traitor and spy” 
[Пенковский/Пеньковский]),532 was a Moscow loafer who made his living roaming 
hotels, restaurants and other “foreign” spaces, exchanging  anti-Soviet stories and jokes 
for Western trinkets. Penkovskii, Sturua concluded “was not a spy but SCUM, dirty scum 
that is sometimes formed on the surface of clean pools...such people are needed by 
foreign scum-gatherers, first because they are becoming rarer, and second because it is 
not so hard to push a soft sign into their last name” (i.e turn Penkovskii into Pen’kovskii). 
  In case this warning was not clear enough or readers were confused, Sturua’s 
feuilleton was accompanied by an appendix by Lev Kassis, a KGB officer who doubled 
                                                          
530 Chernyi biznes, dir. Vasilli Zhuravlev, (Moscow: Mosfilm, 1965). For details on the court case from 
which the plot of the movie was ripped, see N.F Chistiakov, Po zakonu i sovesti (Moscow: Voenizdat, 
1979), ch. 9. On the movie, see Theodor Shabad, “Soviet Film Depicts Soviet Police as Humane,” New 
York Times, 6/17/1965. 
531 “Dun’ki prosiatsia v Evropu, ili kogo gospoda v Evropu zovut,” Izvestiia 25/5/1963. On Sturua see 
Fainberg, “Notes from Rotten West,” esp. 45-48. 
532 I.e Oleg Penk’ovskii, a GRU Colonel who offered his services to the American and British secret 
services in 1961, and was captured in 1963, alongside an English businessman who was his contact person. 
Pen’kovskii is universally considered the most important Western spy of the Cold War era. See chapter 4 of 
this dissertation for details.  
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as an Izvestiia international reporter. 533 “Penkovskii,” Kassis reveals, was Boris 
Umanskii, a Gulag returnee and freelance journalist who parleyed his job into an informal 
position of tour guide for visiting Americans. From this perch he helped them stage anti-
Soviet provocations in swanky Moscow cafes in exchange for gifts and invitations to 
diplomatic receptions.534 For good measure, Kassis mentioned two other “Penkovskiis”: 
the future prominent human rights activist Aleksandr Ginzburg,535 an associate of 
Umanskii, who was allegedly begging a Western embassy to loan him movies devoted to 
abstract painters so that he could screen them to his “buddies” [druzhki], and Liakhina, a 
graduate of the English language faculty of a teacher’s institute, who instead of working 
or caring for her family, spent her time “serving” [prisluzhivat] foreigners, as “all she 
cares about are French perfumes and American lipstick.” 
 The lesson such narratives offered was simple: the distance between 
unsanctioned exchange and outright treason was no more than one step, and it was the 
responsibility of the Soviet kollektiv, embodied most prominently in the KGB,  to police 
such the former in order to prevent the latter.  Thus, to borrow Amir Weiner’s term, 
residents of the demimonde were symbolically excised from the Soviet body politic.  As 
defectors from the last great Soviet mobilization drive, they stood with imperialism and 
                                                          
533 On Kassis, see Anatolii Druzenko et al, S zhurnalistikoi pokoncheno, zabud’te! (Moscow: Izvestiia, 
1991). Accesed online version at http://www.agentura.ru/library/izvestiaend/39.htm on 2/20/2015. 
534 The caffe in question was Aelita, Moscow’s hottest jazz spot, frequented by both foreigners and Soviet 
bohemians. See Mikhail Kull, “Stupeni voskhozhdeniia.” 
535 Alexander Ilyich Ginzburg (1936-2012), then a young returnee from a 2 year sentence received over 
attempts to publish a “formalist” literary almanac, and later an important member of the Soviet human 
rights movement.  
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against the Soviet people and its party – and the very definition of Soviet patriotism was 
to recognize that beyond the glitter of material goods, fartsovshchiki and ethnically 
suspect black marketeers and prostitutes and dissolute youth and emerging dissidents 
were, morally speaking, foreign.536 
 
 Lenient Times: c. 1965- c. 1980. 
 
And yet, a scant few years later, as the Soviet Union became ensconced in the “little 
deal” era, calls to excise merchants and harlots from the Soviet temple became 
increasingly incongruent with the real existing USSR. The shift from Khrushchev-era 
mobilization to Brezhnev-era accomodation did not fail to transform relations between 
the Soviet state, Soviet society, and the demimonde, allowing the latter to enter into a 
golden age of sorts. 
 At the most basic level, as the Rokotov case demonstrated, the only way to 
eradicate the demimonde was to both publicly acknowledge the problem and employ 
Stalin-style draconian methods of social discipline. Such forthrightness and ruthlessness 
were thoroughly foreign to the Brezhnevite state. For instance, the official presumption 
that prostitution was eradicated meant that the Soviet legal code did not in fact contain 
                                                          
536  On symbolic excision as a Soviet practice of power, seeAmir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The 
Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2001), ch. 4. 
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penalties for prostitution, pimping, or solicitation – thus letting “Intourist girls” largely 
off the hook, as long as they arranged for fictive employment and paid appropriate 
bribes.537  Either due to the reputational damage the antisemitic undertones of 
Khrushchev’s campaign caused to the Soviet state abroad, or since, as Sovietologist 
Charles A. Schwartz speculated, the Stalinist echoes of the Rokotov show trial had a 
negative impact on Soviet public opinion, both the prevalence of and public attention 
devoted to trials of foreign currency speculators and other “economic criminals” plunged 
after 1965.538 The penalties large-scale currency speculators could be expected to receive 
were reduced from death to 8-12 years.539  While this surely was no walk in the park, the 
combination of the vast riches the black market offered, and the relatively lenient 
conditions (and early releases) their profits could buy made participation in the black 
markets worthwhile for the “merchants.”540 
 The same calculus applied to street level operators. The key here was that as 
historian Larissa Zakharova writes: “fartsovka was not mentioned in the legal code:” 
Soviet legislation did not forbid purchasing (as opposed to selling for profit) consumer 
items from foreigners. 541 This legal issue was only settled in 1970, with a Supreme 
Soviet decree that defined small-scale currency violations and purchase of consumer 
                                                          
537 See many articles gathered in Khochenkov, Prostitutsiia i prestupnost’. 
538 Schwartz, “Economic Crime,” 294. 
539 This was the case for example with the speculators highlighted in Tsvigun, Tainyi front. None of the 
trials highlighted by him was covered in Pravda, Komsomolskaia Pravda, or Izvestiia, nor captured by the 
Current Digest of Soviet Press. 
540 Aizenshpits, Zvezdy.  
541 Zakharova, Mode du Degel, 228. 
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items from foreigners as administrative offenses.  As such, first violation was punisheable 
by fines of 10-30 rubles and confiscation of illegally obtained currency or items. A 
second violation within one year entailed a fine of fifty rubles. Only a third violation of 
currency laws (but not a third instance of fartsovka) carried a prison term - of up to one 
year.542 In 1977 penalties were further loosened.543 Needless to say, Soviet authorities 
had other means to penalize black market operators: penalties for parasitism, public 
shaming, transfer to junior delinquent schools for minors544 and expulsion from 
universities for students. However, the (relative) liberality of post-1970 legislation meant 
that, given one could make hundreds of rubles on a single deal, the potential benefits of 
fartsovka far outweighed the risks.  
 Resource constraints further dampened the war against the demimonde. In 
Leningrad in 1969, local militia complained that while the city received 300,000 
foreigners, the department in charge of policing interactions between foreigners and 
Soviet society in Leningrad and its environs had only 50 officers, charged with a dizzying 
variety of duties (security in international events, maintaining order and preventing 
fartsovka in Intourist locations and on the Leningrad-Vyborg highway, investigating 
                                                          
542 “Ob otvetsvennosti za skupku prodazhu i obmen v nebol’shikh razmerakh valiuty i skupku veshchei u 
inostrantsev. Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 25/3/1970,” in: V.I Vasil’ev et al (ed.) Sbornik 
zakonov i ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovknogo Soveta SSSR, 1968-1970 (Moscow: Gosudastvennoe 
izdatelstvo iuridicheskoi literatury, 1971. 
543 For a short review of the history of currency violations law, see: S.K Osipov, “Otvetvstvennost za 
narushenie valliutnogo zakonodatelstva,” Pravo i ekonomika 5 (1999), accessed online at: 
http://www.lawmix.ru/comm/7568/ on 5/4/2015.  
544 As Vasil’ev points out, for these non-violent offenders, this was a nightmarish prospect. (Sostoianiia, 
139-141). For a fictionalized account of the encounter between a fartsovshchiki teenager and his rough 
cellmates, see the slightly fictionalized novella Difficult Search by Soviet criminologist Mark Lanskoi (Dve 
posvesti. Trudnyi Poisk. Glukhoe delo (Leningrad, Sovetskii pisatel’, 1969). 
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crime both against foreigners and black market dealers).545 Fifteen years later, a 
Leningrad official bemoaned that while black market traders operated hundreds of 
automobiles on the Leningrad-Vyborg highway, the militia had only 2 squad cars 
operating in the area.546  
 Worse still, as we had seen, the very high profit margins offered by the 
demimonde made on-the-ground officials resolutely ambigious about constraining it. 
Most telling in this regard was the behavior of militia officers. Even in the Khrushchev 
era, some friendly visitors wondered why Soviet militiamen let black market operators 
openly work the Red Square: “if we could easily recognize their faces, why couldn’t the 
militia, since they come back to the same places over and over again?”547  The answer 
here was simple: militia officers were systematically bribed by fartsovshchiki and their 
bosses to turn their eyes away from their activities, which were, after all, victimless 
crimes.548 Furthermore, high-ranking militia figures sometimes circulated in demimonde 
circles. The writer Georgii Vainer tells how when fellow scribe Iulian Semenov got into a 
scruff with “some fartsovshchiki and hooligans” in a prestigious Moscow restaurant and 
got arrested, he and his brother Arkadii, the head of the investigative department of the 
                                                          
545 “Spravka o proverke raboty otdela spets. sluzhb UVD Lengorispolkoma po vypolneniiu postanovleniia 
TsK KPSS i Soveta Ministrov SSSR ot 19/11/1968 g. ‘O sereznykh nedostatkakh  v deiatelnosti militsii i 
po ee dalneishemu ukrepleniiu’ i postanovleniia biuro Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta KPSS ot 
13/1/1969 'O povyshenii otvetsevennosti partiinykh organizatsii za povedeinei sovetskikh grazhdan pri 
obshchenii s inostrantsami’,” TSGAipD SPB f. 24, op. 140, d. 85, ll. 47-51, 55. 
546 “Stenogrammma zasedaniia Komissii po inostrannym delam Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, 23/6/1983,” 
GARF, f. A-381, op. 13, d. 4931, ll. 24-25.  
547 “Spravka o nekotorykh faktakh skupki….” GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, d. 268, l. 173. 
548 On bribery, see Vasil’ev, Sostoianiia, 132-134. On militia disregard for the pursuit of black marketeers, 
see, Vyshenkov, Krysha, 31, 39, 57. 
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Moscow militia, “discovered” both sides to the row were among their circle of friends.549 
Needless to say, charges were dropped as a favor, a favor that was no doubt repaid.  
 Even, or especially, the druzhiny were not immune to the seductions of the 
demimonde.  As Joseph Brodsky recalls: “whenever these patrols frisked black marketeers, 
plenty stuck to their hands - money and icons.”550 The ethical distance between skimming 
off the top to playing both sides was short:  Ilia Lerner, the druzhina chieftain who 
instigated the assault on Brodsky in 1963, was few years later imprisoned for extorting 
fartsovshchiki in exchange for protection.551 Soon, it became common knowledge among 
black market operators that “they beat you only if you don’t give them some dough 
[bablo].552 In some cases things went even further: Mikhail Dakhia, the kingpin of the 
Leningrad foreign currency speculation market in the 1980s, began his career as a 
druzhinnik.553   
 Statistical data, to the extent they exist, seem to bear out the impression that 
struggle against the demimonde slackened in the Brezhnev era.While the number of 
foreigners visiting the Soviet Union kept growing, the number of people detained for 
commercial relations with foreigners declined from 2,283 in 1963 to 1,960 in 1968. More 
important than the raw numbers were statistics on the treatment meted out to the 
                                                          
549 “Kak bratia Vainery spasli Iuliana Semenova ot tiurmy,” Aleph, 08/09/2008, accessed online at: 
http://www.alefmagazine.com/news697.html, 3/13/2015.  
550  Solomon Volkov, Conversations with Joseph Brodsky: A Poet’s Journey throughout the 20th Century 
(New York: Free Press, 1998), 60. 
551 Etkind, Protsess, 47.  
552 Vyshenkov, Krysha, 272. 
553  Milosh, “Fartsovshchiki.” 
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detainees. In 1968, only 102 people were subject to fines and 5 were charged with 
criminal offenses. Over 1,100 detainees were subjects of profilaktitka, and the rest, 
apparently, were released without consequences.554 In Ukraine, a republic with no 
shortage of commercially minded tourists, only 6 foreigners and 68 locals were detained 
(and not all were tried) for contraband activities between 1970 and 1973.555 National 
figures show similar trends: between 1959 and 1962, 582 people were either arrested or 
underwent profilaktika for foreign currency speculation. That number declined to 382 
between 1970 and 1974.556 In short, beyond the most brazen (or unlucky) of operators, 
the rest enjoyed a near total freedom of action. 
 This relaxation of attitudes was undoubtedly a silent acknowledgment of the 
role fartsovka played in supplying educated urbanites with the Western-produced goods 
they craved and a general Brezhnev-era bias against rocking boats.557 However, I argue, 
the growing official tolerance of the demimonde was rooted in something deeper: the 
radical incongruity between the language of excision employed during Khrushchev’s 
                                                          
554  For 1963, see: “V. Shumilov [KGB, Leningradskaia oblast’] to G.I Kozlov, [Leningrad Obkom], 
27/7/1963,” TsGAiPD SPB, f. 8422, op. d. 191. (Published by K.A Boldovskii as “Nezdorovye i 
antisovetskie proiavleniia: Spravka KGB pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR po Leningradskoi oblasti, 27/7/1964,” 
Noveishaia istoriia Rossii, 1(2012).  For 1968, “Spravka o proverke,” TSGAipD SPB f. 24, op. 140, d. 85, 
ll. 47-51. 
555   “KGB USSR to V.V Shcherbitskii [Central Committee, Ukrainian Communist Party]. Dokladnaia 
zapiska ob operativnoi obstanovke v Respublike po linii ideologicheskoi diversii protivnika, 29/8/1972”), 
GDA SBU f. 16, op. 3, spr. 11, ark. 145.  
556 “Andropov to TsK KPSS. Svedeniia o chisle lits privlechennykh k ugolovonoi otvetsvennosti i 
podvergnutykh profilaktike organami KGB za 1959-1974 gody, 29/10/1975,” cited in, A.A Makarov et al 
(ed.) Vlast’i dissidenty, 62. 
557 Chernysheva, Consumer Culture and Zhuck, Rock and Roll in Rocket City both make versions of this 
argument. 
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assault on the demimonde and the post-Stalin relationship between Soviet state and 
society. 
 On the most basic level, perhaps because they were well aware of how central 
fear of spies and saboteurs was to Stalinist discourse, Soviet officials and propagandists 
were genuinely concerned about the possibility that the campaign for vigilance would 
devolve into spy-mania [shpionomaniia]. For this reason, calls for vigilance were 
generously leavened with warnings against paranoia and xenophobia. For instance, 
during the 1961 22nd Party Congress, KGB chief Shelepin called on Soviet people not to 
succumb to spymania in their pursuit of vigilance, as “spymania spreads mistrust and 
paranoia [podozritelnost’] among our people.”558 As human rights activist Aleksandr 
Esenin-Vol’pin points out, this rhetorical restraint had practical consequences: after the 
1950s, acts that were previously classified as treason - exchanging information and 
literature with foreigners - were under Brezhnev prosecuted, if at all, as anti-Soviet 
agitation, a far lesser charge.559 
   Official hedging on the limits of vigilance opened a space for liberal resistance 
against its extreme manifestations. Here, the travails of Vsevolod Kochetov’s 1969 novel 
What Do You Want? (Chego zhe ty khochesh?)  were a case in point.560  Kochetov, a 
“fanatical Stalinist,” editor of the literary journal Oktiabr’561and key figure in the 
                                                          
558 Pravda, 10/28/1961. 
559 “Beseda.” 
560 Vladislav Kochetov, Chego zhe ty khochech (London: Flegon Press, 1970) [orig. published in Oktiabr, 
no. 3, 4, 5 (1969].  
561 Zubok, Zhivago’s Children, 198. 
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conservative faction in Soviet intellectual life,562 intended his novel as an all-out assault 
on Westernizing Soviet elites. His plot follows the misadventures of a tourist group, 
consisting of a Nazi war criminal, a former white émigré, an American photographer, and 
a sexually loose American journalist, sent by a shadowy Western cabal with a mission to 
corrupt Soviet culture.563 To do so, the “tourists” meet, greet, and seduce fartsovshchiki, 
liberal intellectuals, the useless, hyper-sexualized children of Soviet bureaucrats and 
working class youth attracted to shallow material benefits, only to have their plans foiled 
by a Soviet writer (who bears a remarkable resemblance to Kochetov) and his ally, a 
metalurgical engineer who has no time for nonsense and intellectual waffling.  
 With its conflation of foreigners, black marketeers, espionage, sex, and 
espionage, Kochetov’s volume reads like a barely fictionalized elaboration of Liakin’s 
article. And yet, whether because his novel was published too late, or because he went 
too far by openly calling to reinstitute late-Stalinist isolationism, Kochetov’s novel 
withered under savage liberal attacks. The novel was published by a provincial press, 
with a small (by Soviet standards) print run of 65,000.564 In a review published in 
                                                          
562  On Kochetov, see Mitrokhin, Russkaia partiia, 156-160, Yitzhak M.  Brudny, Reinventing Russia: 
Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953-1991 (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1998), 31-33, 54-56. 
563 The American journalist in question was based on the American reporter Patricia Blake, who, while 
reporting on the intellectual environment in Moscow in the late 1960s, interviewed Kochetov, and was 
“wearied by the hatred in the man, and by the pity I somehow felt for him.” (“New Voices in Russian 
Writing,” Encounter 20, no.4 (1963), 37). Kochetov, in his turn, responded to Blake with an enraged 
diatribe, in which he called her a “female reptile,” and vividly described the “nocturnal adventures of this 
middle-aged woman with Moscow lads.”(“Dirty Trade,” Current Digest of Soviet Press [CDSP], 18, no. 
14(1966). In his novel, a stand in-for Kochetov has a second encounter with the stand-in for Blake, an 
encounter that culminates, with, as Fitzpatrick delicately puts it: “a smack on the bottom” delivered by 
Kochetov to his tormentor. (Fitzpatrick, Spy, 239.)  
564 On Khochetov’s reception, see Evgenii Popov, “Vladislav Kochetov kak predtechia kontseptulizma,” 
Oktiabr, 8(2004) accessed online at: http://magazines.russ.ru/october/2004/8/popov7.html on 5/10/2015; 
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Literaturnaia Gazeta, the critic A. Andreev pointed at Kochetov’s ideological weak spot: 
by focusing so heavily on negative elements, he made it look as though Soviet youth was 
fully Westernized - something that by definition could not be true.565 During the 1971 
Congress of the Writers’ Union, the poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko, one of Kochetov’s 
targets, played on the same topic, denouncing “a certain writer who attempted to slander 
Soviet youth as a gathering of spiritual currency speculators.”566 At a time when social 
mobilization was out of fashion, Kochetov’s honest embrace of the language of excision 
broke the rules of the game and thus left him defenseless against attacks from the left. 
 The gap between vigilance talk and the realities of the Brezhnev period left it 
open to the most withering of the rhetorical tools of late Soviet liberalism: satire and 
mockery. Kochetov’s heavy-handed Stalinism was a natural target. And indeed, two 
parodies of his novel by Zinovii Paperno and Sergei Smirnov entitled, respectively, What 
does he Want? [Chego zhe on khochet] and What is he Laughing About? [Chego zhe on 
khokhochet], both enjoying wide samizdat circulation.567 Other satirical takes on 
vigilance talk appeared under an official imprimatur. Efim Gamburg’s 1967 animated 
film Spy Games brilliantly lampoons familiar clichés about Western attempts to steal 
                                                          
Mikhail Zolotonosov, “Sud’bonosnyi roman i ego avtor,” Delo, 6/13/2006, accessed online at: 
http://www.idelo.ru/421/17.html, on 5/10/2015; K.B Sokolov, Khudozhestvennaia kul’tura i vlast’ v 
poststalinskoi Rossii: soiuz I bor’ba, 1953-1985 gg. (St. Petersburg: Nestor-istoriia, 2007), 302-304. 
Sokolov points out that with all its many literary flaws, Kochetov’s novel was a prophetic work, in that it 
correctly predicted the impac of Western consumer culture on Soviet ideology.  
565 “O romane Vladislava Kochetova ‘Chego zhe ty khochesh,” Literaturnaia gazeta, 02/11/1970. 
566 Literaturnaia Gazeta, 7/7/1971.  
567 For segments of both parodies, see Popov, “Kochetov.” See also Zinovii Papernyi, “Istoriia odnoi 
parodii,” accessed online at: http://antology.igrunov.ru/authors/paperny/one-parody.html (acessed on 
5/11/2015). 
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Soviet secrets.568 Taking things one step further, the joint Italian-Soviet comedy The 
Incredible Adventures of Italians in Russia [Neveroiatnye prikliucheniia Italiantsev v 
Rossii] took a familiar plot - a search for treasure buried by a White émigré that draws 
dubious foreigners to the Soviet Union -  and turned it into a wild slapstick affair, ending 
with a suspiciously “capitalist” denouement: the Soviet state gives the Italians 25% of the 
treasure as finders’ fee, while the KGB agent who surveilled the group marries one of the 
treasure seekers.569 The message of such works was clear: like everything else in late 
Soviet culture, vigilance talk was not to be taken too seriously. 
 If calls for vigilance became leavened with some skeptical dissonance, 
denunciations of the commercial demimonde increasingly became a rarity. As mentioned 
above, the campaign against economic crime faltered shortly after Khrushchev’s ouster. 
Foreign currency prostitution also disappeared from the Soviet press, to the extent that 
perestroika-era publicists held as truism it was total taboo since the 1920s.570 Similarly, 
unless they involved the politically fraught topic of Jewish emigration (see Chapter 5), 
major trials of currency speculators were not covered in major Soviet newspapers.571 
                                                          
568 Shpionskie strasti, dir. Efim Gamburg, (Moscow: SoiuzMultfilm, 1967). 
569 Neveroiatnye prikliucheniia Italiantsev v Rossii (dir. Eldar Riazanov and Franco Prosperi, Moscow: 
Mosfilm and Milan: Dino de Laurentis Cinematografica, 1974). 
570 Igor Kon’, Klubnichka na berezke: seksualnaia kul’tura v Rossii (Moscow: OGI, 1997). Accessed 
online at http://sexology.narod.ru/chapt612b.html (accessed 3/10/2015).   
571 This and other information about the Soviet press in this paragraph is based on searches in the Eastview 
Individual Russian Titles Database (covering Pravda, Izvestiia, Literaturnaia gazeta, and The Current 
Digest of the Soviet Press). On the low profile of major corruption investigations in the 1970s, see the 
recollections of OBKhSS colonel Lev Akopov (“Glukhoe delo,” Versiia, 3/22/2010, accessed online at: 
https://versia.ru/yeksklyuzivnye-podrobnosti-samogo-zasekrechennogo-yekonomicheskogo-prestupleniya-
yepoxi-zastoya, accessed online on 5/16/2015). Akopov recalls a massive, multi-republic investigation into 
underground textile factories that led to 55 trials and 4 executions. The affair received extremely scant 
coverage for “obvious reasons:” concern about international reactions to a trial of mostly Jewish 
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 The last point was part of a larger trend: while the Soviet press was generally 
silent on the commerical demimonde, it still vigorously promoted vigilance against 
foreign ideological subversion. The official press continued to issue warnings about 
“vigilance and carelessness”572 while propagandists still warned their audiences about 
“visitors from another world” rummaging after Soviet secrets.573 Even Khrushchev-era 
arguments about links between fartsovka and espionage did not altogether fade. For 
instance, The Secret Front, a collection of cautionary tales about foreign subversion 
penned by Semen Tsvigun, the literary-ambitious Chairman of the KGB prominently 
featured the demimonde as fertile ground for spies and saboteurs.574 On a less exalted 
level, Soviet teachers attempted to deter “chewing gum knights” by spreading tales of 
foreigners distributing syphilis-infected chewing gum - tales that brought back 
xenophobic myths going back at the very least to the 19th century.575 
 Furthermore, on relatively rare occasions, the Soviet public still called to 
participate actively in rituals of symbolic excision. While a relatively small number of 
people underwent profilaktika for commercial relations with foreigners, for the unlucky 
few, it was a harrowing experience.576 In Donetsk in 1975, for example, several students 
                                                          
defendants, and embarrassment due the support the textile network received from Soviet officials all across 
the country.  
572 See, for example, Gen. A. Malygin, “Bez komropissov v ideologicheskoi bor’be,” Molodoi Kommunist, 
1(1969), 49-62; “O  bditelnosti i bezalabernosti,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, 12/3/1970,  
573 G. Sokolov and I. Timofeev, Vizitery iz chuzhogo mira (Simferopol: Tavriia, 1974), N.F Chistiakov and 
V.E Smol’nikov, Taina ne tolko v seifakh (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968). 
574 Tsvigun, Tainyi front. 
575  Von Bremzen, Art of Soviet Cooking, 16; Klose, Closed Society, 289. 
576  On profilaktika as method of rule see Mark Harrison, One Day we will Live without Fear: Everyday 
Lives under the Soviet Police State (Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 2016), ch. 5. 
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caught speculating in items bought from foreigners faced a series of public meetings in 
front of over 1,500 komsomol members in which their sins were roundly denounced. 
These meetings were widely publicized in the local and regional press.577 In the 
Lithuanian port city of Klaipeda, groups of fartsovshchiki and girls dating foreign sailors 
could expect not only “private” forms of pressure (“conversations” with KGB officers, 
threats of loss of employment, possible charges of parasitism, expulsion from 
universities), but public humiliation.  Most strikingly, victims of profilaktika had their 
photos set up in a “they shame our city” photo-array in the city square - a public shaming 
that relied for its efficacy on general public acceptance of official denunciations of the 
demimonde.578 
 Devastating as such attacks could be for their victims, statistically speaking, 
they were surely exceptions to the general official trend of tolerance for the demimonde.  
However, they served as reminder that the language of excision did not disappear from 
the official toolkit – and demimonde residents faced the risk of the wrath of the Soviet 
state falling on their heads at any moment.  However, generally speaking, the focus of 
Soviet assaults on the demimonde shifted from the Khrushchev era wide-ranging charges, 
to selective targeting of Soviet citizens whose associations with foreigners were deemed 
especially dangerous. In other words, the connections Khrushchev-era campaigns made 
between youth, education, disloyalty and material privilege were no longer pointing at  
                                                          
577 “IS, 11/9/1972,” GDA SBU, f. 16, op. 3, spr. 11, ark. 252. 
578 “Raport o provedenii profilakitik v otnoshenii gruppy lits iz chisla sviazei inostrannykh moriakov,” 
Lietuvos Ypatingas Archivas [YPA], f. K-41, ap. 1, b. 697, ll. 15-20.   
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ill-defined (and largely a-political) “golden youth” or (even more a-political)  black 
markeeers but at a specific, identifiable group that, Soviet authorities argued,  actively cut 
it itself off from Soviet society: otshchepentsy - dissenters and human rights activists.579 
For instance, the historian N.N Iakovlev, charged by the KGB with writing an 
authoritative history of American subversion against the Soviet Union,580 employed such 
themes when denouncing dissidents as “dropouts [nedouchki], idlers [lobotriasy], with 
over-developed ambitions and pretensions.”581 Motivated by “vainglory” and hedonism, 
they became easy marks for “all sorts of scum with diplomatic passports [or] simply 
tourist visas.”582  
 And indeed, while unlucky fartsovshchiki were publicly humiliated in their 
towns, ritualized humiliations of dissenters were national affairs, broadcast on television 
and covered in central newspapers. For instance, the confessions of Peter Yakir and 
Viktor Krasin, human rights activists who broke under interrogation,  dictated by the 
KGB and undoubebly reflecting official  perceptions of their activities, included tales of 
                                                          
579 On the complicated relations between dissidents and their most crucial ally, Western journalists, see 
Barbara Walker, “Soviet Human Rights Activists”and Sarah B. Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the 
End of the Cold War: a Transnational History of the Helsinki Network (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011).  On Soviet views of dissident connections to the West see Walter 
Parchomenko, Soviet Images of Dissidents and Non-Conformists (New York: Praeger, 1986) and chapters 4 
and 5 of this dissertation. 
580 N.N Iakovlev, TsRU protiv SSSR (Moscow: Pravda, 1983). According to his memoiristic appendix to a 
post Soviet edition of one of his works,  Iakovlev, who spent some time in prison in 1952/3, used his 
connections with Soviet Minister of Defense Ustinov  make contact with Andropov and  Bobkov, the head 
of the 5th, Ideological, Department of the KGB. In 1980, he was given access to the KGB’s library and 
other “closed” sources to write a definitive history of the CIA, published in more than 20 million copies. 
(N.N Iakovlev, “Prilozhenie,” in idem, 1 avgust 1914 (Moscow: Moskviatianin, 1993), 286-315.See also 
Sokolov, Kultura i vlast’, 344-346. 
581 Iakovlev, TsRU, 176. 
582 Ibid, 177.  
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receiving money from the anti-Soviet émigré organization NTS, payments by Western 
journalists for “slanderous materials” and receiving  “handouts” from foreigners.583 The 
dissenting priest Dmitrii Dudko made similar confessions, stating on Soviet TV that he 
was led astray by Western journalists, diplomats, and other foreign malefactors who plied 
him with gifts and media attention.584 On the republican level, the Literaturnaia Gazeta 
and the Georgian Zaria Vostoka both described how the Georgian nationalist Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia “grew up in great privilege” and despite everything Soviet power did for 
him was recruited by American diplomats and “anti-sovetchiki who abuse their status as 
guests” to betray his country in exchange for gifts and publicity abroad.585  
 To what extent was vigilance talk accepted by the public, and to what extent 
was it deemed parody-worthy prattle? The limited available evidence suggests that, 
outside rarefied intellectual circles, denunciations of the demimonde – even in its 
commercial guise - had real and lasting effect. A scintillating hint in this regard is offered 
by a svodka of questions asked by the public in KGB-sponsored talks about vigilance 
prepared for the Ukrainian Politburo in 1981, featuring numerous examples of “Soviet 
toilers” inquiring why the state didn’t tamp down on fartsovshchiki, foreign spies, 
subversive tourists, diplomats and journalists, and the dissidents who served as their 
henchmen.586   
                                                          
583 “Sud v Moskve,” Izvestiia, 8/29/1973.  
584  Oliver Bullough, The Last Man in Russia: the Struggle to Save a Dying Nation (New York: Basic, 
2013), ch. 9, 10. 
585  “Ten’ v pustyne,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, 5/24/1978. See also “Who Profits by this?” CDSP, 5/18/1978 
(original published in Zaria Vostoka 3/23/1978). 
586 “Perechen‘ voprosov,” DGA SBU f. 16, op. 7, spr. 35, ark. 208-225. 
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 Other evidence points in the same direction. Both contemporary and post-
Soviet accounts emphasize the extent to which fartsovshchiki were despised by other 
Soviet people, including their clients.587 More strikingly, warnings against espionage 
seem to have taken effect among the Soviet public. Esenin-Vol’pin rememebered the 
early 1960s as a period of “hysteria… and spymania.”588 Similarly, Soviet dissidents and 
informal artists remember with some pride being spied on and viewed with suspicion by 
their communal apartment neighbors for their dubious Western connections and 
visitors.589   
 Furthermore, at least some Soviet people were willing to take vigilance talk as 
a call for action. For instance, tourists taking suspicious pictures could expect vigilant 
reactions. In one such case from Smolensk in 1963, a pair of young American tourists 
taking pictures of garbage piles left after construction were “apprehended by our Soviet 
citizens, who forced them to expose their films,” to help avoid embarrassment to the 
Soviet state.590 Even in nationalist-minded Lithuania, locals took similar actions against 
nosy foreigners.591  Finally, no matter how often they were lampooned by the intellectual 
classes, vigilance was  certainly taken seriously by some young men, including very 
                                                          
587 Yurkchak, Everything was Forever, 201-202.  Aiszenshpits, Zazhigaiushchii Zvezdy, 87, Panov, 
Fartsovshchiiki.  
588 “Beseda.” 
589 Marchenko, Nezhelannoe puteshestvie, 8-9; Sergei Dovlatov, Nashi, (accessed online at 
http://www.sergeydovlatov.ru/index.php?cnt=8&sub=4&part=10, on 5/15/2015). 
590 “Organizatsiia i provedenie ekskursii dlia turistov puteshestuiuschikh po avtomarshrutam, [Smolensk],” 
GARF, f. 9612, op. 1, d. 558, l. 123. 
591 “Spravka o nekotorykh faktakh proiavleniia grazhdanami Lit. SSR politcheskoi bditel’nosti.” YLA, f. k-
1, ap. 10, b. 300, l. 173. 
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famous ones, who, influenced by Soviet spy thrillers, choce fighting “dangers coming 
from abroad” as their calling.592  
 In short, official attitudes to the demimonde underwent a significant shift under 
Brezhnev.  On the one hand, the Soviet state learned to live with all but the most 
ideological interactions between Soviet people and foreigners. On the other hand, the 
master narrative that doomed demimonde residents to symbolic excision from Soviet 
society remained intact.  Dissidents now absorbed the entire brunt of association of 
foreignness, corruption, privilege, and treason. In the early 1980s, as international 
conditions deteriorated and the Soviet state once again attempted to use reinvigorate 
socialism by enhancing social discipline, the demimonde again recast as ideological 
problem. 
  
 The Andropov Interlude, or the Last Soviet Campaign, Late 1970s - 1986  
 
Soviet historiography, usually well-attuned to periodization, has yet to either delineate or 
provide a convenient title for the years between the slow disintegration of Brezhnev’s 
rule and the moment when perestroika ceased being a mobilizing slogan and became a 
revolutionary force. For some scholars, Aleksei Yurchak most prominently, the years 
                                                          
592 Masha Gessen, The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin (New York: Riverhead 
Books, 2013), 52.  See also: Sergei Gorlenko, Zapiski opera. Ot KGb do FSB (Moscow: Tradistsiia, 2013), 
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between 1980 and 1986 saw nothing new in particular, as nothing new could exist, by 
definition, in the “eternal state.”593 For others, period was the quiet before the storm with 
a series of crises gathering as Soviet society awaited the Brezhnev gerontocrats to exit the 
scene.594 And yet, as the following pages make clear, enough evidence exists to see this 
time frame as a period in its own right, defined by a last desperate drive for social 
discipline and coercive reform.  I term this period “the Andropov interlude,” after the 
man whose agenda shaped Soviet policy from the late 1970s until 1986/7.595  
 As in the Khrushchev era, this period was defined by an intermingling of 
international and domestic crises: a series of Cold War crises that exacerbated fears about 
foreign subversion, coupled with growing concern regarding the impact of corruption and 
moral degeneration on economic performance and the future of the socialist project. 
Subsequently the Andropov interlude was was a period of coercive reform, focused on 
social discipline, moral exhortation, and attempts at ideological revival.596 As the 
problem of unsanctioned contacts between foreigners and Soviet people was closely 
                                                          
593 Yurchak,  Everything was Forever, ch. 1 
594 See Zubok, Failed Empire, ch. 8, 9. English, Russia and the Idea of the West, ch. 5. 
595 Still the best summary of Andropov’s contribution to Soviet history is Dmitrii Volkogonov, Sem’ 
vozhdei (Moscow: Eksmo, 2011), ch. 5.  Fedor, State Security, 139-160, has references to the many Russian 
authors who view Andropov as a key figure in the run-up to perestroika.  
596 On Andropov-era campaigns, see Duhamel; Corruption, Sokolov, Kul’tura i vlast’, 383-458; Zhuk, 
Rock And Roll, ch. 14; Robert English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the 
End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), ch. 5.  The best known Andropov-
style campaign took place under Gorbachev (Andropov’s protégé): his drive for sobriety in 1986/7. On this 
campaign, see Stephen White, Russia Goes Dry: Alcohol, State and Society (London: Taylor and Francis, 
1997) and Mark L. Schrad, Vodka Politics: Alcohol, Autocracy and the Secret Hisory of the Russian State 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), ch. 17, 18.  
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related to both fears of ideological subversion and moral degeneration, Andropov’s 
coercive reform efforts included a renewed assault on the demimonde. 
 One indication of official loss of patience with the demimonde came 
immediately after the highpoint of Soviet diplomatic achievement, the signing of the 
Helsinki Accords. According to an intelligence estimate prepared by the CIA in 1977, 
while initial Soviet intentions were to apply “carrot and stick methods” to dissidents who 
attempted to leverage the Accords for their purposes, their success in riling global public 
opinion moved the Soviet authorities to decisive action.  In short order, the Soviets shot a 
broadside at dissenters and their Western allies by arresting and deporting the 
Washington Post reporter Robert Toth. Even more alarming, his contact Anatolii 
Shcharanskii, one of the top links between Moscow dissidents and the West, was arrested 
and indicted on treason charges. Both incidents, the CIA concluded, were violations of 
recent Soviet practice, which stipulated leaving reporters in peace, and charging their 
sources only with anti-Soviet agitation.597  
 Whether the details of this assessment are accurate or not, it constituted an 
accurate prediction regarding future Soviet actions. Dismantling the connection between 
Westerners and Soviet dissenters became a key Soviet tactic in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Most famously, if in 1976, at the height of détente, Soviet authorities used 
Sakharov’s freedom to engage with Western reporters in order to publicly refute Western 
                                                          
597 “Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Vice 
President Mondale, 7/19/1977,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980. Volume VI: the 
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“slander” regarding the Soviet human rights record,598 by 1979 his meetings with foreign 
journalists, diplomats, and “intelligence officers seeking political information,” were 
privately cited by Andropov and Prosecutor General Rudenko as both reason and legal 
pretext for his exile to the closed city of Gor’kii.599  
 These measures were part of a conscious strategy of turning the screws on 
interactions between Soviet people and foreigners. In a famous example of this trend, in 
the run-up to the 1980 Olympics, Moscow was not only purged of undesireables, but saw 
its school year shortened and its youth “exiled” to pioneer camps and other summer 
facilities to avoid ideological contamination - a far cry from the optimism of 1957.600   In 
another indication of the intensifying struggle against contamination from abroad, 
Andropov’s short-lived KGB successor Vitalii Fedorchuk penned a memorandum 
complaining about the liberal approach of Soviet film-makers to representations of social 
(and sexual) contacts between foreigners and Soviet citizens (citing, among others, the 
happy ending of Unusual Adventures), and the growing numbers of prominent  Soviet 
citizens marrying foreigners.601 
                                                          
598 “Vypiska iz protokola P201/P44,”  in Vlast’ i dissidenty, 87 
599 “Zapiska n. 2484-A Predsedatelia KGB Iu.V Andropova i gen. prokuratora SSSR R.A Rudenko v TsK 
KPSS, “O merakh presecheniia vrazhdebnoi deiatelnosti Sakharova A.D, 26/12/1979,” in idem, 220-221. 
600 “Vypiska iz protokola n. 168 Sekretariata TsK “O vvedenie vremennykh ogranicheniinia v’ezda v 
Moskvu v period Olimpiady-80 i napravlenii grazhdan Moskvy v stroitelnye otriady sportivnyem 
pionerskie lageria i drugie mesta otdykha letom 1980 goda, 23/7/1980,” posted online at the Bukovsky 
Archive,  http://www.bukovsky-archives.net/pdfs/sovter75/ct168b79.pdf,  accessed  online on 5/22/2015.  
 
601“O brakakh sovetskikh deiatelei kul’tury s grazhdanami kapitalisticheskikh stran, 22/11/1982,” cited in 
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  Perhaps in response to this liberal trend, the late 1970s and early 1980s saw 
a resurgence of vigilance talk. In 1979, the KGB established its own literary and 
cinematic prizes, an apogee of its post-Stalin public relations efforts.602  These awards 
were just the tip of an immense iceberg. In 1984, in Ukraine alone, the Republican KGB 
helped party propagandists prepare 3,000 talks about vigilance and sponsored over 
10,000 talks and lectures on the same topic by KGB veterans and reserve officers.  The 
KGB also organized about 150 “authors’ groups” that “released 1 fictional and 11 
documentary films,  published 55 books and 24 pamphlets, prepared 1,209 radio 
segments and composed 3,739 newspaper articles [devoted to] exposing the machinations 
of foreign intelligence services , centers of ideological subversion, foreign Zionist, 
nationalist, clerical, and other anti-Soviet organizations, of hostile and anti-social 
elements.”603   
 If this was rather familiar fare, under Andropov, these broadsides at corrupt 
dissidents and their foreign benefactors were accompanied by something new- a 
systematic assault on corruption and informal economic activity.604  For this campaign, 
the demimonde was a natural target. Intourist, criss-crossed as it was with networks of 
corruption, was under assault of such intensity that one Intourist official complained that 
an average Intourist barman could expect to work no more than 2 or 3 years before going 
                                                          
602 Fedor, State Security, 152.  
603 “Dokladnaia zapiska KGB USSR [Ukrainian KGB] po podgotovke proizvedenii literatury i iskusstva 
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to prison.605 These legal attacks were accompanied by media coverage that, for the first 
time, acknowledged the systemic nature of the demimonde problem. In one letter by a 
whistleblower, a barman recently fired from a Sochi resort, published in Sovetskaia 
Rossiia, the author described how his bosses demanded “tribute” (dan’) which they then 
disbursed to the rest of the hotel kollektiv, and to local militia organizations.606 Pravda in 
its turn ran an expose on “young specialists” who refused their raspredelenie and found 
instead employment at an Intourist motel in Northern Ossetia, with the clear insinuation 
that they did so to gain access to the imported goods and foreign currency so easily 
obtainable at Intourist facilities.607  
 This assault on the commercial world surrounding foreign visitors was not 
limited to Intourist. Starting in the late 1970s, authorities moved to re-energize the 
struggle against fartsovka.608 According to figures collated by Catriona Kelly, in 
Leningrad, detentions of Soviet citizens festering foreigners skyrocketed from 1,500 to 
above 3,400 between 1977 and 1978.609  Around 1980, Intourist hotels were ordered to 
launch security departments, charged with disciplining Intourist labor force and 
                                                          
605 “Stenogramma zasedaniia… 2/12/1985,” GARF, f. A-385, op. 13, d. 6116, l. 57. 
606 “Pochemu ia ushel s Zhemchuzhiny,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, 10/30/1983. 
607 “Okhota k peremene mest,” Pravda, 11/3/1983. Shortly after the publication of this article, seven staff 
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608 “Spravka ob organizatsii deiatel’nosti dobrovolnykh druzhin i puntkov okhrany obshchestvennogo 
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coordinating actions against “a-social elements” with the militia and druzhiny.610 Most 
tellingy, Soviet authorities seriously discussed a reinstatement of the Khrushchevian 
practice of instating quotas of “parasites” to be exiled from major cities- a move that was 
understood by them as the only effective measure against fartsovka.611  
 Indicating the lasting impact of Andropov’s coercive reform agenda, assaults 
on the demimonde only intensified early in Gorbachev’s reign.The years 1985-1987 saw 
the issuance of a major Central Committee resolution on the reorganization of the fight 
against prostitution and speculation,612 the formation of militia units designated to police 
Intourist hotels,613 and even, in Riga, the first Soviet vice squad.614  In Moscow in 1986, 
the Gor’kii Street pleshka was declared an “Komsomol Influence Zone” and was flooded 
by militia and Komsomol patrols.615 Following a major publication in Sovetskaia Estonia 
on the prevalence of prostitution and speculation involing Finnish tourists there, over 800 
druzhinniki and significant number of militia officers were sent to patrol tourist areas of 
                                                          
610 “Postanovlenie 58/22 DSP Kollegii Gosudartvennogo Komiteta po inostrannomu turizmu ob uslienie 
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611 “Protokol n.4,” A-385, op. 13, d. 4927, l. 25. 
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Talinn.616 Thus, in theory at least, the early perestroika years saw the worst clampdown 
on the demimonde since the Khrushchev period. 
   Yet, as is so often the case in late Soviet society, this activity faced obdurate 
resistance from both Soviet society and Soviet institutions. Intourist hotel managers had 
little enthusiasm for policing, and often shortchanged or diverted the employees of 
security departments to other tasks,617 and the MVD did not care about the assignment 
much either.618 In Tallinn in 1986, only 16,500 Finnish marks, 100 DMs, and 3 US 
dollars were confiscated from black market participants – surely less than a drop in the 
ocean of black market activity surrounding Finnish tourists.619 Even black marketeers so 
clumsy or unlucky to be captured had little to worry about, since, as Estonian party and 
KGB officials complained, universities and places of employment did not particularly 
care about the “moral profiles” of their students and staff and sometimes openly refused 
to participate in profilactic measures.620 Most strikingly, in February 1985, the All-Union 
Council of Ministers, alarmed at the high percentage of empty rooms at recently built 
Intourist hotels, instructed Intourist to start selling packages to Soviet citizens, in rubles, 
but at “prices equivalent to those paid by foreign tourists.” 621 This resolution not only 
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618 “Postanovlenie kollegii Gosudarstvennogo Komiteta SSSR po inostrannomu turizmu, n. 14/10 DSP, 
21/4/1987,” GARF, f. 9612, op.3, d. 1933, l. 45. 
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provided exactly the same idlers and parasites Andropov’s campaigns were aimed at 
legitimate access to the top of the Soviet pyramid of consumption (who else, after all, had 
the available income to purchase an Intourist tour?), but also allowed fartsovshchiki and 
“Intourist girl” a perfectly legal method to purhcase access to foreigners in rubles, in 
order to make profits off them in dollars - thus making perfect mockery of this last Soviet 
mobilization drive. 
 If such quiet subversion of official strictures was in itself nothing new, 
renewed media attention to the demimonde created new and unintended consequences. 
As was the case in the Khrushchev era, authorities sought to publicize the misdeeds of 
black marketeers, in order to both warn others and mobilize the public against their 
misbegotten lifestyles. The practice of public show trials of major currency speculators 
was therefore revived, with the 1986 trial of the aforementioned Mikhail Dakhia 
broadcast on Leningrad TV.622 In Estonia, profilaktika measures now included TV 
coverage of the public shaming of street operators.623 In the realm of fiction, narratives 
about the link between demimonde and espionage triumphantly returned to Soviet 
screens: the highest grossing Soviet film in 1986, Dual Trap, was seemingly a standard 
thriller, detailing the stuggle between the Latvian KGB, a Western businessman sent by 
                                                          
622 Leonid Milosh, “Fartsovshchiki,” Smena 3 (1988). On Dakhia, also see the somewhat sensationalist 
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shadowy forces to subvert Soviet youth, and a gang of fartsovshchiki that do his 
bidding.624  
 While much of the resurgent coverage of the demimonde was resolutely 
orthodox in tone, in the contex the late Soviet culture, the messages it broadcast to the 
public were complex, contradictory, and sometimes subversive. For instance, even 
though Dakhia conducted criminal operations on a scale far surpassing Rokotov’s, he 
received only a six-year sentence –a clear indication of the distance the Soviet justice 
system had traveled since the 1960s.625 
 Even more importantly, coverage of busted demimonde networks in the Soviet 
press no longer depicted the culprits as foreign elements, but rather emphasized the extent 
to which they were product of “native” social forces. For example, a 1984 multi-part 
Komsomolskaia Pravda expose on an Arab student running a vast commercial network in 
Rostov, made it very clear how his network depended on local officials, who protected 
him in exchange for bribes and regular gifts of jeans for their children.626 Other pieces 
denouncing fartsovka focused on the demand side of the problem: the instatiable demand 
for Western consumer goods from law-abiding Soviet urbanites.627 
                                                          
624  Dvoinoi kapkan/Dubultslazds dir. Alois Brenčs’ (Riga: Rizhskaia kinostudiia, 1986). For fims 
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Gorkogo, 1986.) 
625 Leonid Milosh, “Fartsovshchiki,” Smena 3 (1988), and aslo see the somewhat sensationalist 
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  And here was the heart of the issue: unlike in the Khrushchev era, even the 
briefest glimpse at the demimonde could not fail to reveal the extent to which it became 
embedded in Soviet urban life. As a result, coverage of the demimonde often exhibited 
not so much denunciation as elucidation of desire. Thus, in the successful 1985 romantic 
comedy The Most Charming and Attractive One [Samaia obaietalnaia i privlekatelnaia], 
a matter-of-fact visit to the well stocked apartment of a fartsovshchik is a key moment in 
the transformation of Nadia, the protagonist, from a reticent engineer a glamorous beauty. 
Even more strikingly, despite its traditional plot, much of the imagery of Dual Trap 
celebrated material excess associated with the demimonde. The first “Soviet” scene in the 
movie is set in a bar/cabaret catering to foreigners, and features near-naked dancers 
gyrating to jazz music. In a key scene, the fartsovshchik ring leader, known as Banan, 
effortlessly bedazzles “normal” Soviet girls with his money and endless stock of Western 
consumer products.  Even the KGB officers who vanquish Banan seem for a moment 
transfixed with the images in the pornographic journals he distributes. Commissioned as 
warning agains the dangers of the demimonde, Dual Trap visually celebrated its 
temptation. This ambiguity gave rise to a thorny question: were black marketeers 
renegades excised from Soviet life, or were “normative” Soviet people excised from the 
good life the black marketeers enjoyed? 
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Figure 3.3: Scene from Dual Trap: “Banan” seduces visitors to his apartment 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Scene from Dual Trap: Investigator Peeking at Pornographic Journal 
Source: Alois Brancs (dir.) Double Trap. 
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 Conclusion: The Demimonde Becomes the World, 1986-1989 
 
If such dangerous questions were but a subtext in 1985/6, by 1986/7, the twin forces of 
glasnost’ and commercialization made them absolutely central to media coverage of a 
hitherto unspoken aspect of the demimonde: hard currency prostitution.628 According to 
an interview with Evgenii Dodolev, the author of the first high-profile piece on the issue 
published in the Soviet media629 his article was commissioned by the KGB, and was 
meant to signal to Intourist and local authorities to finally tackle the problem.630 Indeed, 
Dodolev’s publication was followed by a massive media campaign aimed to 
propagandize a Central Committee resolution that acknowledged the problem for the first 
time since the 1920s.631 Inevitably, such coverage elicidated responses couched in 
violent, excisionary, language: one letter to the editor proposed to burn prostitutes alive, 
                                                          
628 For two contemporary treatments of this phenomenon, see Ia.P Diachenko, “Interdevochki v zerkale 
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while a group of teenagers from Brest boasted that they founded a group devoted to the 
violent eradication of prostitutes and fartsovshchiki.632  
 And yet, the vast majority of publicity associated with hard currency 
prostitution veered far from the initial design of the campaign. By far the most prominent 
example of this trend is Kunin’s Interdevochka. Like Dodolev’s piece, Interdevochka was 
commissioned by Soviet authorities for propagandistic purposes.633 Nevertheless, both 
the novel and the movie it inspired present the protagonist, Tatiana, and her fellow 
interdevochki as largely positive characters, fighting to navigate a reality rife with 
poverty, meaningless ideological speech, and misogyny. At the same time, Interdevochka 
not only celebrated the material comforts obtained by Tatiana and her friends, but did 
what very few Soviet movies did before: sell sex, in vivid color, to an audience that, as 
ticket and book sales indicated, was starved for it.634 
 This rejection of official views of the demimonde in favor of both moralism 
and unabashed commercialized sexuality rapidly became the dominant themes in the 
coverage of hard currency prostitution. Reforming academics and journalists pointed out 
that hard currency prostitution was a social problem, and that the decades-long policy of 
pretending it did not exist caused great harm to sex workers by blocking all attempts to 
                                                          
632 “V Zerkale pressy,” 74. “Chitatel prodolzhaet diskussiu,” Komsomolkskaia Pravda, 8/16/1987. 
633 According to Israeli-Russian journalist Shelley Schreiman, Vladimir Kunin’s composition of 
Interdevochka was enabled by the MVD, which embedded him with a unit charged with policing hard 
currency prostitutes. (“Istoriia sozdaniia interdevochki,”accessed online at: 
http://www.proza.ru/2011/02/04/1813 on 6/1/2015). 
634 Interdevochka (dir. Petr Todorovskii, Moscow: Mosfilm, 1989). 
  
   
 
  222 
 
 
 
tackle the issue or protect them from abuse and disease.635 The playwright Alexander 
Galin used the Olympic deportation of undesirables from Moscow as background to Stars 
in the Night Sky, a play set in a barrack in a mental hospital to which deportees were sent, 
using the setting to discuss the plight of marginal social groups.636  
 With their mixture of empathy, moral horror, and paternalism, such 
treatments of the prostitution problem were, in their own way, no less moralizing than the 
official line. As such, they were soon overshadowed by coverage of an altogether 
different tenor. Increasingly released from both censorship restrictions and state 
subsidies, Soviet media found hard currency prostitution an irresistible topic.  
Significantly, while such narratives did not of course, lack for sex, their nearly obsessive 
focus lay elsewhere: the mad profits and luxuriant lifestyles of the interdevochki.637 
   Khau du iu du, a documentary film about the hard currency scene in 
Moscow, was perhaps the most powerful indication of the extent to which the campaign 
against the demimonde became an advertisement for it. Initially conceived as a 
Komsomol educational vehicle, it turned instead into a commercially-minded celebration 
of the demimonde, showcasing luxurious fixtures of Intourist hotels, meals consumed in 
Intourist restaurants, apartments stocked with Western consumer goods where 
demimonde participants resided. Above all, Khau du iu du emphasized the mental 
                                                          
635 This is the general line in the articles gathered in Prostitutsiia.  
636  Alexander Galin, “Stars in the Morning Sky,” in Michael Glenny (ed.), Stars in the Morning Sky: New 
Soviet Plays (London: Nick Hern Books,1989). 
637 See, in great detail, survey in “V zerkale pressy.” 
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satisfaction offered by the demimonde and denied to Soviet toilers (“Don’t I have the 
right to be happy?” one interdevochka inquires of the camera in a key scene). The only 
voice expressing moral indignation belonged to a doorman at the Metropol hotel, who, 
the movie made clear, was accepting bribes from prostitutes for access to “his” hotel- a 
higly effective visual representation of the failure of Soviet efforts to excise the 
demimonde, and the moral failure of the language of excision.638 It was in this 
atmosphere that a poll taken among Riga teenagers found hard currency prostitution, 
alongside black market trading and waiting in Intourist bars, the most desired 
professions.639 Released from the discursive and coercive limits that kept access to 
foreigners and their wealth to those daring to leave normative Soviet existence behind, 
the demimonde rapidly colonized the Soviet (soon to become post-Soviet) imagination.640 
As Liakin and Kochetov prophesied, speculators, parasites, and girls of easy behavior did 
indeed help lay the foundation for the defeat of the socialist project 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
638 Khau du iu du, dir. S. Baranov (Moscow: RTsDSF, 1988). For a review see “Khau du iu du,” Pravda, 
9/27/1988. 
639 Kon’ Klubnichka na berezke. A year or two later, an American anthropologist found that “because of the 
often posivite image given to to young female prostitutes through the association of prostitution with… 
access to foreign goods and high lifestyle, those who sleep with men for money are often regarded more 
highly than those…[who] have different sexual partners or a series of short term sexual relationships,” 
Hillary Pickington, Russia's Youth and Its Culture: A Nation's Constructors and Constructed (London: 
Routledge, 1994), 207. 
640  On post-Soviet fascination with sex, wealth and violence, see Eliot Bernstein, Overkill:  Sex, Violence, 
and Russian Popular Culture after 1991 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).   
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  Chapter 4: Vigilance is Our Weapon! The KGB, Foreigners, and the 
Limits of Surveillance 
 
 
Sometime in August 1972, the Jewish-American lawyer Samuel Dash was in Kharkiv, 
fighting to keep his pants on.  Dash, a law professor at Georgetown who recently issued a 
widely circulating public rebuttal to the British account of the Belfast Bogside Massacre, 
was a man on a mission. As he recounted in an oral history interview in 2003, he was 
asked by an “emissary from the Israeli government” to “do an errand on behalf of Israel 
and the Refuseniks:” to go to the Soviet Union as a tourist, make contact with Jewish 
emigration activists, and draw public attention to the plight of Soviet Jewry upon return 
home. To fulfill his assignment, Dash carried around a little notebook with the names and 
numbers of the activists he was to meet. After a series of unsuccessful attempts to extract 
the notebook from Dash’s hotel rooms, the KGB devised a plan: his Intourist guide 
pushed him to visit the Kharkiv subway construction site, where, over his protests, the 
site manager forced him to strip and put on protective gear for a tour of the tunnels. This 
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gave KGB operatives time to ruffle through his pants in search of the notebook - a plan 
that was foiled because Dash prudently stuffed it into his underwear.641  
 If Dash’s account reads like a farce, it was also, from the point of view of the 
officials who authorized this sartorial heist, a deadly serious representation of the 
dilemmas created by growing foreign presence inside the USSR. As we’ve seen in the 
preceding chapter, the official Soviet view of contacts between Soviet citizens and 
foreigners was imbued with what sociologist Andreas Graeber terms state paranoia. This 
“highly indexical suspicion which radiated from the center of the party state to its 
periphery,”642 made the Soviet official mind presume that even seemingly a-political 
contacts with the outside world undermined the Soviet state and were therefore 
systematically employed as weapons by its imperialist foes.  What made things worse 
was that while the Soviet state and especially its security services had a rich tradition of 
generating paranoid attitudes about foreign subversion of the Soviet collective out of 
mere phantoms,643 the Dash incident indicates that, in the post-Stalin period,  the Soviet 
obsession with foreign subversion had a solid foundation in fact. From the moment more-
or-less obstacle-free travel to the USSR became a reality in the mid-1950s,  a variety of 
                                                          
641 This version of the story is based on “Professor Samuel Dash,” Oral History Project of the District of 
Columbia District Court Historical Society (Washington DC: The District of Columbia District Court 
Historical Society, 2003), accessed online at: http://dcchs.org/SamuelDash/samueldash_complete.pdf, 
accessed 5/15/2005.  An earlier version of the story is contained in a report by Dash to the National 
Conference on Soviet Jewry:  Samuel Dash, ’Operation Contact’ in the Soviet Union, 9/2/1972,” National 
Conference for Soviet Jewry Records, The Soviet Jewry Movement Archives [NCSJ-TSJM], Box 38, 
Folder 9. 
642 Andreas Graeber, “Monolithic Intentionality, Belonging and the Production of State Paranoia: A View 
through the Stasi onto the Late GDR,” in Andrew Shyrock (ed.) Off Stage/On Display: Intimacies and 
Ethnographies in the Age of Public Culture (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press), 2004, 244-277. 
643  See, for a recent example, Whitewood, The Red Army and the Great Terror. 
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groups, individuals, governmental and non-governmental institutions in the West did see 
in the  Soviet opening up to the world a real opportunity to promote a variety of agendas 
harmful to Soviet interests.  
This chapter explores how the ideological dangers, operational challenges and 
security risks created by visiting foreigners were read by Soviet security services through 
an analytic lense rooted in state paranoia. From this perspective, the threats to social 
discipline and political unanimity created by encounters between Soviet people and 
foreigners were seen not as set of disparate problems created by various groups pursuing 
limited objectives, but as coordinated aspects of an all-out assault on the foundations of 
the socialist project. Faced with this challenge, the Soviet security service set out to 
surveil, police, and disrupt unauthorized connections between foreigners and Soviet 
people – and, as the Dash incident indicates, fell short in this task.  
In this chapter and the next, I reconstruct the epistemological structures that 
underpinned the Soviet view of foreign danger, and how it adapted the classical elements 
of Soviet policecraft to meet it. Then, I demonstrate a curious and yawning gap between 
the KGB’s threat perceptions, the resources it put into surveillance of foreigners, and the 
very limited scope to which these threat perceptions translated into aggressive action to 
deter them from subverting Soviet power. This conundrum leads to the central question 
posed in this and the following chapter: why this immense gap between perception and 
action? Why did the Soviet alarm at the subversive effects of foreign travel did did not 
lead to resolute action to reduce interactions between the Soviet Union and the outside 
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world, or at least to determined action against subversive travelers like Dash?  Before 
raising and answering these questions however, I sketch out a quick profile of the 
perceived security threat Soviet authorities faced in the era of (almost) open borders. 
 
 
 Spies, Saboteurs and Subversive Travelers 
 
Harmful as it might have been judged by post-Stalin Soviet authorities, the Soviet self-
isolation of the late 1940s and early 1950s posed two intractable problems to Western 
Cold Warriors.  First, at the end of the Second World War, their knowledge of their 
erstwhile ally was rudimentary and intelligence gathering capacities on Soviet soil 
negligible.644 In subsequent years, Soviet and British attempts to clandestinely infiltrate 
agents (usually members of various émigré groups) to gather intelligence and foster 
clandestine resistance networks on the Soviet periphery were easily foiled by Soviet 
security services.645 Second, the complete closure of Soviet physical and cultural spaces 
                                                          
644 See, for example, David J. Alvarez, Spying trough a Glass Darkly: American Espionage against the 
Soviet Union, 1945-1946 (Lawrence, KS: Kansas University Press, 2016) and David Engerman, Know Your 
Enemy, Part 1. 
645 Peter Grose, America’s Secret War behind the Iron Curtain (Boston: Houghton Muffin, 2000); Curtis 
Peebles, Twilight Warriors: Covert Air Operations against the USSR (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press), 2005, ch. 2; Simo Mikkonen, “Exploiting the Exiles: Soviet Émigrés in U.S. Cold War 
Strategy,” Journal of Cold War Studies, 14, No. 2 (2012), 98–127; Benjamin Tromley, “The Making of a 
Myth: The National Labor Alliance, Russian Émigrés, and Cold War Intelligence Activities,” Kritika, 18, 
no. 1 (2016), 80-111. 
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to foreign presence made spreading Western propaganda behind Soviet borders 
practically impossible.646 
 For state and non-state actors in the West seeking to learn about the Soviet Union 
in order to change (or, in case the Cold War turned hot, more effectively incinerate) it, 
the opening of Soviet borders was a golden opportunity to recover lost ground. For 
instance, when the Soviet Union removed its ban on diplomatic personnel travel outside 
Moscow, Western military attachés could return to their core mission: using travel under 
the protection of diplomatic immunity to conduct visual and signals intelligence.647 In a 
more innovative manner, as the CIA’s in-house journal Studies in Intelligence put it in 
1963: “during the past seven or eight years of increased tourist travel to the USSR and 
official exchanges … [The CIA] devoted a great deal of time and energy to briefing and 
debriefing those who may thus have opportunities to make useful observations, seeking 
to exploit these sources of opportunity with reference to targets of opportunity [sic].”648  
 Translated from bureaucratic language, what this meant was that for “spies and 
saboteurs” the price of admission to Soviet territory suddenly dropped, from life-
                                                          
646  Hixson, Parting the Curtain. On late Stalinist isolation, see Zubok, Zhivago’s Children, ch. 1, Fuerst, 
Stalin’s Last Generation. 
647 See the memoirs of the British military attaché to the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, E.S Williams 
(Cold War, Hot Seat: A Western Defense Attaché in the Soviet Union (London: R. Hale, 2000). Intelligence 
gathering by diplomats was of course not limited by such trips: throughout the Cold War, the CIA station in 
Moscow was not short on CIA case officers. See, for recent accounts of their adventures, David Hoffman, 
Billion Dollar Spy: a True Story of Cold War Espionage and Betrayal (New York: Doubleday, 2016) and 
Martha Denny Peterson, The Widow Spy: My CIA Journey from the Jungles of Laos to Prison in Moscow 
(Wilmington, NC: Red Canary Press, 2012). 
648 Robert Vandaveer, “Operation Lincoln,” Studies in Intelligence 7 (1963), 65.  Accessed online via: 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000608379.pdf, on 
4/16/2015 on 5/1/2016. 
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threatening parachute drops to purchasing an Intourist package.  From 1959 onwards, the 
CIA ran “Operation Lincoln,” which tasked about sixty visitors a year with identifying 
possible missile sites by means of “visual, photographic, or conversational observations.” 
From 1962 onward, this program was converted to gathering information by means of 
elicitation: making contacts with Soviet scientists and engineers in order to “draw… 
out… a friendly conversation to the point of revealing something useful.”649 The 
American Air Force ran an even more ambitious program, using engineers, scientists, and 
members of official delegations to help create a wartime targeting database by observing 
and photographing strategic sites.650 In a similar endeavor, the Pentagon offered a number 
of young Americans studying in Europe funds to purchase a car and take a trip across the 
European part of the USSR - in exchange for taking photographs of Soviet military 
installations.651  Some “tourist-spies” were so brazen as to openly take pictures of officers 
entering and exiting the KGB’s headquarters at Lubianka Square.652 
 By the mid-1960s, such blatant use of tourism and exchanges for espionage 
purposes seems to have tapered off, due to both Soviet counter-measures (see below) and 
technological advances that made direct observation less useful.653 However, travelers 
still provided the United States with helpful intelligence. For instance, the era of mass 
travel finally allowed the CIA to put its émigré assets to good use, by employing diaspora 
                                                          
649 Ibid, 72. 
650 Peebles, Twilight Warriors), ch. 6.  
651  See the recollection of one of these “spies on wheels”, Marvin McKinnen., who was apprehended in 
Ukraine and spent several years in Soviet prisons. Stu Borman, “A Chemistry Spy Story,” Chemical and 
Engineering News 91, no.7 (2013), 47-49. 
652 Semichastnyi, Bespokoinoe serdtse, 172.  
653 Pebbles, Twilight Warriors, 158. 
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Lithuanias and Ukrainians who were visiting relatives to both conduct visual intelligence 
and gather information on local Soviet officials. 654 In a less voluntaristic vein, American 
authorities could and did apply pressure on exchange students and scholars to obtain 
information about their Soviet experiences.655 
  Using travelers to gather intelligence is of course a tactic of statecraft at least as 
venerable as, at least, the Book of Joshua. More unusual by historical standards was the 
uses to which Western actors put foreign travel in their efforts to change Soviet society.  
Both governments and individuals saw the opening of Soviet borders as golden 
opportuniy to directly deliver Western messages to the Soviet public. Settings for such 
efforts ranged from iconic locations like the 1959 Sokolniki Exhibit to everyday 
manifestations of friendship outside the control of Soviet authorities. For instance, as an 
Intourist document from 1960 complained, members of the Yale and Harvard university 
choirs, “acting according to instructions they probably received in the US” used their tour 
of the Soviet Union for propaganda purposes by: “leaving their hotels in the evening 
hours and singing Russian songs…starting conversations with Soviet people drawn to 
these improvised concerts… making provocative statements and attacking the Soviet 
                                                          
654 For the Baltics, see “Baltic REDSKIN Review, 11/7/1961,” Accessed online at 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1705143/AEBALCONY_0004.pdf. On 
Ukraine, see “AERODYNAMIC/FI Opportunities in 1961, 9/4/1961,” accessed online at: 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1705143/AERODYNAMIC%20%20%20
VOL.%2017%20%20(OPERATIONS)_0063.pdf.  These projects lasted at least until the early 1970s 
(CA/PEG Project Data Sheet, 7/22/1969) accessed online at:  
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1705143/AERODYNAMIC%20%20%20
VOL.%207%20%20(DEVELOPMENT%20AND%20PLANS)_0005.pdf . All accessed on 4/30/2016. 
655 Graham, Moscow Stories, 200-203. See also William B. Edgerton, “Adventures of an Innocent 
American Proffesor with the CIA and the KGB,” Russian History 24, no.3 (1997), 321-327. 
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government.”656 At times, Soviet fears of clandestine links between unruly travelers and 
the CIA proved true. Historian Karen Paget recounts, for instance, the tale of two 
students who, armed with CIA funding, infiltrated the American delegation to the 1957 
Moscow Festival in order to “debate democracy in Red Square:” to sow division within 
the (Communist-dominated) American delegation, and reach out to both other 
delegations and ordinary Muscovites.657 
 While, as Susan Reid brilliantly demonstrates, such engagement attempts did not 
always produce the desired effects and could repel Soviet citizens disgusted with 
American materialism,658 subversive travelers achieved a measure of success by 
operating on a narrower front. Namely, from the 1950s onward, various Western groups 
employed travel to the Soviet Union to give aid and succor to sundry Soviet dissenters 
and non-conformists. Worse still from the point of view of Soviet authorities, they found 
no shortage of Soviet interlocutors who sought out the visitors in order to actualize, 
enunciate, and publicize their departures from Soviet normative existence. Together, 
subversive travelers and their interlocutors created a variety of transnational networks 
that, while immeasurably smaller than the demimonde, posed no greater threat to Soviet 
claims of ideological unanimity. 
 Yet again confirming that Soviet fears of the link between subversion, 
“imperialism” and foreign travel were at least to some extent justified, the links that 
                                                          
656 “Spravka o prebyvanii v Sovetskom Soiuzee gruppy turistov universitetov shtata Novaia Anliia (SShA), 
7/9/1960,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, d. 268, ll. 182-185. 
657 Karen M. Paget, Patriotic Betrayal. The Inside Story of the CIA’s Secret Campaign to Enroll American 
Students in the Crusade against Communism (Yale: Yale University Press, 2015), 186-195.  
658 Reid, “Who Will Beat Whom?” 
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connected Soviet non-conformists to the outside world were, at times, state-sponsored. 
To cite just one example, a CIA-funded book-smuggling operation enlisted American 
travelers to distribute hundreds of thousands of copies of Russian language translations of 
Western literature and samizdat publications among Soviet elites.659 In the late 1970s, 
during the Carter administration’s human rights push, a number of diplomats at the 
American Embassy in Moscow had “contact and reporting responsibilities for the Soviet 
dissident community”- or, in other words, aided them in their core activity of publicizing 
Soviet human rights abuses.660 As Dash’s case demonstrates, smaller states such as Israel 
could also get in on the action (and, as we shall see in chapter 5, did so with gusto). 
 More important still, as was the case with so much of the cultural Cold War, 
much of this subversive activity was organized by non-governmental groups, often 
entangled in various ways with Western governments. The émigré organization NTS 
(narodno-trudovoi soiuz), a frequent collaborator with the CIA in the immediate postwar 
years and in all probability a recipient of American funds throughout the Cold War,661 
refocused much of its activity on legal travel after the 1950s. It recruited and trained 
“eagles”, Russian emigres, Russian-speaking students, or members of European youth 
                                                          
659 Isaac Patch, Closing the Circle: a Buckalino Journey Around our Time (Wellesley, MA: Wellesley 
College Printing Services, 1996, 257.  Unfortunately, the files of this operation (known as the  Bedford 
Project) are still classified, and according to Peter Finn and Petra Couvee, may well have been destroyed 
(The Zhivago Affair:The Kremlin,  the CIA, and the Battle over a Forbidden Book (London: Vintage, 
2014), 264..  
660 “Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency: Anticipated Soviet Moves in the 
Shcharansky Case, 1/10/1978,” cited in FRUS, 1977-1980. Soviet Union, 247. 
661 Tromley, “The National Labor Alliance.” 
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right-wing organizations, to serve as its emissaries on Soviet soil.662 There, they were to 
distribute subversive literature and smuggle out samizdat, (rarely) engage in public 
protest, make contact with dissenters, and provide money, gifts, and clandestine 
technology to would-be resistance groups (missions that could and sometimes did  end 
with disasters for all involved).663 Baltic and Ukrainian nationalist organizations 
employed similar tactics with a larger measure of success – with continued CIA backing. 
A probably numerically more significant transnational network connected 
evangelical believers in the West to their Soviet brethren. From the 1950s to the 1980s, 
religious travelers, ranging from tourists armed “with cameras and the Bible,”664 to 
professional “God’s Smugglers,”665 driving across the Soviet Union in cars equipped with 
hidden compartments storing thousands of Holy Books, distributed vast amounts of 
religious literature among Soviet “sectarians.” This large-scale (yet historiographically 
                                                          
662 V. Senderov (ed.), Ot zarubezhia do Moskvy: Narodno-Trudovoi Soiuz v vospominaniiakh i 
dokumentakh, 1924-2001 (Moscow: Posev, 2014.) 
663 For court cases involving contacts between NTS emmisaries and clandestine groups in the Soviet Union, 
see “Obvinitelnoe zakliuchenie po ugolovnomu delu n.38 po obvineniiu Evdokimovoi Galiny Nikolaevnoi 
v sovershenii prestupleniia predusmotrennogo chastiu 1 stat’i 70 UK RSFSR, 25/4/1972,” GARF, f. 8131, 
op. 36, d. 4966, ll. 13-26 and “Obvinitelnoe zakliucheniae po ugolovnomu delu. n.248  po obvineniiu 
Gureeva Edvarda Vasilevichia, Derunova Mikhaila Vladimirovichia,  Nemchinova Sergeiia 
Vasilievichia,  Beglianova Aleksanndra Andreevichia, Stempokskogo  Sergeia Appolinarevichia, vsekh v 
prestupleniakh predusmotrennykh st. st. 70-oi ch.1  i 72- oi UK RSFSR [n.d- july 1967],” GARF f. 8131, 
op. 31, d. 99976, ll. 18-69.  Perhaps the most famous case involving the “eagles” was the arrest, 
imprisonment and subsequent exchange of Gerald Brooke, a British Russian language lecturer and NTS 
emissary, in 1966. Roger Platt, “The Soviet Imprisonment of Gerald Brooke and Subsequent Exchange for 
the Krogers, 1965–1969,” Contemporary British History 29, no.2 (2010), 193-212. 
664 Gernot Friedrich, Mit Kamera und Bibel durch die Sowjetunion: ein Thüringer Pfarrer besucht illegal 
Brüder und Schwestern im Osten (Berlin: Am Park, 1997). 
665 “Andrew” [Andrew van der Bijl], God’s Smuggler (New York: Hodder and Stoughton), 2002. 
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obscure)666 movement was initiated in the 1950s as the brain child of largely apolitical 
activists like the Dutchman Andrew van der Bijl (better known as Brother Andrew). By 
the late 1970s, Bible smuggling became a cottage industry, with dozens of organizations, 
some closely tied to right-wing circles in the West, vying for tens of millions of dollars in 
donations to fund their endeavors.667 Furthermore, as Brother Andrew freely concedes in 
his memoirs, significant components of this godly network were funded by various anti-
Communist organizations, who, in, turn, could have plausibly been connected to Western 
governments.668 
 Brother Andrew’s contribution to the evangelical cause underlies an important 
point: that even if the politicized demimonde enjoyed governmental support, it was, in 
the final account, a product of myriad individual commitments. Thus, many Western 
journalists residing in Moscow took cultivating, publicizing, and at times materially 
aiding dissenters as key ingredients of both their professional and ethical duties.669 
Journalists, students, and scholars made the apartments of dissidents and Soviet 
intellectuals’ places of pilgrimage where they could partake in the practice of resistance-
via-kitchen talk.670  
                                                          
666 For an exception, see Brent Boel, “Bible Smuggling and Human Rights in the Cold War,” in: Luc Van 
Dongen and Stephanie Rouline (ed.), Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War: Agents, Activities 
and Networks (London: Palgrave McMillan, 2014), 263-275. 
667  Russel Chandler, “Smuggled Goods: the Good Book,” Los Angeles Times 3/24/1978. 
668 God’s Smuggler, 178. 
669 Kruse, Closed Society is an excellent account of a reporter’s sojourn in the Soviet Union, written in this 
key. Nagorski in his Reluctant Farewell narrates his stay in the Soviet Union in a similar key, making a 
strong distinction between the minority of journalists who maintained this ethical commitment, and the 
majority of the Moscow contingent that relied on official sources of information. See also Fainberg, “Notes 
from Rotten West,”181-193, Walker, “Human Rights Defenders.” 
670 See for example, Clarence Brown, “Introduction,” in Nadezhda Mandelstam, Hope against Hope: a 
Memoir (New York, Modern Library, 1999), xvii.  For similar relationship between foreigners and a much 
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Such encounters begat perhaps the most substantial contribution of foreigners to 
Soviet non-conformity: the smuggling of samizdat and subversive manuscripts abroad. 
One of the earliest texts of Soviet dissent, Sergei Yesenin-Volpin’s “Why I am not a 
Communist,” was, for instance, smuggled abroad by a member of the aforementioned 
Yale choire, in its 1959 tour of the Soviet Union.671  Later on, samizdat smuggling took 
more organized features. As Alexander Solzhenitsyn revealed in the post-Soviet edition 
of his memoirs, foreigners - journalists, literary scholars, diplomats, and others were an 
essential ingredient in his network of “invisible” collaborators [nevidimki].672 One such 
“invisible,” the French-Russian diplomat Anastasia Durrouf, smuggled large segments of 
Solzhenitsyn’s manuscripts abroad, disguising them as gifts she asked French tourists and 
businessmen returning home to present to her Parisian “friends.”673 In Ukraine, “ethnic” 
foreign students from Czechoslovakia and Canada formed an important channel through 
which Ukrainian nationalists could smuggle their works abroad.674  On an individual 
level, Dutchman Robert Van Voren describes how, as a teenager, he became so obsessed 
with Soviet dissidents he reached out to exile dissident Vladimir Bukovsky who “trained” 
                                                          
less famous Moscow dissident, see: Lisa C. Paul, Swimming in the Daylight: an American Student, a 
Soviet-Jewish Dissident, and the Gift of Hope (New York: Skyhorse Publishers), 2011. 
671 Benjamin Nathans, Alexander Volpin and the Origins of the Soviet Human Rights Movement 
(Washington, DC: NCEER, 2006), 13. I thank Professor Nathans for drawing this fact to my attention. 
672 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, I bodalsia telenok s dubom. Ocherki literaturnoi zhizni (Moscow: Soglasie, 
1996), 562-579. 
673  Anastastia Durrouf, Rossiia: Ochishchenie ognem. Iz dnevnika khristianki, Moskva 1964-1977 
(Moscow: Rudomino, 1999), 170-171. 
674 Taras Muraško and Jerguš Sivoš, “Keď žije jazyk, žije celý národ. Preprava ukrajinskej disidentskej 
literatúry ukrajincami žijúcimi na Slovensku,” Pamäť národa 1(2013). 
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him to become a journalist posted in the Soviet Union- and a publicity agent for human 
rights defenders.675 
  Of course, such devotion was but a faint reflection of the determination that was 
required from the Soviet participants of these transnational networks of dissent. Most 
telling in this regard was the zeal with which individuals outside Soviet capitals pursued 
opportunities to engage with sympathetic foreigners.  Siberian Baptists often undertook 
long journeys to contact religious emissaries in the Soviet West in order to receive Bibles 
that were then copied by hand and recirculated in the Far East.676  Desperate petitioners 
from Soviet provinces found ways to deliver their complaints about injustices to 
Moscow-based journalists.677 One Tbilisi engineer spent nearly three years in the 1960s 
trying to contact foreigners willing to take his letters to Western editors abroad. For this 
purpose, he repeatedly travelled to various foreign exhibitions in Moscow, sent his 
friends there with the letters and, when those connections bore no fruit, attempted to 
convince tourists he met at Tbilisi churches to smuggle them out in exchange for 
Georgian souvenirs.678 
  Finally, the most dramatic illustration of the subversive potential of foreign 
presence on Soviet soil was the use that potential “traitors to the motherland” made of it. 
                                                          
675 Van Boren, Dissidents and Madness, 6-9. 
676 Lois M. Bass, Forbidden Faith (Thousand Oaks, CA: Thousand Oaks Publishing, 2000), 214-215. 
677 Kruse, Closed Society, 53-92, David Souter, Age of Delirium, 90-122. 
678 “Postanovlenie st. sledovatelia spets. otdela KGB pri SM GSSR kapitana Chitashvili, 23/12/1964.” 
GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 98411, ll. 1-5.  In a similar case in Yalta , one underground author desperate to 
get published abroad resorted throwing copies of his writings into an Intourist bus in Yalta “Postanovlenie, 
23/12/1963,”  GARF, F. 8131, op. 31, d. 96873, l. 6. 
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Western embassies in Moscow were magnets for non-conformists and, especially, 
religious activists, who could spend years living as refugees inside them if they were 
lucky, or be immediately expelled if they were unlucky. 679 While such desperate ploys 
were treason only under Soviet standards, other “traitors” targeted travelers with bona 
fide attempts to instigate espionage. Oleg Pen’kovskii, for example, made his first contact 
with Western intelligence services by contacting two American exchange students who 
delivered his message to the American embassy.680 Similar attempts, by amateurs 
wishing to escape the Soviet Union as well as professional intelligence officers wishing 
to defect, continued throughout the Cold War era.681 Attempts to seek out foreigners to 
divulge secrets were apparently so common that, in locations where foreigners 
congregated, the KGB employed baits (agents dressed as foreigners) to flush out potential 
traitors.682 
  
                                                          
679  The most famous case involving embassy refugees was involved the so-called Siberian Seven- a group 
of Soviet Pentecostals who spent five years in the basement of the American embassy (1978-1983). See 
Kent Richmond Hill, The Soviet Union on the Brink: an Inside Look at Christianity and Glasnost (Portland, 
OR: Multomah Publishers, 1991) 20-40. For an example of an immediate expulsion that brought the 
expellee, Donetsk miner and activist Alexei Nikitin, to a psychiatric hospital, see Klose, Closed Society, 
88-91. 
680 “Interview with Joe Bulik, 1/31/1998,” hosted at the National Security Archive Website, at: 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-21/bulik1.html (access: 3/1/2015). 
681 P.N Riabchuk, “Dva dela,” in V.S Gusev et al (ed.) Sledstvie prodolzhaetsia: khroniki politicheskikh 
prestuplenii. Kniga piataia (St. Petersburg: Spetsialnaia literatura), 2008, 141-145. Viktor Sheymov, Tower 
of Secrets: a Real Life Spy Thriller (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press), 1993, 300-313.  
682 See the court case of Zinov’ev, V.E, cited in Vladimir Kozlov et al (ed.) 58(10): Nadzornye 
proizvodstva Prokarutury SSSR po delam o antisovetskii agitatsii I propagandy. Annotirovannyi katalog, 
1953-1991. (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond DEMOKRATIIA, 1999), 784. I was not able to gain access to 
the relevant archival file at GARF, f. 8131, op. 36, d. 8461. 
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  Reading the Foreign Danger 
  
In short, from an official Soviet standpoint, illicit interactions between foreigners and 
disloyal elements represented a raw body of facts sufficient to classify foreign travel into 
the USSR as a national security threat. However, in order to craft a policy response to 
these raw facts, they had to be analyzed and weighed alongside additional factors, 
ranging from the benefits of international exchanges to Soviet scientific and 
technological development (as well as Soviet intelligence gathering operations),683 to the 
reality that the Soviet opening up to the world coincided with a long era of political 
stability. As all intelligence assessment does, this analysis took place in a specific 
political, institutional, and epistemic context. Namely, it lay more or less entirely in the 
hands of the KGB, the organization charged with all aspects of defending the Soviet 
Union from peacetime dangers: intelligence gathering and assessment, 
counterintelligence operations, border controls, and political secret policing.684 
                                                          
683 On Soviet foreign intelligence-gathering operations after the mid-1950s, see Christopher M. Andrew, 
The Sword and the Shield: the Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic 
Books, 1999), and idem, The World was Going our Way: the KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New 
York: Basic Books, 2005), Jonathan Haslam, Near and Distant Neighbors: a New History of Soviet 
Intelligence (London: MacMillan, 2015), 143-272.  
684 For an interesting take from a practitioner on the problems of cultural and institutional evaluation of 
intelligence, see Rob Johnson, Analytic Cultures in the US Intelligence Community (Washington, DC: 
Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005). For a recent treatment of similar issues in the context of Soviet 
Cold War security operations, see Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Leaders and Intelligence: Assessing the 
American Adversary During the Cold War (Washington, DC: University of Georgetown Press, 2015) and 
Ben de Jong, “The KGB View of the West: Conspiracies and Agents of Influence,” in Heiner Timmerman 
(ed.), The Future a Memory: The Cold War and Intelligence Services (Berlin: Dr. W. Hopf Verlag, 2013), 
77-96. 
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The KGB, the successor organization to the Stalin-era NKVD, was formed at a 
moment of crisis of legitimacy for Soviet security services. Faced with the necessity to 
reformulate its raison d’etre in the wake of Khrushchev’s revelations of Stalin’s crimes 
(and the ensuing drastic cuts of secret police payrolls) the defense of the Soviet state from 
external enemies became absolutely central to the KGB’s mission statement -  both as 
public relations strategy and as a statement of organizational ethos.685 Thus, the 
introduction to its official History stipulates that while in the early days of the Soviet 
Republic the focus of the Cheka was on battling domestic enemies, after the war its main 
task was “to vigilantly defend the achievements of socialism from the machinations of 
imperialism, its intelligence and other services.”686 Vladimir Semichastnyi, the first KGB 
Chairman appointed after Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin, proudly describes how he 
reoriented the Soviet security services from Stalinist diversions to their proper focus - 
“intelligence and counter-intelligence.”687 In his appearance before the anti-Stalinist 1962 
Party Congress, his successor, Alexander Shelepin, emphasized that in the era of the all-
people’s state, the KGB “concentrates… [its] main efforts on exposing and firmly 
suppressing the activities of hostile intelligence agencies.”688 Shelepin’s successor, 
Andropov, repeated the same refrain, reminding his listeners that the KGB’s main task 
                                                          
685  On the KGB’s campaign to rehabilitate itself, see Fedor, Russia and the Cult of State Security, 30-58. 
686 Istoriia organov, 3. 
687 Vladimir Semichastnyi, Bespokoinoe serdtse (Moscow: Vagrius, 2002), 164-180. 
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was to “closely observe the machinations of imperialist intelligence services” in a parting 
talk before KGB senior cadres in 1981.689   
More specifically, the KGB identified two major dangers stemming from foreign 
“machinations.” First, the KGB was well-informed regarding Western uses of tourism for 
subversive purposes. Tsvigun, in his Secret Front, accurately described the origins and 
function of Operation Lincoln while warning Soviet scientists that “it would be irrational 
to presume that every visitor is an intelligence officer… but we might find among them 
some people who wouldn’t object to grab some secret information.”690  
While potential espionage activity was described by Tsvigun in a nearly matter-
of-factly tone,  KGB officers viewed Western efforts to encourage dissent in similar 
terms to Liakin and Kochetov’s warnings – and many of them still view the link between 
foreigners, foreign subversion, dissent, and moral dissolution as a key causal mechanism 
for the Soviet collapse in their post-Soviet recollections. According to Semichasntyi, “as 
early as during Khrushchev’s ‘Thaw’ American political strategists started shifting the 
ball to our court [perenisti igru na nashe pole], and started building ‘an organized 
resistance movement’.”691 N.M Golushko, a long-serving deputy chief of the KGB’s 
notorious Fifth (ideological) Department, believes that throughout the post-Stalin era, the 
West engaged in an elaborate psychological warfare campaign, by “assisting dissent and 
                                                          
689 From a speech by Andropov to leading KGB cadres in May 1981, quoted in V.I Alidin, 
Gosudarstvennaia bezopasnost i vremia (Moscow: Veteran MP, 1997, 217. V.I Alidin was at the time the 
chief of Moscow’s KGB. 
690 Tsvigun, Tainyi front, 104.  
691 Bespokoinoe serdtse, 244. 
  
   
 
  241 
 
 
 
treason… subverting morals [and the] spiritual [nravstennye] foundations of society, 
promoting ideological erosion [and] provoking a disruption of the self-defense instincts 
of [our] country.”692 His long-serving commanding officer, General Filip Bobkov, applies 
the same framework, crediting Western “agents of influence” for the destruction of the 
Soviet Union in his many post-Soviet publications.693 
Bobkov’s long career commenting on such matters provides us with an 
opportunity to compare such retroactive assessments with contemporary information 
delivered to both decision-makers and subordinates - a comparison that clearly 
demonstrates the continuities of the Chekist mind.  In a 1960 seminar on combatting 
ideological diversions, Bobkov warned Lithuanian KGB cadres that Western secret 
services aimed to “make use the international links of socialist countries with the 
capitalist world (tourism, scientific and cultural exchanges)” in order to “negatively 
influence  ... student youth and the creative intelligentsia,” and thus “activate certain anti-
Soviet elements” and forge them into an opposition movement.694 16 years later, as head 
of the Fifth Department, Bobkov kept to the same line. Shortly after the Soviet Union 
signed the Helsinki Accords (which included, inter alia, a commitment to increased 
international exchanges and tourism)695 he penned a memo to the Politburo on “negative 
                                                          
692 N.M Golushko, V spetsluzhbakh trekh gosudarstv (Moscow: Kuchkov pole, 2012), 41. 
693 693 Fedor, “Chekists,” 853-854. Fedor shows that this conspiratorial view of the Soviet collapse is more 
or less consensus among KGB memoirists. 
694“Tezisy doklada ‘Ideologichskaia diversiia imperializma protiv SSSR i deiatelnost organov KGB po 
bor’be s nei,” LYA, f. k-1, ap. 10, b. 325, ll. 26-27. 
695 David L. Edgell Sr. and Jason Swanson, Tourism Policy and Planning: Yesterday, Today and 
Tomorrow. 2nd Edition (London: Routledge, 2013), 218-223. 
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phenomena among students and educated youth,” crediting such phenomena- ranging 
from dissent to rising popular religiosity- to the influence of “hostile ideological centers” 
which made use of travel and exchanges to “propagandize bourgeois philosophical values 
[and]….ways of life… [to] make contacts with representatives of Soviet youth in order to 
ideologically convert [obrabatyvat’] them.”696  
While, as we see below, the KGB struggled to translate these warnings into 
coherent action, these were not mere words but expressions of a deeply ingrained and 
well-operationalized institutional ethos.  Daily reports filed by the republican KGB to the 
Ukrainian Politburo throughout the 1970s and 1980s on domestic life in the republic, 
recently made available to researchers, are perhaps the best indication of the extent to 
which this ethos guided practice. These reports invariably started with a careful statistical 
breakdown of visiting foreigners.  Even most a-political incidents involving foreigners 
(accidents and heart attacks, suicides, and brawls between foreign students and Soviet 
citizens) were reported to the Central Comittee.697 Reports on visits of journalists, foreign 
delegations, and diplomats to Ukraine invariably included lists of questions asked by the 
visitors. Such lists, no doubt useful in the ideological battles described in Chapter Two, 
also revealed a barely hidden anxiety that curiosity about any aspect of Soviet life was, 
                                                          
696 “Analiticheskia spravka o kharaktere i prichinakh negativnykh proiavlenii sredi uchiashcheisia 
molodezhi i studenchestva,” in Vlast i dissidenty 135-148.  In his post-Soviet memoirs, Bobkov reiterates 
this stand, arguing that agents of influence recruited by the West were instrumental in bringing about Soviet 
collapse. (Cited in Fedor, “Chekists,” 853-854.) 
697 See, for example among many, “IS 24/5/1977,” DGA SBU, f. 16, op.7, ark. 26, spr. 13, “IS, 3/4/1987,” 
DGA SBU, f. 16, op. 4, spr. 2, ark. 92, “IS 2/8/1982,” DGA SBU, f. 16,op. 7, spr. 69, ark. 190-191. 
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ipso-facto, an attempt to obtain information that was better kept hidden.698  At times, this 
institutional paranoia veered into conspiracy theorizing: a report from spring 1972 on the 
aftermath of a major cholera outbreak reveals that the republican investigative 
department of the KGB devoted significant resources to tracing the possibility it was 
caused by deliberate sabotage by Western travelers.699 
 
Figure 4.1: Daily KGB Report, Ukraine, 6/5/1972  
Source:DGA SBU, F. 16. 
Concerns about the link between visiting foreigners and dissent were also 
operationalized by the Ukrainian KGB. Here, it is again important to emphasize the 
                                                          
698 See, for example, “IS 12/2/1972,”DGA SBU f. 16, op. 3, spr. 14, spr. 271-272. 
699 “Informatsionnoe soobshchenie o prodelannoi rabote organov gospezopasnostyi respubliki po 
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distinction between facts regarding Western aid to Ukrainian dissent, of which the KGB 
had many, and the analytic framework it used to assess the threats these facts represented.  
Despite much mythologizing by both Soviet sources700 and nationalist historiography,701 
recent scholarship heavily emphasizes the extent to which late Soviet non-conformism 
was a product of domestic factors: tolerance for limited forms of pluralism, the Soviet 
state’s promotion of certain cultural forms of nationalism, relatively low levels of 
penetration of Soviet identities in the countryside, and even the popularity of Western 
counter-culture in Ukrainian cities.702 Furthermore, as Zbiegnew Wojnowski recently 
demonstrated, even in troublesome Western Ukraine, anti-Soviet activities hardly 
threatened either political stability or the evolving “Sovietness” of the local population.703 
While, as we have seen, concerns about the link between foreign machinations 
and dissent go back at least to the late 1950s, the Ukrainian KGB’s understanding of the 
problem seems to have been rooted in its reading of the crisis of 1968. As Amir Weiner 
demonstrated, the events of the Prague Spring deepened endemic fears about 
                                                          
700 On growing Soviet obsession with Ukrainian nationalism and its diaspora, see Trevor Erlacher, 
“Denationalizing Treachery: The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists 
in Late Soviet Discourse, 1945–85,” Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia 2, no. 2 (2013), 289-316. 
701 For a view of Ukrainian nationalism that integrates prewar, wartime, postwar and late Soviet 
nationalism into a whole cloth, see Volodymyr Viatrovych, Istoriia z hryfom "Sekretno:" Ukraïnsʹke XX 
stolittiia (L’viv: Chasopys), 2013. On Viatrovych and his role in Ukrainian history wars, see Jared Mcbride, 
“How Ukraine’s New Memory Commissar is Controlling the Nation’s Past,” The Nation 8/13/2015, 
accessed online at: http://www.thenation.com/article/how-ukraines-new-memory-commissar-is-controlling-
the-nations-past/ on 1/4/2016. 
702 See William Jay Risch, The Ukrainian West: Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet L’viv 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); Iu.Z Danyliuk, O.H Bazhan, Opozytsiia v Ukraini: 
druha polovyna 50-kh- 80-ti rr. XX st. (Kyiv: Ridnyi krai, 2000); H.V Kasianov, Nezhodni: ukrains’ka 
intelihentsiia v rusi oporu 1960-80-kh rokiv (Kyiv: Lybid, 1995); Baran, Dissent on Margins; Zhuk, Rock 
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nationalisms, social stability, and ideological pollution brought by both Western and 
Eastern visitors to the Soviet West.704  Archival evidence shows that the Ukrainian KGB 
faithfully transmitted information from Czechoslovak security services, which pinned 
much of the blame on the unrest that led to the Prague Spring on the activities of Western 
embassies and security services who allegedly planted “emissaries” disguised as tourists 
and exchange students to help generate political opposition.705  
 Documents from the late 1960s and early 1970s show that such views of the 
Prague Spring had lasting effects. Instead of a loosely organized constellation of groups 
and individuals pursuing various agendas, the KGB wove all forms of dissent into a 
looming opposition movement, funded and organized from abroad. According to this 
image, diaspora Ukrainian nationalists, controlled by Western intelligence services, used 
emissaries, visitors on tourist or exchange visas, to help organize and support the 
dissident movement.  Ukrainian nationalists, emboldened by this support, sought contacts 
with Jewish nationalists (either controlled by the CIA or representatives of the forces that 
controlled the CIA)706 and Moscow dissidents, (witting or unwitting accomplices of CIA 
–backed Western journalists and diplomats), to create an all-Union oppositional force.707 
This narrative shaped the security perceptions of the higher party leadership, with Petro 
Shelest, the Ukrainian party leader, complaining to the all-Union Politburo that his 
                                                          
704 Amir Weiner, “Deja Vu.” 
705 “Tezisy vystupleniia na predstoiashchem soveshchanii ofitserov gos. Bezopasnosti Vostochno-
Slovatskogo kraia,” [N/D, May 1968],” DGA SBU, f. 16, op. 3, spr. 2, ark. 140-141. 
706 See Chapter Five of this dissertation. 
707 See for example, speech of Ukrainian KGB chief Fedorchuk to the aforementioned meeting, “Protokol 
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republic was witnessing “a merger of the NTS with bourgeois nationalists of all shades 
and colors and with Zionist elements…a forging of active political formations 
[oppositional to the regime]”, and calling for “re-examination of certain aspects of our 
policy regarding foreign tourists.”708 
While there is no evidence that the restrictions on foreign tourism Shelest hinted 
at ever materialized, the picture of an emerging opposition monolith controlled by foreign 
“ideological centers” bankrollled by Western secret services, was convincing enough to 
inspire a massive wave of arrests. Held under the tellingly codenamed “Operation Bloc,” 
this wave was triggered by the arrest of the Belgian-Ukrainian student Yaroslav Dobosh, 
a member of an émigré youth organization, who was indeed visiting Ukraine to make 
contact with local dissidents. His interrogation focused heavily on obtaining information 
implicating him in facilitating contacts between the émigré community and local 
dissidents.  Soviet arrestees were pressured to recount any and all encounters and 
exchanges of information they had with diaspora Ukrainians, other foreigners, and 
Moscow dissidents – and thus provide confirmatin to the threat inflation in which Soviet 
security services engaged.709    
While the massive wave of arrests that followed Operation Bloc never repeated 
itself, similar fears animated Ukrainian KGB reports well into the perestroika era. Thus, 
throughout the late 1970s, the Ukrainian KGB framed the activities of human rights 
                                                          
708 As recorded by Shelest in his diary (Petro Shelest, Da ne sudimy budete. Dnevnikovye zapisi, 
vospominaniia chlena Politbiuro TsK KPSS, (Moscow: Edition Q, 1995), 503-504. 
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activists, especially their connections to diplomats, journalists, and “emissaries,” as 
attempts to revive the organizational structure allegedly dissolved by Operation Bloc.710 
As late as 1987, KGB reports fretted that the Vatican used missionaries disguised as 
tourists to manipulate Ukrainain Uniates into forming into Solidarność -style protests,711 
and, more surprisingly, that the activities of local hippies, punks, and yoga practitioners 
were enhanced by meetings with visiting members of Western pacifist organizations, 
recruited by the CIA to dissolve “the ideological vigilance of Soviet youth.”712 Until the 
very eve of the dissolution of Soviet power by a combination of grassroots activism and 
elite rebellion, the agency charged with protecting it looked westward rather than inward 
in determining the weaknesses it had to guard against. 
 
 A Bug in Every Room: Policing Foreigners713 
 
If foreign presence in the Soviet Union seemed to the KGB the thin edge of a massive 
wedge threatening the unity of the party and people, it was not without resources it could 
employ to deter this danger. A massive state-within-a-state, the KGB had hundreds of 
thousands of employees, significant numbers of uniformed troops in its border guards and 
                                                          
710 See reports in DGA SBU, f. 16, op. 7, spr. 33, spr. 34, spr. 36, spr. 37. 
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other militarized units, still unknown numbers of informants and unofficial collaborators, 
and a complex set of relationships with all institutions interacting with foreigners.714 It 
was also a store of institutional knowledge about surveillance and population 
management techniques that extended back at least to the Bolshevik Revolution.715  
While some of these techniques- say, mass terror - were no longer available in its 
dealings with the local population, let alone foreigners, the KGB could and did make use 
of tried and true technologies of power to deal with the challenges of foreign travel. Such 
methods included mobility controls (rezhim), surveillance of both foreigners and Soviet 
people who had even fleeting contact with them, profilaktika, and, at times, “active 
measures”- violence and provocations, aimed to dissuade or penalize especially difficult 
“clients”- or turn foreigners into assets. 
The most important asset Soviet coercive agencies possessed as they sought to 
police foreigners was their rich experience of managing Soviet society by creating sub-
groups defined by disparate legal and administrative standings. In the strict legal sense, 
foreigners on Soviet soil “enjoyed all the rights, privileges and obligations of Soviet 
citizens,” as Soviet jurist M.M Boguslavskii put it.716 Just like Soviet citizens, foreigners 
                                                          
714 For estimates on the KGB’s manpower see Evgeniia Albats, Minna zamedlennogo deistviia: 
politicheskii portret KGB (Moscow:Russlit, 1992), 27-43, 
715 On the history of Soviet surveillance, policing and population management, see Peter Holquist, 
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Journal of Modern History 69, no. 3 (1997), 415-430; Amir Weiner and Aigi Rahhi-Tamm, “Getting to 
Know You: the Soviet Surveillance System, 1939-1957,” Kritika 13, no. 1 (2013), 5-45; David Shearer, 
Policing Stalin’s Socialism: Repression and Social Order 1924-1953 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
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716 M.M Boguslavskii, Pravovoe polozhenie inostrantsev v SSSR (Moscow: IMIMO, 1962), 3. 
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were eligible for free healthcare, and just like them, they were bound by Article 70 of the 
RSFSR criminal code, banning anti-Soviet activities and propaganda (a point that 
Boguslavskii politely omits).  Outlandish as such contention would doubtlessly have 
occurred to Soviet people aware of the vast privileges afforded to foreigners, it contained 
within it important seeds of truth.  As Russian historian T.S Kondrat’eva  points out, long 
after the Soviet state ceased to officially categorize its citizenry according to their class 
origins,717 Soviet society still contained multitudes of  “regimented people” [rezhhimnye 
liudi]. These groups, ranging from prisoners and collective farmers at the bottom to 
academics and family members of senior Soviet officials at the top, all enjoyed (or 
suffered) special rights, privileges, restrictions on and barriers to mobility that separated 
them from the mass of the Soviet urban population.718 Seen from an angle informed by 
this administrative practice, the challenge of managing foreigners seems less like an epic 
clash between a totalitarian state and unruly “liberal subjects,” than a history of the 
Soviet struggle to create the proper balance of privileges and restrictions to accommodate 
an especially challenging group of “regimented people.” 
 What this meant in practice is that foreigners travelling on Soviet soil were 
hemmed in by a thicket of regulations that strove to control where they went, what they 
                                                          
717 T.S Kondrat’eva, “Vvedenie,” in idem and A.K Sokolov (ed.), Rezhimnye liudi v SSSR (Moscow: 
ROSSPEN), 2009, 10-22. From a provocative reading on the practice of regime making a claim that it was 
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could and could not do and (at least in theory) with whom they could interact. The most 
obvious and famous of these restrictions was the practice of closing vast tracts of Soviet 
soil to foreigners (and, sometimes, Soviet people). As geographer Pavel Postel shows, 
these closed zones could be divided into three major categories. First, there were vast 
tracks of Central Asia, the Far East and the Soviet Pacific that housed sensitive military 
bases, nuclear bases and experiment zones, and similar sensitive locations that were 
closed to foreign eyes. In the European parts of the Soviet Union, closed zones included 
cities housing major defense industry factories (most famously, Gork’ii and the “rocket 
city” of Dnepropetrovsk) and a plethora of closed zones surrounding “post boxes” erected 
in the vicinity of major cities- most prominently Moscow and Leningrad. Finally, in areas 
annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939-1945, nearly all space outside large cities was 
closed to foreigners, due to both political sensitivity and prevalence of military bases. At 
the end of the Soviet period, about 20% of Soviet territory was still closed to foreigners - 
a land area roughly equivalent to India in size.719 
                                                          
719 P.A Polian, “Ogranichenie territorialnoi mobilnosti ot Stalinskoi ery do nashikh dnei,” in Kondrat’eva 
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Figure 4.1: Closed Zones c. 1988 (Source: demoscope.ru) 
 
 The closed zones were but a tip of the iceberg in regards to attempts to regulate 
foreigners’ movements and social interactions across the Soviet territory. Most 
fundamentally, (again, just like Soviet citizens), even within open zones, foreigners 
enjoyed freedom of movement only within strictly delineated boundaries. As late as 
1959, travelers were still encumbered by Stalin-era regulations stipulating that foreigners 
could travel between large cities only with a costly Intourist escort,720 and de-facto 
banned the practice of photography by foreigners (foreigners were not allowed to take 
                                                          
720 On travel regulations, see “Dudorov to TsK KPSS, 1/5/1959,” GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 506, l. 16. On 
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negatives across Soviet borders, while the Soviet Union’s only shop able to develop 
Western-made film was unable to handle Kodak products).721 
While such strict regulations were gone by the early 1960s, travel into and across 
the Soviet Union remained a tightly regulated affair. Tourists were allowed only to travel 
to areas included on their Intourist itineraries.  Resident foreigners (journalists, diplomats, 
and exchange scholars) were forbidden to travel more than 40 kilometers from their place 
of residence without prior notification and permission from Soviet authorities.722An 
Intourist booklet from the 1970s cited by journalist Robert Kaiser reminded Anglophone 
travelers of the long list of don’ts maintained by Soviet authorities. Among other 
regulations, travelers were banned from taking pictures from the windows of airplanes, 
snapping photos of railroad stations and bridges, and importing “pornographic literature 
and pictures… negatives…records, cinema films, manuscripts  ... and other items harmful 
to the Soviet Union politically and economically” – a fluid enough definition to include 
anything Soviet authorities disdained.723 
Such formal restrictions probably paled in comparison to the efforts Soviet 
authorities took to de-facto isolate foreigners from Soviet society. As was the case with 
privileged groups of Soviet citizens, some of this isolation stemmed from the foreigners’ 
place on top of the Soviet hierarchy of consumption. Arrangements like the exclusion of 
                                                          
721 “S. Borisov [Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Trade] to Sovmin SSSR, 22/8/1957,” GARF f. 9612, 
op. 2, d. 239, l. 155. 
722 Richmond, Cultural Exchange and Cold War, 26-27. 
723 Kaiser, Russia, 10. 
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anything but the top Soviet hotels and restaurants from the list of facilities catering to 
foreigners, separate housing for foreigners resident in large cities, Intourist’s service 
bureaus charged with helping tourists navigate Soviet bureaucracy and deficits (for 
instance by providing them with theatre tickets and thus obviating the need to stand in 
lines with Soviet theater goers),724 foreign currency stores, separate facilities for 
foreigners in airports and train stations were surely intended to make the Soviet 
experience as pleasant as possible. However, they also served the important secondary 
purpose of keeping foreigners (in theory at least) in well-controlled spaces.  
 Other aspects of informal mobility controls Soviet authorities imposed on 
foreigners were not nearly as benign. Maps, charts, and telephone directories, due to both 
secrecy considerations (as travelers and Sovietologists surmised)725 and paper deficits and 
sloppy publishers (as Intourist officials complained)726 disorientated and confused 
generations of travelers. Other barriers were physical. For instance, apartment buildings 
housing resident foreigners were surrounded by walls and “defended” by militia block 
posts, widely assumed to be manned by KGB agents, as were Western embassies.727 Still 
more importantly, a plethora of regulations and informal norms governed foreigners’ 
access to Soviet people in whom they were interested. Tourists, for instance, were only 
allowed proffesional contacts with specific Soviet citizens only by arrangement with 
                                                          
724 On the biuro obsluzhivaniia, see Salmon, “Land of Future”, 167-168.  
725 See, for instance, Raymond Hutchings, Soviet Secrecy and non-Secrecy (Totowa, NJL: Barnes and 
Noble, 1988), 24-27.  
726 See, for instance, “Otchet or rabote Otdela reklamy i pechati Upravleniia informatsii, 21/3/1971), GARF 
f. 9612, op.3. d. 512, l. 225. 
727 Smith, The Russians, 12.  
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Intourist (which, many of them felt, mostly sought to forestall such meetings).728 
Especially after the vigilance campaign of the early 1960s, Soviet scholars and officials 
who wished to meet foreigners could do so only after receiving security and secrecy 
briefings (and could land in hot water for unsanctioned meetings).729 On a smaller scale, 
generations of foreign scholars in the Soviet Union had to battle Soviet archivists and 
librarians, pressured by the KGB to exhibit proper levels of suspicion of these “spies in 
the archives.”730 
 While regulations and mobility controls could slow down the formation of illicit 
links between foreigners and Soviet people, surveillance could provide an even more 
valuable asset: the identities of both subversive foreigners and the Soviet people who 
came into contact with them. And indeed, as a number of scholars have recently 
demonstrated, the opening of the Soviet Union to the world was (not coincidentally) 
concomitant to a profound transformation in the Soviet practice of surveillance.731 As we 
have seen in chapter 3, after a short resurgence of surveillance as a social mobilization 
                                                          
728 “Spravka o poseshchenii inostrannymi turistami…v 1959 godu,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, d. 286, ll. 142-
151. 
729  The tendency of scholars and Soviet officials to conduct unofficial meetings with foreigners was a 
major theme, of the 1961 “vigilance” resolution of the Central Committee. (TsK KPSS o povyshenii 
revoliutsonnoi bditelnosti …2/6/1960,” RGANI, f. 3, op. 22, d.103, ll. 85-88). For the continued drive to 
eliminate such meetings, see correspondence between the KGB and the Central Committee Science Sector 
about an unsanctioned meeting between an American scholar and a Professor at the Higher Party School, 
(RGANI, f. 5, op. 60, d. 45, ll. 44-45 [May 1968).  
730 Fitzpatrick, Spy in the Archives, is the indispensable guide for the struggle between archivists and 
scholars. See also Samuel H. Baron and Kathy A. Frierson, Adventures in Russian Historical Research: 
Reminiscences of American Scholars from the Cold War to the Present (Armonk, NY: M.E Sharpe, 2003). 
For a glimpse of the pressure put on Soviet archivists from the KGB see “Ob ispolzovanii spetsluzhbami 
SShA kanala nauchnogo obmena po linii Ireksa, 29/4/1978,” DGA SPU, f. 16, op. 7, spr. 34, ark. 147-152. 
731 See Weiner, Aigi Rahhi-Tamm, “Getting to Know You,” and Harrison, One Day, ch. 5.  
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device, it was not used to forge a socialist body politic, nor did it serve to generate targets 
for repression. Instead, surveillance became a form of social epidemiology, aiming to 
penetrate every nook and cranny of Soviet society, in order to identify and disrupt 
“diseased cells” before they spread further - and if possible, to make the formation of 
such cells impossible. This refined method of surveillance was the perfect tool for 
battling the spread of foreign-introduced ideological infection.  
 Perhaps the best way to assess the operational assumptions that overlay 
surveillance of foreigners is to begin examining it via a somewhat indirect means, by 
looking at how the KGB solved an obvious problem: given the ever-growing volume of 
interactions between Soviet people and foreigners, how to tell which contacts were 
innocent and which an indication of dangerous intentions? The answer seemed to be as 
simple as it was telling: contacts with foreigners were ipso-facto seen as positive 
indication of danger. In short, the KGB collected all the information about transnational 
contacts it could, and sorted it later. Thus, a 1961 report from Vilnius, issued about a year 
after the city was opened to foreign traffic, indicated that over 2,300 residents (about 1% 
of the total population of the city)732 came into the KGB’s purview due to encounters 
with foreigners. Of this number, 110 were put under close surveillance, several others 
were undergoing a thorough examination (pod proverkoi), while the vast majority of 
cases were deemed innocuous- and yet were maintained in the KGB’s card catalog of 
                                                          
732 According to the Soviet census of 1959, the population of Vilnius numberd 236,100 people (Timothy 
Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999 (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2003), 92.) 
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possible suspects.733 Inclusion in such card catalogs could have life-long implications, 
even when such contacts were fleeting indeed. A Jewish Leningrader, for instance, 
recounted to an American journalist that after he applied to immigrate to Israel, he was 
invited to a meeting where he was questioned about an encounter he had had in a 
bookstore with a Frenchman a decade earlier.734 If such stories could be discounted as 
sour grapes or exaggeration to impress symphatetic foreigners, they fully mesh with 
Bobkov’s account of a case in which a Donetsk resident was deemed perpetually suspect 
(and thus denied promotions and travel abroad) after spending thirty minutes sharing a 
park bench with a Canadian tourist – one of the few criticisms of the KGB culture of 
suspicion Bobkov makes in his memoirs.735 
 Despite such retroactive misgivings about over-reach, it seems that during Soviet 
times, the KGB had few qualms about the scope of its surveillance operations. The best, 
if tantalizing, indication of the vast ambitions of its counter-intelligence empire is a copy 
of an instruction sent from Moscow to the Lithuanian KGB (and to all other republican 
organizations) on July 4, 1973. The instruction describes a soon-to-be-activated computer 
program, code-named FORT-67, aimed at “gathering, processing, and distributing 
information about contacts of foreigners from capitalist and developing countries with 
                                                          
733 “O sostoianii raboty po proverke lits imevshikh podozritelnye sviazi s inostransami, 1/9/1961), LYA, f. 
K-1, ap. 1, b. 299, ll. 57-58. 
734 Kaiser, Russia, 13. 
735 KGB I vlast’, 234.  
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citizens of the Soviet Union.”736 Based on the description provided in the document, the 
purpose of this project was to convert local index-card holdings into digital forms and 
allow easier cross-checking and cross-referencing across regional and republican lines. In 
theory, at least, this document describes a vast grid aimed to make any and all social 
interactions between foreigners and Soviet people visible to proper authorities. 
 Whether they were digitized or remained in paper format, to function properly, 
these databases needed a constant stream of input that could be generated only as long 
foreigners were closely observed. Figures on the extent of the resources devoted to this 
task are not easy to find, but scattered impressions from Lithuanian and Ukrainian 
archives give a good image of the scale of the KGB’s surveillance effort. For example, in 
the early 1970s during the summer season, the border crossing in the Ukrainian town of 
Chop, on the Slovak-Hungarian-Ukrainian border triangle, saw about 600 tourists from 
the West arriving daily. These were “served” by a staff of over 200 KGB officers, agents, 
and “trustees” [doverennye litsa].737 From Chop, foreigners advanced in train cars 
intensely surveilled by the KGB agents under guise of train conductors and passengers, as 
well as wiretaps, with suspicious foreigners (and Soviet people who interacted with 
foreigners) tagged for further surveillance.738 In the rural parts of the Donetsk oblast’, a 
                                                          
736 “Prikaz predsedatelia Komiteta Gosudarsvennoi Bezopasnosti pri Komitete Ministrov SSSR: o vvode v 
deistvie v kontrrazvedyvatelnkykh operatsii Komiteta gosbezasnosti informatsionnoi sistemy Fort-67, 
4/7/1973,” YLA, K-1, ap. 46, b. 118 ll. 72-79. 
737 In the KGB parlance, officers were full-time operatives. Agents were civilians bound by an agreement 
with the KGB (and often paid for their services) and trustees were people who occasionally delivered 
information or conducted operational tasks voluntarily. 
738 “Zonalnoe soveshchanie,” DGA SBU, d. 28, t. 1, ark. 191.  
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local officer complained, agents and officers assigned to surveil the few foreigners 
arriving to the area actually outnumbered the latter.739 The Crimean port city of Yalta 
experienced a large seasonal migration of KGB officers and agents who  received highly 
desired hotel rooms in exchange for helping the local KGB department with surveillance 
of foreigners and their contacts during the summer tourist season. 740 To the north, in 
Lithuania, in the key strategic port city of Klaipeda, the local port and other facilities 
visited by foreigners were honeycombed by surveillance: KGB agents tracked foreign 
sailors on the streets and in port facilities, set up multiple safe houses and wiretapping 
posts across town, worked to recruit Western crew members as agents to keep an eye on 
prospective spies and saboteurs, and recruited hundreds of locals as agents  tracking 
“unhealthy elements” (nationalists, people with relatives in the West, Zionists, and so 
forth) who came in contact with them.741   
 Institutions dealing with foreigners exhibited similar levels of penetration by state 
security agents. For instance, UPDK [Upravlenie po oblsuzhivaniiu diplomaticheskogo 
korpusa], the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ department that handled the needs of 
foreign diplomats and other resident foreigners in Moscow, was widely assumed by its 
“clientele” to be a cover for intelligence operations, no doubt for very good reasons,742 
                                                          
739 Ibid, ark. 114. 
740 “Stenogramma soveshchaniia rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov organov KGB Ukrainskoi SSSR, 24-
26/2/1971,” DGA SBU, f. 16, op.8, spr. 1, ark. 75-76. 
741 See, for example, “Spravka o rasstanovke i zagruzke operatvnoi rabotoi sostava apparata UKGB pri SM 
SSSR in na Litovskom morskom basseine, 15/6//1963.” YAL, F. K-18, ap.1, b.352, ll. 186-197. 
742  See, for example, Daniloff, Of Spies and Spokesman, 64-66, Also see an account of a British embassy 
driver, pressured into service as KGB agent: “Ex-Soviet Agent Vows to Fight Lubianka ‘Cancer’,” The 
Independent, 10/13/1991.  
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while international departments of Soviet universities, handling exchange scholars from 
the West and students from the developing world, were heavily staffed with officers from 
the “active reserve” of the KGB (officers serving in and drawing their salary from a 
different Soviet institution while still maintaining their KGB rank and benefits, a practice 
that lasted well into the 1990s).743  
  Intourist, the Soviet institution that interacted with by far the largest number of 
foreigners, naturally stood at the epicenter of this surveillance effort. From top to bottom, 
involvement with the peculiar social ecology that sprouted in its facilities meant some 
entanglement with official mechanisms of surveillance. At the very bottom of the 
Intourist universe, both contemporary observers and post-Soviet accounts widely 
presumed that in order to ply their trade, foreign currency prostitutes and black 
marketeers had to provide information on their business partners to the KGB.744 The 
                                                          
743 Albats, Minna zamedlennogo deistvia, 50. As a number of observers note, Vladimir Putin’s first post-
Soviet assignment after he left the KGB was as the Leningrad State University assistant chancellor for 
foreign affairs, a classic position for an officer in the “active reserve.”(See, for example, Gessen, Man 
without a Face, 92-93).  
744 For examples of varying luridity, see: Popovskii, Tretii lishnii, 323-331, Anderson, Undeground, 
loc.370 ff., “Riadovye seksa,”Novyi vzgliad 105(1993) [accessed online, at: 
http://www.newlookmedia.ru/IDNV/Novyj_Vzglad/Stranic/Novyj_vzglad_1993.html#5, on 5/1/2016), 
Vasil’ev, Sostoianiia, 83-85.  Other, usually more reliable authors, correct this image, arguing that the KGB 
was not involved with hard currency prostitutes, preferring to set up “honey traps” using better trained and 
educated agents. Shraiman, “Vladimir Kunin,” Oleg Kalugin, Spymaster: My 32 Years in Intelligence and 
Espionage against the West (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 257-258.  As I show below the general topic 
of sex and Soviet espionage is shrouded in much mystery, and the current state of our archival knowledge 
does not allow us to say much about it. Yet, interestingly, one of the few available documents that touch on 
the topic is a 1962 memorandum from Klaipeda, detailing work with a female agent code-named Neris, 
working in a facility serving foreign sailors, specifying the efforts her handlers took so that she won’t allow 
foreigners to take “freedoms” with her and she would make clear to her contacts that “she is a morally 
upstanding girl, thinks about her future, and wants to create a family and live honestly.” In this instance at 
least, the KGB took its educational functions seriously. “Spravka na agenta Neris, 22/1/1962,” LYA, K-1, 
ap. 10, b. 311, ll. 17-18ar. 
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same was true of many other Intourist employees.  For instance, the son of a dissident 
who returned from exile in the early 1970s and was assigned to live in a communal 
apartment in Kaluga recalls that he and his father were especially wary of a neighboring 
couple, as both were employed in the local Intourist motels and thus, they surmised, 
“were surely KGB, like all waiters in hard currency hotels.”745  
For other people employed at or by Intourist, surveillance was part of the job description.  
Doormen in Intourist hotels (many of whom were former or reserve KGB officers),746 
charged with barring a-social elements from entering hotels, and the renowned 
dezhurnye, “the elderly ladies who were positioned on every hotel floor to monitor the 
comings and goings of guests,”747 were key to facilitating control over foreigners. In 
hotel lobbies, officers of the KGB’s Seventh Department were in constant 
communication with their “volunteer collaborators” and stood ready to take up visual 
surveillance of suspicious foreigners (and their Soviet contacts) pointed out by the 
latter.748 Other officers manned surveillance stations to which audio (and, later, video)749 
signals from rooms housing suspect foreigners were broadcast. In Tallinn’s hotel Viru, 
for instance, about on in five rooms was bugged.750 Similarly, in restaurants receiving 
                                                          
745 Paola Messana, Soviet Commmunal Living: an Oral History of the Kommunalka (London and New 
York: Palgrave, 2009), 101. 
746 Albats, Minna, 57. 
747 Amy Knight, “The Two Worlds of Vladimir Putin,” Wilson Quarterly, 24 (no.2), 32.  
748 “Spravka o sostoianii i merakh ulucheniia sluzhby naruzhnogo nabliudeniia v kontr-razvedyvatelnoi 
deiatelnosti KGB pri Sovete Ministrov Lit. SSSR, 17/3/1974,” LYA, f. K-1, ap. 10, b. 786, l. 52. 
749 Aleksandr Nezdolia, KGB: rassekrechennye vospominaniia (Donetsk: Kahstan, 2008), 103. 
750 Personal communication during a visit to Viru’s 23rd floor “KGB Museum,” May 15, 2014. On the 
museum, see “Pay no Attention to the Spy on the 23rd floor,” The Smithsonian.com, 8/4/2013, accessed 
online at http://www.smithsonianmag.com/ist/?next=/history/pay-no-attention-to-the-spies-on-the-23rd-
floor-17885145/, on 30/10/2015. 
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foreigners, the latter were shunted to tables containing hidden microphones.751  This 
activity was coordinated by “active reserve” KGB officers embedded in Intourist hotels 
and departments. The responsibilities of these officers included “the study of foreign tour 
firms and their representatives in order to locate persons of operational interest752… 
Locating potentially suspicious foreigners  ... [and] controlling foreign compliance with 
travel regulation… Heightening the political vigilance of Intourist workers, discovering 
their informal contacts with foreigners… [and] improving the KGB’s agent apparatus [i.e 
recruiting more agents] among Intourist staff.” In theory at least, these officers served as 
the central processing node of a powerful surveillance matrix that touched any and  all 
Soviet  people who were involded with Intourist.753  
 Given their central role in accommodating foreign visitors, Intourist guides were 
surely the most essential component of this surveillance matrix. And indeed, for any 
Intourist guide, interactions with “men from the sixth floor,”754- security briefings, 
background checks, inspections of morals and good behavior, and political education 
                                                          
751 Victor Sheymov, Tower of Secrets: a Real Life Spy Thriller (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
1993), 177-179.  Sheymov was a senior officers in the Eighth Directorate (signals security), was recruited 
by the CIA and was smuggled out of the Soviet Union in a major CIA operation. (David Hoffman, The 
Billion Dollar Spy: a True Story of Cold War Espionage and Betrayal (New York: Double Day, 2015),126-
128.  
752 I.e, either people connected to émigré organizations and foreign secret services, or potential recruits to 
the KGB. In Lithuania at least, the interest the KGB exhibited in tour firms and their representatives 
compliments the historical accuracy exhibited by the writers and producers of FX’s The Americans. 
753 “Spravka o rabote ofitsera deistuveshchego rezerva KGB LSSR, raboatiushchego pod priktryiem v 
otdelenii VAO Inturist za 1979 god,” LYA, f. k-41, ap. 1, b. 758, l. 82. 
754 Kenderovskaia, “Moia zhizn’ v Inturiste. Shestoi etazh,” accessed online at: 
http://kraeved1147.ru/intourist-2, on 5/2/2016.According to her, this was the colloquial term for KGB 
agents among Intourist staff- supposedly because the KGB office in Moscow’s Metropol hotel was located 
there. 
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talks – were an inevitable price of employment.755 Furthermore, recollections of former 
Intourist guides almost universally contain tales of KGB recruitment as a necessary rite 
of passage.756  While, judging by the evidence of said recollections, as well as scattered 
available figures,757 one could easily avoid recruitment as agent, none could escape the 
duty of generating information for the KGB’s surveillance mechanisms. Specifically, an 
Intourist guide recruited as an agent had to commit to reporting on colleagues behaving 
suspiciously758and to seek out contacts with foreigners “of interest.”759 Other Intourist 
guides might have avoided such unpleasant tasks but had to make a daily trip to the “sixth 
floor” to fill out a report on the activities of their charges, their possible contacts with 
unsavory elements, possible provocations, and responses to Soviet life. These reports, 
filed in a special notebook accessible only to embedded KGB officers,760 were then 
collated, processed, and and moved up the ladder to officers of the Second Chief 
                                                          
755 See ibid for the content of these security briefings, and “Stenogramma … 17/1/1969,” GARF, f. 9612, 
op.2, d. 286, ll. 159-165, for an example of a security talk focusing heavily on the morals of Intourist’s 
guides. 
756 For such accounts, see Lyudmila Noble, Just Touching the Memory (New York:X-Libris, 2013) [e-
book], Russel L. Volkema, Elena Turner, A Russian Intourist Guide Visits the USA (New York: Vintage, 
1996) 6-9, Dora Anchipolskaia Memuary odinokoi zhenshchiny (Jerusalem: Mishmeret shalom, 1998),100-
101,  Oleg Khlebnikov, “Shpion, nakhodka dlia shpiona,” Luch 1(1992), 52-56. 
757 In 1979, the entire staff of the KGB office in Vilnius contained 19 agents and 35 trustees. Given that 
Vilnius saw relatively large numbers of foreigners and, as we had seen above, many of them were members 
of hotel staff, this implies the large majority of Intourist guides were not among their ranks.  
758 Khlebnikov, “Shpion,”54. 
759.For example, “Agenturnoe soobshchenie. Psevdonim agenta: Maria, 24/7/1987,” YLA f. K-35, ap. 2, 
b.333, ll.217-221. In this case, agent Mariia was a female guide, assigned to escort a tourist group one 
which members, a Chicago businessman, was an “object of operational interest.” Said businessman was 
“openly interested in our source, paid her heightened attention, and aspired to be near her at all times.”  
760 Kenderovskaia, “Shestoi etazh.” 
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Directorate, where they were scoured for behavioral irregularities and suspicious 
activities – and, one presumes, served as foundations of myriad personal files.761 
 As was the case with the policing of Soviet society in the post-Stalin era, this 
massive surveillance project operated like a giant funnel, gathering information on any 
and all foreigners crossing Soviet soil, in order to identify a narrow band of targets that 
could then be deterred, punished or “turned” with minimal disruptions to “channels of 
tourism and international exchange.” In simpler terms, while information was gathered 
on all foreigners, some selection criteria had to be applied to pick foreigners “eligible” 
for profilaktika and active measures.  In addition to resident foreigners (mostly diplomats 
and journalists) these groups included, according to the KGB’s official textbook: 
               Officers of military, political and propaganda institutions... scientists seeking access to 
institutions.. where the enemy could receive information that interests him, people seeking 
informal relationships with Soviet officials, representatives of the ‘Civil Exchange Corps’762 and 
‘Peace Corps,’ employees of ‘research institutes’ of politics, economics, sociology and various 
‘Russia experts,’ members of reactionary student organizations and Zionist elements, tourists 
interested in specific areas and population groups, people who know Russian and hide it, and 
people on return trips to the Soviet Union.763   
This was, moreover, only a partial list, as even eccentricity could suffice to make one a 
suspect: according to an officer of the Seventh directorate, one American tourist in 
                                                          
761 Oleg Nechiporenko, KGB i zagadka smerti Kennedy (Moscow: Algoritm, 2013), 28. Despite this book’s 
somewhat sensationalist title, the information provided by the author, a KGB colonel, confirms my 
impression of Intourist practices. 
 
 
763 Istoriia, 364-365. 
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Moscow became a subject of intense surveillance, as his habit of taking long daily walks 
seemed like a potential agent-running operation.764 
 What did profilaktika and “active measures” mean when applied to foreigners? 
For once, for many, the knowledge that they were surveilled surely served exactly the 
prophylactic purposes the KGB intended. With more obdurate souls, the KGB again used 
tactics clearly borrowed from its domestic toolkit. The most basic and probably most 
common disciplinary action taken by the KGB was a “friendly warning” issued to 
misbehaving foreigners at Intourist offices or militia stations under KGB tutelage.765 In 
tune with its growing tendency to maintain legal fictions, often when encountering 
troublesome foreigners, the KGB documented their behavior by taking in “complaints” 
from Soviet citizens that could be used as a foundation for deportation and barring them 
from further entry to the Soviet Union.766 Foreigners who especially aggrieved Soviet 
authorities (most often journalists and exchange scholars) often underwent public 
humiliation: publications in the Soviet media charging them with everything from 
collaboration with the CIA to distributing pornography.767 
                                                          
764 Grig, Ia tam rabotal, 53. 
765 “Spravka o sostoianii profilakticheskoi raboty 1 Otdela 2 Upravleniia KGB pri SM LSSR, 25/10/1974,” 
LYA F.  K-41, ap. 1, b. 786, l. 150. 
766 See, for example, “IS 24/7/1972”, DGA SBU, f. 16, op. 3, spr. 10, ark. 17-18. 
767 See for an example, V. Andreev, Nauchnyi obmen i ideologicheskaia diversiia (Lenigrad: Lenizdat, 
1970), 20-29, for an attack on American historian Edward Keenan, charged with, among other things, not 
working hard enough in the archives, spending his time in “markets and synagogues,” glorifying the 
Western way of life, faking a boat ticket to visit a monastery on a White Sea island to which foreigners 
were banned from entry, and, inevitably, CIA connections.  For another example, see “Mnogostradaiuschii 
Khutter,” Izvestiia 15/11/1978 – an assault on an Austrian journalist with close dissident links,  charged 
with, among other things, beating up his sister in-law, keeping stolen property, buying up icons, and 
distributing magazines “known for their pornographic content.” 
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 At times, Soviet authorities strayed from such psychological measures into the 
realm of direct action. For instance, an Italian journalist in Vilnius, under suspicion 
because of her meetings with staff members at the Italian embassy, “slander of Soviet 
reality,” and taking photos of “negative aspects” of Soviet life, was the subject of an 
elaborate operation. During her first visit to Vilnius, she was introduced to an agent 
(“Neman”), who became friendly with her. On her second visit, alongside an Italian 
diplomat “fond of women and drink,” Neman invited the two to a dinner in the company 
of a local actress. As the Italians ate and drank, the KGB surrounded both the hotel and 
restaurant with a surveillance squad to make sure they were not disturbed, entered her 
room with a portable x-ray machine, and destroyed hundreds of negatives she kept 
there.768 Perhaps employing similar methods, KGB agents in Moscow entered the hotel 
rooms of foreigners keeping pornographic literature and confiscated it.769 Less subtly, 
suspect foreigners often faced “resistance [otpor] from of “operative groups” made of 
Komsomol aktiv members, agents and trustees” –everything from provocative questions 
meant to stop them from interacting with Soviet people, to harassment and open 
violence.770 Journalists, especially in the years of the “Andropov interlude,” were 
especially likely to experience what British reporter Robin Knight described as “pitfalls 
                                                          
768 “Spravka, 27/9/1960,” LYA F. K-41, ap. 1, b.275, ll. 25-29. 
769 Andropov to TsK KPSS, “Rapport du K.G.B. sur la diffusion d'ouvrages pornographiques par 
des étrangers, 2/2/1970,” cited in Nicholas Werth (ed.) Rapports secrets soviétiques. La société russe dans 
les documents confidentiels, 1921-1991 (Paris: Gallimard, 1997), 441. No record remains of what KGB 
operatives did with this particular form of contraband. 
770 “Spravka o rabote 2 otdela 2 upravleniia pri SM LSSSR v svete trebovanii Predsedatelia KGB pri SM 
SSSR tov. Andropova Iu. V, dannykh na maiskom (1975 g.) soveshchanii rukovodiashchikh rabotnikiov 
organov i voisk KGB,” LYA, f. k-41, p.1, b. 731, l. 173. On harassment of Western diplomats, see 
Williams, Hot Seat, passim, and Barron, KGB, 121-122.  
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of the Soviet kind”- assaults ranging from defamation in the Soviet press, through violent 
provocations, and up to charges of espionage (which however invariably led to 
deportation, not imprisonment).771  
 Finally, the presence of foreigners on Soviet soil represented not only danger but 
opportunity for Soviet secret services. Here, the KGB took a decidedly carrot and stick 
approach. On the one hand, even in the cynical late Soviet period, attempts to show 
foreigners the benefits of the Soviet way of life were not abandoned- and not left to 
Intourist and Sputnik only, either. In Lithuania, for instance, participants in language 
classes for North American heritage students lived inside a veritable bubble.  The KGB 
helped filter out unwanted candidates for the classes, helped the rectorate “plan the 
leisure time of the foreign students to avoid contacts with undesirable people,” cleared 
teachers assigned to the class and Soviet students sharing their dorms, made plans with 
the Polish secret services to infiltrate the group with the latter’s “ethnic” agents, 
wiretapped a significant proportion of the rooms students stayed in, made contacts with 
relatives of incoming students to “make use of them for our benefit,” designed a plan for 
KGB agents from among “youth and creative intelligentsia of the Lithuanian Republic” 
to slake their thirst for intellectual contacts – all in order to “exert positive ideological 
                                                          
771 “Pitfalls of the Soviet Kind for Unwary Correspondent,” The Times, 02/09/1986.  See also Kevin Kruse, 
“Living by Moscow Rules: A Western Correspondent Learns Soon to be Suspicious of Everyone.” 
Washington Post, 9/8/1986. In perhaps the most famous incident of this sort, the New York Times reporter 
Christopher Wren was targeted by KGB goons and lost a tooth during the suppression of the 1977 Moscow 
“bulldozer exhibit,” Doucette, “Norman Dodge,” 148. In a more subtle incident, David Satter, an especially 
unruly reporter, recounts how in a train ride to meet Estonian nationalists, he got into conversation with 2 
attractive young women who plied him with drinks- and woke up several hours later, with his notebook and 
other documents missing (Personal Communication, August 2011, Palo Alto, California). 
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influence.”772 On a more personalized level, members of nationalist émigré organizations, 
including ones with a rich past as “emissaries” and book smugglers, were often given 
repeated access to the republic, with the hope that extensive wooing and manipulation of 
their disagreements with current tactics of their organizations would help divide émigré 
communities at worst, or even better, turn them into KGB “sources.”773  
 Turning foes into friends was not, of course, the only or most common method of 
turning visitors into assets. Agent recruitment was, in this regard, a far more cost-efficient 
proposition. Here, again, carrots were at times used: the Lithuanian and Ukrainian KGB 
both used tactics similar to the ones described above to entangle visiting “ethnic” 
scientists and engineers, the best way these moderately-sized republican organs could aid 
in the KGB’s crucial task of industrial espionage against the West.774 At other times, 
more aggressive approaches were taken. Many visitors, were, for example, targeted by 
alleged dissidents who asked for help or fartsovshchiki offering to exchange dollars to 
rubles – a quick and easy way to get a foreigner in some trouble that could be used as 
leverage against them in a recruitment attempt.775  More subtle KGB operatives 
attempted to forge relationships with foreigners, hoping that fear of entanglement and 
                                                          
772 “Plan agenturno-operativnykh meropriatii po kontrrazvedyvatel’nemu obespecheniu gruppy inostrantsev 
litovskogo proikshozhdeniia, priezhaiushchikh na kursy litovskogo iazyka pri VGU, s 4/07 po 18/08/1977 
goda,” LYA f. k-35, ap.2, b.2999, ll. 118-122. 
773 “Plan agenturno-operaivnykh meropriatii na period prebyvaniia obekta DOR n. 1212  
‘Proferssora’ v LSSR. 23/8/1987,” LYA, f. k-35, ap. 2, b. 165, l. 78-82, “Spravka o provedennykh 
vstrechakh s ob’ektom operativnoi podborki, “Skulptor,” N/D [after July 15,1986], LYA k-35, ap. 2, b. 
316, l. 259-261. 
774 For Lithuania, see, for example, “Plan agenturno-operativnkyh meropriaitii na period prevyvaniia 
‘Znatoka’ v LSSSR, 3/10/1977,” LYA, f. K-35, op. 2, b. 129, ll. 187-188. 
775 See, for example, Amy Knight, “Two Worlds of Vladimir Putin,” 32-33.  
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exposure of their connections to the KGB could turn them into informants.776 Finally, and 
most famously, the KGB specialized in the use of “honey traps” – sexual entrapment of 
married or homosexual foreigners who were then blackmailed with scandal and exposure 
and enticed to work for the KGB.777 
  
 
 
 Glitches in the Matrix: Surveillance as Late Soviet Institution 
 
Round the clock surveillance, secret databases, break-ins and harassment, honey traps 
and provocations: in theory at least, travel to the Soviet Union had the potential of 
becoming an admixture of dystopian nightmare and a not particularly good spy movie. 
And, from the point of view of the KGB, to reach its goals of minimizing interactions 
between foreigners and Soviet people, maximizing the information it possessed on such 
interactions, and turning this information to the Soviet state’s favor, creating the 
                                                          
776 See, for example, Dourofff, Iz dnevnika, 65-69. Matthews, Mervusha, ch. 1,2.  
777 The most famous cases in this regard were the recruitment of the French ambassador to Moscow,  
Maurice Dejean (Barron, KGB, 170-192), and several decades later, a similar entrapment of Marine Guards 
in the American Moscow Embassy in the 1980s (Rodney Barker, Dancing with the Devil: Sex, Espionage  
and the U.S Marines. The Clayton Lonetree Story (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). On homosexual  
entrapment, see Terry Teachout, “A New Columnist with his own Secret,” Wall Street Journal, 4/26/2012. 
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perception or (even better) reality of total surveillance would have plausibly counted as a 
positive policy outcome.  
 To what extent was this outcome achieved? The isolation, surveillance, and 
harassment of foreigners formed a significant ingredient in Cold War era accounts of life 
in the Soviet Union. For instance, the Washington Post’s Anatole Shub, in his New Soviet 
Tragedy (1969), complained that “the foreigner in Moscow... lives in a state of permanent 
disability,” detailing life in fenced “ghettos,” the strain of every Soviet “local helper” 
being a KGB informant, bugs in hotels rooms, wiretaps and blackmail attempts.778 
Writers specializing in security services went even further. John Baron, the author of 
KGB: the Work of Soviet Secret Agents, the defector testimonials-based best-seller 
purporting to show the immense scope of the KGB, concluded that “a visitor 
unknowingly passes through the Soviet Union wrapped in an invisible KGB cocoon that 
effectively shields him from what the KGB does not want him to see or hear.”779 Less 
prominent but much more piquant, David Lewis’ Sexspionage mingled details about 
verifiable Soviet “honey trap” operations, and tales of the “secrets of sex schools,” where 
“tall, blonde and elegant” Soviet seductresses were taught to ensnare Westerners.780 
 If such fare could be considered a blatant attempt to capitalize on prurience and 
Cold War paranoia, there can be little doubt that surveillance left its imprint on the minds 
                                                          
778 Shub, The New Russian Tragedy, 27-31.  
779 Barron, KGB, 120. 
780 David Lewis, Sexspionage: the Exploitation of Sex by Soviet Intelligence (New York and London: 
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1976), 33. 
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of foreigners in the Soviet Union. The Soviet practice of naming and shaming scholars 
who aggravated them was rather efficient in breeding fear and anxiety.781 Soviet 
hounding of unruly journalists during the Andropov interlude created a deep rift in the 
Moscow reporter community between activist journalists who considered many of their 
colleagues subservient to the Soviets and others who viewed activists as provocateurs 
who broke the bounds of professional ethics.782 Even foreigners friendly to the Soviet 
Union were discomfited with the level of surveillance they encountered.783  Less friendly 
travelers also experienced strong levels of discomfort.  For instance, then senatorial aide 
Robert Kennedy refused to eat Soviet food or be “doctored by Communists” out of fear 
of poisoning during his 1955 Central Asian trip.784 The renowned child writer Kay 
Thompson, visiting Moscow in 1959, “got spooked” by the suspicion she was watched 
everywhere, spending much of her time in the hotel rooms looking for bugs “in the 
chandeliers  ... below the rugs... in cupboards.”785 The anxiety produced by Soviet 
surveillance did not disappear even 25 years later, when travel to the Soviet Union was a 
                                                          
781 On the psychological effects of such attacks, see Fitzpatrick, Spy in the Archives, 47. 
782 Nagorsky, Reluctant Farewell. 
783 The historian Ron Suny, for instance, reports he wished to ask his KGB shadows:  “I’m on your side; 
why are you following me?” Cited in Engerman, Know your Enemy, 175. See also Pereira, 
“Vpechatleniia,” 231-232.  
784 Robert Caro, The Years of Lindon Johnson. The Passage of Power (New York: Knopf, 2012), 235.  
785  Sam Irvin, Kay Thompson: from Funny Face to Eloise. A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
2010), 277-278. For similar example of dread among early cohorts of visitors See also “Protokol 
soveshchaniia…16-18/5/1957” GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, d. 237, l. 50, for an example of Soviet officials 
making fun of an American tourist for his “cowardice” and manic suspicion he was followed everywhere. 
Tellingly, they gained this knowledge from his (presumably pilfered) diary. 
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mundane affair, with travelers reporting paranoia, isolation, and fear as inevitable 
consequences of Soviet travel.786  
 And yet, such somber views of the Soviet Union were not universal or uniform.  
Just like Soviet wags, many Westerners perceived spy games as just that –and had little 
affection or respect for people who took them too seriously. Lewis’ Sexspionage was 
savaged in the New York Times as “a skimpy little book…telling patriots to look for Reds 
not underneath their bed, but inside it.”787  Polonsky and Taylor mercilessly spoofed 
travelers who, like Thompson, succumbed to wiretapping mania: “his type, on entering 
his hotel room, will spend the first ten minutes searching in tense silence for listening 
devices. To flatter such guests' egos, the hotel management has equipped rooms with a 
range of sinister and suspicious fittings… which very stupid people may knowledgeably 
identify as sophisticated surveillance equipment.”788 Despite her fright in Moscow, the 
bestseller Thompson produced after the visit, Eloise in Moscow, also recognized some of 
the hilarity of spy games.  The animated tale of the adventures of the titular six year old 
“rich girl” in her hotel and around it, turns surveillance into a game: Eloise bribes the 
dezhurnaia with a copy of Life magazine to get keys to other rooms, uses disguises to 
confound KGB officers, speaks absurdities on the phone to confuse her KGB audience, 
and then coyly reports to the American ambassador that she was “an absolutely darling 
                                                          
786 For example, Lisa Grekul, Leaving Shadows: Literature in English by Canada’s Ukrainians (Edmonton: 
University of Alberta Press), 203-205. 
787 “Sexpionage,” New York Times 8/29/1976. 
788 From an Original Design, 25. 
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Sweetnik.”789 Such playful attitudes were taken by at least some real-life travelers. One 
art professor, for instance, recalled the mixture of thrill and danger generated by dealings 
with informal artists, American collectors and the KGB: “It was a game. For me, it was 
dangerous living.”790 
 Which of the two visions of foreign experience in the Soviet Union rings truer? 
Without diminishing the psychological costs of Soviet surveillance so acutely felt by 
some travelers, the evidence is overwhelming that the Soviet Union was hardly a 
panopticon. On the most basic level, the mechanisms of evasion that defined so much of 
Soviet life were not unknown to foreigners. As early as the mid-1950s, for instance, 
foreign researchers easily bypassed Intourist restrictions regarding meetings with Soviet 
colleagues by simply calling them up directly.791 Despite regulations to the contrary, the 
economist Norman Dodge, in the Soviet Union on a tourist visa, researching a 
dissertation on women in the Soviet economy, discovered that he could “just take a cab to 
this and that Soviet institution” and obtain all the information he required.792 Just like 
Soviet citizens, foreigners felt that paradoxically, it was the ubiquity of Soviet laws and 
regulations that made them inconsequential- and if Soviet authorities tried to enforce 
them, hardly a foreigner would remain on Soviet soil. The exchange scholar Norman 
Pereira, for instance, lists the violations he committed as a matter of course without any 
consequences: 
                                                          
789 Kay Thompson, Kay Thompson’s Eloise in Moscow (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959).  
790 McPhee, Ransom of Russian Art, 91. 
791 “Spravka o poseshchenii,” GARF f. 9612, op.2, d. 268, ll. 142-143. 
792 McPhee, Ransom of Russian Art, 2. 
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crossing Red Square in a car-only zone... visiting the Chinese embassy…participation in 
religious propaganda (I visited the Moscow synagogue for Passover), meetings with 
‘speculators and criminal elements’ (book and art sellers), secret meetings with unhealthy 
elements (acquaintances who didn’t want to invite a foreigner home and met.. in a subway 
station), violating travel restrictions (how should have I known that Khimky was outside 
the allowed zone and had a military installation nearby?), and spreading “false 
rumors”…(as I was expressing my own opinions).793 
 
 
Resource constraints and the structures of the Soviet economy represented another grain 
of sand in the wheels of the Soviet surveillance machine. For once, as we’ve already 
seen, such constraints made it impossible to keep Soviet people from Intourist hotels, or 
foreigners from non-Intourist hotels. In restaurants serving foreigners, 100-150 rubles 
slipped to the head waiter could get any “unhealthy element” a good table.794 While trains 
were, as we have seen, heavily policed by the KGB, Soviet authorities didn’t seem to 
have even tried to separate foreigners from Soviet citizens, and accounts of train car 
transnational bonhomie are an important ingredient of many a Soviet-era travelogue.795 
On board Soviet airplanes, seat deficits overrode concerns for keeping foreigners away 
from “secret-bearers.”796 Even in theaters, foreigners faced an onslaught of scalpers and 
desperate music-lovers that nullified the efforts of Intourist service bureaus.797 
 Furthermore, the KGB and other coercive agencies were not exempt from 
resource constraints and coordination problems. On the one hand, as the official KGB 
                                                          
793 Pereira, “Vpechatleniia,” 230-231. 
794 Panov, Fartsovshchiki, 43. 
795 See, for example, Shishin, Rossiya, Eric Newby, The Big Red Train Ride (New York, St. Martin’s, 
1978). Smith, Russians, 19-20. 
796 Ibid, 22. 
797 Geoffrey Bocca describes how when foreigners with spare tickets were assaulted by throngs of cultured 
Muscovites in front of theaters and concert halls “touring bachelors” who acquired two tickets at the 
Intourist service bureau would “offer spare tickets to the prettiest girl,” and thus acquire a date for the 
night, or more. (Moscow Scene, 20-21). 
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textbook conceded, the KGB gathered too much information and included too many 
people in its surveillance target lists.798 On the other hand, as a 1971 meeting of the 
Ukrainian KGB leading cadres revealed, it lacked resources to maintain the level of 
surveillance it found appropriate. Manpower for surveillance squads outside major cities 
was insufficient.799 The KGB could not raise sufficient numbers of agents with 
knowledge of relevant languages, and thus was forced to lower its recruitment 
standards.800 A KGB officer in charge of border oversight estimated that due to lack of 
manpower and backward technology, no more than 10% of printed materials smuggled 
by foreigners was apprehended.801 The latter problem especially was noted by enemies of 
Soviet power: one NTS official recalled that he had “eagles” drop clandestine methods of 
smuggling literature, because “border guards thoroughly checked only 1 in 15 people.”802 
In a similar spirit, Los-Angeles based literary agent Olga Andreeva-Carlyle, a key part of 
Solzhenitsyn’s “invisible” network, recalled that she sent one of her “couriers” to conduct 
negotiations and exchange materials with the author armed with an array of Bic pens to 
bribe customs officials, and made sure he would arrive “on the eve of the October 
Revolution celebrations. Everyone was drunk and the vigilance of customs and Intourist 
was blunted.”803  
                                                          
798 Istoriia, 562. 
799 “Stenogramma,” DGA SBU, f. 16, op. 8, spr. 1, ark. 15,  
800 Ibid, ark. 136. 
801 Ibid, ark.120-121. 
802 Adrei Vasil’ev, “Tretiiia grazhdanskaia,” in Senderov (ed.), Ot Zarubezhia, 277. 
803 “Solzhenitsyn. V kruge tainom,” Voprosy Literatury 4 (1991), 195-196. 
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 Most significantly, however, the KGB was a Soviet institution, functioning in a 
planned economy, where quality could count more than quantity. Republican KGB 
departments, bound by strictures of plans, conducted operations that one could safely 
surmise brought no benefit to Soviet security.  More than one traveler, for instance, 
reported that the Uzbek KGB conducted crude provocations aimed to get foreigners into 
brawls and then be either forced into signing documents testifying to their improprieties, 
or pressed to provide “secret” information (which they did not possess).804  In the city of 
Ulianovsk, one former Intourist guide recalled, local counter-intelligence officers, 
convinced that, just like in Soviet practice, tourist groups were accompanied by secret 
security minders, staged a provocation, arranging for one of the tourists to be seduced by 
a local girl, and hoping that the alleged minder will reveal himself when he realizes he 
“lost” a tourist.805 
 Intourist, yet again, represents a useful case study of the difficulties surveillance 
faced in the late Soviet era. KGB officers often complained that Intourist officials were 
too interested in “commercial” affairs and did not devote enough resources and attention 
to the “political” aspects of their organization’s work.806 Doormen and dezhurnye often 
were interested not so much in conducting intelligence work as in gathering “tribute” 
from various unwanted elements in exchange for access to foreigners.807 While 
                                                          
804 John Carl Falk, The Bokhara Incident (New York: Exposition Press, 1970), Dick Combs, Inside the 
Soviet Alternative Universe. The Cold War’s End and the Soviet Union’s Fall Reappraised (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008), 22-23. 
805 Khlebnikov, “Shpion”, 53.  
806  See for example, “Stenogramma zasedaniia Soveta po glavnomu Upravleniu po inostrannomu turizmu 
pri SM SSSR, 27/1974,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 837, l. 45. 
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undoubtedly, their assistance in surveilling suspect foreigners as part of the tribute they 
paid to the KGB in exchange for this graft opportunity, at times, even self-interest failed 
to motivate them: a 1965 inspection of the hotel Natsional revealed that the dezhurnye 
there  were more interested in knitting than in maintaining order.808  
 Guides were a still more significant element of weakness in the surveillance 
scheme. Especially in the late 1950s and 1960s, some of them seem to have taken their 
surveillance tasks seriously, with reports from that era full of minute details of foreign 
behavior and interactions with Soviet people.809As late as 1977, two senior guides sent to 
an inspection tour of the Kazakh Intourist wrote back complaining that the local KGB 
and military authorities let military officers mingle with tourists in a hotel bar in the 
remote town of Taraz (Jambyl). However, we already seen how, even during the 
ideologized Khrushchev years, Intourist guides often failed to meet the expectations set 
by the KGB and their superiors, whether politically, culturally, or sexually. In line with 
the general drift of Soviet culture, in later years, open dissent did become rare, but quiet 
disobedience seems to have become the norm. Perhaps wishing to avoid unnecessary 
headaches, some guides failed to report on tourists who left their groups, stayed outside 
Intourist hotels, or entered closed regions.810 Going further, some Intourist guides 
                                                          
808 “Spravka po proverke raboty i sostoiania obsluzhivaniia v gostinitse Natsional, 2/6/1965,” GARF, f. 
9612, op. 3, d. 49, l. 86. 
809 “Spravka…v 1959 godu,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, d. 268, ll. 143-147; “Spravka o prebyvanii v SSSR 
gruppy amerikanskikh turistov –studentov i prepodavatelei,” RGANI, f. 5, op. 55, d. 112, ll. 89-90; 
“Spravka o prebyvanii v SSSR 4-amerikanskikh turistov- slushatelei amerikanskoi voennoi akademii Vest-
Point,” RGANI, f. 5, op. 55, d. 121, ll. 99-101.  
810 “O sostoianii pasportnogoo-vizovogo rezhima na predpriatiakh Goskominturist i merakh po ustraneniiu 
vyiavlennykh nedostatkov, 6/3/1985,” GARF, f. 9612 op.3, d.1755, ll. 6-9. 
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protected their charges from KGB and vigilante attacks,811 helped tourists obtain 
permission to visit closed areas under false pretenses,812 or took pride in their charges 
thinking they were “the freest person they met in the Soviet Union.”813  
 Most importantly, however, at least according to post-Soviet recollections, 
when it came to compliance with KGB regulations, many guides took “formal” 
approaches. The Crimean guide Ivanova describes, for example, how compliance with 
regulations banning tips from foreigners were subverted: “when the minder approaches 
you, you give him some money from one pocket, but keep what’s in the other. If they ask 
whether you got tips, you say “yes” give him some, and keep the rest for yourself... [And] 
later, you could see them [the minders] sitting in hard currency bars, that’s for sure.”814 In 
a similar vein, Kenderovskaia recalls being terrified when being summoned to the “sixth 
floor” for the first time, but then discovered that the local embedded active reserve officer 
was “a tiny little white-haired grandpa, and you wanted to do something nice for him. 
Later we met the other chekists and they all looked old, slightly senile retired nice guys 
[dobriakami] who simply adored playing spies.” And accordingly, when time came to file 
her reports, “I had my stable of tourists making the pilgrimage from one report to the 
other. Their names were monsieur Tomate... monsieur Konkombr, and my favorite 
                                                          
811 “Otchet o komandirovke v Kazakhskuiu SSSR 16/6-10/7/1977,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 3, d. 1126, ll. 26-
27. 
812 Neil Kobrin, Emotional Well-Being: Embracing the Gift of Life (New York: Morgan James Publishing, 
2012), 82-83. The author, a Jewish-American psychotherapist, recounts how an Intourist guide helped him 
to concoct a story of being descended from “a servant of a famous Russian general” in order to obtain 
permission to visit his family’s Pale of Settlement town of origin in a “closed” region of Belarus. 
813 Shakurov, “S prikhodom Rossii.” 
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monsieur Pamplemousse. They all exhibited uniform enthusiasm for the socialist way of 
life and the Soviet foreign policy... due to the heroic efforts of their guide.”815 While such 
accounts are clearly self-serving and probably should not be taken literally, they do jibe 
with the memoirs of retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin, who found that cooperation 
between Intourist and the KGB yielded “little if anything in way of concrete results.”816 
 These weaknesses no doubt blunted the effectiveness of KGB operations on the 
margins. However, the most telling evidence about the gap between the analytic 
assumptions behind the Soviet surveillance effort and its actual performance may be 
gleamed in a more straightforward manner - by looking at facts and figures. Yearly 
reports by the KGB to the Politburo, available to researchers from the mid-1970s to the 
mid-1980s, provide a breakdown of the numbers of foreigners the KGB pinpointed as 
spies or expelled for political, administrative, or criminal offenses. In 1976, 114 
foreigners were deported from the Soviet Union and 11 foreigners were exposed as 
officers of foreign intelligence services.817 In 1978, the former number declined to 100 
and the number of “burned” intelligence officers declined to 2.818 In 1982, at the height of 
the Andropov interlude, the combined number for both categories was 75.819  
                                                          
815 “Shestoi etazh.” 
816 Kalugin, Spymaster, 347-348. 
817 “Zapiska n. 709- A/OV, predsedatelia KGB SSSR Iu.V Andropova   Generalnomu Sekretariu TsK 
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Given what we know about the extent of illicit activities foreigners conducted on 
Soviet soil and KGB knowledge of these activities, such numbers demand a better 
explanation than operational weaknesses or late Soviet malaise. Rather, while direct 
evidence on the considerations that led to this relative leniency is lacking, the vast 
discrepancy between threat assessment and coercive action leads one to conclude that 
policy choices were involved. 
Crucially, no matter how hard the KGB borrowed policing mechanisms from 
domestic practice and no matter their de-jure status, foreigners were de-facto imbued 
with privileges and immunities no Soviet citizen enjoyed. First and foremost among these 
was, of course, the right to exit the Soviet Union at will. To cite an easy example, while a 
commitment to work for the KGB was very much an enforceable contract for a Soviet 
citizen, Kalugin recalls that his review of dozens of cases involving victims of honey 
traps showed that “few if any could be persuaded to fulfill their promises once they were 
back in their native land.”820 Even in the USSR, the coercive capacity of the Soviet state 
was limited, in both in formal and informal ways. The most a foreigner could typically 
expect from entering a “closed” area was a short detention, followed by a fine and a 
prophylactic talk at Intourist or other relevant organization.821 While buildings housing 
foreigners were surrounded by militiamen and KGB operatives, Soviet people brave 
enough to pass these barriers had temporary immunity, a fact which, for instance, allowed 
                                                          
820 Kalugin, Spymaster, 257. 
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dissidents space and time to provide vital information that then was smuggled abroad by 
friendly journalists.822 In a less inspiring manner, fartsovshchiki and sex workers knew 
that leaving an Intourist hotel and walking to the nearest subway station alongside a 
foreigner meant immunity from assaults by police, hotel staff, or druzhinniki.823 
 The band of immunity enjoyed by foreigners on Soviet soil was especially evident 
when it came to the thorny issue of emissaries and “tourist-spies.” Here also, 
circumstantial evidence suggests that after the vigilance campaign of the early 1960s was 
rolled back, the Soviet state treaded very carefully.  
 The legal clash between the Soviet authorities and subversive foreigners began 
shortly after the Powers shoot down.  According to the authorized biography of General 
Dimitrii Boiarov, then head of Ukrainian counterintelligence, the U-2 incident was 
followed by a quick set-up of a defensive grid around military installations near roads 
frequented by “tourist-spies.”824 And indeed, these traps ensnared a number of victims.  
By October 1960 three Americans were charged with taking photos of secret activities or 
military installations and deported.825  The following year, Soviet policies hardened.  
American chemistry graduate student Marvin McKinnen was apprehended in Kiev while 
                                                          
822 Kruse, Closed Society, 17-25. 
823 Panov, Fartsovshchiki, 46-47. 
824 Kevorkov, General Boiarov, 6-7 
825 “East-West Issue: Espionage,” Stanford Daily 11/23/1960. The three Americans arrested in 1960 were 
Irvin T. McDonald, an air attaché in the American Embassy in Moscow who was apprehended during a 
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spying on Soviet military facilities in a Beetle purchased for him by American military 
intelligence and was sentenced to 8 years in prison camps. He was shortly followed by 
six West European tourists, imprisoned to terms of 7-13 years.826 
 While this harsh strategy was rather successful in signaling to Americans that 
the Soviet Union would not tolerate espionage under guise of tourism, imprisoning 
foreigners carried significant downsides. This became clear as early as November 1963, 
when Yale political scientist Frederick Barghoorn was arrested on espionage charges in 
Moscow- an arrest meant to facilitate an exchange of a Soviet agent recently arrested by 
the KGB.827 Barghoorn’s detention, however, triggered massive negative coverage 
abroad, and a direct threat from President Kennedy (who, KGB chief Semichastnyi 
surmised, was a personal friend of Barghoorn)828 to cut off bilateral negotiations.829 
Barghoorn was quickly released, with the whole issue laconically regarded as an “error” 
at a Politburo meeting.830 
                                                          
826 For McKinnen’s case see Borman, “A Chemistry Spy Story,” According to the official KGB history, 
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from the border to Kiev, with video surveillance in his hotel rooms showing he put used films in a hidden 
compartment in his suitcase.  During a stop at camping site, he was approached by an officer disguised as 
tourist, who befriended him, and used the opportunity to search his car, finding a notebook registering his 
observations of Soviet military installations and columns he encountered. In Kiev, another operative helped 
him to find the street where a military installation was found, where he was arrested by a security team 
laying in wait. (Istoriia, 566.)  On other cases, see Peebles, Twilight Warriors, 156-158. For more details 
on the German and Dutch nationals arrested in 1961, see German Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Speaker of 
the Bundestag, 12/20/1961, [in response to a parliamentary inquiry by the SPD faction], accessed online, at: 
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/04/001/0400106.pdf,  
827 This theory of Barghoorn arrest, suspected by him and the CIA (Barron, KGB, 63-65 and Engerman, 
Know Your Enemy, 243), was confirmed by then KGB chief Semichastnyi, (Serdtse, 181-182). 
828 Ibid, 181. 
829 “President Kennedy’s News Conference, 11/14/1963.” Accessed online at: 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/Press-Conferences/News-Conference-
64.aspx on 5/4/2016. 
830 Cited at Engerman, Know your Enemy, 243. 
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 Whether due to such negative consequences or to other factors, cases in which 
Soviet authorities arrested foreigners after Khrushchev’s ouster tended to follow similar 
patterns. All imprisoned “tourist-spies” were released by the late 1960s.831 As British 
historian Roger H. Platt shows, the last case of a tourist charged with espionage, the NTS 
emissary Gerald Brooke, went to trial in 1965 due to British authorities’ refusal to 
exchange him for a British couple caught spying for the Soviet Union.832 Two years later, 
another NTS emissary, the Russian-Venezuelan student Nikolai Broks-Sokolov, was 
indicted for a lesser charge: anti-Soviet propaganda, confessed to his “crime,” 
condemned to a six-month suspended sentence, and deported from the Soviet Union.833 
For the next decade and a half, similar patterns were exhibited in the cases of other 
emissaries, usually released before trial in exchange for televised confessions (as was the 
case with Yaroslav Dobosh, the main protagonist of the “Block” drama),834or as a display 
of Soviet leniency.835 The only foreigner to be put on trial and convicted under Article 70 
after the 1960s, the Belgian student Antoon Pype, caught distributing NTS leaflets on the 
campus of LGU in an attempt to test Soviet commitment to the human rights basket of 
                                                          
831 Pebbles, Twilight Warriors, 78. 
832 “The Soviet Imprisonment of Gerald Brooke and Subsequent Exchange for the Krogers, 1965–1969,” 
Contemporary British History 29, no. 2 (2010), 193-212. 
833 Kozlov (ed.), Nadzornye proizvodstva, 688-689. 
834 Spetsialnoe soobshchenie, 7/6/1972” DGA SBU, f. 16, op. 8, spr. 3, ark. 26-32. Two months later, 
proper reactions to Dobosh’s confession and condemnation of Ukrainian nationalism already featured as a 
test question in profilaktika conversations. “IS, 2/8/1972,” DGA SBU f. 16, op. 3, spr. 10, ark. 119.  
835 For instance, the Italian student Gabrielle Cocco, apprehended trying to smuggle out dissident writings, 
was released after his parents obtained the services of a Communist lawyer, who issued a not-so-veiled 
threat to take the case to the court of public opinion in a letter to Soviet attorney general Rudenko. See 
correspondence between Eva and Artur Cocco and Franco Boffa, and Franco Boffa and Rudenko, 6/6/ - 
8/6/1971 and “Postanovlenie po prekrashcheniiu ugolovnogo dela, 24/7/1971,” in GARF f. 8131, op. 36, 
4673, ll. 7-8, 19-21.  
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the Helsinki accords, was released 3 months after his conviction.836  As we’ve seen in 
chapter 3, charges for espionage could also be filed against foreigners- with the last such 
case being the arrest and weeks-long detention of journalist Nicholas Daniloff occurring 
as late as 1986.837 Without denigrating the dire straits such arrests and detentions caused 
for foreigners so affected, the small number of these incidents, and rapid releases of all 
involved, indicate that they were exceptions that proved the rule regarding foreigners’ 
band of immunity. 
 Even more strikingly, some evidence exists that coercive agencies did not win 
all battles to control foreign traffic flows. For instance, the KGB, MVD and the Red 
Army all objected to loosening restrictions on unescorted car travel by foreigners in the 
Western USSSR in the late 1950s - to no avail.838 While as late as 1988/9, the KGB 
successfully held off demands from local authorities to open closed cities to foreign 
travel and investment,839 it also lost its share of fights over geographic restrictions – for 
instance over opening the Moscow-Vladimir road to tourists in the mid-1960s (despite 
the many “post-boxes” strewn around the area).840  
 Most crucially, enough evidence exists to offer the tantalizing possibility that, 
from the 1960s onward, KGB efforts to reduce the flow of foreign traffic to the Soviet 
                                                          
836 Kozlov (ed.) Nadzornye proizvodstva, 772. 
837 Bastow, Reporters, 335-337. 
838 “Dudorov to TsK KPSS,9/71959,” GARF, f. 9401, op.2, d. 506, l. 222, 
839 “G.N Gudkov, [Vice Chairman Gor’kii Soviet], to Silaev I.S [RSFSR Prime Minister],” 20/4/1990,” 
GARF, f. A-10004, op. 1, d. 835, l. 151; “A.A Sobchak [Mayor, St. Petersburg] to V.S Pavlov [USSR 
Prime Minister], 25/5/1991,” ibid, l. 153. 
840 “Sovet Ministrov SSSR, postanovlenie [draft form, N/D, 1964], f. 9612, op. 4, d.3, l. 107. 
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Union were largely unsuccessful. Less than a year after the Prague events, Andropov sent 
out a circular letter to republican-level KGB chiefs regarding the ideological dangers of 
incoming tourism. While the letter itself is not available, local reactions make its contents 
is clear: in Estonia, the only Soviet republic where foreign tourism formed a significant 
sector of the economy, the local KGB demanded to reduce the number of foreigners 
visiting the Republic. When local leadership resisted this push, it agreed to a compromise 
under which the number of tourists was to be kept from rising for several years.841A 
Lithuanian KGB follow-up to an Andropov talk to leading KGB cadres in May 1975 
indicates that, even at the height of détente, the KGB was pushing for more mobility 
restrictions on foreigners.842 In a 1981 talk, Andropov conceded that this push failed 
during the détente years: “after Helsinki… we faced pressure from the West, which tried 
to use the accords to pursue its own goals… we had to make some concessions, loosening 
restrictions [poslablenie rezhima] ... for diplomats, journalists, tourists”; concessions, he 
implied, could be safely rolled back.843 This rollback was evident already in the run-up to 
the Olympics, as the Soviet leadership, inundated with KGB warnings that “imperialists,” 
Zionists, and émigré organizations planned to use Olympic travelers as provocateurs,844 
                                                          
841 See correspondence in ERAF arf. 1, arv. 302, s. 129, ll. 10-21.  
842 “Spravka o rabote 2 otdela 2 upravleniia KGB pri SM LSSR,” LYA, f. k-41, p.1, b. 731, ll. 171-178. 
843 Cited in V. Alidin, Gosudarstvennaia bezopasnost’ i vremia, 221-222.  
844 “Zapiska KGB pri SM SSSR v TsK KPSS ‘O zamyslakh zapadnykh spetsluzhb  i zarubezhnykh anti-
sovetskikh organizatsii v sviazi s Olimpiadoi-80, 16/6/1978,” “Zapiska KGB pri SM SSSR v TsK KPSS ‘o 
vrazhdebnoi deiatelnosti protivnika v sviazi s Olimpiadoi 80, 25/4/1979,” “Zapiska KGB pri SM SSSR v 
TsK KPSS ‘o vrazhdebnoi deiatelnosti protivnika v sviazi s Olimpiadoi 80, 30/7/1979”, in N.G Tomilina et 
al (ed.), Piat kolets pod Kremlevskimi zvezdami: dokumentalnaia khronika Olimpiady-80 (Moscow: 
Mezhdunarodnyi Fond Demokratiia, 2011), 177-179, 210-212, 220-222, 234-236, 242-245. 
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banned 6,000 foreigners from entering the Soviet Union, and extended wait periods for 
receiving tourist visas.845  
 During Andropov’s short reign and its aftermath, attempts to restrict foreign 
travel both into and around the Soviet Union gained more traction. For the first time, the 
Soviet leadership took active steps to curtail travel to the Soviet Union from both socialist 
and capitalist countries. Least surprising in this regard was treatment of travel from 
Poland: during the Solidarność crisis, travel from Poland to the Soviet Union was 
significantly curtailed—by as much as 40%—in the wake of reports on subversive 
activities of Polish tourists all across the Western borderlands.846 Furthermore, as 
Zbigniew Wojnowksy discovered, Soviet authorities cracked down on Polish citizens in 
the Soviet Union: in the city of L’viv, over 1,500 KGB troops stopped more than 21,000 
Polish tourists from entering the town without permission in 1981 alone.847 Even more 
strikingly, Soviet authorities, who had long been bothered by the “nationalist” activity of 
Romanian tourists in Moldova,848 stopped receiving Romanian tourists, unless they 
purchased a tour of other Soviet republics.849 
                                                          
845 “Zapiska KGB SSSR v TsK KPSS ‘Ob osnovnykh meropriatiakh po obespecheniiu bezopasnosti v 
period podogotovki provedeniia igr XXII Olimpiady 1980 goda, 12/5/1980,” in idem, 628. 
846 Mark Kramer, “Soviet Deliberations on the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981,” CWIHP Working Paper no. 1, 
April 1999, 29-32. “Directive of the CC Secretariat of the CPSU ‘On Temporary Reduction in Tourist 
Exchanges between the USSR and the PPR, 28/11/1980,” accessed online at: 
https://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/archive/files/tightening-soviet-borders_44b1dd95ee.pdf on 2/2/2016. 
847 “Bulwark,” 14-15. 
848 Informatsiia o rabote s Rumynskimi turistami posetivshimi Moldavskuiu SSR vo vtoroi polovine 
avgusta 1968,” Arhiva Organizaţiilor Social-Politice din Republica Moldova [AOSPRM], f. 51, inv. 29, d. 
102, ll. 1-4. I thank Professor Amir Weiner for providing me with this document. 
849 “S.S Nikitin to P.P Petrik, Secretary of Moldovan TsK, 20/2/1981,” [AOSPRM], f. 51, inv. 56, d. 7, f. 8; 
accessed online at: 
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 Finally, under Andropov, for the first time since the Stalinist period, Soviet 
authorities were willing to sacrifice international exchanges and hard currency proceeds 
on the altar of state security.  Dimitrii Volkogonov, who examined Andropov’s “special 
file” for the period when he served as General Secretary, found that in 1983 the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry and the KGB were working on new procedures to make obtaining 
Soviet visas for Americans more difficult.850 In the subsequent year, Karl Vaino, First 
Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, wrote to Intourist Chairman Abrasimov, 
proposing to reduce Finnish travel to the Republic from 80,000 people in 1983 to 45,000 
in 1986, by making travel to Estonia more expensive and less pleasant, as “the vast 
majority of visiting Finns evade their itineraries… establish friendly, family, contraband-
speculative or intimate connections” with locals.851  
 
 Conclusion  
 
The chronological coincidence of these victories for vigilance with Andropov’s reign 
emphasizes the seriousness with which Soviet coercive agencies took the problem of 
foreign travel. And yet, they were incomplete and transitory in ways that highlight the 
limits of coercion and surveillance in the late Soviet period. Even as it was receiving 
                                                          
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116397.pdf?v=a2ce450554520cefa162c0dca9bec0d6 on 
3/30/2015. 
850  Volkogonov, Autopsy for an Empire, 357.  
851 “Vaino to Abrasimov, 22/8/1984,” ERAF arf. 1 arv. 302, s. 460, ll. 6-7.  
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pressure from Estonia to reduce tourism there, Intourist celebrated capitalist tourist traffic 
hitting 40% of its total tourist base, and planned further expansion in the second half of 
the 1980s.852  By that time, needless to say, both tourist travel and illicit activities by 
Finnish and Polish travelers were in full recovery.853 Finally, not only did the KGB fail to 
prevent the 1986 Council of Ministers resolution that allowed Soviet people to stay at 
Intourist hotels (see Chapter 3), but in Lithuania at least, it was involved in efforts to 
effectively implement it.854 
 So, in the end, we are forced to return to the question with which we started: 
why did the KGB’s actions did not track with its threat assesment? Why did the KGB 
struggle to translate the dire warnings of its security services regarding the dangers of 
foreign presence on Soviet soil, and the vast resources it piled into surveilling foreigners 
failed to translate into resolute coercive action? Some answers come easily to mind. A 
cynic might conclude that, to the extent the KGB was a massive bureaucracy operating in 
a state that enjoyed an exceptional level of political stability, resolving the problem once 
and for all would have put a crimp on the job prospects of many a KGB officer, whose 
livelihood after all depended on maintaining high levels of threat perception among 
Soviet policy-makers. More seriously, a quick counter-factual thought experiment could 
                                                          
852  “O sostoianii razvitiia inostrannogo turizma v 1980-82 gg. i perpektivakh ego razvitiia  v 1983 g.,” 
GARF, f. 9612, op.3, d. 1594, ll. 1-3.  
853  On Polish tourists, see: “O protivopravnoi deiatelnosti turistov iz PNR, 11/1/1989.” GARF, f. A-10004, 
op. 1, d. 802, l. 97. On Finnish tourists, see Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
854 “O khode vypolneniia postanovlenii kollegii i prikazov Goskominturista SSSR priniatykh v ispolnenie 
Postanovleniia Soveta Ministrov ot 7 fevralia 1985 goda ob organizatsii obsluzhivaniia i prodazhi turistkikh 
poezdok sovetskim grazhdanam na territorii SSSR, 17/12/1985,” LYA, f. K-1, ap. 46, b. 810, ll. 66-70. 
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suggest that the question itself is misplaced, as the late Soviet political stability might 
very well have been a product of the KGB’s surveillance efforts –and that without such 
efforts, the impact of contact with the outside world would have been much more 
explosive - as it became in 1985-1991.  
 However, the discrepancy between the genuine alarm exhibited by the KGB 
regarding the subversive effects of foreigners on Soviet soil and the relatively feeble 
nature of its response requires more than snide dismissal or counter-factual analysis. 
Rather, we must seek to understand the political calculus that restrained Soviet policy-
makers from taking appropriate measures to address the problem.  Unfortunately, sources 
produced by the Soviet state are to no avail here, as the entire rhetorical intent of KGB 
reportage was to convince the decision-makers that its efforts were indeed appropriate to 
the level of threat the Soviet state faced. We are faced therefore with a conundrum: how 
do we explain this curious gap between perceptions and actions, when the documents at 
our possession ignore the very existence of this gap? To truly answer our question, we 
must gain a better understanding of the constraints under which the KGB operated in an 
era of growing Soviet integration with the outside world – constaints about which the 
KGB’s archives are conspiciously silent. Therefore we would do well to give a second 
look at Dash, or rather at the way the movement which he represented used transnational 
mobility to challenge the total sovereignty claims of the Soviet state. 
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Chapter 5: Transnational Nationalists: ‘Zionist Emissaries’ Tour the 
Soviet Union 
 
As Dash was struggling for his pants in Kharkiv in 1972, he was participating in a 
historical confrontation that went back to the late 19th century, and was about to enter its 
culminating point.  As Yuri Slezkine argues in his Jewish Century, the 20th  century 
history of Russian/Soviet Jewry was defined by a long argument between Zionists, 
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Bolsheviks, and proponents of emigration to America, or, as he memorably put it, the 
children of Tevye’s daughters Chava, Hodl, and Beilke.855 
 While in the first 40 years of Soviet history, this argument seemed to have been 
resolved by a mixture of persuasion, social mobility, and violence in favor of the 
Bolsheviks, since 1948 and the founding of the State of Israel, the Zionists rejoined the 
fray. After 1967, when Israeli access to Soviet soil was strictly curtailed, American Jews 
put their considerable weight on the side of the Zionists, forging the transnational Soviet 
Jewry movement – perhaps the Cold War’s most prominent and succesful human rights 
campaign.856 Dash’s mission to meet and greet the refuseniks was an expression of its 
most powerful tactic- using international travel to support, publicize and, to the extent 
possible, protect Soviet Jewish activists.  
 In other words, this tactic was a powerful confirmation of the KGB’s institutional 
view of the dangers of foreign travel. The history of the encounter between the KGB, 
Jewish nationalists, and foreign “emissaries” was therefore a microcosm of the Soviet 
state’s struggle to accommodate both its institutional paranoia and the realities of the 
                                                          
855 Yuri Slezkine, The Jewish Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
856 The literature on the Soviet Jewish emigration movement is immense. For prominent works see Boris 
Zinger and Lilia Belenkaia Naperekor: Evreiiskoe natsional’noe dvizhenie v Sovetskom Soiuze,1945-1976, 
(Minsk: Met, 2004); A.M Morozova, Anatomiia otkaza (Moscow: RGGU, 2011); Vladimir (Ze’v) Khanin 
(ed.) Shestidnevnaia voina i evreiskoe dvizhenie v SSSR (Moscow: Akademicheskaia seriia,2008), Iulii 
Kosharovskii, My snova evrei: ocherki po istorii sionistkogo dvizheniia v Sovetskom Soiuze, (Jerusalem: 
Self Published, 2007); Bin’yamin Pinkus, Tehiyah u- tekumah leumit: hatsiyonut ve ha-tenuah ha- tsiyonit 
be Verit ha-Moatsot 1947-1987 (Sde Boker: ha-merkaz le moreshet Ben Guryon, 1993 ); Gal Beckerman, 
When They Come for Us, We'll be Gone: the Epic Struggle to Liberate Soviet Jewry (Boston: Houghton, 
2010);  Pauline Pererz, Let my People Go! The Transnational Politics of Soviet Jewish Emigration during 
the Cold War (New York: Holmes and Meier, 2010); Yaacov Ro’i (ed.), The Jewish Movement in the 
Soviet Union (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Institute University Press), 2012. 
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post-Stalin era. In this chapter, I sketch out the history of the transnational effort to aid 
the Soviet Jewish emigration movement, survey KGB’s lackluster policy response to it, 
and demonstrate how this reaction was limited by the uses transnational Zionist activists 
made of channels of international exchange to constrain the policy choices of Soviet 
security services. 
 
Diplomats from Lilienblum Street: 1948-1967. 
 
From its inception in 1948, the year in which Israel obtained its independence, the 
struggle for Soviet-Jewish allegiance was rooted in a clash between two claims: the 
Soviet state’s claim for the absolute, undivided allegiance of its citizenry, and the Jewish 
state’s claim on the hearts and minds of Jews everywhere. In less florid language, for 
both ideological and demographic reasons, fostering nationalist, Zionist and migratory 
moods among Soviet Jews was a central Israeli foreign policy goal.857 In the context of 
the xenophobic late Stalinist period, this was a direct provocation - and still ran 
contradictory to Soviet claims of multiethnic harmony in the more tolerant era that 
followed.  
                                                          
857 Yaacov Ro’i, The Struggle for Soviet Jewish Emigration, 1948-1967, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991). 
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  These realities came to a head already during the short “honeymoon” between the 
Soviet Union and the fledgling Jewish state in 1948/9. While the USSR provided Israeli 
forces with arms and diplomatic support, authorities were alarmed by numerous instances 
of Soviet Jews who wrote them with offers to volunteer and fight in Palestine.858 Even 
more concerning from this point of view was the mass outpouring of Moscow Jews who 
came to see the Israeli ambassador, Golda Meir, attending High Holidays services there 
in September 1948.859  Images of tens of thousands of Soviet Jews massing on Moscow 
streets rapidly became a powerful international Zionist icon (they were, for instance, until 
recently featured on Israeli currency).860 In the Soviet Union, however, they served as 
catalyst for the anti-cosmopolitan campaigns of Stalin’s later years, and contributed to the 
anti-Semitic atmosphere that culminated in the “Doctor’s plot” of early 1953.861 In these 
circumstances, it was little wonder that the only Israelis on Soviet soil, members of the 
small Israeli legation, didn’t make much headway in connecting to Soviet Jews. And 
even that link with Soviet Jewry was broken when the Soviet Union broke diplomatic 
relations with Israel in February 1953, in the midst of the Doctor’s Plot crisis, and the 
antisemitic campaign it wrought.862  
                                                          
858 Shimon Redlich and Gennady Kostyrchenko, ed., Evreiskii antifashistkii komitet. Dokumentirovannaia 
istoriia, 1941-1948(Moscow: mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1996), 293-298, 
859 Golda Meir, My Life (Boston: Futura, 1976), 250-255. 
860  Clyde Haberman, “Face that Launched Millions of Shekels Heads for Retirement,“ New York Times, 
2/8/1995. 
861 Gennady Kostyrcehnko, V plenu krasnogo faraona: politicheskie presledovanii︠ a︡  evreev v SSSR v 
poslednee stalinskoe desiatiletie: dokumental'noe issledovanie (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 
1994), is the best account of this era as it pertains to Soviet Jews. 
862 On life in the Israeli embassy, see: Mordechai Namir, Shelihut be-Moskvah: yerah dvash u-shenot za’am 
(Tel Aviv: ‘am oved, 1971). On the Doctors’ Plot, see Jonathan Brent and Vladimir Naumov, Stalin’s Last 
Crime: The Plot against the Jewish Doctors (New York: Harper and Collins, 2003). 
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           Figure 5.1: Crowd outside the Moscow Synagogue, September 1948) 
    (Source: israelim.ru) 
  
  Faced with these realities, Israeli authorities could do little but to prepare the 
ground for future activities.   In 1952, the Israeli government established a clandestine 
organization named Lishkat ha-kesher [Bureau of Communications], better known as 
Nativ [the Path], charged with facilitating clandestine Zionist organizations Eastern 
Europe, seeking ways to establish connections with Soviet Jewry, and swaying Western 
public opinion to apply pressure on Soviet authorities to open their borders. 863 
                                                          
863 The archival files of Nativ are not available for researchers. However, two of its chiefs released their 
memoirs: Nehemiah Levanon, ha-Kod: Nativ (Tel Aviv: ‘Am ‘oved, 1995), Ya'kov (Yasha) Kedmi, 
Milhamot avudot (Tel-Aviv: Matar, 2011). Additionally, the Israeli Association for the Documentation of 
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  Stalin’s death and the attendant Soviet opening up to the world completely 
transformed the environment in which Nativ operated. Within months, the Israeli 
embassy in Moscow was reopened, with a number of Nativ operatives, most prominently 
Nehemiah Levanon, its future long-serving head, installed there under diplomatic 
cover.864 Various bilateral agreements, from cultural accords to commercial deals that 
brought Israeli oranges (and sailors) to Odessa ports, allowed Israelis access to Soviet 
soil.865 Israeli tourists, most often former residents of the Soviet West coming to see 
relatives, started appearing in Soviet cities. 
  These circumstances proved an opening for the renewal of Israeli activity on 
Soviet soil. In secret, Nativ’s diplomats worked to re-establish connections to prewar 
Zionist circles, hoping that they could be used as nuclei of a new Zionist movement.866  
Beyond this clandestine activity, they traveled widely through the Soviet periphery, 
hoping that encounters with living, breathing Israelis would trigger Soviet Jews’ interest 
in Israel and Zionism. In the Ukrainian town of Chernovtsy, for instance, a local official 
complained that representatives of the Israeli embassy publicized the ambassador’s visit 
to the local synagogue by “walking around town with a large bag emblazoned with the 
                                                          
Clandestine Activity for Soviet Jewry, a veterans’ association of Nativ, published an oral history of its 
operations, a condensed version of an unpublished, and probably classified, manuscript (Shelomoh Rosner, 
Bi Netiv ha-demamah: ha-peilut ha-hashai le-maan yehudei Verit ha-Moatsot (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman 
Shazar le-ḥeḳer toldot ha-ʻam ha-Yehudi,2012).  
864 Levanon, Nativ, 32-39. 
865 Govrin, Yechasei, 122-128. 
866 Pinkus, Tehiyah, 104. 
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word ‘Israel’ in large foreign [i.e. Hebrew] script” – and were successful in triggering an 
extremely high (and mixed gender) turnout in the local synagogue.867 
With or without Nativ nudging, Israelis without diplomatic passports also 
participated in this effort. For instance, the “Zionist” section of the Israeli delegation to 
the Moscow Youth festival was staffed with many recent IDF veterans with connections 
to Nativ.868 According to Levanon, all Israeli ships sailing to Odessa had a Nativ agent on 
board, charged with meeting local Jews and distributing Israeli paraphernalia (postcards, 
pins, and religious objects).869 Additionally, Israeli tourists, Soviet authorities fretted, 
were spreading Zionist propaganda and bourgeois influence by everything from 
providing their relatives with Israeli gifts to favorably comparing kibbutzim with Soviet 
kolkhozes.870 
All this activity had an important, but limited effect on the development of Soviet 
Jewish nationalism. As was the case in Chernovtsy, Israeli diplomats were often mobbed 
by crowds of excited Jews during their travels. Israeli travelers to Moscow, even ones 
friendly to the Soviets,871 invariably reported being the objects of intense interest by 
Soviet Jews.872  
                                                          
867 Cited in Ze’v Khanin, Boris Morozov, Bogdim ba-moledet: ha-hagirah he-yehudit be-einei ha-shilton 
ha-Sovyeti (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 2005), 78. 
868 See below. 
869 Levanon, Nativ, 68. 
870 “Spravka o rabote Kishinevskogo Otdelenia VAO Inturist s turistami- emigrantami s byvshei Bessarabii 
v 1963 godu,” GARF f. 9612, op. 1, d. 558, ll. 150-151.  
871 See the account of Margot Clausner, chairman of the Israeli-Soviet Cultural Relations Society (Margo 
Clausner, Shalosh nesiot li-Verit ha-Moatsot (Tel Aviv: Niv, 1965), 65-70). 
872 Seee for example, Shlomo Even-Shoshan, Sipuro shel masa: ‘esrim yom be Verit ha-Moa’tsot (Tel-
Aviv: ha-Kibbuz ha-meuhad, 1964), 28-32; Hayim Shorer, Arbaim yom bi Verit ha-Moa’tsot (Tel Aviv: 
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As was the case with so many other transnational phenomena, the Moscow Youth 
Festival was the most brilliant success the Israeli strategy of encounters enjoyed. Many 
young Soviet Jews made the trip to Moscow, as individuals or informal delegations, for 
the specific purpose of meeting the Israeli delegation.873 Despite efforts to isolate it and 
close surveillance of its members,874 Komsomol authorities had to concede that “many 
Muscovite groups are causing a sensation [azhiotazh] around this delegation. They gather 
around theaters, hotels, invite the Israelis to their apartments… declare they are being 
repressed and dream of moving to Israel.”875 Overall, Israeli historian Bin’yamin Pinkus 
estimates that the Israeli delegation was seen by between 30 and 60 thousand Soviet 
Jews.876  
While it would be misguided to presume that anyone who excitedly met an Israeli 
was ipso-facto a Zionist, such encounters often provided emotional jolts that provided 
intense nationalist awakenings. One fan of the delegation, Minsk's Anatolii Rubin, recalls 
that “I did not budge [from the delegation] for days… I just wanted to look at them, at 
boys and girls like me, but proud and independent.”877  Other festival attendees 
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on details on meetings between Israeli Festival participants and local Jews, see David Shaham, Pegishot be-
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interviewed by historian Vladislav Zubok adored the Israelis for their “demeanor, dignity, 
[and] fearlessness.”878   
Such emotional effects were not limited to 1957 alone. Nine years later, Hillel 
Butman, a young Leningrader who recently lost his job as militia officer, experienced a 
near-mystical rapture while watching a show by an Israeli mime acting out the role of a 
soldier planting a flag on enemy soil: 
This was the people of Israel in its difficult march forward! This is an IDF [the Israeli 
Army] soldier, fighting alone against ten [foes], because the dozens of young guys sitting 
in this concert hall cannot run to his side and support this flag with dozens of powerful 
hands.879   
 
One on one encounters also produced moments of ideological activation.  During his 
short posting in Moscow, Levanon was able to seed several Zionist circles centered on 
venerable activists who now started raising a new generation of acolytes.880 The Riga 
scientist German Branover recounts a chance encounter with Israeli diplomats in a 
restaurant, leading to a trip to the embassy where he received holy books and ritual items, 
as well as instructions to go on a conspiratorial trip to the resort town of Sochi where he 
was supposed to discuss avenues for further activity.881 During his festival stay, Rubin 
received Zionist literature and Hebrew textbooks from his interlocutors, and promptly 
established a Zionist network when he came home to Minsk.882 Even people who did not 
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have direct contacts with Israelis were influenced by their presence: Yasha Kazakov, then 
a Moscow teenager, recalls being energized by materials a friend received from an Israeli 
diplomat, and deciding on the spot to become a Zionist.883 
 And yet, it would be an error to classify Israeli-led activities on Soviet soil as an 
unqualified success. By 1967, Soviet-Jewish emigration numbers were still a trickle, and 
the Zionist movement there numbered, at most, several hundred people, heavily 
concentrated in less-assimilated areas of the Soviet West, rather than the major cities 
where the majority of the Soviet Jewish population lived.884 Communications between 
the Zionist underground and the Israelis were encumbered not only by the realities of a 
closely surveilled society, but also by ideological factors. Israeli diplomats were almost 
universally members of the ruling socialist party Mapai and advocated quiet work behind 
the scenes with minimal aggravation of Soviet authorities, while local activists, 
overwhelmingly from areas where the Zionist movement before the war was dominated 
by right wing revisionists, were suspicious of all varieties of socialism, in sympathy with 
revisionist (i.e, right wing) Zionism, and favored bold action.885 
Most importantly, however, the structure of the early Zionist movement in the 
Soviet Union - clandestine, reliant on communications with a single center and dependent 
on support from an easily identifiable group of foreigners - was ideally designed for 
surveillance and disruption by the KGB.  In a clear signal about the limits of what Soviet 
                                                          
883  Kedmi, Milhamot avudot, 17-19. 
884  Pinkus, Tehiyah, 217. 
885  Kedmi, Milhamot avudot, 59-63. 
  
   
 
  299 
 
 
 
authorities would tolerate, Levanon was detained in the apartment of a Moscow Zionist in 
July 1955, and was shortly afterwards deported along with 3 other diplomats.886 His 
principal Moscow contact, the 70 year old Zionist Ilia Guberman, was condemned for 
espionage and spent 5 years in Soviet prison camps.887  
Beyond such crudities, the comings and goings of Israeli diplomats were of 
course well-known to the KGB, and they could be targeted for harassment and 
profilaktika. For instance, a few months after the Moscow Festival, the Israeli diplomat 
Eliyahu Hazan was attacked in Izvestiia as a “Diplomat from Lilienblum Street,” (the 
location of Israel’s black dollar market, as Izvestiia helpfully pointed out to its readers), 
for allegedly trying to bribe Odessa Jews with money and gifts in order to convert them 
to Zionism – a familiar enough refrain to the general Soviet public. 888 
Even worse from the Israeli point of view, the majority of their contacts were 
from the Soviet West, where the Soviet security services achieved full penetration of pre-
annexation political structures.889 The reactivation of Zionist circles therefore meant the 
reactivation of long implanted agents. In Vilnius, one such agent, code-name Gobis, 
managed to infiltrate the local “delegation” to the Moscow Youth Festival. There, he met 
other “Jewish nationalists” and attended their meetings with Israeli diplomats. During his 
conversation with the latter, he agreed to become one of their Lithuanian contacts. This 
                                                          
886 See, for example, various reports on visits of Israeli diplomats to Ukrainian cities in 1955-1967, 
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connection was kept alive for at least 3 additional years, giving the KGB hours of 
recordings of Israeli diplomats engaging in conspiratorial activities, the names of some of 
their contacts, and helping it frustrate efforts to set up a Zionist network in Vilnius.890 
Beyond such conspiratorial feats, the KGB possessed other means to penetrate 
and disrupt ties between Soviet Jews and Israelis. In Vilnius, KGB documents show that 
every Israeli tourist who came to town, their contacts, and sometimes their contacts’ 
contacts, became targets of KGB backgrounds checks, agent “penetration,” wiretaps and 
other forms of close surveillance.891 The few Israeli tourists who visited Leningrad and 
Moscow reported similar levels of surveillance that was often made visible to its targets 
in a way that was clearly meant to deliver a message to them and their relatives.892 The 
Israeli author Hanoch Bartov highlights the escalating nature of Soviet surveillance and 
the effective chilling effects it created. During a train trip he and a small group of friends 
took from the Polish border to Moscow and Leningrad, they first were able to freely 
converse with small groups of Jews on the station platforms. And then:  
After our second or third stop, nervousness was everywhere. In one town, I saw how the gate to 
the station was locked. In another, men dressed in suits scattered small groups of people curious 
about us. Whenever our accordion started playing some Hebrew song, some volunteer orchestra 
drowned it.... Even in the smallest, poorest station, we saw the men in the brown suits and straw 
hats … standing everywhere. They eavesdropped on every conversation. Their presence was 
nuisance enough. But when things got far enough they started snatching our gifts: a pin, a record, 
a postcard.893 
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In short, as long as the international links of the Soviet Zionist movement depended on 
the thin thread of a handful of Israeli tourists and diplomats operating under near-total 
surveillance, its practical achievements were minimal. 
 
 Zionist Emissaries Are Coming: 1967-1989 
 
1967 was the great watershed of the Soviet Jewry movement. Pride over the Israeli 
triumph, horror at the stridently pro-Arab Soviet stance,894 the rising tide of anti-Jewish 
discrimination,895 and (later and to a lesser extent) the crushing of the Prague Spring896 
greatly expanded the numbers of Soviet Jews willing to emigrate. In parallel in the West, 
the electrifying effects on the Six Day War created hosts of Western Jews eager to do 
their part for the Jewish people – and the plight of Soviet Jewry was a cause on which 
they could focus their energies (not without some guidance from Nativ’s North American 
emissaries).897  
 In these circumstances, Butman finally managed to fulfill his patriotic dreams. 
Now a leading activist of the clandestine Leningrad Zionist Committee, he helped plan a 
hijacking of a small Soviet airliner in order to take it to Sweden (or, as other members of 
                                                          
894 See the essays gathered in Vladimir (Ze’v) Khanin (ed.) Shestidnevnaia voiina and Zubok, Zhivago’s 
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the group realistically assessed, to publicize the emigration cause by martyrdom).898 
Soviet authorities, well aware of the operation, easily foiled it - and provoked a 
maelstrom of international outrage by condemning three members of the group to death 
and others to long imprisonment.899 Seeking to assuage Western public opinion in the era 
of détente, Soviet authorities allowed increasing numbers of Jews, predominantly from 
the Baltic States, the Caucasus and Central Asia, to emigrate. And yet, for a variety of 
reasons having to do with concerns about brain drain, leaks of state secrets, objections of 
Arab allies, and the deleterious effects of mass emigration on Soviet claims of the 
superiority of the socialist way of life, many (and by the early 1980s, the vast majority of) 
prospective emigrants - predominantly young, educated, formerly assimilated urbanites – 
were refused permission to go, with some of them stuck in the limbo of “refusal” for 
periods of ten to twenty years. 900 
 Thus, unwittingly, Soviet authorities provided Nativ with everything it worked for 
before 1967: hundreds of thousands of Jews willing to emigrate, a cohesive, activist, 
several-thousand-large nationalist community to serve as focal point of the emigration 
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movement,901 and a sympathetic body of victims and martyrs to present to the 
movement’s Western supporters. Its operatives, however, faced a significant hurdle: with 
the end of Soviet-Israeli diplomatic and cultural ties after the Soviet Union broke 
diplomatic relations with Israel in 1967, they lost their main means of access to Soviet 
soil.  
  Fortunately for its purposes, Nativ, well aware of the limitations of the Israeli-
only strategy, already had a wealth of experience with using third country citizens for its 
purposes. Already in early 1953, Levanon, then serving in Stockholm, bribed Swedish 
marine officers en route to Leningrad (perhaps the very same officers that so excited 
Mikhail German) to send letters with fake return addresses to old Zionist activists to let 
them known they were not forgotten.902 In 1965, Nativ, possibly alarmed at the relative 
success the Soviet authorities had in convincing visiting religious Jewish-American 
delegations that all was well with Soviet Jewry,903 helped organize the trip of a young 
French journalist, Elie Wiesel, to the Soviet Union to write a report on the conditions 
Jews faced there. The text he produced, The Jews of Silence, rapidly became a rallying 
cry and a central slogan of the international Soviet Jewry movement.904  
  Activist Soviet Jews also grasped the possibilities offered by foreign presence in 
the USSR.  On June 11th, 1967, Yasha Kazakov, already a semi-regular visitor to the 
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Israeli embassy, decided that “if the Soviet Union breaks relations with Israel, I will 
break relations with the Soviet Union,” stormed into the US embassy, delivering a letter 
to the UN General Secretary in which he renounced his Soviet citizenship and demanded 
the right emigrate. After this action failed to garner media attention, Kazakov approached 
a group of German students and asked them to deliver a similar letter to an Israeli 
newspaper – and in short order became an international media sensation.905  In a similar 
maneuver, Butman and his Leningrad cohort, wishing to consult with Israel before they 
started their adventure, intercepted an Israeli-Norwegian tourist who, like many other 
young visitors,906 attended the local synagogue, briefed them on their plans, and had him 
deliver word to Israel (they subsequently rejected Israeli advice to abandon the operation- 
a sympthomathic miscommunication between the cautious Israelis and the radical Soviet 
activists).907 
  According to available evidence, Nativ began systematically employing the 
possibilities offered by travelers from third countries starting in the 1960s.  Initially, this 
group, the so-called tourist-emissaries (tayarim-shelihim), consisted of well-briefed, 
tightly controlled members of the international religious Zionist movement Bnei-Akiva, 
recruited by Levanon’s subordinate Aryeh Krol (incidentally, one of the few religious 
non-socialists serving in Nativ). Their initial mission, based on hints in the memoiristic 
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literature, focused not so much on providing aid or Zionist literature, as on helping to 
keep the lid on often unruly activists.908 
The consequences of the 1967 war vastly increased the numbers and importance 
of the tourist-emissaries.  As mentioned above, the Soviet stance on the Six Day war 
provoked a wave of fury among American Jewry. Intourist guides in Moldova, for 
instance, picked up anger among American-Jewish tourists that their tourist dollars went 
“towards aiding Arab states against Israel.”909 Indeed, according to Levanon, American 
Jewish organizations pondered a partial travel boycott of the Soviet Union- and were 
quickly dissuaded by the Israelis who knew that without Western travelers, they would 
lose their last links to Soviet Jewish activists.910 Over the next 25 years, as emigration 
from the Soviet Union grew into a stream, then slowed to a trickle and finally surged into 
a flood, Western travelers became the main connecting link between Soviet activists and 
their international support networks. 
While Nativ kept closely interacting with American activists throughout the Cold 
War era, the growing scope of the American movement for Soviet Jewery mean that 
Zionist travel to the Soviet Union soon escaped the narrow bounds of its control. Until 
the end of the Cold War, Nativ kept its corps of tourist-emissaries under tight control, 
preferring to send travelers with either an Israeli background or strong religious 
affiliations, and provided them with military-style briefings and elaborate cover stories. 
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No less importantly, it made strenuous efforts to steer them towards Soviet activists who 
towed the Israeli “line.”911  American travelers were divided between “establishment” 
organizations, operating under the umbrella of the National Conference for Soviet Jewry 
and an array of “rebel” organizations, like the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry, or even 
the Rabbi Meir Kahane’s extremist Jewish Defense League.912 While originally, the 
recruitment and preparation of American travelers were conducted by Nativ’s “local 
friends,”913 by that the numbers and demographic profiles of American travelers seemed 
to have sharply exceeded Nativ’s strict guidelines by the mid 1970s.914 Additionally, 
many travelers lacking any particular affiliation also saw it as their duty to visit 
refuseniks.915 Finally, outside the Zionist framework of the rest of the movement, ultra-
orthodox rabbis and activists worked to form Hasidic and ultra-orthodox communities on 
Soviet soil.916 While hard figures are hard to assess, given the lack of access to Nativ’s 
archive and the polycentric nature of the movement elsewhere, a safe assumption would 
put the number of travelers to the USSR involved with Jewish affairs in a given year at 
somewhere in the mid to low thousands by the 1980s.917  
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Whatever their disparate agendas, taken as a whole, Zionist travel and the support 
systems that underlay it amounted to a substantial transnational network linked to the 
small world of Soviet Jewish activists in a myriad ways that made their plight much 
easier than it would otherwise have been. Travelers heading to the Soviet Union were 
thoroughly briefed, given names and addresses of refuseniks they were to visit and their 
spiritual and material needs. Upon return, they composed trip reports, including 
everything from the names and addresses of Jews who wished to emigrate and required 
invitations from Israeli “relatives” (which were provided by Nativ- with very few actual 
relatives involved in the effort), through rumors of Soviet clampdowns and relaxations, 
and up to impromptu studies of demand on the Soviet black market.918 This information 
was then processed, used to brief subsequent cohorts of travelers, and fed into files that 
contained thousands of names of refuseniks and used to target them with aid packages, 
letters and phone calls of support, future visits, and post-emigration aid.919 
Inside Soviet borders, foreign travelers did much to reverse the the isolation, 
ostracism, and penury that Soviet authorities attempted to impose on the refuseniks. 
Travelers provided refuseniks (who as general rule lost their jobs) with various forms of 
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material aid: Berezka certificates, cash, items to resell on black markets (ranging from 
ever popular jeans to cameras and video equipment).920 Medical doctors were dispatched 
to provide medications and emergency treatments for seriously ill refuseniks.921 On one 
occasion, when a group of female refuseniks needed urgent gynecological checkups, a 
“battle group” [desant] of doctors arrived from the United States to aid them.922  A stream 
of artifacts brought by foreigners: Zionist literature, religious items, Israeli music 
recordings, and, most crucially, Hebrew textbooks and study aids, helped spread the 
Zionist gospel among hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews, the majority of whom never 
met a foreigner.923 Leon Uris’ Zionist epic Exodus was a key text in this regard, with its 
fictionalized Hebrew warriors serving to inspire activists in the same way flesh-and-
blood Israelis did in 1957.924 This samizdat hit, first brought to the Soviet Union in the 
mid -1960s by a tourist and widely circulating among the Jewish community there for the 
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subsequent two decades,925 was still high on the list of items emissaries were 
recommended to bring to the Soviet Union in the 1980s.926 
 Zionist travelers could, of course, do little about the things that made life in 
refusal harrowing: unemployment, fear, systematic harassment, uncertainty about the 
future, and regrets about lost years.927 Their aid to Jews imprisoned for Zionist activities 
(iternationally renowned as Prisoners of Zion) was limited to aid packages and endless 
streams of complaints to Soviet authorities. Yet, to the extent the policy goal of the 
Soviet authorities was to use hardship, isolation, and repression to keep Jews away from 
the emigration movement, the activities of Zionist travelers did much to frustrate these 
policy goals.  On the most basic level, the fact that foreigners cared enough about their 
fate to risk a visit to their Soviet apartments could provide immense emotional sustenance 
to people the Soviet state was determined to mark as pariahs.928 As Martin Gilbert wrote 
in his account of encounters with refuseniks in 1983: “all of them are given hope when 
visitors come, listen to their stories and talk about them when they come back to the 
West” (and indeed, even though it was composed at a moment when Jewish emigration 
was shut down by the authorities, Gilbert’s pointedly titled The Jews of Hope was a 
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celebration of the end of isolation and fear Wiesel bemoaned).929 Refusenik activists 
shared these lofty sentiments, at least to some extent: trip reports reveal that activists 
whom Western travelers frequented attempted to direct tourist traffic to less “popular” 
activists who they felt needed encouragement and support, lest they drop out of the 
movement.930 
 On a more practical level, foreign aid was crucial for the survival and growth of 
myriad informal institutions that allowed the refuseniks to live life outside the bounds of 
the Soviet system. To cite one telling example, Leningrad refusenik Mikhail Beizer 
developed a small private alternative to Intourist itineraries, taking both foreign travelers 
and curious Soviet Jews on tours of “Jewish Leningrad.”931 On a far grander scale, given 
the lack of Hebrew materials in the Soviet Union, the thriving network of Hebrew 
teachers and classes (ulpanim) found it very hard to function without large amounts of 
teaching aids brought into the Soviet Union by foreigners.932 Scientific seminars 
organized by refusenik scientists and scholars were given protection and publicity by 
visiting foreign colleagues, who also helped academic refuseniks keep their careers alive 
by bringing scientific publications into and smuggling manuscripts out of the Soviet 
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Union.933 In a more mundane fashion, by the 1980s, the joint efforts of refusenik doctors, 
Western doctors on Zionist visits, and other visitors who brought as much medications as 
the former groups required, led to the formation of an impromptu medical service which 
probably provided its clients with better treatment than anything non-elite Soviet citizens 
could access.934  Finally, by controlling access to foreigners and transforming certain 
activists into distribution nodes of goods received from them, Nativ and establishment 
American organizations could at least attempt to create a rough hierarchy among the 
cantakerous Soviet Zionist community. This practice inevitably stirred both political 
disagreements and personal jealousies,935 but also helped created a leadership structure, 
conflict resolution methods, and international coordination mechanism that helped forge 
the refuseniks into a coherent (if contentious) political force.936  
Perhaps the best evidence for the possibilities transnational networks allowed for 
the development of sub-cultures thoroughly alien to Soviet norms was the emergence of a 
small, but thriving ultra-Orthodox communities in Moscow and Leningrad by the 1980s. 
                                                          
933  The most famous was the Moscow Scientific Seminar organized by Mark Azbel and Aleksandr 
Voronel. See Azbel, Refusenik, 460-471, Levanon, Nativ, 425-428, and the testimonial of Viktor 
Brailovskii, a physicist who took charge of the seminar after the original organizers were allowed to 
emigrate (online at: 
http://www.angelfire.com/sc3/soviet_jews_exodus/Interview_s/InterviewBrailovsky.shtml  Yakov Alpert, 
another notable refusenik scientist, provides a roster of the foreign scientists who gave talks at the seminar, 
totaling 350 foreign guests: Making Waves: Stories from My Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2000), 247-252.  On smuggling of manuscripts, see ibid, 168-170. 
934 Kosharovksii, Evrei, 4, 362-366. 
935 On material jealousies, see Levanon, Nativ, 385 and Aleksander Paritskii, Molitva (Jerusalem: Verba, 
2006), 144-145, 165, 316-317. 
936 Rosner, bi-Netivei ha-demamah, 150-155. Iulii Kosharovskii was universally considered the hinge of the 
Nativ network in the Soviet Union and his four volume memoir (My snova evrei) provides perhaps the most 
comprehensive picture of how the various strands of the Soviet Jewish national movement operated in 
disparate, but interlocking, ways. 
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Unlike the surviving pre Stalin-era orthodox communities in the Soviet periphery, 
Leningrad and Moscow-based Orthodox groups were dominated by young, university 
educated, Russian-speaking refuseniks, who had little preexisting knowledge of Jewish 
law. 937  Given the tight control Soviet authorities exercised over religious education and 
the manufacture of items necessary for Jewish religious life (kosher food, religious 
literature, and prayer artifacts), support from abroad was the only viable path for living an 
Orthodox life in the USSR.  Foreign emissaries brought the Soviet Orthodox items as 
diverse as compilations of Talmudic law, kosher cookbooks, and canned food.938  Even 
more importantly, roving American rabbis conducted classes on Jewish law, brought and 
interpreted halakhic literature, gave classes about the intricacies of running kosher 
households, circumcised babies, and trained Soviet Jews to become the functional 
equivalent of rabbis for their underground communities.939 And thus, in the seventh 
decade of Soviet power, in Leningrad, the cradle of the Revolution, some of Hodl’s 
                                                          
937 On this community, see: “Soviet Refuseniks Turn towards Orthodox Judaism,” East European Jewish 
Affairs 22, no.1(1992), 51-62;  Dov Kontorer, “Moe evreivstvo i Izrail',” in: Khanin (ed.), Dvizhenie, 176-
190;  Miriam Stark Zakon with Eliahu Essas, Silent Revolution: Torah Network in the Soviet Union (New 
York: Mesorah, 1992). 
938 “Memo to briefers, February 23, 1981” and “Trip Report, Jan 15,1981, Ruth Goldsmith and Norma 
Joseph,”  Bay Area Council for Soviet Jewry Records, Soviet Jewry Movement Archives,  Box 87, Folder 1. 
939 Since the ultra-orthodox networks were not part of the establishment Soviet Jewry organizations 
neither ideologically nor organizatonally, both works and sources on the activities of the ultra-orthodox 
visitors to the Soviet Union are scarce, but see: Miriam Zakon and Eliagu Essas, Silent Revolution: a Torah 
Network in the Soviet Union (Brooklyn, NY: Mesorah Press, 1992); 118-134, Teitz Blau, Learn Torah, 
Love Torah; Itskhak Zilber, Chtoby ty ostalsia evreem (Jerusalem:Toldos Yeshuron, 2004), 329-335. Also 
see Adam S.  Fergizer, “Outside the Shul”: The American Soviet Jewry Movement and the Rise of 
Solidarity Orthodoxy, 1964–1986." Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation 22, no. 1 
(2012), 83-130. 
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grandchildren experienced something completely unforeseen: a happy Hassidic 
childhood.940 
 
Battling the “Zionist Peddlers” 
 
From the point of view of Soviet authorities, all this activity amounted to an embodiment 
of their darkest fears regarding foreign subversion: an international movement, supported 
by a hostile government manipulating a range of  “ideological centers,” sending 
thousands (and, cumulatively over a period of 25 years, probably tens of thousands) of 
emissaries on missions of subversion that aided and abetted activities that shattered the 
Soviet myth of the “friendship of the peoples,” highlighted the willingness of many 
Soviet citizens to abandon the socialist way of life, and promoted activities that the 
Soviet state deemed just short of treason. 
As was usually the case with dangers rooted in the Soviet opening up to the 
world, Soviet security authorities read this threat through the prism of institutional 
paranoia, perceiving the Jewish problem in the context of an alleged global conspiracy 
against Soviet power. Thus, the KGB’s 1956 textbook on the history of the clash between 
Zionism and Soviet power lays clear lines of continuity between the ideological 
foundations of Zionism (“a tool of the bourgeoisie...aiming to distract workers from class 
struggle”) its past as “an ally of Denikin and Petliura despite the appalling massacres that 
                                                          
940 Moshe Rokhlin, “Detvsvo khassida v sovetskom Leningrade,” accessed online at 
http://www.angelfire.com/sc3/soviet_jews_exodus/Memory_s/MemoryRokhlin.shtml on 5/5/2015. 
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their forces conducted in the Jewish shtetls of Ukraine and Belorussia,” and its present, in 
which “foreign-based ideological Zionist centers are being used by the American and 
Israeli secret services to subvert Soviet power.” 941  
Here again, such ideologically inflected statements were not mere phraseology, 
but building blocks of Soviet threat assessment. Semichstastnyi, for instance, considered 
Nativ’s activities in Eastern Europe (which he ascribes to the more famous Israeli service 
Mossad) as model that the CIA employed in its mission to create Soviet domestic 
opposition to Soviet power.942 In a 1972 note to the Politburo, Andropov found that “the 
Zionists wish to ideologically influence the Jewish population of the Soviet Union… to 
create a nationalist underground... [in order to] change our Middle Eastern policy, cause 
harm to the friendship of the peoples, to turn a segment of the Jewish population into a 
destabilizing social factor [and] provoke anti-Semitic feelings among the Soviet 
population.943 As Edith Rogovin-Frankel points out, even minor issues involving the 
Zionist movement, like the case of an Intourist guide who maintained a correspondence 
with a family in Israel and showed signs of studying Hebrew, crossed Andropov’s desk 
and was rerouted to the highest level of Soviet decision-makers – a sure sign of the 
seriousness with which the problem was perceived by the KGB.944 Even as late as 1989, 
Vladimir Kryuchkov, the last KGB Chairman, complained that Jewish nationalists and 
                                                          
941 L.A Mamaev, Antisovetskaia deiatelnost’ evreiskikh natsionalistov i bor’ba s nei organov 
gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti (Moscow: Vyshaia shkola KGB, 1956), 3-4. 
942 Semichastnyi, Bespokoinoe serdtse, 244.  b 
943 “Spravka, 17/5/1971,” cited in Boris Morozov (ed.) Evreiskaia emigratsiia v svete novykh dokumentov 
(Tel Aviv: Ivrus, 1998), 105.  
944 “Behind the Scenes: the Attitude of the Regime and Society towards Jewish Emigration,” in Ro’i, ed., 
The Jewish National Movement, 194. 
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“foreign agitators” were key elements in the efforts of “a-social elements” to slander the 
KGB.945  
In Ukraine, local KGB officers took an even more dour view of the Zionist 
problem.  The republican KGB considered the refuseniks as a key element in the 
ephemeral dissenting coalition they fretted about in the years leading up to Operation 
Block.946 Such fears lasted well in the 1980s. During Israel’s invasion of Lebanon (1982-
1985), for instance, the Ukrainian KGB informed the republican Politburo that the 
Israelis included in their ranks volunteers raised by the nationalist Ukrainian organization 
OUN (presumably in order to use military experience they gained for future guerilla 
operations on Soviet soil).947  In a darker key, for some KGB officers, Zionism seemed 
less like the tool of an imperialist conspiracy and more like its puppet-master.  Thus, one 
report to the Ukrainian Politburo mentioned as a matter of fact that “Zionists” controlled 
many large American monopolies and “up to 80% of international press agencies.”948 
Given these fears, it was little wonder that Soviet efforts to combat Zionism 
escalated after 1967. While before 1967, Israeli diplomats and emissaries were handled 
by the general counter-intelligence mechanism, in 1971, the Fifth Directorate set up a 
                                                          
945 Cited in Evgeniya Albats, The KGB: State within a State (London: I.B Taurus, 1994), 254. As usual in 
such matters, the KGB’s fears had elements of truth. According to Kosharovskii, by 1987/8 even refuseniks 
who previously towed the Israeli line which called for distance from Soviet dissidents changed their 
approach, and using their superior resources, organized and led a number of human rights seminars well-
attended by foreigners. (Kosharovskii, Evrei, 4:226.) 
946 “Protokol zonalnogo soveshchaniia… 1971,” DGA SBU, d. 28, t.1, ark. 123. 
947 “IS, 28/10/1982,” DGA SBU f. 16, op. 7, spr. 16, ark. 61. To the KGB’s credit, it suggested the 
information not be used in Soviet propaganda until it was confirmed. 
948 “V. Fedorchuk  to V. Scherbritskii [Head of Ukrainian Communist Party], 5/2/1982,”DGA SBU, f. 16, 
op. 7, spr. 66, ark. 229. This was not an isolated point of view within the KGB- see similar reports cited in 
Andrew and Mitrokhin, The World was Going Our Way, 226-237.  
  
   
 
  316 
 
 
 
Jewish section meant to battle Zionism and migratory moods.949 This, of course, did not 
absolve territorial departments from joining the struggle.950 On the propaganda front, 
Soviet authorities organized a vast anti-Zionist machine, featuring everything from the 
“pocket Jewish” Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public to rabid anti-Semitic 
elements among the Russian nationalist wing of the Soviet establishment.951  
Therefore, despite the vast expansion of the Zionist network in the Soviet Union, 
the level of surveillance its members could expect more than kept pace. Zionist meetings 
were closely surveilled, wiretapped, and penetrated by KGB agents who both reported on 
the movement and helped sow dissension and suspicion among authentic activists.952 
Zionist “emissaries” were well-tracked, and even their future intentions were sometimes 
known by the KGB.953 Foreign travelers reported constant low-level harassment: “tails” 
that made no attempt to disguise themselves, midnight phone calls, and attempts to 
provoke illegal activities.954 Detentions, KGB interrogation, and deportations were a 
relatively rare but profoundly unpleasant possibility.955 In a less formal way, KGB 
                                                          
949 Barron, KGB, 85. 
950 Besides the Ukrainian material cited above, see “Plan agenturno-operativknykh meropriatii LGB 
Litovskoi SSSR po bor’be s podryvnoi deiatelnostiu spetsluzhb Izrailia, zarubezhnykh sionistskikh tsentrov 
i organizatsii a takzhe pro-sionistski i natsonalistki nastroennykh lits evreiskoi natsionalsti v respublike na 
1982-1985 god, 17/8/1982,” LYA, f. K-41, b. 774, ll. 114-130. 
951 On the intersection of anti-Zionist propagandists and racial antisemitism, see Mitrokhin, Russkaia 
partiia 404-428 and William Korrey, Russian Antisemitism, Pamyat and the Demonology of Zionism (Chur, 
Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1995). 
952 See for example, “Dokladnaia zapiska, 15/12/1978,” DGA SBU, f. 16, op. 7, spr. 37, ark. 369-370, 
“Dokladnaia zapiska, 16/2/1978,” DGA SBU, f. 16, op. 7, spr. 33, ark. 38-42. 
953 This method of agent recruitment was often used by the KGB, most often in order to infiltrate spies into 
Israel.  
954 For a typical example, see Philip Baskin “Journey to the Unknown” (n/d 1977],” NCSJ Records, Soviet 
Jewry Movement Archives, Box 12, Folder 3. For examples of arrests and harassment, see Paritskii, 
Molitva, 118-120, 173-174, Eisen, Canadian Perspective, 139-141, Lein, Zabyt' , 162, and  oral history 
interview with Mark Glotter, 10/14/2014. 
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operatives, especially in the periphery, were not above the occasional “hooligan” 
beatings.956 
Beyond such crudities (or for that matter, the clumsy Dash operation), the KGB 
was more than capable of conducting complex operations that caused real harm to the 
Soviet Jewry movement. For instance, a KGB agent recruited in the 1960s and given 
permission to move to Israel in order to infiltrate the international Zionist movement957 
was able to convince various Western Zionist organizations of the existence of a 
powerful Zionist cell in Odessa, which was in fact controlled by the KGB.  The members 
of that “cell” then were used to divert material aid from authentic Zionist circles, to 
provide false information to visiting American Jews, and, most importantly, to sow 
doubts regarding the authenticity of other Ukrainian cells.958 In a much more famous 
operation, Aleksandr Lipavskii, a doctor from Uzbekistan recruited as a KGB agent in the 
1960s to rescue his father (a factory manager charged with “economic crimes”), was able 
to infiltrate Zionist circles in Moscow and to become especially close to the Anatoly 
Shcharanskii.959 On March 5, 1977, Lipavskii “published” an open letter in Izvestiia in 
which he (or his KGB ghost writer) charged that Moscow Zionists were in the employ of 
the CIA, providing it with state secrets and anti-Soviet slander- in exchange for dollars, 
gifts, Western consumer goods, and lavish attention received from sundry Western 
                                                          
956 Khlebnikov, “Shpion,” 56. 
957 Shlomo Shpiro, “Soviet Espionage in Israel, 1973-1991,” Intelligence and National Security 30, no. 4 
(2015), 486-507. 
958 “Dokladnaia zapiska o meropriatiakh protiv zarubezhnykh sionistkikh organizatsii, 5/2/1982,” DGA 
SBU f. 16, op. 7, spr. 66, ark. 219-222. 
959 Kosharovskii, Evrei, 3: 159-169. 
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visitors – an open letter that served as the opening shot of Shcharanskii’s unprecedented 
trial for espionage.960 
While even by the standards of Soviet treatment of dissidents, Shcharanskii’s trial 
was unusual, the tactic of associating refuseniks with foreign money was perhaps the best 
rhetorical weapon the Soviet Union could employ in the battle against transnational 
Zionism. In the same way the rhetorical weight of the official assault on black marketeers 
and frivolous girls under Khrushchev was transposed onto dissidents in the 1970s, the 
language of Khrushchev’s campaign against “economic criminals,” and the stereotypes 
that underpinned it were repurposed to combat would-be emigrants.  
In this spirit, the Soviet media broke its silence on the topic of cross-border illicit 
trade when it involved would-be Jewish immigrants. Sovetskaia kul’tura, in a story with 
the tellingly dehumanizing title “Insects,” relayed the story of one David Klain, a former 
Soviet citizen and now a Budapest factory manager, who used business travel to Moscow 
to smuggle out the ill-gotten gains of Jewish-Azeri black marketeers so that they would 
have them available upon emigration.961  Even more telling was the story of one Leviev, 
as told by Trud. Leviev, a Tadjiki Jew, made a fortune from textile and jewelry trade with 
the connivance of local authorities. He then used foreigners to smuggle his profits abroad, 
to prepare for his pending emigration. Leviev, the story did not neglect to mention, was 
the recipient of wartime medals, even though “he spent the War running around Central 
                                                          
960 Reprinted in L.N Smirnov et al (ed.), Belaia kniga: fakty, svidetelstva, dokumenty (Moscow: 
Iuridicheskaia literature, 1979, 181-184. 
961 “Tarakany.” Sovetksaia kul’tura, 25/12/1977. 
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Asia and did not spend a day in the military,” an open allusion to the widespread myth 
Soviet Jews avoided frontline service by escaping to Central Asia during the war.962 
In a similar vein, Zionist travelers bearing gifts for refuseniks could serve as the 
living embodiment of the official argument about Soviet Zionism as product of avarice 
and treason. Mark Glotter, a 20 year old University of Michigan student, was one 
emissary cast into such role. Glotter, an activist associated with the Student Struggle for 
Soviet Jewry, was a member of a student tour group of the Soviet Union, doubling as a 
Zionist emissary. In Kyiv, days before his scheduled departure home, he sustained food 
poisoning,963 along with other members of the group. In the hospital, he recalls, he was 
kept isolated from other patients, and underwent interrogation by men who he presumed 
were KGB officers, who pressured him to write a letter of apology to the Soviet people 
for his actions. After his release from the hospital, he discovered other members of his 
group were sick, and was interrogated again, in his hotel group, and threatened with 
lengthy imprisonment. Pressured and alone, he agreed to provide a televised confession 
of his crimes against the Soviet people, and was subsequently deported.964  His 
confession was broadcast on Ukrainian TV, incorporated into a widely circulating White 
Book on Zionist subversion released by the Soviet authorities,965 and featured in a 1977 
central Soviet television documentary entitled “The Soul Buyers” [Skupshchiki dush] which 
                                                          
962 “Raskhititeli,” Trud 1/9/1975. 
963 According to John Barron’s interviews with KGB defectors, this was a common Soviet practice in 
operations against foreigners, KGB, 121. 
964 Interview with Mark Glotter, 10/14/2014. 
965 L.N. Smirnov (ed.), Belaia kniga: fakty, svidetelstva, dokumenty (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 
1979).   
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was widely interpreted by Soviet Zionists as an indication of a coming clampdown.966 And 
indeed, in the following years, Soviet audiences were treated to similar “confessions” by seized 
travelers.967 
 
 
 
                                                          
966 Kosharovskii, Evrei, 3: 157-158. 
967 See, for example, “Korobeinitsy ot sionizma,” Leningradskaia Pravda 8/4/1984, detailing the arrestof 
two American emissaries detained while “bent under the weight of their enormous rucksacks” staffed with 
gifts for Zionist. Text cited in Beizer, “Financing the Movement,” 386. Kassis’ writings were heavily 
featured in this effort. See L. Kassis et al., Caught in the Act (Moscow Progress: 1977), 187-205. This 
collection of broadsides included such gems as “Zionist Twins,” and “Travelling Salesmen from 
Philadelphia.” See also the sequel to the original White Book (A.I Filatova, Belaia kniga: novye fakty, 
svidetel’stva, dokumenty (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1985). 
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Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3: Books, gifts and Money Seized from “Emissaries” and 
Marc Glotter providing his confession 
 (Source: Belaia Kniga. Fakty, svidetelstva, Dokumenty). 
 
Deterring the KGB 
 
All this meant that the KGB enjoyed a share of successes in its battles against “Zionist 
peddlers.” Even among Nativ’s carefully selected emissaries, some chose to abort their 
missions when they hit Soviet soil, and others reported feelings of constant anxiety that 
made every-day occurrences (like fartsovshchiki approaching to buy one’s jeans), or even 
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approaches by Jews with a smattering of Hebrew appear as a KGB trap.968 Among the 
refuseniks, uncertainty about who was and wasn’t a KGB source was a fact of life. 969 
 And yet, the fact remains that, even during the darkest years of the Soviet Zionist 
movement (during the Andropov interlude, when emigration was frozen, “Prisoners of 
Zion” proliferated, and many refuseniks gave up on the cause), foreign traffic didn’t taper 
off, and the informal institutional environment built by Soviet activists and their Western 
supporters remained intact. Briefing materials for travelers emphasized prudence, safety 
protocols, and avoiding possible provocations and violations of Soviet law- but gave no 
impression that they were preparing travelers for physical danger.970 A series of oral history 
interviews with former emissaries reveal that few of them fretted or feared travel to the 
Soviet Union.971 As one British-Israeli traveler put it: “the worst they could do was put me 
on a plane to London, and I wasn’t enjoying the Soviet Union much anyway.”972 And 
indeed, during the 25-year run of Zionist travel, not a single visitor was put on trial for 
violations of Article 70 of the Soviet constitution.  
 So, we are back to the inquiry with which we finished chapter 4. Why did the Soviet 
alarm at Zionist machinations and awareness of the crucial role of Zionist travelers in 
supporting the refuseniks not translate into resolute action? As usual, Soviet archives are 
rather quiet on the question – and, with the exception of the KGB, the general impression 
                                                          
968 Rosner, bi-Netivei, 91-92. See also Harrison, Passover Revisited, 140-142. 
969 Kosharovskii, Evrei, 4:219. 
970 “See, for example, ““Shorthand Guide for Soviet Tour, 4/14/1977,” NCSJ Records, Soviet Jewry 
Movement Archives, Box 12, folder 3. 
971 Interviews with Mark Glotter, Avner Greenberg, Sylvia J. Yehiel, Rabbi Bobby Sacks, Stephen 
Meizlish, conducted in September-October 2014. 
972 Interview with Avner Greenberg.  
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they create is that many Soviet officials charged with dealing with the problem simply 
wished it didn’t exist, at least as far as the paperwork they failed to produce about it 
indicates.973 And yet, the scope of the Soviet Jewry Movement activities, the multitude of 
fronts on which it engaged the Soviet state, and the vast paper trail it left behind, allow us 
to infer some answers.  
 A good starting point is a series of Soviet actions, or rather pointed inactions, in the 
summer and spring of 1973. In March of that year, Yossi Klein Halevi, a self-described 
“Jewish extremist” loosely associated with Meir Kahane’s JDL (which made a name for 
itself by direct action and terrorist activities aimed at Soviet targets on American soil- 
including Intourist offices),974 organized a group trip of young Jewish radicals to the Soviet 
Union, planning a demonstration at the central OVIR (the MVD unit in charge of 
processing emigration requests). The purpose of the trip was to get arrested, and if possible 
sent to Siberia, in order to become martyrs for the plight of Soviet Jewry. The group 
infiltrated OVIR’s Moscow offices, unfurled its banners, and quickly got ejected from the 
building by burly men who pointedly avoided arresting the Americans. Knowing that they 
“simply had to be arrested,” Klein Halevi’s group loitered outside- until they were  taken 
to a police station, where they were given cookies, and then told that as first-time violators, 
they were forgiven and could go back to their tour.975 A few months later, another group 
                                                          
973 Afer 1967, I was able to find only one instance in which the Intourist senior brass discussed their Zionist 
problem, “Stenogramma zasedaniia…26/5/1976, GARF, f. 9612, op.3, d.1014, l. 156. Even more striking, 
the international department of the Soviet Ministry of Justice, which faced serious onslaught from Zionist 
visitors (see below), has no evidence of it in its (admittedly, thin) record. (GARF, f. 9492, op. 8). 
974 Beckerman, When they Come, 170, 211,231. 
975 Klein Halevi, Extremist, 140-146. 
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of JDL activists, in transit from New York to Istanbul and lacking Soviet visas, touched 
down in Sheremetyevo airport, planning to break out to Moscow. Soviet authorities 
responded by providing them with rooms at the airport hotel, and “proper leisure, food, 
phone calls to the American embassy and offer of Moscow sightseeing in a bus with a tour 
guide.”976 
There was little mystery regarding why these two incidents unfolded the way they 
did: in Klein-Halevi’s case, seven US Senators were in Moscow for official meetings on 
the implications of the Jackson-Vannick amendment and were glad to be seen giving 
support for the fight for Soviet Jewry,977 and the Sheremetyevo visit coincided with 
Nixon’s visit to Moscow, and “neither side was interested in any excesses.”978 
 To the extent they cared about détente and bilateral negotiations, JDL-style 
radicals considered such activities a betrayal of Soviet Jewry to “new Pharaohs.”979 
However, while it was by no means enthusiastic about détente, the larger Soviet Jewry 
movement, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, was very well aware that détente 
represented only one facet of the larger Soviet bet on international exchanges as a 
modernization strategy.980 Armed with this insight, the international Soviet Jewry 
movement proved capable of leveraging networks of exchange that increasingly bound 
the Soviet Union to the rest of global society, by both shrewdly nestling itself into these 
                                                          
976 “Andropov to TsK KPSS, 23/6/1973,” cited in Morozov, Dokumenty, 175-176. 
977 Klein-Halevi, Extremist, 147-148. 
978  “Andropov to TsK KPSS, 23/6/1973,” Morozov, Dokumenty, 176. 
979 Klein-Halevi, Extremist, is an indispensable guide to the world of détente era Jewish radicals. 
980 On exchanges as modernization strategy, see Sari Autio-Sarasmo, “Stagnation or Not? The Brezhnev 
Leadership and East-West Interaction,” in Fainberg and Kalinovsky (ed.), Stagnation, 86-104.  
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networks, and by being able to credibly threaten damage to them in case of Soviet 
counter-attack. 
Put simply, if in the 1950s Soviet authorities could relatively easily deter 
provincial Soviet Jews - for whom emigration was a distant dream and the KGB a 
concrete reality - from contacting rare Israeli visitors in small and easily surrounded train 
stations, things were much more difficult in the 1970s and 1980s. The refusenik 
movement was concentrated in the largest Soviet cities, where even the KGB’s enormous 
resources did not allow it to surveil every foreigner at will.981 Zionist activists were well-
educated professionals with good understanding of how Western media operated and also 
had relatively little to lose from meeting with foreigners, having given up on their Soviet 
careers.982 High profile visitors- most commonly American politicians,983 but also 
celebrities such as the Indian maestro Zubin Mehta,984 relished opportunities to 
demonstrate support for refuseniks. Celebrities who were hesitant to raise the issue while 
on Soviet soil faced quiet pressure to do so. In March 1975, for instance, the NCSJ 
appealed to the cast of the high-profile Soviet-American co-production Blue Bird, then in 
Leningrad, with the request that they publicly address the cases of two young imprisoned 
refuseniks.985 A decade later the star cast-member of Blue Bird, Jane Fonda, back in the 
                                                          
981 Kalugin, Spymaster, 347. 
982 Sarah Fainberg, “Friends Abroad: how the Soviet Campaign for Soviet Jewry Influenced Activists in the 
Soviet Union,” in Ro’i, Movement, 402-403. 
983 See, for example, Alexander Lerner, Change of Heart (Minneapolis, MN: Lerner Publications, 189-
203), Harrison, Passover Revisited, 177, “Former Refusenik Recalls Kennedy’s Helping Hand,” accessed 
online at: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=112264395/.  
984 Keis-Kuna, Caged, 225-228,  
985 “Telegram from NCSJ to Jane Fonda, Tom Hayden, George Kukor [and others], 3/25/1975, NCSJ 
Records, Soviet Jewry Movement Archives,  Box 2, Folder 18. On the film, see Tony Shaw, “Nightmare on 
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USSR on a peace tour, was the first foreigner to meet with recently released Prisoner of 
Zion Ida Nudel.986 While the KGB could sometimes prevent such meetings by detaining 
refuseniks or forcing them to go out of town during high profile foreign visits,987 on the 
rare occasions when such high profile personae were detained, reputational damages to 
the Soviet Union were surely greater than any possible benefit it gained in deterrence.988 
Even travelers not protected by celebrity status had ways to deter the Soviets from 
punitive action. Most importantly, Zionist travelers (and their briefers) were surely 
familiar with the Soviet dissident tactic of demanding the Soviet state respect its own 
laws, and, unlike the former, had enough leverage to use it to their benefit.989 Thus, when 
the Canadian human rights lawyer Irving Cotler, going to a wedding in a Moscow suburb 
with the refusenik scientist Aleksandr Lerner, was detained for going into a closed area, 
he stumped his Soviet interrogators by pointing out his permission slip from Intourist and 
refusing to speak or sign any documents. After several hours, they had little choice but to 
bring him back to his hotel and instruct him to leave the country. Even before he landed 
                                                          
Nevsky Prospekt: The Blue nevsky as a Curious Instance of U.S.-Soviet Film Collaboration during the Cold 
War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 14, no.1 (2012),3-33.  
986  “Jane Fonda Speaks on Behalf of Soviet Jews, UPI 3/15/1985. A clipping of a Time Magazine report on 
Fonda’s tour is found at the NCSJ Records, Soviet Jewry Movement Archives, Box 2, Folder 18. 
 
987 “Spetsialnoe soobshchenie, 1/4/1978,” DGA SBU, f. 16, op.7, spr. 35, ark. 277-278. 
988 Lerner, Change of Heart, 188-191, describes the KGB’s horror when it incidentally arrested the 
Congressman James Shoyer who was visiting his apartment, especially since this arrest was broadcast on 
American radio within 15 minutes. On a repeat visit, Shoyer thanked Lerner for helping boost his 
popularity at home. 
989 The Soviet human rights activist Valerii Chalidze even prepared a memorandum for foreigners facing 
interrogation, modelled after equivalent documents prepared for domestic dissidents. Valerii Chalidze, 
Inostranets v SSSR. Iurideicheskaia pamiatka (Benson, VT: Chalidze Publications, 1980).  
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in London, the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged an official complaint with 
Soviet authorities.990  
Beyond such dramatic encounters, foreigners had a myriad of ways to confound 
Soviet authorities. To take an easy example, even if they knew that the person they were 
examining was a Zionist emissary, customs officers could hardly confiscate the cameras 
they carried (which were then gifted to refuseniks). Soviet regulations prohibited the 
distribution of religious items and anti-Soviet propaganda, but foreigners were allowed to 
bring these items for personal use. And how were customs officials to know which piece 
of luggage was Zionist contraband and which intended for personal use?991 Nativ also 
could manipulate the subtleties of Soviet customs: since tourists coming Scandinavia on 
cruise ships enjoyed visa free travel, and faced much less stringent customs procedures 
than foreigners coming through other channels, it engaged Christian Zionists from 
Scandinavia to lease small tourist boats, sail up the Baltic shore, and off-load rucksacks 
full of Zionist literature at every stop.992 
Intourist was naturally the site of many such clashes, with its guides as general 
rule pretending to ignore what tourists did in their free time, as long as they avoided 
arguments and made a show of attending sightseeing tours, recalled one frequent Zionist 
traveler.993 Even in the early 1980s, when Intourist attempted to clamp down on evasive 
tourists, all they needed to do was “invent some stomach illness or headache. Intourist 
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guides knew what was going on, but they were understanding.”994 During the 1980s, as 
assaults on refuseniks and emissaries intensified, Soviet Jewry movement organizers 
were applying behind-the-scenes pressure on Intourist’s foreign partners to complain 
about the negative effects such attacks were having on travel to the Soviet Union. In June 
1986, NCSJ filed suit against Intourist’s American affiliate arguing consumer fraud, 
alleging that Intourist made false claims in its advertisement by promising that its clients 
would not be harassed in the Soviet Union.995 
And here lay the rub: Zionist travelers could leverage not only nebulous concepts 
like global public opinion but could harm specific Soviet interests in ways that required 
Soviet elites to find ways to live with their presence on Soviet soil. For instance, while 
direct evidence for such a contention is lacking, it doesn’t take much imagination to 
realize that youth exchanges like the one Levitt went on would have run aground if 
Soviet authorities attempted to screen them for Jewish travelers- and thus deny many a 
Komsomol official and/or KGB asset an American junket.996 Inna Rubin-Akselrod, 
widow of the sinologist Vitalii Rubin, a leading refusenik activist, recalls that Western 
sinologists working on behalf of her husband convinced the World Congress of Oriental 
Studies to choose Mexico City over Moscow as a location for its 1976 meeting.  This 
choice of venue gravely embarrassed Bobojon Ghafurov, the functionary in charge of 
                                                          
994  Sat, cited in Kosharovskii, Evrei, 4:90-91. 
995 “Harassment of American Visitors Charged in Lawsuit against Soviet Travel Agency,” Jewish 
Telegraphic Agency, 6/27/1986. This lawsuit never went to court, maybe because by 1987/8, conditions 
changed dramatically. 
996 On Soviet uses of international exchanges, see Sergei Zhuk, “Academic détente": IREX files, Academic 
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Soviet oriental studies. Ghafurov, as Masha Kirasirova shows,997 was a figure of some 
influence in Soviet foreign policy circles, and a hit to his prestige could plausibly have 
played a part in Rubin receiving permission to emigrate shortly afterwards.998 
 While these personalized issues must remain a matter of speculation, we are on 
more solid ground when examining the use Western activists made of international 
exchange systems to get inside Soviet borders. For instance, as the Soviet Union was 
lobbying the International Olympic Committee to host the Olympics, it could not deny 
Israeli athletes access to competitions in the Soviet Union, and the latter could use the 
opportunity to “distribute propaganda magazines, religious literature and religious 
artifacts.”999 On a far grander scale, when in 1977, four years after the Soviet Union 
joined the International Copyright Convention, and two years after the Helsinki accords, 
Soviet officials were negotiating with American publishers in an attempt to get them to 
join the inaugural Moscow Book Fair, the Americans, under pressure from American 
Jewish organizations, agreed to join only on the condition that Israeli publishers were 
                                                          
997 Masha Kirasirova, “Sons of Muslims in Moscow: Soviet Central Asian Mediators to the Foreign East, 
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invited too.1000 In the Fair itself, The Israelis, in collaboration with friendly Westerners, 
staged a massive operation that distributed vast amounts of “Zionist propaganda” to 
hundreds of local Jews who swarmed their exhibits.1001 
 Professional exchanges were perhaps the most important forum in which Western 
activists could demonstrate their strength. Lawyers were one key group in this regard. 
Like Cotler, many Jewish North American lawyers were passionately committed to the 
refusenik cause, perhaps because it allowed them to resolve the tension between their 
universalistic commitment to human rights and their attachment to the Jewish nation.1002 
Soviet Jewry movement lawyers offered their services to defend refuseniks, publicized 
their plight in the West, and incessantly badgered Soviet officials about the Jewish 
emigration problem.1003 And if the Soviets had in mind to use visa regulations or other 
procedures to cut off the stream of such visitors, movement lawyers had powerful 
counter-measures in their disposal. When in the early 1980s, Soviet legal authorities, 
seeking to integrate their practices into international commercial law, negotiated with the 
American Bar Association the establishment of a formal exchange agreement, a 
considerable faction of the latter body vowed to resist any such agreement unless all 
                                                          
1000 Kevin DiCamillo, “How a Book Fair forever Changed, US/Soviet Literary Relations,” Publishing 
Perspectives,” 8/27/2014, accessed online at: http://publishingperspectives.com/2014/08/how-a-book-fair-
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1001 Aisen, Count us in, 163-164; Beckerman, When they Come, 428-43; Rosner, Demamah, 171-186. 
Jewish organizations and Israeli publishers kept participating the subsequent biennial book fairs in 
Moscow. Bartov, Yarid, is an account of the 1989 Israeli exhibit that drew hundreds of thousands of 
attendees. 
1002 See, for instance, Alan Dershowitz, Chutzpah (New York: Touchstone, 1991), 209-250. 
1003 For a snapshot of the activities of Jewish-American lawyers visiting the Soviet Union, see the travel 
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American legal delegations to the Soviet Union contained a strong contingent of lawyers 
associated with the Soviet Jewry movement.1004 
Scientific, cultural, and technological exchanges were an even more important 
ingredient of networks connecting the Soviet Union to the outside world that the Soviet 
Jewry movement could leverage for its purposes. Some of the actions taken by exchange 
scholars were individualized. Thus, for instance, one French philosopher who repeatedly 
travelled to the Soviet Union under the aegis of the French Academy of Sciences 
exchange agreement with its Soviet counterpart, not only taught classes on Jewish 
tradition to refuseniks but also browbeat Soviet customs officers into letting her keep 
notes with information she received from the refuseniks, arguing they were part of her 
research project and thus protected by the exchange agreement.1005 Collective actions 
were even more powerful: In 1980, an organization devoted to the release of Anatolii 
Shcharanskii and dissident physicists Andrei Sakharov and Yuri Orlov was able to get 
8,000 scientists to cease visits and other forms of cooperation with the Soviet Union.1006 
As was often the case, visits to the Soviet Union proved an even more powerful 
tool of the Soviet Jewry movement than travel boycotts. We have already noted above the 
crucial contribution of scientific networks in fostering aid to the refuseniks. At times, 
scientists’ visits could be transformed into both powerful public relations coups for the 
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Soviet Jewry movement, and subtle demonstrations of the price Soviet authorities would 
pay if they decided to deal decisively with the problem. Thus, in April 1974, Soviet 
authorities had to confront a mass international outpouring of support for the organizers 
of an international session of the Moscow Scientific Seminar- the most famous of 
refusenik semi-regular gatherings in the 1970s. Mark Azbel’ and Aleskandr Voronel’, the 
seminar’s organizers, used a lacuna in Soviet law - the lack of any ban on independently 
organizing international scientific meetings  - to send invitations to hundreds of foreign 
scientists, many of whom (including 8 Nobel Prize winners) gladly accepted. Faced with 
the prospect of a massive Zionist gathering on Soviet soil, Soviet authorities refused visas 
to foreign attendees, arrested the seminar organizers, and scattered the few foreign 
scientists present in Moscow for other purposes who attempted to attend it. However, 
Voronel’, Azbel’, and many other seminar attendees were allowed to emigrate in the next 
2 years.1007  
In an even more powerful action, the 1984 Congress Federation of European 
Biochemical Societies in Moscow was a Zionist tour de force. Again, the Soviets could 
not deny the Israeli delegation, headed by biochemist and ex-President Ephraim Katzir, 
permission to attend the Congress. They and many other participants used the Congress 
to smuggle large amounts of Zionist materials into the Soviet Union. Some scientists 
included dedications to refusenik scientists on their slides, while others conducted side-
seminars with Moscow refuseniks.1008 The Soviets retaliated by deporting a small number 
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of participants, and briefly detaining Katzir and his wife during a visit to Leningrad– a 
detention Soviet authorities were then forced to disavow when it became international 
news.1009 And what better epitaph could there be for the Soviet effort to deter the “Zionist 
peddlers” 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Somewhere in the 1990s, Yasha Kazakov, now known as Ya’kov Kedmi and serving as 
head of Nativ since 1992, went on an official trip to Moscow. There, he met Filipp 
Bobkov, the now retired chief of the defunct Fifth Department, for a professional summit 
of sorts. According to Kedmi, this was Bobkov’s message to Nativ: “you beat us, you 
broke us. Using the West, you managed to keep the refusenik movement strong, and then 
used that movement to make us lose the Soviet Jews.”1010 
 Whether one can trust this second-hand account, or whether this was an attempt at 
flattery, or perhaps post-Soviet depression on Bobkov’s part, this declaration rings far too 
strong. Despite the Soviet Jewry Movement’s best efforts, the Soviet Union did not open 
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its gates until 1989. Prominent Zionists were as likely to be imprisoned and sent to the 
Far East as released and allowed to immigrate to the Middle East until perestroika began 
in earnest, and Shcharanskii remained in prison for six long years after 8,000 scientists 
vowed to boycott the Soviet Union until he was released.  
 And still, the success the international Soviet Jewry Movement enjoyed in forcing 
the Soviets to de-facto tolerate the existence of a Jewish religious-nationalist community 
on Soviet soil was evidence of the extent to which growing integration with the outside 
world challenged the strategic assumptions of the Soviet state and its coercive agencies. 
The latter found themselves constrained by growing Soviet dependence on the economic, 
reputational, and scientific-technological benefits of international exchanges- and the 
serious threat to the welfare of the Soviet state that massive coercive actions against 
foreign visitors would have represented.  Thus, even as it continued to operate on the 
basis of a deeply ingrained institutional paranoia, the Soviet state, and especially its 
sword and shield, the KGB, consistently failed to fully operationalize it. This partial 
withdrawal of the Soviet absolute sovereignty claims allowed a social space for the 
emergence and survival of a nationalist Jewish community in the Soviet Union- and the 
flourishing of the various social ecologies and non-conformist movements we covered in 
the preceding 2 chapters.  As long as the underpinnings of Soviet power remained intact, 
these subcultures were effectively kept to the margins of Soviet life. But when the 
foundations of Soviet power were knocked out under glasnost’, the full import of this 
gradual withdrawal was clear for all to see. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Let us imagine a visitor to Moscow, arriving somewhere around 1985 – a certain Mister 
T. perhaps.  If Mister T. had visited Moscow before, perhaps 10 or 20 years prior, he 
would find that very little had changed. Intourist hotels, now built by Finns, French or 
Americans, are better than they used to be, but paint is already peeling, faucets are 
broken, toilet paper comes at a premium, and even at Intourist restaurants, food supplies 
can be spotty. Service is as rude and inefficient as ever, but one gets what one wants in 
the end, possibly after some money changes hands. During his sight-seeing tours, Mr. 
T.’s Intourist guide, who perhaps is preparing for a competition for the best referat on the 
70th Anniversary of the October Revolution,1011 is as full of facts and figures on the 
momentous achievements of Soviet power as ever.  
In his hotel lobby, Mr. T. might find, with some annoyance, posters warning 
locals about foreigners carrying Bibles in one hand and a dagger in another.1012 And yet, 
the strange men badgering him for jeans are as active as ever, as are girls offering him 
adventure for a night. If Mr. T. is on a group tour he might observe guides pretending not 
to notice that some members of his group are deliberately absent from most excursions – 
                                                          
1011 “Polozhenie o trer’em vsesouiznom konkurse gidov-perevodchikov sistemy goskominturista SSSR na 
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and maybe followed around by furtive men in dark suits. If Mr. T. is there to make 
contact with dissidents or co-religionists, he will find the experience harrowing and the 
besuited men menacing, but probably not so menacing as to abort his mission. Like 
everything else in the late Soviet Union, the complex ecology woven around the hundreds 
of thousands of “Mister T.s” who visit the USSR yearly seems to be in a state of 
inefficient, but stable, equilibrium. 
And then, it all dissolved into air. For Intourist, the early days of perestroika 
seemed like glimpses of a golden era, as it hosted record-breaking numbers of tourists,1013 
was allowed, for the first time, to form joint ventures with foreign firms,1014 and was 
bombarded by ambitious, sometimes fantastic,1015 pitches for investment projects from 
foreign businessmen eager to colonize the virgin Soviet market. Between 1988 and 1990, 
Intourist went through a reorganization in the spirit of “full cost-accounting, self-
financing and hard currency profitability.”1016 The Joint Stock Firm Intourist yet again 
emerged as a separate entity, owned by Goskominturist (the latest incarnation of the 
central Intourist bureaucracy), and a number of commercial operations were set up on the 
basis of functional and territorial Intourist units (for example, Intourist-Moscow, 
                                                          
1013 Over 2.7 million tourists visited the Soviet Union in 1989.  (Innostrannyi turizm, 9). 
1014 In 1987, for instance, Intourist and Finnair formed the first joint company operating on Soviet soil, 
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Intourist-Leningrad, Intourist-Transport, and Intourist-Servis). Between this 
reorganization and infusion of foreign capital and knowledge, Intourist was set to 
conclude its integration into global markets, as (in theory)  a flexible entity, combining a 
centralized infrastructure (for instance, Intourist’s IT systems) and decentralized 
operations of its sub-units.1017 
Unfortunately, things did not turn out this way at all.  Most fundamentally, 
outside large cities, Intourist hotels and departments, faced with the collapse of Soviet 
supply networks, could barely feed their clients, let alone prepare for a hypothetical 
tourist surge.1018 By 1989/90, in some areas of the Soviet Union, say, Northern Ossetia, 
the only guests in Intourist hotels were journalists and diplomats attempting to broker 
shaky cease fires.1019 Republican Foreign Tourism Administrations, long frustrated by the 
center’s practice of impounding all their hard currency proceeds, rebelled against the 
center in 1988/9,1020 and by 1991, had mostly exited the scene. (In Ukraine, for instance, 
the question whether Intourist existed or not in 1992 was a matter of some debate).1021 
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information. This and the following paragraph is based on RSFSR Foreign Tourism Administration 
archives, and media reports cited below. 
1018 See, for instance, “Iu. A. Dmitriev, [Vladimir Oblispolkom] to Sovmin RSFSR, 06/12/1990,” GARF f. 
A-10004, op. 1, d. 836, ll. 9-11. 
1019  Personal communication, Ambassador Richard Norland, Tbilisi, December 2012. On travel in the soon 
to be former Soviet Union in 1990/199, see Von Bremzen, Art of Soviet Cooking, ch. 8.  
1020 “I. Kalin [Chairman, Moldavian Sovmin], to V.M Kamentsev [International Economic Cooperation 
Comittee, Sovmin USSR], 10/12/1988,” GARF f. A-10004, op.1, d. 781, ll. 181-182. 
1021 Thus, the journalist Henry Kamm, (“In Ukraine, Bad Old Ways,” New York Times 4/5/1992) 
complained that with Intourist’s “dissolution” in Ukraine, both travelers and employees were defenseless 
against chaos. In response, Alexey Mesiatsev, the Deputy Director of Intourist in New York angrily wrote 
that Intourist did exist and provided services all over the CIS. To which Kamm replied these would be 
welcome news to Intourist employees who “told the company went the way of the Soviet Union,” “Intourist 
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 In the Russian republic (RSFSR) itself, confusion reigned. The Intourist system 
became driven by a complex (and unfortunately ill-documented) struggle that, roughly 
speaking, pitted the RSFR Foreign Tourism Administration (now subordinated to 
Yeltsin’s Russian government) and cooperatives organized by Intourist staff against the 
central all-Union apparat, now entrenched in Intourist’s commercial structures, backed 
by hotel managers and local authorities. Based on documentation produced by the 
RSFSR Main Administration, the only extant archival evidence of this struggle, the 
former envisioned the new Intourist system as a network of worker-owned enterprises 
provided with informational and transport infrastructure by a state-owned Intourist-like 
entity, while the latter sought to municipalize and/or privatize (or, as the Russians say, 
prikhvatat’) Intourist’s considerable assets.1022 In 1992, Intourist split into 2 bodies, each 
laying claim to the brand, and holding various bits of its erstwhile empire.1023 Meanwhile, 
cities seized (and often sold for pittances or transferred to cronies) Intourist’s real-estate 
holdings.1024  Tourism and state proceeds from it collapsed, due to both the general 
economic crisis and the dissolution of Intourist’s infrastructure, marketing, and network 
of international partners.1025 Thousands of small, under-capitalized and often fraudulent 
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1023 “Imushchestvo Goskominturista eshche ne dodelili,” Kommersant’, 01/20/1992. 
1024 Ibid; Ivan Golunov, “Imperskie ambitsii,” Forbes.ru, 11/03/2005, accessed online at  
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tour firms sold a dizzying array of services to the shrinking market, often at fire-sale 
prices, with some of their members calling on the government to step in and recreate 
Intourist, as “wild businesses” were destroying the industry.1026 By the mid-1990s, the 
former apparat faction, having won the battle for the brand name but having lost nearly 
all of Intourist’s hotels and other assets in the process, found a home in the Sistema 
holding company owned by billionaire Vladimir Evtushenkov.1027 In the meantime, 
foreign tourism in Russia in 2015 barely exceeded its 1989 numbers.1028 
The other elements of foreign experience of the Soviet Union covered in this 
dissertation also either dissolved or were transformed beyond recognition. 
Unsurprisingly, Intourist’s propaganda functions gave up quickly and without much 
resistance. After the 1987 celebration of the 70th Anniversary of the October Revolution, 
1988 saw a rapid shift, as Intourist celebrated 1,000 years of Christianity in Russia.1029 In 
                                                          
1026 “N.V Pozhidaev [Manager, SP Georgii Tour Firm] to B.N. Temnikov, 1/10/1991,” GARF f.A-10004, 
op. 1, d. 850, ll.16-18.  See also “V tiskakh dikogo biznesa,” Trud, 8/19/1991; “Firmy predpochitauiut 
voinu tsen original’nosti,” Izvestiia, 3/4/1993; Celestine Bohlen, “Tourism Transformed,” New York Times, 
3/12/1992. 
1027 In 2014, Intourist’s gross sales, amounted to $71 million- the vast majority of which came from 
outgoing tourism. “Sistema JSFC, Annual Report, 2014,” accessed online at: 
http://www.sistema.com/fileadmin/user_upload/annual_reports/annual_report.pdf.  Since, conditions 
deteriorated further, and Evtushenkov was forced to concede that for now, Sistema considers Intourist a 
sunk cost. “Intourist ne prodaetsia,” Hotelier.pro 9/7/2015, accessed online at: 
http://hotelier.pro/news/item/441-sistema/441-sistema . Both accessed on 6/1/2016. 
1028 Official Russian statistics registered 20 million tourist entries in 2015. However, 15 million of these 
were citizens of former Soviet republics - the vast majority of whom were migrant laborers . Of the 
remaining 5 million tourist entries from non-former republics, about 3 million are either from countries in 
which a significant proportion of travel is for purposes of commerce or labor (Poland and China) or from 
countries with significant former Soviet populations (Germany and Israel) - which would put “pure” tourist 
travel at about 2 million- just about equivalent to 1989. (For official statistics see 
http://www.russiatourism.ru/contents/statistika/statisticheskie-pokazateli-vzaimnykh-poezdok-grazhdan-
rossiyskoy-federatsii-i-grazhdan-inostrannykh-gosudarstv/).  
1029 M. Chernov, K tysiachelitiiu vvedeiniia khristianstva na Rusi (Moscow: Goskominturist, 2008).  
  
   
 
  341 
 
 
 
the next 2 years, guide training was stripped of its ideological components, Intourist 
guides became willing to speak about difficult topics, and were allowed to maintain 
personal relationships with their clients - and even visit them abroad.1030  For many 
Intourist guides, the crumbling of the system offered new opportunities, first by forming 
cooperatives providing services to Intourist, and then as independent tour operators, 
especially for the rapidly expanding Russian outgoing tourism market.1031 For many other 
tour guides, however, the 1990s brought loss of job security, prestige, and blat, as well as 
the pains of deprofessionalization.1032 Things were no doubt even more dire for Intourist 
doormen, waiters, and dezhurnye, who lost their uniquely privileged positions vis-à-vis 
foreigners and their consumer goods. 
If, as I have argued, the demimonde registered a symbolic victory over Soviet 
power, many of its practitioners discovered, to their misfortune, the extent to which their 
business was entangled with that power. The heyday of the foreign currency speculator 
ended quickly, as, starting in 1988, the Soviet state gradually loosened its exchange 
regime, thus sharply constraining the arbitrage opportunities they enjoyed.1033Russian 
currency markets were, of course, nowhere near “normal” even after the shock therapy of 
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Little Glasnost for Foreigners,” Star Tribune, 11/29/1987; Personal Communication with Professor Anna 
Krylova, November 2015, Philadelphia, PA. 
1031 “Shakurov, “S prikhodom Rossii.”  
1032 “Chem otlichaetsia Rossiiskii gid perevodchik ot Sovetskogo,” Gorod 812, 02/28/2013. Accessed 
online at: http://www.online812.ru/2013/02/28/005/ on 4/5/2015. 
1033 “’Dereviannye’ rubli tozhe den’gi,” Izvestiia, 6/8/1991; Corinne Krupp and Susan J. Linz, “Shock 
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of the early 1990s.  The Russian government still maintained multiple currency regimes 
that provided immense opportunities for well-connected speculariors. Hyper-inflation, 
massive counter-fitting, and the wealth and prestige that came to be associated with those 
holding baksy and kapusta (U.S dollars), kept Russian atttitudes to foreign currency, 
legally, economically and culturally peculiar. Still, businesss largely moved from the 
streets to currency exchange stalls and hastily established banks, often connected to 
emerging business, criminal and government networks.1034 Lucky (and well-connected) 
currency speculators moved into this growing sector, sometimes in route to gathering 
dumbfounding riches,  while less lucky ones had to discover other ways to make ends 
meet.1035 
Fartsovshchiki also did not fare well under the new order. While an impressive 
post-Soviet mythology celebrates their escapades,1036 as a group they enjoyed far less 
post-Soviet success than one would have expected based on their entrepreneurial élan. 
Their place as a key component of urban Russian supply chains was rapidly lost to the 
vast armies of “shuttlers” [chelnoviki] - often desperately poor women who traveled back 
and forth between Russia and abroad, bringing back cheap consumer goods at quantities 
                                                          
1034 Ibid and Alaina Lemon, “’Your Eyes are Green like Dollars: Counterfeit Cash, National Substance and 
Currency Apartheid in 1990s Russia,” Cultural Anthropology 13, no. 1 (1998), 22-55. 
1035 See, for example, the case of Andrei Mel’nichenko, who started his career in the late 1980s and early 
1990s as currency speculator, then opened a network of currency exchange spots, then a bank, and is now 
one of the 10 richest men in Russia. David Hoffman, The Oligarchs: Power and Wealth in the New Russia 
(New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 228-229. 
1036 For instance, the hit TV Show Fartsa aiming to celebrate the adventures of a group of black marketeers 
from the late 1950s to the 1980s, had been running on Channel One since 2015. 
  
   
 
  343 
 
 
 
fartsovshchiki could scarcely dream of.1037 In the Russian business world, access to state 
assets and Party, state and Komsomol networks counted for quite a bit more than access 
to Intourist doormen,1038 meaning that relatively few fartsovshchiki could use their 
business acumen for enrichment. Thus, in a comprehensive study of erstwhile Leningrad 
fartsovshchiki, a Russian journalist found that only a handful of people detained in St. 
Petersburg in the 1980s for badgering foreigners had prominent post-Soviet careers and 
about 50% had no assets whatsoever registered to their names (meaning that they were 
either dead, emigrants, or totally impoverished).1039  
A similar territorial transformation occurred in the sex work field. “Domestic” sex 
work involving foreigners, while it never disappeared,1040 became a mere speck 
compared to the vast wave of international trafficking of women from the former Soviet 
space, fed by poverty and despair, but also, perhaps, by myths about the luxurious lives 
of the interdevochki and Russian women’s desire for Western men rooted in late Soviet 
myths.1041  
                                                          
1037 Irina Mukhina, Women and the Birth of Russian Capitalism: A History of the Shuttle Trade (DeKalb, 
IL: NIU Press, 2015). 
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(Cambridge: MA, University of Harvard Press, 1998). 
1039 Vyshenkov, “kak vymerli.” 
1040 See Mark Ames and Matt Taibbi, The Exile: Sex Drugs and Libel in New Russia (New York: Grove 
Press, 2000), for many stomach-churning examples.  
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 When it came to encounters between foreigners and the KGB, outcomes are 
somewhat murkier. Based on materials from Lithuanian archives, the KGB kept its 
surveillance system intact to the last possible moment – tracking both the foreign 
businessmen who scoured the republic for business opportunities, and Lithuanian North 
Americans whom the KGB (rightly) suspected were assisting nationalist forces.1042 While 
evidence on this issue is lacking, there can be very little doubt that vast elements of the 
KGB’s surveillance, agent, and reserve officer networks (which now included an obscure 
colonel laboring as vice-rector of international affairs at LGU) remained intact.1043  
Yet, things changed. Bible smuggling became unnecessary, as the Soviet 
authorities allowed American evangelicals to legally deliver millions of Bibles.1044 The 
entirety of the clandestine edifice built by Nativ was rendered obsolete, as the Israeli 
embassy reopened and American visitors (including Leon Uris himself) could legally 
bring copies of Exodus into the Soviet Union.1045 In the next few years, nearly 2 million 
Soviet Jews emigrated, and a trickle of American rabbis and Chabad emissaries traveled 
in the opposite direction to establish an institutional Jewish community that to this day 
                                                          
1042 “Agenturnoe soobshchenie, Agent Adrean, 8/18/1989,” LYA, f. K-1, ap. 46, b. 2145, ll. 214-215; “Plan 
raboty I otdela po linii politicheskoi razvedki na 1991 god [draft version, December 1990], LYA, K-18, ap. 
1, b. 491, ll. 57-59. 
1043 Karen Dawasha, Putin’ Cleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013), 13-
104;  Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The New Nobility: the Restoration of Russia’s Security State and 
the Enduring Legacy of the KGB (New York: Public Affairs, 2010), 3-49. 
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12/17/1988. 
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enjoys very close relations to the Russian government.1046 Finally, in a moment that 
perhaps best encapsulated the surrender to global forces, by early 1992, tourists could get 
a guided tour of the KGB headquarters - for $35.1047 
 So, one might reasonably inquire, if our story ends in the total defeat of the 
ultimate guardian of the socialist order by the all-mighty dollar and the “golden hordes” 
of international travelers, is this dissertation but another neo-liberal parable about the 
world becoming “flat,” and humanity surrendering to the “golden fetters”  of democratic, 
transnational capitalism?1048 On some level, the stories told in this dissertation are 
consistent with this narrative. Beginning in the late 1950s, the Soviet institutions 
surveyed here - Intourist, in both its propagandistic and commercial guises, the social-
disciplinarians of the Komsomol, official media, and even the KGB – were all forced to 
make a series of compromises with forces stemming from the Soviet opening up to the 
outside world: increased dependence on foreign capital and technology,  quiet acceptance 
of the impossibility of selling the Soviet way of life to foreigners, and increasing 
tolerance for unsanctioned commercial and, to a lesser extent, political,  interactions with 
foreigners. The new post-Stalin order these compromises shaped was contradictory, 
reactive, and straddled a profound chasm between the ethos of Soviet institutions and the 
illicit practices they tolerated and, at times, engaged in. Seen from this vantage point, 
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such compromises, by no means limited to foriegners and their Soviet interlocutors, 
hollowed out the Soviet order, and made its dissolution seem, using Yurchak’s language 
“completely unsusprising” when the last barriers to the cultural and economic forces of 
Westernization were inadvertently removed under Gorbachev. 
 However, Porous Empire tells another, more complex (and, if one is so inclined, 
darker) story. Soviet institutions were no mere bystanders to the USSR’s move from 
“isolation to globalization,” from late-Stalinist Soviet naïve patriotism to late Soviet 
infatuation with the “True West.”1049 Rather, they actively shaped the terms under which 
this shift unfolded. As this dissertation amply demonstrated, attitudes inherited from the 
Stalinist period: a neo-mercantilist ethic regarding foreign trade, a deep commitment to 
moral purity and social discipline, profound suspicion of the outside world, and refusal to 
bow down to foreign judgments of Soviet reality, still shaped Soviet attitudes towards 
engagement with the outside world well into the 1980s.  
Despite the contradictions that the clash between these attitudes and the realities 
of the post-Stalin period engendered, the institutional resistance of the Soviet state to the 
demands of this order helped shape the course of late Soviet and post-Soviet history. In 
the late Soviet period, the structures of the planned economy constrained the choices of 
even the most “global” of Soviet institutions, Intourist.  Soviet tour guides’ unflinching 
commitment to the official line vexed and amused their Western charges but also served 
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as a reminder of the seemingly unbreakable solidity of the Soviet state. The demimonde 
was an irrepressible social institution that embarrassed Soviet authorities and fed Soviet 
urban obsession with jeans and rock-n’roll – but it was also a marginal sub-culture 
belonging to which carried significant risk and social stigmas. Foreign travel provided 
force multipliers for small networks and communities of dissent, but effective repression 
prevented the transnational institutional building that helped forge liberal pressure groups 
that shaped transitions from authoritarianism to democracy elsewhere:  the vast complex 
of Catholic and civil society institutions, academic communities, trade union activists, all 
able to gain easy access both to foreigners at home and to travel abroad which emerged 
in, say, late socialist Poland or late Francoist Spain was quite inconceivable in the 
USSR.1050   
The late Soviet opening up to the outside world is therefore best understood as a 
case of selective Westernization, or what anthropologist Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing 
memorably termed friction: “the grip of encounter” between local cultures and global 
forces that reshapes non-Western localities but also helps forge new local, and often anti-
Western, communities and identities.1051 From this vantage point, the late Soviet period 
saw not the erosion but the reconfiguration of Soviet identities, as Soviet elites (as well as 
a significant majority of the Soviet body politic) came to embrace some elements of 
                                                          
1050 For Spain, see, Pick, Tourism and Dictatorship. For Poland, see Stewart Shields, “Global Restructuring 
and the Polish State: Transition, Transformation or Transnationalization?” Review of International Political 
Economy 11, no.1 (2004), 131-154 and Anthony Kemp-Walsh, Poland under Communism: A Cold War 
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), esp. 172-268. 
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Western culture, from jeans to rock ‘n roll to European high culture, while maintaing 
fidelity to a highly adversarial view of relations between the Soviet Union and the West.  
This perspective on late Soviet society has the crucial benefit of allowing us to 
historicize contemporary Russian political culture. Following Gorbachev’s brief attempt 
to resolve the contradictions between Soviet institutional attitudes and global structures 
by means of unabashed internationalism and a view of the Soviet Union as an integral 
part of the West,1052 and the near dissolution of Russian institutions in the 1990s, official 
late Soviet views regarding relations between Russia and the West are still woven into the 
fabric of the newly reconstituted Russian state. Here, evidence from the last several years 
is overwhelming that the current Russian regime is both heavily influenced by suspicions 
of the outside world and is displaying an impressive measure of what political scientists 
term “authoritarian learning”- applying lessons from the failures of other authoritarian 
regimes- in regards to the ideological overreaches, contradictions, and inefficiencies that 
made Soviet responses to the global era brittle, unsatisfying, and in the end, self-
defeating. 1053 
The successful authoritarian learning of the Russian authorities is most evident in 
the two fields where Soviet responses to the outside world were weakest: economics and 
cultural consumption. As political scientist Anni Kangas shows, despite its recent 
flirtation with autarkic rhetoric, Putin’s regime successfully combined a deep 
                                                          
1052 English, Russia and the Idea of the West.  
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commitment to economic nationalism with neoliberal reform by recasting the latter as the 
necessary foundation of state power in the modern age.1054 Similarly, Russian authorities 
were, until very recenly1055, generally uninterested in its citizens’ cultural consumption, 
reading habits, or travel patterns – thus resolutely taking such things out of the political 
arena. 
On the other hand, the Russian state, famously manned by many graduates of the 
KGB, has maintained an ideological commitment to Soviet era state-paranoid views of 
the global age, ideological commitments that are increasingly becoming the foundation of 
state action. Thus, as we have seen in Chapter Four, KGB-derived Russian elites 
resolutely considered the collapse of the Soviet Union via the prism of Soviet state 
paranoia. As Julie Fedor demonstrates, from the very dawn of the post-Soviet era, such 
readings of the past made the FSB view itself as the guardian of the purity and integrity 
of the Russian nation, leading charges against “sects” and now, increasingly, queer 
people, as vectors of foreign-derived ideological pollution.1056 Since the post-2012 
elections, Russian elites have repeatedly connected domestic opposition with Western 
plans to destabilize Russia, moved to restrict Western NGOs, brand civil society 
institutions in Russia as “Foreign Agents,”1057 and unsubtly connected effeminacy and 
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privilege associated with the “creative class” - all rhetorical ploys familiar (mutatis 
mutandis) to readers of this dissertation.  
  As was the case in the Soviet Union, such rhetoric is often accompanied by 
action. In recent years, a number of scholars, sometimes at the instigation of state-owned 
television, conducted profilaktika by compiling “stop-lists” of enemies of Russia.1058 
Anecdotal reports by tour guides indicate that in a manner unprecedented even in Soviet 
times, American tourists are facing at least some level of street harassment from locals 
unhappy about Russian-American relations.1059  
Finally, as in the wake of the Ukrainian conflicts, terms like “political 
technology,” “hybrid warfare” and “Putin’s army of trolls” became buzzwords of global 
discourse on Russia and the West.1060 Russian challenges to the Western-dominated 
global order and the central role of propaganda in providing backing to these challenges 
have yet again moved to the forefront of global politics.1061  And here, yet again, late 
Soviet practices prove rather illuminating. Seen from the early 21st century, the robotic 
utterances of Soviet tour guides that so often baffled and amused contemporaries seem 
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less and less like the last gasps of a dying ideology and more like a reminder of Russia’s 
seemingly unlimited capacity to generate epistemological defiance of the West.  
 While we would be foolhardy to propose that any single manifestation of 
illiberalism or hostility to the West is a product of irreducible Soviet (or even worse, 
primordial Russian) xenophobia, taken together they suggest that historiographical 
narratives of the late Soviet period are due for an update taking account of the realities of 
Putin’s Russia. Even as the Soviet opening up to the world promoted Westernization and 
undermined some of the ideological foundations of Soviet power, it also generated, 
within the bowels of Soviet institutions, a profound and honestly-held commitment to 
authoritarianism and social discipline as instruments of geopolitical resistance. This 
ambiguous response to the Soviet opening up to the world remains an underexplored 
aspect of the late Soviet experience – and the historical profession would do well to scour 
the period not only for harbingers of Soviet collapse, but also for the mental and 
institutional factors that helped so many Soviet institutional and mental habits to survive 
for so long after 199
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Verit Ha-Moʻatsot, 1941-1964. Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar le-toldot Yiśraʼel, 
2007.  
Andrew, Christopher M. The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the 
Secret History of the KGB.  New York: Basic Books, 1999.  
———. The World was Going our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World. 
New York: Basic Books, 2005.  
Barghoorn, Frederick Charles. The Soviet Cultural Offensive; the Role of Cultural 
Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 
1960.  
Baldwin, Kate A. Beyond the Color Line and the Iron Curtain: Reading Encounters 
between Red and Black, 1922-1963, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002). 
Bagdasarian, V. E. and A. A. Fedulin. Sovetskoe zazerkalʹe: Inostrannyi turizm v SSSR v 
1930-1980-e Gody. Moscow: Forum, 2007.  
  
   
 
  368 
 
 
 
Belenʹkaia, Liliia and Boris Zinger. Naperekor: Evreiskoe natsionalʹnoe dvizhenie v SSSR 
i ego ideologiia, 1945-1976 gg. Minsk: MET, 2004.  
Barker, Rodney. Dancing with the Devil: Sex, Espionage, and the U.S. Marines: The 
Clayton Lonetree Story. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.  
Bassow, Whitman. The Moscow Correspondents: Reporting on Russia from the 
Revolution to Glasnost. 1st ed. New York: W. Morrow, 1988.  
Beckerman, Gal. When they Come for Us, we’ll be Gone: The Epic Struggle to Save 
Soviet Jewry. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2010.  
Bittner, Stephen V. "A Negentropic Society? Wartime and Postwar Soviet History." 
Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 14, no. 3 (2013): 599-619.  
Boel, Brent. "Bible Smuggling and Human Rights in the Cold War." In Transnational 
Anti-Communism and the Cold War: Agents, Activities and Networks, edited by Luc 
Van Dongen and Stephanie Rouline, 263-275. London: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2014.  
Borenstein, Eliot. Overkill: Sex and Violence in Contemporary Russian Popular Culture. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008.  
Borman, Stu. "Chemistry Spy Story." Chemical and Engineering News 91, no. 7 (2013): 
47-49.  
Brown, Clarence. "Introduction." In Hope Against Hope: A Memoir. Translated by Max 
Hayward. New York: Modern Library, 1999.  
Brown, Kate. "Gridded Lives: Why Kazakhstan and Montana are nearly the Same Place." 
The American Historical Review 106, no. 1 (2001): 17-48.  
Bruner, Edward M. "Abraham Lincoln as Authentic Reproduction: A Critique of 
Postmodernism." American Anthropologist 96, no. 2 (1994): 397-415.  
———. "Tourism in Ghana: The Representation of Slavery and the Return of the Black 
Diaspora." American Anthropologist 98, no. 2 (1996): 290-304.  
Bullough, Oliver. The Last Man in Russia: The Struggle to Save a Dying Nation. New 
York: Basic Books, a member of Perseus Books Group, 2013.  
Cabezas, Amalia L. Economies of Desire: Sex and Tourism in Cuba and the Dominican 
Republic. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2009.  
  
   
 
  369 
 
 
 
Caro, Robert A. The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Passage of Power. New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 2012.  
Caute, David. The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold 
War. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.  
Ceplair, Larry. Anti-Communism in Twentieth-Century America: A Critical History. 
Westport: Praeger, 2011.  
Chandler, Andrea M. Institutions of Isolation: Border Controls in the Soviet Union and 
its Successor States, 1917-1993. Montreal; Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University 
Press, 1998.  
Chalidze, Valerii. Inostranets v SSSR. Iuridicheskaia pamiatka. Benson, VT: Chalidze 
Publications, 1980. 
Chernyshova, Natalya. Soviet Consumer Culture in the Brezhnev Era. New York: 
Routledge, 2013.  
Cull, Nicholas John. The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American 
Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008.  
Danyliuk, Iu. Z. Opozytsiia v Ukraïni: Druha polovyna 50-Kh-80-ti tr. XX st. Kyiv: 
Ridnyi krai, 2000.  
David-Fox, Michael. Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and 
Western Visitors to Soviet Union, 1921-1941. Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012.  
Dawasha, Karen. Putin’s Cleptocracy: Who Rules Russia. New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2015. 
De Grazia, Victoria. Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century 
Europe. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005.  
Dobson, Miriam. Khrushchev's Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of 
Reform after Stalin. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009.  
Duhamel, Luc. The KGB Campaign against Corruption in Moscow 1982-1987. 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010.  
Eisen, Wendy. Count Us in: The Struggle to Free Soviet Jews. A Canadian Perspective. 
Toronto, Ont., Canada; Vancouver, B.C: Burgher Books, 1995.  
  
   
 
  370 
 
 
 
Endy, Christopher. Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2004. 
Engerman, David C. Know Your Enemy the Rise and Fall of America's Soviet Experts. 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Erlacher, Trevor. "Denationalizing Treachery: The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the 
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Late Soviet Discourse, 1945–85." Region: 
Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia 2, no. 2 (2013): 289-
316.  
Etkind, E. G. Protsess Iosifa Brodskogo. London: Overseas Publications Interchange, 
1988.  
Fainberg, Dina and Artemy M. Kalinovsky. Reconsidering Stagnation in the Brezhnev 
Era: Ideology and Exchange. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016.  
Fedor, Julie. "Chekists Look Back on the Cold War: The Polemical Literature." 
Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 6 (2011): 842-863.  
———. Russia and the Cult of State Security: The Chekist Tradition, from Lenin to 
Putin. New York: Routledge, 2011.  
Feltshinskii, I. M. "Ian Rokotov." Volia: Zhurnal uznikov totalitarnykh system, 1(1993): 
54-56.  
Ferziger, Adam S. "“Outside the Shul”: The American Soviet Jewry Movement and the 
Rise of Solidarity Orthodoxy, 1964–1986." Religion and American Culture: A 
Journal of Interpretation 22, no. 1 (2012): 83-130.  
Fiedler, Anke and Michael Meyen. "The Steering of the Press in the Socialist States of 
Eastern Europe: The German Democratic Republic (GDR) as a Case Study." Cold 
War History 15, no. 4 (10/02, 2015): 449-470.  
Finn, Peter and Petra Couvée. The Zhivago Affair: The Kremlin, the CIA, and the Battle 
Over a Forbidden Book. New York: Prometheus Books, 2014.  
Fitzpatrick, Sheila. "Ascribing Class: The Construction of Social Identity in Soviet 
Russia." The Journal of Modern History 65, no. 4 (1993): 745-770.  
———. "Social Parasites: How Tramps, Idle Youth, and Busy Entrepreneurs Impeded 
the Soviet March to Communism." Cahiers Du Monde Russe 47, no. 1 (2006): 377-
408.  
  
   
 
  371 
 
 
 
Friedman, Thomas L. The World is Flat: a Brief History of the 21st Century. New York, 
NY: Basic Books, 2005.  
———. The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006. 
Fursenko, A. A. and Timothy J. Naftali. Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an 
American Adversary. New York: Norton, 2006.  
Fuerst, Juliane. Stalin's Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of 
Mature Socialism Oxford University Press, 2010.  
Gessen, Masha. The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin. New 
York: Riverhead Books, 2012.  
Gilburd, Eleonory. "The Revival of Soviet Internationalism in the Mid to Late 1950s." In 
the Thaw: Soviet Society and Culture during the 1950s and 1960s, edited by Denis 
Kozlov and Eleonory Gilburd, 362-401. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012.  
Gorsuch, Anne E. All this is Your World: Soviet Tourism at Home and Abroad after 
Stalin. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.  
Govrin, Yosef. Yaḥase Yisra'El Berit-Ha-Moʻatsot: me-Et ḥidusham bi-shenat 1953 ʻad 
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Universiṭah ha-ʻIvrit, 1990.  
Graeber, Andreas. "Monolithic Intentionality, Belonging and the Production of State 
Paranoia: A View Through the Stasi Onto the Late GDR." In Off Stage/On Display: 
Intimacies and Ethnographies in the Age of Public Culture, edited by Andrew 
Shyrock, 244-277. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004.  
Gregory, Paul and Mark Harrison. "Allocation under Dictatorship: Research in Stalin's 
Archives." Journal of Economic Literature 43, no. 3 (Sep 2005, 2005): 721-761.  
Grekul, Lisa. Leaving Shadows: Literature in English by Canada's Ukrainians. 
Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2005.  
Guillory, Sean. "Culture Clash in the Socialist Paradise: Soviet Patronage and African 
Students' Urbanity in the Soviet Union." Diplomatic History 38, no. 2 (2014, 271-
281. 
Hagenloh, Paul. Stalin's Police: Public Order and Mass Repression in the USSR, 1926-
1941. Washington, D.C.; Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2009.  
  
   
 
  372 
 
 
 
Harrison, Mark. "Accounting for Secrets." The Journal of Economic History 73, no. 04 
(2013): 1017-1049.  
Harrison, Mark. One Day we will Live without Fear: Everyday Lives Under the Soviet 
Police State. Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 2016.  
Harrison, Andrew. Passover Revisited: Philadelphia's Efforts to Aid Soviet Jews, 1963-
1998. Madison NJ; Cranbury, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press; London; 
Associated University Presses, 2001.  
Harrison, David. Tourism and the Less Developed Countries. London; New York: 
Belhaven Press, 1992.  
Haslam, Jonathan. Near and Distant Neighbors: A New History of Soviet Intelligence. 
First edition. ed. 2015.  
Hazbun, Wale. Beaches, Ruins, Resorts: The Politics of Tourism in the Arab World. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008.  
Hessler, Julie. "Death of an African Student in Moscow." Cahiers Du Monde Russe 
(/01/2006, 06): 33; 33-64; 64.  
Heydenmann, Steven and Reinoud Leenders, “Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian 
Resilience: Regime Responses to the ‘Arab Awakening’.” Globalizations 8, no. 
5(2011): 647-653. 
Hill, Kent Richmond, The Soviet Union on the Brink: An Inside Look at Christianity & 
Glasnost. Portland, OR: Multnomah, 1991.  
Hixson, Walter L. Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-
1961.  New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.  
Hoffman, David. The Billion Dollar Spy: A True Story of Cold War Espionage and 
Betrayal 2015.  
Hoffman, David. The Oligarchs: Power and Wealth in the New Russia. New York: 
Public Affairs, 2002. 
Hollander, Paul. Intellectual Pilgrims: Western Intellectuals in Search of the Good 
Society. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998. 
Högselius, Per. Red Gas: Russia and the Origins of European Energy Dependence. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.  
  
   
 
  373 
 
 
 
Holquist, Peter. ""Information is the Alpha and Omega of our Work": Bolshevik 
Surveillance in its Pan-European Context." The Journal of Modern History 69, no. 3 
(1997): 415-450.  
Hornsby, Rob. Protest, Reform and Repression in Khrushchev's Soviet Union. 
Cambridge, U.K. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.  
Hutchings, Raymond. Soviet Secrecy and Non-Secrecy. Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble, 
1988.  
Ilic, Melanie and Jeremy Smith. Khrushchev in the Kremlin: Policy and Government in 
the Soviet Union, 1953-1964. London; New York, NY: Routledge, 2011.  
———. Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev. London; New York: 
Routledge, 2009. 
Iakovlev, N. N. 1 Avgusta 1914. Moscow: Moskvitianin, 1993.  
Irvin, Sam. Kay Thompson: From Funny Face to Eloise. New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2010.  
Jaakson, Reiner. "Tourism in Transition in Post-Soviet Estonia." Annals of Tourism 
Research 23, no. 3 (7, 1996): 617-634.  
Johnston, Rob. Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic 
Study. Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005.  
Jong, Ben de, “The KGB View of the West: Conspiracies and Agents of Influence,” in 
The Future a Memory: The Cold War and Intillegence Services edity by Heiner 
Timmerman, 77-96, Berlin: Lit. Verlag Dr. W. Hopf, 2013.  
Kangas, Anni. “Market Civilization Meets Economic Nationalism: the Discourse of 
Nation in Russia's Modernization.” Nations and Nationalism 19, no. 3(2008): 572-
591. 
Kas’ianov, H. V. Nezhodni: Ukrains’ka intelihentsiia v rusi oporu 1960-80-Kh rokiv. 
Kyiv: "Lybid’", 1995.  
Kelly, Catriona. St. Petersburg: Shadows of the Past. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2014. 
Kevorkov, V. General Boiarov. Moscow: Sovershenno sekretno, 2003.  
———. Viktor Lui: chelovek s legendoi. Moscow: Sem’ dnei, 2010.  
  
   
 
  374 
 
 
 
Khanin, Vladimir (Ze’v).  Shestidnevnaia Voina i Evreiskoe dvizhenie v SSSR. 
Akademicheskaia Seriia; Variation: Moscow: Sefer, 2008.  
Khotchenkov, Iu.M. Prostitutsiia i prestupnost’: Problemy, diskussii, predlozheniia. 
Moscow: IUrid. lit-ra, 1991.  
Kharkhordin, Oleg. The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices. 
Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1999.  
Kirasirova, Masha. "“Sons of Muslims” in Moscow: Soviet Central Asian Mediators to 
the Foreign East, 1955–1962."  Ab Imperio 4, (2011): 106-132.  
Koivunen, Pia. "The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival: Propagating a New, Peaceful Image 
of the Soviet Union." In Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev, edited by 
Mellanie Ilic and Jeremy Smith, 46-65.  London: Routledge, 2009. 
Kon, I. S. Seksual’naia kul’tura v Rossii: Klubnichka na Berezke. Moscow: O.G.I, 1997.  
Konstantinov, Andrei and Igor’ Shusharin. Banditskii Peterburg: dokumental’nye 
ocherki. Saint Petersrubg: Neva, 2004.  
Kostyrchenko, G.V Plenu u krasnogo Faraona : politicheskie presledovanii︠ a︡  Evreev v 
SSSR v poslednee Stalinskoe desi︠ a︡ tiletie.  Dokumental'noe issledovanie. Moscow: 
"Mezhdunar. otnoshenii︠ a︡", 1994.  
Kostyrchenko, G.V. Tainaia Politika Khrushchëva : Vlast’, intelligentsiia, Evreiskii 
vopros. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2012.  
Korey, William. Russian Antisemitism, Pamyat, and the Demonology of Zionism. Chur, 
Switzerland: Harwood Acad. Publishers, 1995.  
Kornai, János. The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism. Oxford : 
Clarendon Press ; Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press.  
Kostianen, Auvo. "The Vodka Trail: Finnish Travelers’ Motivation to Visit the Former 
Soviet Union." In Travel Patterns: Past and Present, edited by Timo Toivonen and 
Janne Ahtola, 33-48. Savonlinna: University of Joensuu, 1999.  
Kotkin, Stephen. “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics” Foreign Affairs 96, no.3(2016): 2-9. 
———. “Mongol Commonwealth? Exchange and Governance across the Post-Mongol 
Space”. Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 8, no.3 (2007): 487-
531. 
  
   
 
  375 
 
 
 
——— .“Modern Times: The Soviet Union and the Interwar Conjuncture”. Kritika: 
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 2.No. 1(2001), 111-164.  
Kotsonis, Yanni. States of Obligation : Taxes and Citizenship in the Russian Empire and 
Early Soviet Republic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014.  
Kozovoi, Andrei.  "Dissonant Voices: Soviet Youth Mobilization and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis." Journal of Cold War Studies 16, no. 3 (2014): 29; 29-29; 29.  
———. "The Way to a Man's Heart: How the Soviet Travel Agency Sputnik Struggled to 
Feed Western Tourists." Journal of Tourism History 6, no. 1 (2014):  57-73.  
Kupferberg, Herbert. The Raised Curtain: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task 
Force on Soviet-American Scholarly and Cultural Exchanges. New York: Twentieth 
Century Fund, 1977. 
Krylova, Anna. "The Tenacious Liberal Subject in Soviet Studies." Kritika: Explorations 
in Russian and Eurasian History 1, no. 1 (2000): 119-146.  
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia: Defining, Policing, and Producing 
Deviance during the Thaw. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012.  
Laruelle, Marlene. "The Iuzhinskii Circle: Far-Right Metaphysics in the Soviet 
Underground and its Legacy Today." The Russian Review 74, no. 4 (2015): 563-580.  
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